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 Sport and the Social 
Signiﬁ cance of Pleasure 
 This innovative text’s critical examination foregrounds the prime reason 
why so many people participate in or watch sport—pleasure. Although there 
has been a “turn” to emotions and affect within academia over the last two 
decades, it is somewhat remiss that pleasure, as an integral aspect of human 
life, has not received greater attention from sociologists of sport, exercise 
and physical education. This book addresses this issue with an unabashed 
examination of sport and the moving body via a “pleasure lens.” It pro-
vides new insights about the production of various identities, power relations 
and social issues, and the dialectical links between the socio-cultural and the 
body. Taking a wide-sweeping view of pleasure—digniﬁ ed and debauched, 
distinguished and mundane—it examines topics as diverse as aging, health, 
fandom, running, extreme sports, biopolitics, consumerism, feminism, sex 
and sexuality. In drawing from diverse theoretical approaches and original 
empirical research, the text reveals the social and political signiﬁ cance of plea-
sure and provides a more rounded, dynamic and sensual account of sport. 
 Richard Pringle is an Associate Professor in the School of Curriculum and 
Pedagogy in the Faculty of Education at the University of Auckland. 
 Robert E. Rinehart is Associate Professor in Sport and Leisure Studies at the 
University of Waikato. 
 Jayne Caudwell is Reader in Sport, Gender and Sexualities at the University 
of Brighton. 
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 1  Proem 
 Sport and the Social Signiﬁ cance 
of Pleasure 
 Richard Pringle, Robert E. Rinehart 
and Jayne Caudwell 
 This is a book about sporting pleasures. It is not a text on how to maxi-
mize experiences of pleasure in sport settings, but a critical socio-cultural 
examination of the signiﬁ cance of pleasure in the constitution of the sport-
ing world, identities and sets of relations of power. The multiple pleasures 
derived from sport are productive in constituting subjectivities, social 
belongings, nationalistic fervor and, for some, even reasons for living. How-
ever, the examination of sport pleasure has not been a central topic of exam-
ination within sport sociology. Given that sport centers on embodied action 
and the pursuit of excitement, Joseph Maguire (1992) noted it is strange 
that pleasure, as an integral aspect of human life, has not received greater 
attention from sociologists of sport. 
 Within this text we, accordingly, aim to examine the social signiﬁ cance of 
sport pleasures and promote it as a topic worthy of extensive consideration. 
Through this examination of sporting pleasures we reveal the importance of 
pleasure in human lives, and how pleasure is integral to prime sociological 
issues such as identity formations, power relations and social transforma-
tion. In this manner, we gain greater understanding not only of sport, but 
also of contemporary cultures, humans and social issues. 
 We view sporting pleasures as productive or constitutive in many of the 
same ways that Foucault (1990) viewed the workings of power. Foucault 
did not view power as primarily coercive, but as the inspirational force that 
underpinned the production of actions, relations, identities and ways of liv-
ing. Power and pleasure, in this respect, can be understood as discursive, 
enacted and embodied. We, correspondingly, signal our linkages to post-
structural and postmodern theorizing, but stress that we examine pleasure 
through multiple theoretical and methodological approaches throughout 
the text. 
 Our interest in examining pleasure arose in part from our recogni-
tion that the sociological study of sport had been predominantly focused 
on issues and problems, such as the critical excavation of racism, sexism, 
nationalism, violence and homophobia. We applaud such examinations, 
yet also recognize that humans primarily play or watch sport in pursuit of 
pleasure. Our concern was not simply that sporting pleasures have been 
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typically marginalized as a topic of examination, but that they have not 
been widely understood as playing an important role in constituting sport-
ing contexts, politics and identities. As critical sociologists with a desire 
to transform rather than just know the social world, it became apparent 
to us that it is also important to examine how sporting pleasures are con-
nected to the development and maintenance of various sporting problems. 
We tentatively suggest, as examples, that the sexualization of sportswomen 
in the media is likely produced in relation to the instrumental pleasures 
of objectiﬁ cation and voyeurism (see Chapter 5), that the tight restrictions 
associated with performing gender and sexuality in sport are linked to the 
rewards of social acceptance and normalization (see Chapter 9) and that the 
risk of sporting pain and injury is negotiated in relation to the potential of 
experiencing a diverse array of pleasures (e.g. the rush of BASE jumping, the 
production of a comforting sense of self via continued sport participation, 
the friendship of teammates, the stoke of surﬁ ng, the joy of burning muscles 
after a workout or the freedom of thought that the banality and aesthetics 
of jogging can produce). Each of these forms of sporting pleasure, given 
the social dynamics that they constitute and are constituted by, deserves 
in-depth examination. 
 Within the last two decades there has been what some have called a turn 
to emotion and affect within academia. This turn has spurred the develop-
ment of new ﬁ elds of study (e.g. hedonic psychology, happiness studies), 
theorizing (e.g. affect theories, life satisfaction theories, the concept of 
subjective wellbeing) and political actions. The United Nations (UN) has 
recently adopted, as an example, a resolution for all member states to give 
greater consideration to happiness in their economic and social develop-
ment policies. In relation to this resolution, the UN proclaimed March 20 
the International Day of Happiness with the aim that this day will be 
observed in an appropriate manner, via education and public awareness-
raising activities, to promote happiness, wellbeing, poverty eradication and 
sustainable development. 
 Although the topics of pleasure and happiness are currently receiving 
increased attention within academia (including sport studies), these topics 
have been of interest to a diverse range of distinguished scholars, religious 
leaders and politicians for centuries. Aristotle, Jeremy Bentham, Sigmund 
Freud and the Dalai Lama, as diverse examples, all agreed that the attain-
ment of happiness was the prime goal and purpose of life. Thomas Jefferson 
justiﬁ ed the need for government, in part, by his belief that the pursuit of 
happiness is an inalienable right. Transnational corporations are also well 
aware of the marketing importance of pleasure and happiness. The Coca-
Cola Company has long striven to connect the consumption of their prod-
ucts with the apparent pleasures of youthful, active, athletic bodies that 
are (perhaps ironically) toned, thin and ﬁ t. The company’s recent global 
marketing campaign simply advises consumers that they can ‘open happi-
ness’. In neoliberal times, happiness and pleasure are states of mind that can 
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seemingly be purchased. Indeed, consumers are routinely ‘informed’ that 
their lives will be better, happier and more pleasurable if they drink a certain 
beer, drive a particular car, join a gym, lose weight, have whiter/straighter 
teeth or support the (men’s) national or regional sporting team. Yet if we 
fail in our pursuit of pleasure we are still told ‘don’t worry, be happy’. The 
ubiquitous happy face ‘ſ’ now populates the ends of text messages and 
emails. Happiness, as such, has become an imperative for (post)modern life 
and irrespective of our inner state of mind, there is increased pressure on 
people to at least appear happy. Despite such moral imperatives, ofﬁ cial 
rates of depression have grown in recent years. 
 Although there is much agreement that humans strive for happiness and 
are motivated by pleasures, there is also considerable debate about how 
to achieve these emotional/affective states. Socrates, for example, argued 
for the higher pleasures of the intellect, whereas the Cyrenaics (an ultra-
hedonist Greek school of philosophy) countered by asserting that bodily 
pleasures, being easier to attain and more vivid, were superior (Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013). The Cyrenaics even encouraged ‘living 
for the moment’ rather than worrying about the future and, thus, advocated 
the pursuit of whatever caused the greatest pleasure now. Needless to say, 
this crude form of hedonism that countered mainstream Greek ethics did 
not have a long existence, yet it can be considered as a precursor to Epi-
cureanism, which has had more lasting impact. Indeed, many notable ﬁ g-
ures have identiﬁ ed with Epicureanism, including Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy 
Bentham, Christopher Hitchens and French philosopher Michel Onfray. 
 Regardless of these lifestyle/pleasure debates there appears a widespread, 
but typically unquestioned, agreement that playing sport is an important 
activity that can produce pleasure and create social and physical beneﬁ ts. 
Indeed, many parents/guardians encourage their children to play sport due 
to these beliefs. Yet, somewhat erroneously, the ﬁ rst question they often ask 
their children upon returning from sport is ‘did you win?’ as opposed to ‘did 
you have fun?’, thus emphasizing the beneﬁ ts of competition rather than the 
potential joys of movement. Many governments (e.g. England, Scotland, 
New Zealand, Australia, Canada) now also promote sport participation as 
a biopolitical strategy to allegedly enhance their population’s level of well-
being and happiness (see Chapter 10). Sport Scotland, for example, primar-
ily aims to help more people  enjoy the beneﬁ ts of sport. 
 Whether or not playing sport is a prudent strategy for attaining plea-
sure and happiness, we acknowledge that scholars of sport and physical 
education—such as biomechanists, exercise physiologists or sociologists—
have all been typically seduced by the pleasures of sport at some stage within 
their life trajectories. These pleasures have subsequently shaped their iden-
tities, lifestyles, educational and career pathways. Douglas Booth (2009: 
133) even contended that pleasure can be understood ‘as a potential pillar 
of disciplinary coherence in physical education’, as sporting pleasures act as 
a glue to connect interdisciplinary scholars of disparate beliefs. 
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 Some critical sociologists of sport also appear to be sport fans. At a rela-
tively recent conference for the North American Society for the Sociology of 
Sport (NASSS) it was announced that a professional ice hockey match was 
being played that evening and if anybody wanted to attend that transport 
was being arranged. A palpable buzz subsequently circulated among some 
of the delegates. Yet this announcement seemed somewhat out of place, 
as the day’s program of papers had overwhelmingly revolved around densely 
theorized critiques of sport. Concerns, for example, had been raised about 
the connections between violence on and off the ﬁ eld of play, various prob-
lems within National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA), inequitable 
gendered relations of power and even the need for greater political activ-
ism among sport sociologists. Hence, the encouragement to attend a ‘men’s 
only’ professional ice hockey match, no doubt replete with acts of violence, 
seemed to be in opposition to the underpinning politics of the conference 
program. We do recognize, however, that one can be a social critic of sport 
but still enjoy participating in or watching it. George Sage (1990), para-
phrasing US Senator J. William Fulbright, even argued that he was critical of 
sport because he cared for and wanted to improve it. Sage accordingly por-
trayed critical analyses of sport as acts of redemption in the service of sport. 
 The writing of this text would not likely have eventuated if it were not for 
our own formative experiences of sporting pleasure. Richard acknowledges 
that it was his identity-afﬁ rming experiences on the rugby ﬁ eld as a ten 
year-old, in his red colored jersey for Tahunanui School, that eventually led 
him to study physical education at university. Although now a stern critic 
of rugby, he still gains pleasure (and pain) on the tennis court. Robert swam 
competitively from age six, broke his collarbone twice playing ‘pick-up’ 
football with his brothers’ friends, loved the aggression, the joy of physical 
contact and tackling, and yet ended up concentrating on swimming and 
more solitary pursuits, like training for (running) marathons. Jayne has a 
long-term, often intense and troublesome, love affair with numerous forms 
of physical activity. Over many years, she struggled to disengage from the 
competitive nature of human movement and now ﬁ nds solace in the non-
serious and playful aspects of sport. 
 EXPLAINING HOW WE WROTE THE BOOK OF PLEASURE 
 Despite growing up and living most of our lives in different parts of the 
world (Jayne in England, Richard in Aotearoa New Zealand and Robert in 
California), we developed similar research interests, approaches and axiolo-
gies. Although our topics of examination were different, we all drew from 
qualitative research methods, adopted postmodern and/or poststructural 
sensibilities and had an interest in critical analyses of sport that we hoped 
would challenge injustices and inequities. It was somewhat serendipitous, 
therefore, that in 2010, when Jayne was on leave from the University of 
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Brighton, we found ourselves living in close proximity to each other in Aote-
aroa New Zealand. Robert had recently begun work in Hamilton at the 
University of Waikato, Richard was based ‘up the road’ at the University 
of Auckland and Jayne was in Raglan, a town with a renowned left-hand 
surf break within a 30 minute drive of Hamilton. We subsequently had an 
opportune get together at a party held in Raglan, and eventually found our-
selves talking about the sociological signiﬁ cance of sporting pleasures. Not 
long after, we came to a general agreement to write this book. 
 Discussions concerning the writing of this text took place at each other’s 
places of residence, in various cafes, at conferences and via Skype. Within 
the initial meetings we debated, among other factors, whether we wanted 
to produce a text akin to a handbook of the sociology of sporting pleasure 
(with various chapters exploring topics such as sporting pleasures and the 
media, politics, gender and identity formation) or a text that better repre-
sented the ‘feel’ and malleable nature of pleasures. Inspired by Susan Bordo 
(1999: 29), who claimed that ‘cultural interpretation is an ongoing, always 
incomplete process, and no one gets the ﬁ nal word’, we opted for the latter 
style, and subsequently developed a text that reﬂ ected the somewhat chaotic 
and, at times, contradictory nature of pleasure. As authors, we had noted, 
for example, how we had each gained differing sporting pleasures in pur-
suits that were often painful or repetitive, from running marathons (Jayne), 
playing rugby (Richard) or staring at the bottom of the pool in swimming 
lap after lap (Robert). 
 We also discussed whether the book should be underpinned by one or 
multiple theoretical approaches. At ﬁ rst we thought there would be greater 
coherence within the text if one theoretical approach dominated. Yet we 
eventually decided that there was value in examining pleasure from mul-
tiple perspectives. We accordingly drew on diverse theories, concepts and 
research approaches to examine and reveal the multifaceted, varied and 
changing nature of sporting pleasures. We also drew from differing disci-
plines (e.g. philosophy, history, psychology and even biology) yet our prime 
interests remain grounded in sociology and cultural studies. 
 We also debated whether to present the chapters as co- or individually 
authored. Given that our understandings of pleasure had been shaped by 
our differing lived experiences and theoretical lenses, and that we each have 
different writing styles, we agreed to write the chapters as individuals. We 
did, however, carefully read, discuss and debate each other’s chapters and, 
at times, ideas/paragraphs or sections were swapped into other chapters. In 
this respect, the various chapters reﬂ ect a combined effort, but we decided 
to state that the chapters were ‘primarily’ written individually. With reﬂ ec-
tion, we agree that our different interests, writing styles, philosophies and 
theoretical underpinnings have helped produce a rich, diverse and, hope-
fully, pleasurable text. 
 Our examination of pleasure, as such, might seem ‘messy’, yet we believe 
that this is an apt representational style given that we were examining an 
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intangible, often ephemeral feeling that is often taken for granted and dif-
ﬁ cult to deﬁ ne, but is of considerable social signiﬁ cance. We use the word 
messy in relation to John Law’s (2004) ideas on messiness in social sci-
ence research. He argued that social science researchers have developed 
robust ways of examining some relatively ‘stable realities’ (p. 2), such as 
income distributions and terms of trade, yet the traditional methods have 
not worked well to capture the realities of more slippery phenomena such as 
‘pains and pleasures, hopes and horrors, intuitions and apprehensions, losses 
and redemptions, mundanities and visions . . . things that slip and slide, or 
appear or disappear, change shape or don’t have much form at all . . .’ (p. 2). 
Pleasure is clearly one of these slippery phenomena, as last night’s ‘pleasure’ 
can be this morning’s ‘horror’. Law argues that when social scientists try 
to simplify the realities of messy phenomena they make more of a mess, as 
they oversimplify and do not capture the ﬂ uid complexities. He accordingly 
advocates methods that do not provide tidy conclusions or single answers 
and encourages greater methodological variety, the blurring of disciplinary 
boundaries and innovative ways of knowing, such as forms of knowing via 
embodiment, ‘private’ emotions and poetics. Our text subsequently employs 
a variety of methods, the use of poetics and autoethnography, and boundary 
crossing in its examination of sport pleasures. A recognized advantage of a 
messy text is that it can work in an ethical and political manner to reﬂ ect 
‘diverse and potentially contradictory experiences—rather than reducing 
them to a singular Truth or voice’ (Avner et al., 2013: 2). 
 INTRODUCING THE TEXT 
 Our broad aim in co-writing this text, as already stated, was to reveal and 
promote the social signiﬁ cance of pleasure. Yet we also wanted to illustrate 
that by examining sporting issues via a focus on pleasure, one can gain a 
new way of looking at these issues. In other words, we wanted to show how 
a ‘pleasure’ lens could encourage ways of seeing things afresh. A pleasure 
lens in this sense could be understood as akin to a theoretical tool, as it can 
direct our attention and change our social and sociological imaginations 
(cf. Mills, 1959), allowing new insights and possibilities. 
 To achieve these broad aims we decided to examine the importance of 
sporting pleasures by linking them to an array of diverse topics. We explored 
the ubiquitous ability of pleasure to shape human lives by connecting the 
relevance of pleasure to topics as diverse as biopolitics and the governing 
of active citizens and sexuality pleasures within sporting contexts. We also 
illustrated the importance of lived experiences of pleasures, those that are 
perhaps the most tangible, by examining the pleasures of moving (running) 
and consuming mediated sport (watching the Olympics). We also compli-
cated the place of pleasure by examining topics that some might mistakenly 
believe have little connection to sporting pleasures: feminism and aging. 
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 In order to do justice to this diverse array of topics, the ﬁ rst section of 
the book introduces and examines the concept of pleasure. This is a concept 
that many feel needs no introduction, as people know ‘pleasure’ when they 
feel it or live it. Yet there is overlap, and at times confusion, between syn-
onyms such as pleasure, joy, fun, happiness, ecstasy, jouissance (cf. Barthes, 
1975) and satisfaction. This blurring of terms exists not only in the litera-
ture but also within people’s life trajectories, as Aristotle explained: a life of 
gratiﬁ cation and pleasure does not necessarily constitute a life of happiness, 
yet a happy life can be pleasant. 
 In  Chapter 2 , Robert delves deeper into the concept of pleasure by illus-
trating its complex and diverse nature and its dis/connections to hedonism, 
happiness, delight and even shame and guilt. He provocatively notes that 
pleasure requiring a detailed introduction ‘speaks volumes to our Western, 
hegemonic Judeo-Christian approach to the subject’. In other words, he 
argues that the inﬂ uence of religion in Western societies has contributed a 
sense of shame to select bodily pleasures (e.g. dance, sport, alcohol and sex) 
and that this shame is one reason why pleasure has been marginalized as 
scholarly topic of analysis. Robert subsequently contends that as pleasure 
can be regarded as a prime mover within human life, we should strive to 
make pleasure the default setting so that the quality of pleasure becomes a 
key focus of examination and the development of social policies. Robert 
concludes by drawing from Foucault to suggest that the prime task of the 
book is to prompt awareness of the social signiﬁ cance of pleasure by luring 
‘pleasure’ out into the open. 
 The introduction to the concept of pleasure continues in  Chapter 3 , with 
Richard providing a short history of the places of pleasure in Western cul-
tures and its tangential links to issues within contemporary sport. The inspi-
ration for the chapter was Huizinga’s (1970/1938) contention that play has 
been signiﬁ cant in the development of human civilizations. The chapter’s 
selective history correspondingly examines this contention by drawing from 
the writings of various scholars and traversing time from the Ancient Greeks 
(via the writings of Aristotle, Foucault and Nietzsche) to studies of the medi-
eval (Bakhtin), to the enlightenment (John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Mary 
Wollstonecraft) to, ﬁ nally, the 20th century, with help from Sigmund Freud 
and Herbert Marcuse. This historical sketch of pleasure allows insight into 
its somewhat amorphous nature, given it has been conceptualized as con-
stitutive and destructive, embodied and disembodied, natural and socially 
constructed, political and subjective, serious and insigniﬁ cant, and good and 
evil. Perhaps the prime lesson learned from this historical analysis is that 
although humans have long been concerned about pleasure and happiness, 
the civilizations they have constructed and their associated leisure pursuits, 
such as sport, have not necessarily solved the issue of how to attain pleasure 
and happiness. 
 The diverse characteristics of pleasure, as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 3, 
and the associated links between pleasure and the body (e.g. adrenaline rush, 
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goose-bumps, shivers of excitement), socio-cultural context and mindset 
provide a challenge with respect to how to theorize sporting pleasures. In 
 Chapter 4 Richard examines this by discussing the difﬁ culties and beneﬁ ts 
of interdisciplinary approaches with respect to the possibilities of producing 
a rapprochement between sociology and psychology and/or a more body-
aware sociology. The chapter then selectively examines theories of sporting 
pleasure that have been used within sociology (e.g. affect theories, body-
reﬂ exive practices, edge theory), biology (i.e. runners high) and psychol-
ogy (ﬂ ow theory). Richard illustrates that although there are advantages 
through studying sport pleasures ‘in the round’ (Elias and Dunning, 1986), 
interdisciplinary approaches are difﬁ cult to undertake in light of the prob-
lems of epistemological boundary crossings. He nevertheless concludes that 
there is value in theorizing and examining pleasure from multiple perspec-
tives and in reading across the disciplines. 
 Jayne extends discussion concerning theorizing in  Chapter 5 by illustrat-
ing that one productive way of examining sporting pleasures is via feminist 
theorizing, particularly in relation to the French feminists Hélène Cixous, 
Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. Feminist critiques of sport have become 
somewhat  de rigueur within the sociology of sport, yet a less ﬂ attering view 
of feminism pervades mainstream society where feminists are regarded, by 
some, as a ‘killjoys’ (e.g. see Sara Ahmed’s blog http://feministkilljoys.com). 
Yet sport feminism, in our view, is distinctly tied to pleasure/happiness, as 
it aims to enrich the lives of females through challenging unjust practices, 
policies (e.g. the IOC’s sex testing regime) and disrespectful representations 
and, of course, promoting equitable opportunities to enjoy sport participa-
tion. Within this chapter Jayne excavates the complex links between sport, 
pleasure, femininity, beauty, sex and sexuality. 
 Chapter 6 turns from feminist pleasures to examine the pleasures of aging 
bodies. There are times in life when most youth look forward to being older; 
aging at these times is equated with increased ability, responsibility and free-
dom. The desire of a 13 year-old basketballer to be 18 might equate with a 
yearning to be taller, increased ability to shoot three-pointers, to play in the 
‘seniors’ or to travel independently to games. Yet for most adults, perhaps 
more so for keen sport participants, the idea of aging into one’s 30s, 50s or 
even 90s, is not typically looked upon with relish. In this chapter, Robert’s 
literary approach uniquely explores differing worldviews on aging by draw-
ing from poetry to compare Western and Eastern (Japanese and Korean) 
philosophies toward the (dis)pleasures of aging. He contends that the mas-
culine ethos of the Western sporting world, which exempliﬁ es competition 
and a ﬁ ghting spirit, underpins attitudes towards the aging athletic body. 
Correspondingly, the aging body must ‘ﬁ ght the good ﬁ ght’ and not ‘go gen-
tly’ with respect to aging. His interpretations of select poems from the East, 
in contrast, reveal a more optimistic view of aging and an acceptance, even 
celebration, of imperfect bodies and the natural processes of getting older. 
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 The following three chapters provide more empirical studies of the plea-
sures associated with performing and consuming sport. In  Chapter 7 ,  Jayne 
co-opts scholarly literature, sporting narratives and her own experiences to 
provide a highly personal and moving account of the pleasures of running—
a form of autoethnography. She illustrates the socio-cultural connections 
between running, class, gender, sexuality and the disciplined pleasures of 
performance, measurement and efﬁ ciency. She then raises concern about 
these achievement-based pleasures and, in following Margaret Wetherell’s 
(2012: 75) recognition of the importance of providing more ‘dynamic, sen-
sual and lively accounts of social life’, vividly reveals running as an affec-
tual practice. Jayne’s aim, in part, is to blur the emotional and physical to 
emphasize the visceral, sensual, emotional and ludic aspects of running. 
 The exploration of affectual practices is continued in  Chapter 8  with a 
focus on the embodied pleasures of watching the Olympics. Critical stud-
ies of media representations of sport have tended to focus on discursive/
political messages rather than the affective/corporeal dimensions. Yet by 
bypassing these dimensions there is a risk that these critical studies produce 
limited insight for understanding how sport media productions garner such 
popularity. In this chapter, Richard introduces and undertakes an analysis 
of the role of affect associated with the production of viewing pleasures 
of the Olympics. He confesses that although he was highly critical of the 
expenditure and politics associated with the staging of the 2012 Olympics 
he nevertheless found himself to be an embodied fan. To explain this appar-
ent contradiction he draws on Brian Ott’s (2010) multi-modal analytical 
approach for examining cinematic rhetoric and analyzes two video clips of 
the London 2012 Olympics. The results reveal how the mediated techniques 
employed in broadcasting the Games can work to encourage uncritical cel-
ebrations of the Olympics and thus allow the Games to be staged with con-
tinued expense and little political protest. Richard concludes by discussing 
the importance of the politics of affect. 
 In  Chapter 9 , Jayne extends the analysis of the pleasures of being a sport 
fan through recognition that the majority of fandom studies have focused on 
so-called traditional fans, and traditional aspects—such as chanting, drink-
ing, group solidarity, hooliganism and issues of class and resistance, with a 
particular focus on white, heterosexual able-bodied males. Yet these studies 
have tended to omit ‘pleasure’, which is undoubtedly a central experience to 
being a fan. She reveals the signiﬁ cance and complexities of the pleasures of 
being a fan through an in-depth interview study with ‘Paula’, a fan of Nor-
wich City Football Club (UK) who self-identiﬁ es as transgender, transsexual 
and queer. Jayne provides an intriguing analysis that reveals how Paula ﬁ rst 
became a football fan, her experiences of transitioning and the resulting 
impact her new identity has had on her fandom. Although Paula experiences 
moments of discomfort in relation to the sexist, homophobic and racist cul-
tures that exist on the terraces, for the most part she experiences a freedom 
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from her identity when she vanishes or blends into the crowd and shares the 
same diverse emotional—almost uncontrollable—experiences of pleasure. 
Throughout this chapter the politics of pleasure, identities and sexualities 
are scrutinized. 
 In  Chapter 10 ,  Robert examines  Love + Guts , an art exhibition themed 
around skateboarding, with respect to the pleasures it affords to skaters, 
the viewing public and the artists. Drawing from Foucault, Baudrillard, 
Baumann, Benjamin and others, he introduces the theoretical framework 
that underpins his ‘snapshot ethnographic’ examination by discussing the 
links between aesthetics, hyper-reality, consumer life and the judgment of 
tastes. Robert’s subsequent examination of the artworks reveals, in part, the 
tensions between skateboarding and art and an art show that is seemingly 
anti-establishment but is sponsored by Oakley sunglasses. His analysis of 
the three prime motifs that dominate the exhibition (skateboarding nos-
talgia, pain and suffering, and the absence and place of girls and women) 
reveals that the potential of the aesthetic to trump the culture of skateboard-
ing fails. He concludes that the skateboarding artworks provide a pedagogy 
of the hyper-masculine. 
 In  Chapter 11 ,  Robert examines the pleasure or, more aptly, displeasure 
effects of extreme or thrill sports. He links the neoliberal turn, the sub-
sequent commodiﬁ cation of alternative sports and the ﬂ attening of affect 
to suggest that the extreme sport participant, as akin to the workings of 
capitalism, is never completely satisﬁ ed. He provocatively argues that 
extreme sport participants live a paradoxical life in that they experience a 
vague sense of inability to experience pleasure yet are still urged to experi-
ence intense forms of pleasure, seize the moment and push the envelope. 
Robert concludes that this contemporary pleasure paradox is difﬁ cult to 
escape from. 
 In  Chapter 12 , we turn from pleasure shaped by commerce to pleasure as 
regulated via the state in Richard’s exploration of the connections between 
sport participation, subjective wellbeing and governmentality. He notes that 
Western governments have realized the signiﬁ cance of a population’s level of 
happiness and have begun designing social policy for the associated biopo-
litical management of citizens. This shift in policy, he suggests, is now shap-
ing the aims of national sporting organizations. The global encouragement 
of mass participation in sport has correspondingly become an important 
public policy issue, with claims that sport participation can enhance public 
health, reduce anxiety and depression and enhance a population’s sense of 
wellbeing and levels of happiness. But Richard questions whether the pro-
motion of sport participation can really achieve such aims. In following 
Valerie Harwood (2008), who encouraged critical exploration of how truths 
and knowledges about the body and life are circulated via techniques of 
biopower, he questions why sport is prioritized as a governance strategy to 
promote wellbeing and happiness. Through reviewing the limited literature 
that has speciﬁ cally examined the connections between sport (not exercise) 
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and subjective wellbeing, he argues that governmental attempts to enhance 
a population’s wellbeing via promotion of sport are currently unfounded, 
potentially futile and, at worst, problematic. Richard concludes by discuss-
ing more prudent public policy strategies that can be employed to enhance 
a population’s state of happiness. 
 As might be expected of a ‘messy’ text (see Law, 2004) we eschew the 
opportunity to provide a tidy conclusion or a set of deﬁ nitive last words 
but hope that the text works as an ‘opening rather than a closing’ (Law, 
2004: 2). 
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 What is this thing—or rather, are these things—we call ‘pleasure’? Is it 
whimsy, as Katie Gosset (2014) posits about The Inconvenience Store in 
Christchurch, Aotearoa New Zealand? In this store, according to one of 
the rotating shop keepers, ‘you can’t buy [items] with money, we only want 
your time . . . the catch is that you have to spend the whole time in the 
shop, while it is being made for you. . . .’ The very idea of ‘inconvenience’ 
creates a  frisson with normative Western capitalistic expectations of shops. 
It is ‘part shop, part art installation, part joke, and part ﬂ ight of fancy’. It 
is a contemporary ‘pleasure’ project, meant for an earthquake-traumatized 
Christchurch. But through it, according to the Inconvenience Store’s ‘cre-
ator’, Ryan Reynolds, runs not simply whimsy, but also perhaps social com-
mentary: ‘[it can be] a kind of comment on our fast pace of contemporary 
life, to be able to walk into a shop and buy and often without thinking 
about how it’s made, where it’s come from. . . .’ 
 Outside-of-the-box thinking, creative processes, spontaneity—these are 
some of the components of what makes The Inconvenience Store pleasur-
able. These kinds of surprises also grant some insight in to how sportspeople 
‘pleasure’ themselves through their own and others’ physical movement. 
 It is clear that the allure of pleasure itself runs a broad spectrum, mean-
dering from the satisfaction of a job well done to physical release within a 
sport action; from the pleasure of the company of good mates simultane-
ously accomplishing a team sport task to a surfer’s sublime, tacit recognition 
of the vastness of the sea, the horizon, the sunrise; from sharing dangerous 
(or aesthetic) experiences to a dazzled, deep engagement with a ‘beautiful’ 
work of art (as seen in the aesthetic appeal of human form and accom-
plished movement). And just as surely, pleasure is a multifaceted, complex 
construct, rarely appearing (even in sport!) by itself. Oftentimes, ‘pleasure’ 
is mixed with other affects—it is mitigated by competing feelings—and the 
combination can at once be overwhelming and powerful. 
 ‘Pleasure’, then, can take place within many realms: emotional, intellectual, 
visceral, social, physical—the list goes on. Pleasure itself is a very complex set 
of overlapping ideas about what it means to enjoy aspects of life. As with ‘deﬁ ni-
tions’ of play (or games or sport), attempts at deﬁ ning pleasure—at describing 
each instance of it in sport—are problematic. To attempt to pin down what 
6244-599d-1pass-002-r01.indd   12 4/3/2015   12:34:44 PM
Pleasures Small and Large 13
‘pleasure’ constitutes is like having a debate about who was the best boxer, 
Muhammad Ali or Mike Tyson. Rather, illustrations of what pleasure might 
 mean (in this case in a sporting context) may more readily sketch out its 
complex characteristics and begin an examination of how we might identify 
pleasure in sport, take notice of it and increase opportunities for an apprecia-
tion of deep and genuine sporting pleasures. 
 One of the points of the extremely variable examples above is that 
pleasure as a concept is not easily quantiﬁ ed or even agreed-upon by its 
common characteristics or facets: pleasure is a complex, multi-directional 
and -dimensional concept that, situationally, may demonstrate the subjec-
tivities of a pleasured subject’s response. But one person’s pleasure (and joy, 
fun, enjoyment, jouissance, and other stand-ins that do not quite match 
 pleasure ) may make no sense to another: how can a man (or woman) experi-
ence pleasure in the juxtaposed midst of violent fear, agony and pain—even 
psychic pain—for example? How might young men become seduced into 
believing, as Isabel Allende (2008[1991]) reminds us, that the camaraderie 
of war, the pleasures of brotherhood amid terror and fear, is the peak experi-
ence of pleasure in their lives? In short, how might pleasure co-exist with the 
reality of pain, loss, negative affect—and, in fact, be enhanced by that very 
tensioned and conﬂ ictual co-existence? 
 In this book, we seek to examine the intersections of pleasure (and its 
antecedents and synonyms) with contemporary sporting practices and 
cultures. Because this is an initial venture into this particular topic, we 
shall trace the historical, philosophical and academic threads regarding 
pleasure—both in a global, non-sporting sense and in a speciﬁ cally sport-
related sense. 
 In discussing Epicurus (341–270 BC), Julia Annas (1993) points out sev-
eral historical anomalies: 1) the way Epicurus (and other Hellenites) viewed 
‘pleasure’ as the ultimate goal in life was more thoughtful than presently 
conceived; 2) ‘pleasure’, in ancient Epicurean texts (most of which have 
been lost), is framed quite differently than modern and contemporary deﬁ -
nitions; 3) in the Epicurean philosophy, pleasure consists of absence of pain 
and of living a virtuous life. More speciﬁ cally, ‘happiness applies to the 
agent’s life as a whole’ (Annas, 1993: 46); this happiness is shaped by daily 
actions, but those actions are shaped by ‘intelligence or  phronēsis ’ (Annas, 
1993: 85) that is, in turn, directed by virtue. 
 Furthermore, Epicurus divided ‘pleasure’ into ‘kinetic’ and ‘static’ plea-
sures (‘. . .  ataraxia , the state of being untroubled, unhindered in one’s 
activities’) (Annas, 1993: 85), consisting of three types of desires: ‘some are 
natural and necessary, some are natural but not necessary, and some are 
neither natural nor necessary’ (cited from Epicurus’  Vaticanae Sententiae in 
Annas, 1993: 190). As Annas puts it, 
 Pleasure understood as an untroubled overall state is not the kinds of 
things that we can produce units of; nor does it even allow of quantita-
tive comparison of an ordinal kind in any obvious way. (1993: 85–86) 
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 The virtuous subject would assess individual acts of pleasure/pain, deter-
mine if they were in alignment with her Epicurean philosophy and if they 
would, on the whole, lead to more overall pleasure, then act. In thus accom-
modating the painful with the pleasant, Epicurus wrote: 
 . . . we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many 
pleasures, when greater annoyance follows for us from them, and we 
judge many pains superior to pleasures, when greater pleasure follows 
along for us when we endure the pains for a long time. Every pleasure, 
therefore, because of having a nature which is familiar to us [ oikeian ] 
is a good, but not every pleasure is to be chosen, just as every pain is a 
bad thing, but not every pain is always naturally to be avoided. . . . we 
make use of the good on some occasions as a bad thing, and the bad, 
conversely, as a good. ( Epistuala ad Menaeceum in Annas, 1993: 85) 
 I would suggest that sporting pleasures often are of the latter kind: ‘when 
we judge many pains superior to pleasures, when greater pleasure follows 
along for us when we endure the pains for a long time’ (ibid.). 
 Finally, Annas (1993: 236) points out how Epicurus was grounded in the 
everyday virtuous as well as the trajectory of one’s life: ‘Epicurus . . . has no 
idea how to conceive of the end [pleasure] . . . if he removes pleasures such as 
those of taste and hearing, the pleasures of sex and of seeing beautiful objects’. 
The sensory apprehension—the linkage to the proprioceptive and tactile, to 
sight and sound—is fundamental to ultimate pleasure within a lived life. 
 Sporting struggle, success and participation, as best I can imagine, would 
likely fall into the ‘natural but not necessary’ realm of kinetic pleasures on 
the way to a pleasant life. In the realm of sporting pleasure, it is evident 
that kinetic pleasure is enhanced by the successful struggle, which may be 
natural but not necessary or not natural and not necessary, depending upon 
one’s subjective outlook. As Orwell puts it, 
 Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, 
jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in wit-
nessing violence: in other words it is war minus the shooting. (1970: 63) 
 Often, however—paradoxically—the harder the struggle, the sweeter the 
success. So, pleasures may derive from such seemingly antipathetic contexts, 
as Orwell suggests. This parallel/dual/multiple nature of pleasure and pain is 
present in ancient Indian stories of ‘the well-known god Siva who is, at one 
and the same time, both creator and destroyer’ (Maffesoli, 1993: 32). The 
tension that exists between two competing impulses often creates more, not 
less, pleasure when it is resolved. 1 
 According to some scholars, the enactment of these social performances is 
not always a learned, socially constructed effort (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 
1966), but may be hard-wired into human consciousness. It is likely, of 
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course, that the striving for—or avoidance of—pleasure is both a biological 
imperative and a socially constructed warning: in many historical examples, 
pleasure has been stultiﬁ ed, muted, tamped down in the name of increased 
civility, surveillance and control. And, just as historically, the backlash 
against such attempts at control results, at least for a while, in heightened 
attempts at pleasure (cf. Bakhtin, 1984; Gillette, 2005). 
 Nevertheless, pleasure as a motivator, as a perversity, as a driving force 
(among, admittedly, many other forces) seems to be ubiquitous. While 
pleasure—both broadly as a concept and speciﬁ cally as an individual goal—
remains a basic tenet of what it means to be human, the academic study of 
pleasure in Western popular culture, 2 and more certainly in sport, has been 
comparatively ignored. 
 There are twin postulations underpinning this dearth of study: one 
assumption regarding pleasure is that, because of its historical ubiquity and 
hegemony within human cultures and societies, most of us already ‘know’ 
what dimensions it takes, what limits it may have, what characteristics it 
embodies. A second assumption derives from a guilt regarding things pleasur-
able that runs through Western Judeo-Christian thought (cf. Bakhtin, 1984). 
Though related, these postulations regarding pleasure, especially within the 
contemporary study of sport, are only just beginning to be investigated, and 
their very invisibility highlights the lack of interest in the study of pleasure 
within sport and sporting practices. 
 The ﬁ rst assumption posits that we need not talk about that which we 
already tacitly know (and presumably agree upon). In the case of ‘pleasure’, 
this stance is age-old, leads to structural strictures that create barriers to 
pleasure, works as an ephemeral panopticon and serves to delimit discus-
sion (cf. Foucault, 1990a, 1990b). (It also works to reinforce strong con-
servative rhetorics of scientiﬁ c knowledge within the ‘social sciences’.) By 
confronting our own surroundings, however, we in fact often learn more 
about that with which we already may be intimately familiar: in order to 
better understand a process or concept or value, we need to make it strange, 
or see it with a new lens (cf. Kuhn, 1996). 
 In the case of the study of pleasure in sport, I suggest that there exists 
a need for scholars to become mindful of  examples, types and  degrees of 
pleasure. In short, if pleasure is a prime mover within life activity, we must 
begin to take notice of the very existence of pleasure, both explicit and tacit, 
within sporting culture, and make it visible. We should strive to proactively 
create a world where pleasure stands as the default setting, and where qual-
ity of pleasure(s) becomes the object of serious examination and one of the 
goals of community policy. 
 As an example of this ﬁ rst assumption, sport itself is tacitly assumed to 
be pleasurable; otherwise, why would an individual participate in it? Like 
play (and pleasure), sport is something we all seem to  know about, but 
something that is quite difﬁ cult to pin down.  We, many of us say,  know it 
when we see it. And the pleasure in sport—though there are many examples 
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of displeasure or unpleasurable occurrences within sport, many distasteful 
aspects to its very unfolding—seems to be a part of that unexamined mix. 
To begin to unravel ‘problems’ in sport, it may be enlightening to get back 
to understanding basic joy in movement, to celebrating the pleasure that 
physically active bodies may give us—and to understand why and for whom 
this pleasure works. 
 There may be a way through the second assumption—that a sense of 
shame and guilt pervades (particularly) Western, Judeo-Christian ethics to 
such an extent that it disallows not only the enjoyment of things pleasurable, 
but the very recognition, study and discussion of such matters. Pleasure, 
in this sense, remains a bit of an untouched taboo. Threaded throughout 
sport discourse—and much of physical education—is this rhetoric that that 
which is not pleasurable ‘will make us stronger’. 3 Though substantially 
imbricated within the fabric of Western society, this—for want of a more 
elegant term—‘cultural baggage’ is nevertheless socially constructed, and so 
it can be dismantled. But it requires study. It requires lifting the veils from 
‘pleasure’ so that we all, at our core, take on the ‘given’ nature of our own 
and our community’s (however characterized) conceptions of ‘pleasures’. 
 Currently, pleasure of and in the body is often—especially in many 
Western cultures—seen as ‘shameful’. Enjoying pleasure, pleasure in the 
workplace, pleasuring oneself—all these forms of pleasure are often seen 
as deviant. Even ‘performing’ pleasure, in some contexts (like professional 
sports) is restricted and sanctioned. One only has to note the preponderance 
of recent rulings banning celebrations after scores as an example of this 
institutionalized repression of the overt displays of pleasure. Pleasure, in this 
sense, is the absence of shame, and shame cuts deeply through contempo-
rary Western society. Mikhail Bakhtin (1984), Elspeth Probyn (2005) and 
Michael Warner (1999) all separately describe shame within ‘non-mainstream’ 
culture. Their discussions work to inform an identiﬁ cation of the extent of 
the problems—and suggest possible solutions as well. 
 Bakhtin (1984), looking at medieval folk feasts, discusses performative 
pleasures that individuals take when they disrupt hegemonic roles. His 
speciﬁ c writings about the grotesque, degradation, shame and ‘laughter’ 
explain the dynamical relationships between dark and light, and between 
‘the unchanging established order and ideology . . . [and] change and renewal’ 
(Bakhtin, 1984: 81). Probyn (2005: 46) systematically unpacks shame, fear, 
guilt and humiliation, and writes: ‘shame can revisit you long after the par-
ticular moment of shaming has passed’. Her categorizations—ancestral 
shame, intergenerational shame, white shame and bodily shame—establish 
and examine precise contexts in which shame can be understood. 
 One possible way of understanding, and a possible way out of the down-
ward spiral of shame (and its companions) may be through the use of a 
queer ‘theoretical’ lens, speciﬁ cally what Michael Warner (1999) terms an 
‘ethical vision’ of queer. In his manifesto, Warner challenges basic assump-
tions about the genealogy and politics of shame. 
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 In so doing, Warner lays out some precepts for an ethical vision of queer, 
in which he suggests: 
 In those circles where queerness has been most cultivated, the ground 
rule is that one doesn’t pretend to be  above the indignity of sex. And 
although this usually isn’t announced as an ethical vision, that what it 
perversely is. . . . sex is understood to be as various as the people who 
have it. It is not required to be tidy, normal, uniform, or authorized by 
the government. This kind of culture is often denounced as relativist, 
self-indulgent, or merely libertine. In fact, it has its own norms, its own 
way of keeping people in line. . . . A relation to others, in these contexts, 
begins in an acknowledgement of all that is most abject and least repu-
table in oneself. Shame is bedrock. (Warner, 1999: 35) 
 In Warner’s view, rejecting the norms of larger society (the ‘normal’) 
becomes a freeing move towards ‘a moving and unexpected form of gen-
erosity’ (ibid.). This bridge between what Bakhtin (1984) calls the ‘upper 
stratum’ and the ‘lower stratum’ has a place within sport culture, which has 
become stultiﬁ ed, bureaucratic and, as many ‘drop-out’ children tell us, not 
 fun . One of the reasons is the incipient shame in and of our own bodies. 
 What Bakhtin terms ‘laughter’ is what I see as an overall pleasure, but in 
this case surrounding sport: 
 The serious aspects of class culture are ofﬁ cial and authoritarian; they 
are combined with violence, prohibitions, limitations and always contain 
an element of fear and of intimidation. These elements prevailed in the 
Middle Ages. Laughter, on the contrary, overcomes fear, for it knows no 
inhibitions, no limitations. Its idiom is never used by violence and author-
ity. (1984: 90). 
 The Middle Ages that Bakhtin describes could easily describe contempo-
rary sporting culture, laden heavily with bureaucratic and institutionalized 
guilt and shame. 
 Contemporary capitalist advertising culture is driven by desire, which 
feeds on shame and guilt. While Bakhtin lays out descriptives of the prob-
lem, Warner goes a bit further: he rejects the normative view of sexuality 
(and pleasure of the body) as ‘shameful’, and by so doing, proposes a way 
forward that sports scholars as well as general publics might heed. Funda-
mentally, if Western sports cultures are grounded in a deep sense of shame 
(and, as an institution of a society grounded in shame, the logics would 
have that they are), admitting to it, leveling the playing ﬁ eld (reducing hier-
archical ‘positions’) and seeing everyone as equally capable of discovering 
their own ‘pleasures’ is a possible way for sportspeople to (re)learn to enjoy 
bodily pleasures—but also, perhaps, a way for society to de-stigmatize such 
a perspective. 
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 PLEASURE WITHIN CONTEMPORARY SPORT 
 As varied as the forms of sport have become, in the late 20th and early 21st 
Centuries, particularly at the ‘top’ levels, they are more and more commodiﬁ ed, 
rigid, restrictive, formulaic, fraught with surveillance (cf. Foucault, 1995; 
Markula and Pringle, 2006) and predictable: their ‘spectacle’ value has 
increased while participation is ever more elite and exclusive (cf. Debord, 
1995[1967]). But where is the fun? Where is the joy? Where is the pleasure? 
One of the ambiguities of contemporary elite sport is that it has taken some-
thing that children enter into willingly and joyfully and made it into work 
(with all accompanying conservative and rigid restrictions). 
 In asking such questions about fun, joy and pleasure, I acknowledge 
that there are qualitative differences between such constructs as jouissance, 
hedonism, joy, fun, affect, happiness and pleasure. Many of these terms—
and their synonyms—overlap both in the public consciousness and in real 
life, and it is often only in speciﬁ c situations that they are fully understood. 
I do not intend to delimit these terms to ‘variables’, because such a reduction-
istic approach essentially kills what makes the terms vibrant and animated. 
As Huizinga wrote, ‘the  fun of playing . . . resists all analysis, all logical 
interpretation’ (1955: 3). In this book, then, ‘pleasure’ comes to mean some-
thing that gives positive meaning to an individual or collective life. 
 Pleasure as a construct is often noted after the act that created it. Pleasure 
itself can be non-productive, similar to how Huizinga deﬁ ned ‘play’: 
 Summing up the formal characteristic of play, we might call it a free activ-
ity standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as being ‘not serious’ 
but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an 
activity connected with no material interest, and no proﬁ t can be gained 
by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space 
according to ﬁ xed rules and in an orderly manner. (Huizinga 1955: 13) 
 It is quite true that many Western theorists have viewed pleasure as ‘non-
productive’, yet I suggest that play itself can be thought of as productive. 
It is not simply productive in the sense that we as humans enjoy pleasure, 
instrumentally rated on a one to ﬁ ve Likert Scale; it is productive in that it 
produces both cultural and symbolic capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). It shapes 
and forms bodies in ways that lack of exposure to the pleasures of physical 
bodies cannot. 
 While pleasure in sport or physical activity seems so obvious that it is not 
even verbalized, it must be spoken. The ranges of pleasure (from, on one hand, 
displeasure to pleasure, on a unidimensional track (cf. Schimmack, 2001); 
from lack of pleasure—anhedonia—to exultation in the jouissance of hedo-
nism) also must be noted. If, in the sociology of sport (physical culture), 
we lack a vocabulary for measures of pleasure, that speaks volumes to our 
Western, hegemonic Judeo-Christian approach to the subject. 
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 Before we delve deeper into what I mean by pleasure, it might be neces-
sary to place the authors a bit more directly and overtly into our text. When 
discussing pleasure—and in co-writing this book—we found that we were 
all coming from at least slightly different philosophical worldviews regard-
ing what pleasure might constitute in individual’s living spaces. 
 While this is typically a question that ﬁ rst-year university students might 
explore, I think it is critical to the study of pleasure: what is the meaning (or 
meanings) of life? Do we exist to somehow perpetuate the species (biologi-
cal determinism)? to gain the most individual pleasure we can (hedonism)? 
to provide the greatest good for the greatest number ( summum bonum prin-
ciple)? There are multitudes of nuanced worldviews that might construct 
one’s values regarding what a good life is. 
 What then, essentially, might be major determinants for existence, keys to 
well-lived lives? Answering these fundamental questions may provide win-
dows to how we understand such a concept as pleasure. To wit: pleasure 
could be re-conceptualized as a combined ‘primordial blood lust’, relief, joy, 
excitement, camaraderie, risk; perhaps there can even be, to cite an extreme 
example, depending upon one’s point of view and experiences, a sociopathic 
joy/thrill in symbolically killing another human being in Laser Tag or Paintball 
(and yet in war that thrill/agony is ‘normalized’). Of course, these extremes 
only serve to contextualize normative versions of sporting pleasure. 
 How we experience pleasure, in some ways, indicates how we accept current 
sporting practices. For example—and we must admit this—if there is pleasure 
in teasing and making fun of fellow players, it comes out in bullying behaviors 
in normative sporting practices. When young people learn that intimidation 
is something to be celebrated, it is no wonder that powerful coaches (who have 
grown up through that system) perpetuate that particular pleasure upon their 
charges. As another example, pleasure can reﬂ ect the dimensions of bliss that 
a conscious relationship to nature and the sublime vastness of the universe may 
instantiate in surfers, trekkers, tri-athletes, climbers and the like. 
 Not all may agree with Allende that there might be pleasure in war. Or, 
poignantly, that it should even be noted. Noticing violence, suffering and war 
(which, incidentally, many team-sport, ‘land-acquisition’ games are modeled 
after) as activities tinged with pleasure might seem anathema to a project 
discussing pleasure in sports. 
 But, just as hedonism can be described as a subjective response—a matter 
of one’s attitude toward the accrued pleasure, or one’s stance toward certain 
relatively objective situations or actions—so too can pleasure be seen as 
reﬂ ective of one’s stance toward the types of pain (inﬂ icting pain, bullying, 
dominating and so on) that can be found in sport and sport contexts. The 
kinds of sensory pleasures that accrue from taking part in sport certainly 
are pleasures that have not been discussed in any large degree, but there 
are more complex pleasures, sometimes-malevolent pleasures, that come to 
dominate certain sport forms. It is not coincidental that these pleasures  at the 
expense of others  are highly regarded in what Hughes and Coakley (1991) 
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termed ‘the sport ethic’, particularly in those sports that are power and 
performance sports as opposed to pleasure and participation sports (e.g. 
Coakley, 2008). 
 In utilizing critical theoretical stances, many sports scholars have charac-
terized public issues as at the far end of a pleasure spectrum. That is to say, 
they typically look at problems within sport rather than pleasures within 
sport. But, as we’ve seen, pleasure is often mixed with pain, joy with frustra-
tion or sorrow. But—and space does not allow for a larger discussion—the 
very nature of ‘critical’ work sometimes precludes the very things that we, 
as human beings living in the world, perhaps should celebrate. 
 US  VIS A VIS PLEASURE 
 The broader project regarding pleasure and sport, then, may be understood 
as primarily existential, detailing an organizing principle of social life, and 
examining a key productive force in the constitution of identities, moral 
codes, governmental strategies and the development of cultures(s) and asso-
ciated relations of power. If we are to see pleasure as one of the major raison 
d’etre  of a well-lived life, then it follows that pleasure is a deﬁ ning principle—
and purpose—for that life-project. Philosophers term this hedonism , though 
the term itself is contestable. 
 Fred Feldman (2004, 2007), a philosopher, points out two differing forms 
of hedonism: ‘sensory hedonism’, in which he ‘indicate[s] views according 
to which pleasurable  sensations or  feelings make for a good life’ and various 
forms of ‘attitudinal hedonism’, in which a ‘person takes intrinsic attitudi-
nal pleasure in some state of affairs’ (2007: 405). The distinction between 
what is popularly thought of as hedonism—self-centered, superﬁ cial and 
momentary titillations—and attitudinal hedonism is critical. Among other 
nuanced subjectivities concerning hedonism, Feldman proposes ‘Intrinsic 
Attitudinal Hedonism’, which ‘is based on the idea that the ultimate sources 
of a person’s welfare are episodes in which the person takes intrinsic attitu-
dinal pleasure in various propositional objects’ (Feldman, 2007: 406). 
 Somewhat conversely, Ulrich Schimmack (2001: 81), a psychologist, pos-
its the pleasure dimensions this way: 
 Some researchers consider pleasure and displeasure—that is, feeling 
good versus bad, positive versus negative, happy versus sad—as seman-
tic opposite labels for different regions of a single dimension. . . . Other 
researchers consider pleasure and displeasure as two distinct feeling 
qualities—just as hunger and thirst are two distinct feelings—that are 
sometimes experienced concurrently. . . . (2001: 81) 
 Margaret Wetherell (2012), in her accessible book  Affect and Emotion: 
A New Social Science Understanding , aims to bridge some of the debates sur-
rounding  affect writ large. She discusses the nature debate for social scientists, 
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but her stance regarding the nature-nurture dynamic appears to be one of 
moderation, where both genetics and experience impact on one’s affective 
range: 
 An affective practice is a ﬁ guration where body possibilities and routines 
become recruited or entangled together with meaning-making and with 
other social and material ﬁ gurations. It is an organic complex in which all 
the parts relationally constitute each other. (Wetherell, 2012: 19) 
 Thus, for Wetherell, ‘nature’ (‘body possibilities and routines’) and ‘nur-
ture’ (‘meaning-making’) come together in interrelated practices that char-
acterize as human performances. 
 Zakaria (2012), discussing Abu Ali al-Husain Ibn Abdallah Ibn Sina’s 
categorizations of three forms of pleasure within gnostic thinking, writes: 
 Ibn Sina divides pleasure into three types: (i) sensual pleasure ( al-ladhdha 
al-hissiya ) such as sex and eating, (ii) inward pleasure ( al-ladhdha al-batina ) 
such as preserving one’s dignity and self-respect, and (iii) intellectual plea-
sure ( al-ladhdha al-aqliyya ). (Zakaria, 2012: 1284) 
 As intellectual pleasure is viewed by Ibn Sina as the highest form of plea-
sure, it is no wonder than he views the body as a barrier to true happiness: 
 . . . the soul, while in the body, must purify itself all kinds of attach-
ments to corporal things that are opposed to the means for happiness. 
By practicing this, the soul is then able to become a pure being and per-
haps free itself from being affected by the bodily states, and accordingly 
prepares for the true happiness. (Zakaria, 2012: 1284) 
 A continual question perhaps worthy of reﬂ ection for sport philosophers 
is: can bodily pleasure co-exist with ‘true’ pleasure, however characterized? 
Postmodern, non-essentialist, poststructuralist sport scholars would likely 
question what is meant by the word ‘true’ and be concerned by the subjec-
tive bias in such a truth claim. 
 But even more than these distinctions about the basic sources of a desire 
for hedonism and/or pleasure, there are at least three categories/degrees of 
pleasure. These include a) pleasure itself, b)  ur -pleasure—a prototypical, 
originary pleasure (cf. Frijda and Parrott, 2011)—and c)  dis pleasure, which 
work together to circumscribe one’s body. If a lived body has experienced 
(and can remember) pleasure, the pleasure itself becomes embodied. We 
hold pleasure in our minds, but we carry it in our movement. 
 So a  sensation aspect of hedonism is in our lived experience, if not in our 
cognitive apperception of it: we are embodied, ﬂ uid in our responses and 
simultaneously constitute our genetics and our experiences. In other words, 
try as we might, we, like Huizinga, may be unable to wrestle a clear ‘analy-
sis, [and] all logical interpretation’ (1955: 3) from that which we name as 
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 pleasure . But, as with Epicurus, the sense of pleasure runs across the trajec-
tory of one’s life. Pleasure is complicated and, at least for our purposes, 
untangleable. 
 With an overview that may include some of the world’s most inﬂ uen-
tial thinkers (from Epicurus to Bentham to Johan Huizinga), writers (from 
Shakespeare to Mary Wollstonecraft to Hunter S. Thompson) and academ-
ics (Freud, Deleuze, Lacan, Bakhtin, Lyotard, Kristeva, Irigaray, Foucault, 
Derrida, Huyssen)—those who have all been fascinated by human experi-
ences of pleasure and the importance of developing an ethical approach to 
developing virtuous but pleasurable lives—we provide a context for sport-
ing practices that both elicit, accompany and produce pleasure. In high-
lighting the broad social importance of pleasure, we then illustrate, through 
drawing on various examples, the social signiﬁ cance of sporting pleasure. 
 The pleasures experienced by both audiences and performers, by cre-
ators and viewers, may or may not be similar to those pleasures experi-
enced in enacting artistic and sporting performance (cf. Rinehart, 1998a; 
Lowe, 1977). What we do know is that, in this particular historical moment 
(cf. Wetherell, 2012), there are dominant ways that both performers and 
audiences see their efforts,  vis a vis work, play, joy and pleasure. According 
to Wendy Steiner (1995), and, I suggest, concomitant with sport, there is a 
contemporary 
 . . . crisis in aesthetics as such. Neither the expert nor the layperson 
can say what makes art art [or sport sport], and though aesthetics 
has always been an area of opinionated speculation rather than scien-
tiﬁ c truth, there have been times of greater consensus than today. . . . 
(Steiner, 1995: 10) 
 This ‘consensus’, or contemporary lack of consensus, reﬂ ecting, respec-
tively, modernist and postmodernist stances, holds true for the aesthetics—
and thus, pleasurable, often unmeasurable enjoyment—of sport. One par-
ticipant’s joy in physical contact with another body ﬂ ying through space is 
distasteful to someone else, who, in turn, enjoys the nuanced moment of 
pleasure, the thrill of precision when a 30-foot putt drops into the hole, 
despite the terrain and speed of the green. This is pleasure in the doing. 
Spectators derive pleasure from sport in many ways. They may enjoy and 
take pleasure in banter over impossible arguments: both in their prime, 
would Ali defeat Joe Louis? Would Helen Willis, in her prime, be victorious 
over Martina Navratilova? This is pleasure in imagining. There is pleasure 
in seeing in-person a graceful Michael Jordan lift to the basket for a slam 
dunk. This is pleasure in appreciating. 
 Examples of unusual pleasures abound, but two should sufﬁ ce. The 
ranges of pleasure—all pleasure, not simply dominant forms of ‘acceptable’ 
pleasure—within life are almost unimaginable, so why would they not be 
within sport and re-creative leisure practices? 
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 For example, the Quiché Maya played a ballgame, which was described 
and mythologized in the Popol Vuh as a game played by the gods with two 
mortal brothers, Hun-Hunahpú and Vicub-Hunahpú, who ‘lost their lives 
in the Underworld’ (Salter, 1996: 127). While the potential outcome/pen-
alty for losing the game (death) was known to the two brothers, the chal-
lenge and potential pleasure of possibly defeating Lords of the Underworld 
proved to be too enticing for them. 
 Following this, might the Taliban, who came to epitomize the ‘. . . land-
scape littered with the remains of viliﬁ ed artworks and discredited ortho-
doxies’ (Steiner, 1995: 209), still celebrate, enjoy, take pleasure in, a simple 
game of [male] soccer football? Or is there a religious repression of that 
 joie de vivre stemming from physical movement (much as there presum-
ably was for the early Puritans in 17th century America (cf. Daniels, 1991)) 
that becomes embodied in everyday lived life for the strict, fundamentalist 
Taliban? Within this culture, does the pleasure only instantiate from instru-
mental enthusiasms—that is, activities that are goal-oriented, in which plea-
sure comes to signify itself as a gratuitous add-on—or might pleasure also 
remain hedonistic—for its own sake? Questions such as these, while located 
in a speciﬁ c time (the present), place (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and people, 
also locate more broadly throughout the ranges of the human condition. 
 Pleasure, then, more broadly, is what Annas (1993: 35) sees as ‘the agent’s 
ﬁ nal end [which] is generally taken to be happiness’. One of the satisfactions 
of a so-called well-lived life is that the agent’s life is ‘. . . uniﬁ ed by that fact 
that all [the] projects and attitudes hang together and tend in a certain way’ 
(ibid.). This ‘life’s  oeuvre ’ kind of harmony demands a cognitive inspection 
of hypocrisies and balances. While pleasure may exist across all cultures, in 
every time period known to humankind, and likely in every possible context, 
the ways that people anticipate, enjoy and reﬂ ect on what is pleasurable—
in Epicurus’ terms, kinetic pleasure—vary greatly. 
 CULTURAL FORMS OF PLEASURE 
 Then let fall 
 Your horrible pleasure. . . . 
 William Shakespeare,  King Lear , Act III, Scene 2 
 The oxymoronic ‘horrible pleasure’ that King Lear speaks of evidences a wide 
range of possibilities toward the apperception of this thing called pleasure: 
one person might enjoy deeply, for example, the physical interplay within 
an American football game, Argentinian rugby match or intensely physical 
netball contest, while someone else may be horriﬁ ed by such performances 
of violence. The Romans’ much-celebrated decadence, perhaps stemming 
from Greek Bacchanalian feasts, and the Marquis de Sade’s infamous sexual 
exploits (Gillette, 2005): these pleasures, often quite class-based, came at 
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the expense of a concomitant sorrow or pain. Without dazzling sunlight, 
there can be no sharpened shadow, and pleasure and horror or revulsion or 
sorrow come to exist simultaneously. 
 On the other hand—and this is only demonstrating two points on a 
continuum, not describing a simplistic binary—the concept of a ‘ delightful 
pleasure’ may seem redundant and hyperbolic. But clearly, the very idea 
of positive and negative aesthetics comes into play within this discussion, 
for, while majorities within a given society may come to consensus regard-
ing that which is pleasurable—or, for that matter, that which is painful—
the existence of both threads within a given cultural performance is a co-
dependent relationship which, though it may be intensiﬁ ed (e.g. ‘delightful 
pleasure’, ‘horrible pain’), still requires its obverse for appreciation of its 
own existence. 
 And what has this to do with sport, and sporting pastimes and ‘plea-
sures’? The most obvious reason for the interest in the intersections of sport 
and pleasure is that, while pleasure, joy and fun have all been  assumed as 
integral parts of sport participation (and I mean this in the broadest sense: 
primary, secondary, tertiary ‘performers’ of sport, ancillary support mem-
bers and spectators are all ‘sport participants’), they have been relegated to 
just that: prior assumptions. Perhaps it is time the sport studies community 
of scholars reinvestigated such residuals of discourses within our areas, both 
questioning our fundamental assumptions and bringing renewed force and 
focus to current and future problematics. 
 These ‘problematics’ might include studies of how people of many stripes 
bring meaning to their sport and exercise and body regimes; how the very 
concept of pleasure is dulled or sharpened through various lenses, such as 
feminist/queer discourse, ascetic and/or hedonist journeys, instrumental-
ist or pragmatic relativism or even an aesthetic viewpoint. We might look 
at how bodies are shamed and guilt-ridden within Western contemporary 
society, and how these shamings play out on sporting ﬁ elds and in sporting 
arenas. Each of these ways of looking at pleasure, of course, is both limit-
ing and freeing in its own way. But on more useful and everyday levels, 
these kinds of standpoints provide an opportunity to examine questions 
about youth and child, and middle-aged and elderly participation in sport; 
about equity issues, particularly those surrounding movement, sport and 
dance; about discourses regarding pain and injury, in power and perfor-
mance sport and in pleasure and participation sport; about professionalism 
and professionalized attitudes regarding the very place of pleasure; about 
media representations of various bodies, including the ascetic body, the sati-
ated body, the ‘disabled’ body, the mortiﬁ ed body and the ‘perfect’ body 
and how those discourses resonate with pleasures of control, abjection and 
self-efﬁ cacy; and about risk, self-realization and selﬁ shness within sport and 
movement—and how these naturalized stances inﬂ uence and are inﬂ uenced 
by contextualized notions of pleasure and hedonism in 21st century sport-
ing practice. 
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 As one example, Miller (1994: 137) discusses 4th- and 5th-century ascet-
ics, particularly pointing out Palladius’ views of ‘emaciated and mutilated 
bodies . . . as angelic bodies’. Discussing the worldview of these ascetics, 
Miller goes on to say: 
 It may be that such conventional descriptions of ascetic persons as lead-
ing ‘heavenly’ or ‘angelic’ or ‘resurrected’ lives were not mere metaphors 
of pious behavior but rather real indicators of a perceptual construct 
embedded within ascetic discourse. This perceptual construct enabled 
observers to ‘see’ ascetic persons as performance artists, enacting the 
spiritual body in the here-and-now. This perceptual construct, more-
over, was immensely satisfying . . . (Miller, 1994: 137) 
 Deriving pleasure—in this case spiritual or intellectual pleasure—from 
emaciated bodies at the very least demonstrates how subjective perceptions 
can impinge upon objective realities. 
 In another (related) case, Joanna Frueh, a contemporary performance 
artist and academic, writes about a 20th-century fascination with ‘femi-
nine perfection and women’s fear of being undesirable and worse unloved’ 
(1991: 70). Characterizing this as a ‘fear of ﬂ esh that moves’, she writes: 
 Because structures of power, such as the art world, gender or erotic behav-
ior, close in on themselves by providing habitual and proper ways for a 
human being to exist, writing that dislocates the reader or that names 
her ‘unﬁ ttingness’ in ways that she herself does, lets the reader know that 
people needn’t remain stuck in societal constraints. (1991: 70) 
 In other words—and returning to a point made previously about reveal-
ing that which is somehow made invisible—Frueh is suggesting that the 
very discussion of issues creates an opening for insight and discussion—and 
change. In addition, the very abjectiﬁ cation of the body reproduces a man-
tra of 20th- and 21st-century advertising that relies upon mortiﬁ cation of 
the self to create desire. These two examples also pinpoint the ﬂ uid nature of 
societal views of 1) the body and 2) various incarnations of pleasure. 
 Examining pleasure from multiple standpoints also allows us to look at 
new questions within sport and movement studies. For example: drawing 
from Coveney and Bunton (2003), these questions might include issues con-
cerning the possibility of a well-lived and satisfying life, through and with 
pleasurable movement; the introduction of affect—in particular, passion—
to the study of sport; carnality and bodily pleasures, disciplined or rational-
ized pleasure, ascetic or self-control/denial pleasures, ecstatic or passionate 
thrills, deviant pleasures, cognitive pleasures, political pleasures and iden-
tiﬁ cation/display kinds of pleasures. There are deep and shallow pleasures; 
there are transitory and lasting pleasures; there are nostalgic and imagined 
pleasures. 
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 Going on a roller coaster ride entails the pleasure of anticipation while 
standing in line, and also includes the actual experience of what Caillois (1961) 
has termed ‘vertigo’. But this pleasure is, relatively speaking, rather short-
lived, and even recalling the experience of pleasure is sometimes difﬁ cult. On 
the other hand, the ﬁ rst enervating slice into a pool of cold water, perhaps 
because it is repeated so easily (and frequently), can be both ‘vertiginous’ and 
a lasting pleasure, both replicated and recollected throughout the trajectory 
of a life. 
 Life pleasures, to be sure, can be deeper, less transitory and often more sat-
isfying than momentary ones—but, like ‘epiphanies’ (cf. Denzin, 2001[1989]), 
deep, life-altering pleasures can be made up of minor or gradual or momen-
tary pleasures. 
 ‘PLEASURE’ AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
 The only position that leaves me with no cognitive dissonance is 
atheism. It is not a creed. Death is certain, replacing both the siren-
song of Paradise and the dread of Hell. Life on this earth, with all its 
mystery and beauty and pain, is then to be lived far more intensely: 
we stumble and get up, we are sad, conﬁ dent, insecure, feel loneliness 
and  joy and love . There is nothing more; but I want nothing more. 
 ʊChristopher Hitchens,  The Portable Atheist: Essential 
Readings for the Non-believer  (emphasis added) 
 As Hitchens points out, despite outcries to the contrary, there is no codiﬁ ed 
rulebook for life. To essentialize such a code, a one-size-ﬁ ts-all prescription, 
might be in the realm of belief, faith, religion or the like. Each individual, 
then, ﬁ nds her/his own way through the traceries of a well-lived life, often 
fumbling along, sometimes sure of the way. For our purposes, we have 
engaged with the facts of both pleasure and sport with the assumption that 
 there is no stated purpose for life . As humans, we are not given a universal 
instruction sheet telling us each what our life’s purpose might be. It might 
be noteworthy to remember that the United Nations’ Declaration of Human 
Rights guarantees essential human freedoms, but is not directive: that is, even 
its essentialisms do not prescribe what constitutes a valuable, or even well-
lived, life. So we’re on our own. We have the capacity to determine to what 
extent we privilege a concept like  pleasure— or ignore it. We also have the 
agency to determine to what extent we will accept pleasure into our general 
lives and our sporting lives. We also, ﬁ nally, have the wherewithal to deter-
mine the very direction our pleasures can take: do we pleasure ourselves at 
the expense of others, or pleasure ourselves through the ediﬁ cation of others? 
 It is important, then, to trace the social constructions of dampened forms 
of pleasure—particularly in the Western world, both within the larger 
societies and in relation to sport—as well as those of heightened pleasure. 
Pleasure has not only been tamped down and packed into a commodiﬁ ed, 
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commercialized, convenient package meant for mass consumption, it has 
often taken on a sense of experiential ﬂ atness. As George Ritzer (2005) has 
rightly pointed out, the disenchantment of many things both cultural and 
personal has gradually eroded even our  recognition of pleasure, especially in 
a consumerist society. But it is more than this erosion of recognition because 
of course there is pleasure in both delivering and producing. 
 TRACINGS OF PLEASURE 
 This section is not meant to nostalgically hearken back to a ‘golden age’ of 
innocent pleasure within sporting practice, but rather to note the ways that 
our apperceptions of pleasure may have changed over time. The following 
cultures spanned hundreds, if not thousands, of years. In broad strokes, 
some populist notions have remained, and sufﬁ ce for our purposes of teas-
ing out some genealogies of current views on pleasure. 
 Epicureanism, based on the teachings of Epicurus, stresses pleasure as the 
primary good (hedonism): happiness would not be achieved by sensual and 
material overindulgence, but rather by avoidance of pain, or  aponia , and ‘. . . 
ataraxia , or tranquility . . .’ (Annas, 1987: 5). In essence, this form of 
Epicureanism—unlike the way the term has been spirited away in contem-
porary times—and many other Greek philosophies, seeks a virtuous life. Yet 
Epicureanism (and hedonism) is seen by many in contemporary society by 
as pleasure-seeking at the expense of individual responsibility. 
 The Gnostics, mentioned previously, eschewed bodily pleasures for spiri-
tual or intellectual ones, celebrating transcendence in their worldview (Hoeller, 
2014). Most people, according to contemporary gnostic summative state-
ments, are not meant for transcendence through ‘interior, intuitive means’: 
 Not all humans are spiritual (pneumatics) and thus ready for Gnosis 
and liberation. Some are earthbound and materialistic beings (hylet-
ics), who recognize only the physical reality. Others live largely in their 
psyche (psychics). (Hoeller, 2014, ¶14) 
 Gnostics regarded the body as a physical prison from which, through 
ascetic behaviors, they sought to escape. Pleasure through the senses was 
largely regarded as a temptation to be avoided. 
 Gnosticism has its traces in ‘the role of an ascetic morality in the ﬁ rst 
formation of capitalism’ (Foucault, 1990: 141). As these anti-pleasure ethe 
were hegemonic, bio-life emerged where ‘methods of power and knowledge 
assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and 
modify them’ (Foucault, 1990: 142). Thus, according to Foucault, the rela-
tive inevitability of the ‘randomness of death’ became mitigated, and social 
controls—and the dance of power and knowledge—began to take form. 
 Well before the gnostics or the late European Middle Ages, when the sensi-
ble fracturing of human subjects’ lower and upper strata began to coalesce into 
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body-mind forms of dualisms, the ancient Chinese likewise explored a height-
ened privileging of the mind: according to Van Dalen and Bennett (1971), 
 . . . in the earlier eras, bodily conditioning play a more important role in 
Chinese society than it did in later times. The development of a book-
ish, classical type of education and the spread of Taoism, Buddhism, 
Confucianism, all of which emphasized the contemplative life, reduced 
interest in the physical development of the child. (Van Dalen and Bennett, 
1971: 13) 
 ‘The earlier eras’ of which Van Dalen and Bennett (1971: 12) write ‘pre-
date . . . Christianity by approximately 2500 years’. We can infer from Van 
Dalen and Bennett that, accompanied by a reverence for the wisdom of 
aging, the ancient Chinese saw ultimate happiness as stemming from a bal-
anced, tranquil, contemplative life, free of disease but also free of conﬂ ict. 
In addition, Diener and Suh (2000: 3) write that the ‘Confucian school in 
ancient China described the good life in terms of an orderly society in which 
individuals correctly performed their roles and responsibilities’. 
 Foucault (1990[1978]), as he often does, has the last word on this prin-
ciple of pleasure traced from before the 17th century. He is writing about 
the ‘ scientia sexualis versus  ars erotica ’ (Foucault, 1990: 70), but similar 
musings might easily apply to pleasure within sport, pleasure in engage-
ment, and pleasure in apprehension: 
 It is often said that we have been incapable of imagining any new plea-
sures. We have at least invented a different kind of pleasure: pleasure in 
the truth of pleasure, the pleasure of knowing that truth, of discovering 
and exposing it, the fascination of seeing it and telling it, of captivating 
and capturing others by it, of conﬁ ding it in secret, of luring it out in the 
open—the speciﬁ c pleasure of the true discourse on pleasure. (Foucault, 
1990: 70) 
 Simply put, that is what this book is about: ‘luring [pleasure regarding 
sport] out in[to] the open’. 
 NOTES 
 1 .  It is worth noting that these simple binaries can be conceived of as end points 
on a continuum, suggestive and instructive for understanding the limits of the 
concepts. 
 2 .  Notable exceptions from the west include Rabelais (1984); Foucault 
(1990[1978]), (1990[1985]). In the east, of course, the classic Kama Sutra 
(VƗtsyƗyana, 2009). 
 3 .  Apologies to Friedrich Nietzsche, 1998. 
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 3  A Short History of Pleasure 
 Richard Pringle 
 The interconnected topics of pleasure, happiness, joy and life satisfaction 
have long been of interest to a diverse range of eminent scholars, including: 
philosophers, historians, politicians, psychologists, theologists, biologists 
and evolutionary and socio-cultural theorists. Attempting to understand 
how one can gain a state of happiness, what makes life desirable or which 
pleasures are worth seeking has long been discussed, examined and debated. 
The results of these debates have had profound inﬂ uences on the societies 
we have created, what we value, the development of laws and moral codes, 
how we understand ourselves, interact with each other and lead our lives 
and, of course, the games and sports we play. In this chapter, I provide a 
 selective examination of the diverse works on this subject to trace and illus-
trate the place of pleasure and happiness within the historical development 
of Western culture. 
 Writing the history of pleasure/happiness/satisfaction is a somewhat com-
plex task given, in part, that the meanings of these words (and other such 
synonyms) have changed over time, have been subject to the faults of transla-
tion and are, at times, used interchangeably in popular discourse (Kretchmar, 
1994; Maguire, 2008). ‘Happiness’ as typically used in daily discourse, for 
example, is very different from how Aristotle used the term ‘ eudaimonia ’ 
(which is typically translated as happiness). Aristotle did not use the term 
‘ eudaimonia ’ to refer to a subjective state of mind or emotion, as we might 
do today, but more broadly to the goal of living a good or quality life. 
 Given the multiple meanings and blurred understandings of terms such as 
happiness and pleasure, I do not provide tight deﬁ nitions but, where appro-
priate, deﬁ ne how others have used them. I do, however, tend to use the term 
‘pleasure’ in a broad, inclusive, positive-affect sense, so that it overlaps with 
understandings of joy, fun and delight. My preference for a loose deﬁ ni-
tion of pleasure follows Chris Shilling (2002: 12) who asserted, somewhat 
boldly, that it is not ‘useful or even possible to provide a precise deﬁ nition 
of emotions’. Moreover, attempts to precisely deﬁ ne and examine various 
‘pleasures’ (e.g. eudaimonic or hedonic happiness) have proved difﬁ cult, as 
empirical evidence suggests considerable overlap amongst differing terms 
(Kashdan, Biswas-Diener and King, 2008). An additional advantage of using 
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a deﬁ nition with porous boundaries is that wider aspects of the phenomena, 
which might be beneﬁ cial for understanding complex social processes, are 
not eliminated from consideration (Izard, Kagan and Zajonc, 1984). 
 In this chapter I aim to reveal the enduring social signiﬁ cance of pleasure 
and some of its seemingly nebulous characteristics. I highlight that pleasures 
have been understood as diverse, socially constructed, productive, political 
and tied to existential issues, the body and the arts of living a ‘good life’. 
In other words, I highlight that there are multiple and, at times, compet-
ing conceptualizations of pleasure. Throughout this abridged chronological 
examination I make links between understandings of pleasure and contem-
porary sport. 
 AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF PLEASURE 
 Before human civilizations had arisen, even before our ancient ancestors 
had evolved into human-like creatures, animals played. So contended Johan 
Huizinga (1970: 19), who asserted in his classical study of  Homo Ludens 
(or  Man the Player ) that ‘play is older than culture, for culture, however, 
inadequately deﬁ ned, always presupposes human society, and animals have 
not waited for man to teach them their playing’. Indeed, lion cubs play 
ﬁ ght, dogs chase their tails and dolphins ride waves. Although we can only 
speculate as to why animals play, Huizinga claimed that the prime reason 
why humans play was to experience ‘fun’. He further characterized play as 
distinct from ‘ordinary life’ and suggested that it was undertaken freely and 
without desire for a material outcome or proﬁ t. In this respect, Huizinga 
regarded play as an autotelic activity undertaken for ‘its own intoxicating 
momentum’ (Kretchmar, 1994: 211). He stressed that the ‘fun’ element of 
play has always been of social signiﬁ cance. Indeed, Huizinga (1970: 23) 
argued that ‘culture arises in the form of play’ and ‘pure play is one of the 
main bases of civilization’. In this manner, he considered play as paradoxi-
cally  unproductive and  productive in that it not only produces pleasure and 
other emotions, but is also related to the production of drama, dance, sport-
ing contests, games of love and, at a much broader level, human culture. 
Huizinga accordingly theorized, in an undoubtedly grand and romantic 
manner, that play and the  pursuit of fun have underpinned the development 
of human civilizations. 
 To explain the signiﬁ cance and constitutive abilities of play, Huizinga 
emphasized the importance of lived experiences of fun. Fun, in accordance 
with Huizinga’s logic, can be understood as the motivational force that is 
integral to the development of human culture. Drawing from Huizinga, 
I suggest that sporting pleasures can be similarly understood as produc-
tive. The ubiquity and social pervasiveness of contemporary sport can, 
correspondingly, be explained as the outcome of the pursuit of multiple 
and diverse sporting pleasures such as the joy of winning, the pleasure of 
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becoming a respected sportsperson, the thrill of ilinx or the satisfaction of 
being ﬁ t. The subsequent production of the sporting world and associated 
cultures, via pursuit of sporting pleasures, is also tied to the production of a 
range of social issues and problems, as evidenced via the numerous critical 
studies concerning sport. Thus, the unintended consequences of the pursuit 
of sport pleasures are associated with the production of both positive and 
negative outcomes. 
 Huizinga’s (1970: 21) least defensible claim (according to some) was that 
the ‘fun element’ of play, the element that makes ‘play’ desirable, ‘resists 
all analysis, all logical interpretation’. Yet fun and its synonyms (e.g. plea-
sure, happiness, joy) have been the focus of analysis for thousands of years. 
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) (1962/350 BCE), for example, defended the social 
importance of examining happiness and provided qualitative examinations 
of various ‘goods’, such as the nature of virtue, self-care and friendship. He 
argued that every activity, whether it be playing the harp or building a house, 
has a ‘good’ that is its own particular end: the good of playing the harp is the 
production of pleasing music and the good in building is the production of a 
functional house. To develop his treatise on  eudaimonia (generally translated 
as ‘happiness’ but perhaps more accurately deﬁ ned as ‘human ﬂ ourishing’, 
‘living well’ or to a lesser extent ‘wellbeing’), Aristotle asked, ‘Why seek any 
particular good?’ His answer was that the ‘good’ could produce happiness 
and that happiness is the only good that is always chosen as an end in itself. 
Thus, he proclaimed eudaimonia the highest good. Cumulative evidence 
over time has indicated that there is general agreement with this sentiment 
(i.e. that ‘happiness’ is the ultimate state that humans strive for). The Dalai 
Lama and Howard Cutler (1998), for example, clearly articulate within their 
text,  The Art of Happiness: A Handbook for Living , that the prime purpose 
of life is to be happy. Aristotle, however, illustrated that debate is rife with 
respect to how best to attain happiness. The (shallow) hedonist, for example, 
seemingly seeks a life of repeated but nevertheless ephemeral pleasures while 
others might live for honor, fame, wealth or virtue. 
 To help clarify this existential debate, Aristotle made distinctions between 
pleasure and happiness. He suggested that animals were a lower form of life 
that were governed by a desire to satisfy physical urges, thus gaining ‘plea-
sure’ through eating, sleeping and reproducing. He claimed that humans 
have a capacity to reason and correspondingly suggested that a life governed 
by the uncritical and unreﬂ exive pursuit of pleasures would not necessarily 
constitute a virtuous or ‘happy’ life. To resolve this dilemma, he emphasized 
the importance of critical reﬂ ection (or rationality) and suggested that vir-
tue, happiness and rationality were all intimately connected in the produc-
tion of a ‘good life’. This interconnection is revealed in his understandings 
of the happiness gained through playing the harp: 
 . . . the function of the harpist is to play the harp; the function of the 
harpist who has high standards is to play well. On these assumptions, if 
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we take the proper function of man to be a certain kind of life, and if the 
kind of life is an activity of the soul and consists in actions performed in 
conjunction with the rational element, and if a man of high standards 
is he who performs these actions well and properly, and if a function is 
well performed when it is performed in accordance with the excellence 
appropriate to it; we reach the conclusion that the good of man is an 
activity of the soul in conformity with the excellence of virtue, and if 
there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete. 
(Aristotle, 1962: 6) 
 Inﬂ uenced by his spiritual beliefs, Aristotle appeared to conclude that 
the highest good is that which most resembles the life of a divine being, 
a life that revolves around contemplation and pure thought (which, per-
haps not surprisingly, appears to resemble how Aristotle attempted to live). 
Aristotle’s ethics subsequently inﬂ uenced Christian beliefs and have con-
temporary resonance in the axiom that a good life consists in developing 
one’s talents to the fullest. His views on happiness and the good life have 
also been the subject of critique. Bertrand Russell (1945: 173), for example, 
suggested that Aristotle’s views on the highest good would likely appeal 
to the ‘respectable middle-aged’, as he appears to defend bourgeois values 
(i.e. work hard, do your best, respect mainstream customs). Cynthia Free-
land (1988) further critiqued Aristotle as a misogynist, despite his recogni-
tion that a society can only function smoothly if women are also provided 
with opportunity to lead a good life and obtain happiness. 
 Drawing from Aristotle’s ethics, one could potentially live a ‘good life’ 
through participation in sport, but only if the participation has been ratio-
nally considered and if the sport is performed at a high standard and in 
accordance with the excellence appropriate to it. Yet this is no easy task. 
There is a risk, for example, that the pursuit of sporting excellence (or virtue) 
could turn into an obsession (i.e. an uncontrolled desire) or that the 
sportsperson becomes seduced by a desire for wealth or fame rather than 
seeing happiness as an end unto itself. Concomitantly, a ‘life well lived’ 
would not likely be obtained via an unreﬂ exive pursuit of various sporting 
pleasures, such as the perfunctory consumption of televised sport, the seem-
ingly thoughtless antics of football hooligans, the pursuit of sporting success 
via doping or, more typically, mundane participation in sport. 
 Foucault’s (1985) examination of ancient Greek ethics similarly revealed 
that individuals (or more speciﬁ cally ‘free men’) were encouraged to reﬂ ect 
on their pursuit of pleasures in order to live an ethical (and in relation plea-
surable) life. Foucault claimed that although the ancient Greeks acknowl-
edged that respecting custom and laws was important for the constitution 
of an ethical self, certain attitudes towards pleasure were more important: 
 The accent was placed on the relationship with the self that enabled a 
person to keep from being carried away by the appetites and pleasures, 
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to maintain a mastery and superiority over them, to keep his (sic) senses 
in a state of tranquility, to remain free from interior bondage to pas-
sions, and to achieve a mode of being that could be deﬁ ned as full 
enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself. 
(Foucault, 1985: 31) 
 The ‘appropriate’ use of pleasure by the ancient Greeks accordingly 
played a signiﬁ cant role within the tradition of  caring for oneself , which 
Foucault considered as a primary organizing principle of the classical art of 
existence. Foucault, however, recognized that this reﬂ exive project of self, 
which centered on controlling desires and the use of pleasures, was not nec-
essarily easy to achieve. Indeed, he intimated that the temptations of speciﬁ c 
pleasures (e.g. alcohol, food, sex) could be so strong that individuals had to 
actively work, via techniques of the self, to control their desires. The intima-
tion from Foucault is that the draw of select embodied pleasures, such as 
the desire to eat calorie-dense foods, could be difﬁ cult to control by mere 
rational thought. 
 In a comparable manner, Huizinga (1970) suggested that the social sig-
niﬁ cance of play/fun highlights that humans are constituted, in part, as irra-
tional beings. He claimed: ‘We play and know that we play, so we must be 
more than merely rational beings, for play is irrational’ (Huizinga, 1970: 
22). Yet the rationality of play is a debatable point. Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1999[1872]) was similarly concerned with how the place of pleasure in 
social life was both a potential source of inner tension and an apparent 
reﬂ ection of irrationality. In  The Birth of Tragedy he drew on Greek mythol-
ogy to examine the dualistic forces of Apollo (god of sunlight, order and 
harmony) and Dionysius (god of wine, parties and disorder). He declared 
that the Apollonian force manifests itself in the desire to craft the self as a 
well-balanced work of art, whereas the Dionysian celebrates the ‘immo-
rality’ of sexuality and natural desires. More to the point, Nietzsche sug-
gested that forces of Dionysius could induce narcotic states of complete 
self-forgetfulness—which could be a great source of pleasure for some. 
He further argued that the Greeks averted the supposed dangers posed by 
Dionysian forces by their invention of the Olympian gods, who were of 
prominence within their various sporting festivals. Yet this social invention 
came at a cost, as it restricted certain creative life forces and these restric-
tions, Nietzsche claimed, still haunt modern existence. More speciﬁ cally, he 
lamented that the Greek ethic of caring for oneself (which also demanded 
the need to care for others) was subsequently marginalized within the West 
via the human ‘invention’ of Christianity and its subsequent focus on the 
unrealistic salvation of the soul rather than the practical arts of everyday 
earthly life. 
 Foucault (1986), directly inﬂ uenced by Nietzsche, was also critical of the 
advent of Christianity and the associated impact on human pleasures/ethics. 
He argued that although there were clear links between the Ancient Greek, 
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Roman and Christian practices of ethics, the antique ethic of ‘caring for thy 
self’ was surpassed by a Christian moral system, which was: 
 . . . based on ﬁ nitude, the Fall, and evil; a mode of subjection in the 
form of obedience to a general law that is at the same time the will of a 
personal god; a type of work on oneself that implies a decipherment of 
the soul and a puriﬁ catory hermeneutics of the desires; and a mode of 
ethical fulﬁ llment that tends toward self-renunciation. (Foucault, 1986: 
239–240) 
 Certain pleasures, under the subsequent inﬂ uence of a Christian moral 
code, became linked to the body (as opposed to the mind or spirit) and 
regarded as sinful. Although Christianity did not invent mind-body dualism, 
the pleasures that have been regarded as tied to the body (eating, drink-
ing, dancing, sex and sport) were consequently degraded in value and/or 
repressed. The marginalization of sport and physical education within con-
temporary education curriculums can be understood as a latent effect of this 
dualistic thinking. Indeed, sport is typically regarded as an ‘extra-curricular’ 
activity within schools, as its educational value is still questioned by some 
educational authorities. Nevertheless, the pleasures associated with sport 
have ensured that sport is still of signiﬁ cance within schooling processes. 
 The mind-body dualism encouraged by Christian philosophies did, how-
ever, encourage the growth of  ascetic pleasures or pleasures gained ‘from 
the acknowledgement of total control of the body’s natural urges . . . a total 
 conquering and  domination of the body’ (Coveney and Bunton, 2003: 172). 
Ascetic pleasures, somewhat oxymoronically, are the pleasures experienced 
through the act of denying pleasure. The pursuit of ascetic pleasure reached 
its pinnacle, according to John Coveney and Robin Bunton (2003: 171), 
in the practices of early Christians such as St Benedict and Catherine of 
Assisi, who ‘all reached heights of ecstasy through severe fasting and other 
ascetic rituals’. I suggest that some contemporary individuals may achieve 
similar forms of ‘ecstasy’ through various ascetic practices, such as restrict-
ing caloric intake, undertaking painful ﬁ tness regimes, or practicing various 
forms of abstinence and teetotalism. The growth of asceticism illustrates 
that pleasures are socially constructed in diverse ways while still tied to 
the body. 
 In an apparent opposition to the Christian moral code and its tendency 
towards self-renunciation and condemnation of the so-called animal side of 
life, Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) wrote about the importance of the pleasures 
of the carnival in the medieval-cultural consciousness (see also Chapters 2 
and 5). Bakhtin (1984: 7) drew from the literary works of Rabelais to sug-
gest that medieval people lived in two worlds: one dominated by the church 
and state and the other that freed ‘them completely from all religious and 
ecclesiastical dogmatism, from all mysticism and piety’. The carnival, he 
suggested, did not simply take place at a certain time but could be regarded 
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as another space for living or even as a ‘country’ that had to endure occa-
sional border skirmishes with ofﬁ cialdom. The carnival was a temporal and 
spatial place where the rules, restrictions and regulations of everyday life 
were turned upside down: it was characterized by laughter, offensiveness 
and excessiveness. Bakhtin explained that a carnivalistic sense of the world 
takes place when: 1) social hierarchies are disbanded, 2) eccentric or ‘unac-
ceptable’ behaviors are legitimated, 3) boundaries that normally separate 
are blurred (e.g. the profane with the sacred) and 4) acceptance and even 
celebration of the sacrilegious occurs. 
 Bakhtin lamented that the central and potentially therapeutic role of the 
carnival started to disappear during the 1800s but suggested that the regen-
erating aspect of the carnival still has holds in modern life via literature. 
Moreover, he argued that it is in these literary forms that a form of resis-
tance to authority could legitimately be expressed, as these literary works 
seemingly stand apart from the ‘real world’ but nevertheless offer opportu-
nities for thinking new ideas that allow for possibilities of resistance. 
 John Fiske (2005: 79) more recently suggested that elements of the car-
nivalesque survive within select television programs such as ‘ Rock n Wres-
tling ’ and various sporting practices. With respect to sport, he stated: 
 Carnival is an exaggeration of sport, the space for freedom and control 
that games offer is opened up even further by the weakening of the rules 
that contain it. Like sport, carnival abides by certain rules that give it 
a pattern, but unlike sport (whose rules tend to replicate the social), 
carnival inverts those rules and builds a world upside down . . . (Fiske, 
2005: 78). 
 Yet sport can also provide opportunities to invert social rules. Rugby 
union, for example, requires participants to normalize and even celebrate 
pain and violence (Pringle and Hickey, 2010). Laura Chase (2006: 229), 
more pointedly, stated that rugby participation requires ‘women to get 
dirty and bloody, and to hit other women’. She correspondingly argued, 
‘the image of the bruised and battered female rugby player exists in opposi-
tion to images of ideal female bodies and to notions of normative feminin-
ity’ (Chase, 2006: 229–230). The rules of femininity, according to Chase, 
are inverted when women play rugby, which offers a form of resistance 
and pleasure to the existing social order. The carnivalesque within women’s 
rugby potentially allows opportunities for existing hierarchies and social 
privileges to be subverted. 
 Roland Barthes (1975) writings on the pleasure of the text resonated 
with Bakhtin’s carnivalesque thesis by arguing that jouissance  is an embod-
ied pleasure that occurs at the point of breakdown between the cultural and 
the natural, such that the social self is lost in moments of ecstasy. He argued 
that given that subjectivity is constituted via ideology, jouissance  allows 
for the evasion of ideology. In this light, Barthes considered that certain texts 
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legitimate embodied pleasures that remove the reader from the constraints 
of the existing social order. Similar arguments could be made in relation 
to the embodied viewing pleasures of sporting contests. Indeed, many fans 
appear to lose their ‘selves’ in moments of sporting celebrations, yet how 
these transitory pleasures relate to the broader social order is a topic under-
examined (see Chapter 8 for further discussion of this topic). 
 During the enlightenment, with the rise of humanism, liberalism and 
nation states, the idea of happiness grew more secular and there was ‘an 
increased emphasis in Western cultures on pleasure as a path to, and even a 
synonym for, happiness’ (Kesebir and Diener, 2009: 61). Indeed, John Locke 
(1823: 245) stated: ‘Happiness then in its full extent is the utmost Pleasure 
we are capable of, and Misery the utmost pain’. Pleasure and the govern-
mental control of populations became an issue of increased philosophi-
cal and political concern. Indeed, the utilitarian philosophers (e.g. Jeremy 
Bentham, John Stuart Mill) inﬂ uenced ideas of governing populations in 
relation to how pleasure/pain was conceptualized. In 1879, Jeremy Bentham 
boldly asserted that: 
 Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters,  pain and  pleasure . It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and 
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all 
we say, in all we think . . . (Bentham, 1879: 1). 
 Bentham highlighted the social signiﬁ cance of happiness (which he con-
ceived as a predominance of pleasure over pain), yet he was concerned 
with the related chain of unintended consequences. He therefore encour-
aged government intervention to control the ‘sovereign masters’ of pleasure 
and pain. To help provide a pragmatic approach for governing pleasure, 
Bentham formulated the ‘greatest happiness principle’, which asserted that 
one must act so as to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
of people. He even provided a series of questions, called the  hedonic calcu-
lus , which he designed to determine the utility of an action. These questions 
related to the various elements of pleasure, including: its intensity, duration 
and certainty (i.e. how likely is it that pleasure will occur?), propinquity 
(i.e. how soon will the pleasure occur?), fecundity (i.e. will similar pleasures 
likely follow?), purity (i.e. what chances are there that displeasures will fol-
low?) and the extent of actions (i.e. to what extent will the experiencing of 
these pleasures affect other people?). 
 Modern gladiators, who run onto the football ﬁ elds and risk injury and 
pain for the delight of fans, could possibly be justiﬁ ed via Bentham’s utili-
tarianism. Indeed, critics of Bentham have been concerned that his hedonic 
calculus, at its extreme, could potentially justify the torture of an individual 
if it created more happiness than pain. Yet Bentham’s calculus was more 
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sophisticated than this critique, as he was aware that the sacriﬁ ce of a few 
could not be morally justiﬁ ed even if the overall pleasure balance within 
a society was increased (Kelly, 1990). Moreover, he was concerned about 
the individual pursuit of happiness, as he recognized that ‘selﬁ sh’ actions 
could create less pleasure more broadly. In this manner, he advocated for 
government legislation as a strategy to ensure the maximum pleasure and 
minimum pain for a population. Utilitarian thought, which John Stuart Mill 
contributed to, subsequently shaped governance strategies. 
 Thomas Jefferson, notably, believed that the ability to protect an indi-
vidual’s pursuit of happiness was a central justiﬁ cation for maintaining a 
system of governance. Although he regarded the pursuit of happiness as an 
‘inalienable right’, it has proven difﬁ cult for governments to develop appro-
priate legislation to ensure that all can pursue their own forms of happiness, 
as evidenced by ongoing political debates related to, as examples, the con-
sumption of drugs, various sexual acts, abortion and censorship. 
 Debates concerning the governance of sporting competitions are simi-
larly rife. Ongoing disputes surround sporting rules in relation to determin-
ing who might participate in particular sports or events (e.g. as related to 
age, sex, race, religion, ability and size), the rules of competition (e.g. there 
seems to be more action off the water than on in America’s Cup yachting 
events) and the prohibition of performance enhancement aids, for example. 
John Hoberman (2005) illustrates that the so-called war on drugs in sport 
shows no signs of victory or armistice. Individual experiences and interpre-
tations of sporting pleasure are undoubtedly shaped by public policy and 
broader systems of governance. 
 One set of governing rules that has shaped the opportunities to attain 
sporting pleasures relates to women and the historical and ongoing struggle 
for the right to participate in sport. Contemporary sport feminists owe a 
debt to Mary Wollstonecraft’s (1992) revolutionary work  A Vindication of 
the Rights of Women , published in 1792. Wollstonecraft is regarded as one 
of the founding feminist philosophers, and her text advocates equal oppor-
tunities for women. Her discussion concerning equal educational opportu-
nities was crafted partly in response to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s sexist belief, 
as expressed in  Emile , that women should be educated primarily for the 
beneﬁ t of men. Wollstonecraft’s advocacy for equal rights for women can 
also be read as a response to Thomas Jefferson’s 1776 declaration ‘that all 
men are created equal’ and that ‘men’ are ‘endowed with certain inalienable 
rights’. Wollstonecraft’s text encouraged recognition that women should 
also be considered ‘equal’ and undoubtedly also have inalienable rights. Her 
advocacy has encouraged more recent acceptance that women should have 
the right to pursue diverse sporting pleasures. For example, the adoption of 
the International Charter of Physical Education and Sport (UNESCO, 1978) 
promoted participation in sport as a  human right. Yet this charter has had 
little impact in some societies. Within Saudi Arabia, for example, it was ille-
gal for women to participate in the Olympics until recent times. 
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 In the early 20th century, Sigmund Freud (2010[1930]) was similarly 
concerned by the rules that regulate social relations and the production of 
a civilization that can undermine human happiness. He theorized that the 
unconscious mind or id was governed by the  pleasure principle and the 
associated innate drive to satisfy desires with urgency. The id, he claimed, 
runs supreme in the infant but as socialization processes occur and contrib-
ute to the development of the ego (or consciousness) the unreﬁ ned drive for 
pleasure is tempered by the  reality principle . The reality principle acknowl-
edges that there is still a fundamental human urge to satisfy the desires of 
the id, but this process is now tempered by social understandings. From 
these (essentialized) psychological propositions, Freud drew sociological 
insights. He proposed in his classic text,  Civilization and its Discontents , 
that civilization is based on the subjugation of the pleasure principle (Freud, 
2010[1930]). Freud (2010[1930]: 14), a devout atheist, argued that there 
is no god-given purpose to life, but if one examines ‘what human beings 
themselves reveal, through their behavior, about the aim and purpose of 
their lives . . . the answer can scarcely be in doubt: they strive for happi-
ness, they want to become happy and remain so’. Freud (2010[1930]: 24) 
acknowledged three primary threats to achieving sustained periods of hap-
piness: ‘the superior power of nature, the frailty of our bodies, and the inad-
equacy of the institutions that regulate people’s relations with one another 
in the family, the state and society’. He recognized that humans have little 
control over the ﬁ rst two threats but, given that humans create the rules that 
regulate social relations, the third threat could be ameliorated. However, 
Freud also stated that the social relations constructed by humans prove to 
be the greatest source of displeasure. In this respect, Freud highlighted an 
apparent paradox: humans strive for happiness, but the civilizations that 
they have created (presumably to increase chances of happiness) are also 
the prime source of human unhappiness. In similar respect, sport can be 
understood as having developed primarily for the purpose of promoting 
pleasure (although it is politically appropriated for other purposes), yet for 
many ex-participants, sport involvement eventually becomes a prime source 
of displeasure and many ‘retire’ injured, disappointed, frustrated. A ques-
tion of some import arises: how can sporting/broader culture be changed to 
allow for greater opportunities to attain happiness? 
 Herbert Marcuse (1961), of Frankfurt School fame, built on Freud’s 
proposition concerning civilization and the suppression of ‘innate drives’ 
and blended his insight with Marxist thought to produce a critique of capi-
talist society. He restated Freud’s thesis to suggest that pleasure is: 
 . . . subordinated to the discipline of work as fulltime occupation, to the 
discipline of monogamic reproduction, to the established system of law 
and order. The methodical sacriﬁ ce of libido, its rigidly enforced deﬂ ec-
tion to socially useful activities and expressions, is culture. (Marcuse, 
1961: 3) 
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 Marcuse (1961: 3) was concerned that this sacriﬁ ce of pleasure, for the 
progress of Western civilization and increased productivity, was bound 
up with ‘mechanization and standardization of life . . . mental impoverish-
ment . . . growing destructiveness (and). . . . intensiﬁ ed unfreedom’. His broad 
aim, accordingly, was to extend the sociological analysis of Freud to diagnose 
the general disorder of contemporary life and to encourage, at a fundamental 
level, social change to produce greater freedoms (primarily from the demands 
of capitalism and associated bureaucracy) and a happier society. 
 And at this point I end my short and selective history of Western pleasures 
to suggest, somewhat boldly, that Marcuse’s fundamental aim is similar to 
what all critical scholars desire, that is, to promote change in the social 
world so as to enable humans to have greater opportunities to experience 
various pleasures (without harming the pleasures of others) that can con-
tribute to the constitution of lives of self-perceived value, equity and quality. 
 CONTEMPORARY LESSONS LEARNT FROM 
DIVERSE SCHOLARLY WRITINGS ON PLEASURES 
 Jim Holt (2006) suggested in his insightful review of Darrin McMahon’s 
(2006) book,  Happiness: A History , that: 
 The history of the idea of happiness can be neatly summarized in 
a series of bumper sticker equations: Happiness=Luck (Homeric), 
Happiness=Virtue (classical), Happiness=Heaven (medieval), Happiness=
Pleasure (Enlightenment) and Happiness=A Warm Puppy (contemporary). 
(Holt, 2006: 20) 
 Holt’s satiric summary of the history of happiness suggests that humans 
have made little progress over the years in attempting to gain happiness 
or live lives of quality. In similar respects, the result of this condensed and 
selective tour of historical treatises of ‘pleasure’ could be summarized in 
relation to what is sometimes called the paradox of happiness: the more one 
searches for happiness the more elusive it proves. Nevertheless, my exami-
nation has illustrated the enduring social signiﬁ cance of pleasure/happiness 
and some of its associated issues and malleable characteristics. Pleasure can 
be understood as a primary existential project and as an organizing prin-
ciple of social life. The signiﬁ cance of pleasure is further illustrated by its 
productive abilities. Pleasure has been assumed by diverse scholars to lie at 
the constitutive core of identities, moral codes, governmental strategies and, 
more grandly, the development of human cultures. Pleasure can even pro-
duce ‘hyperreality’ or an experience that seems ‘more real than the circum-
stances of day-to-day existence’ (Lyng, 1990: 861). A skydiver told Stephen 
Lyng (1990), for example, that free-falling ‘is much more real than everyday 
existence’ (Lyng, 1990: 861). 
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 Yet pleasure has also been recognized as a productive force in eroding 
identity, removing consciousness and constituting a sense of disembodi-
ment. Indeed, some aim to ‘get lost in pleasure’ or ‘get out of it’ through 
pleasure. The pursuit of pleasure has also been linked with death, moral 
decline and the destruction of civilizations. The complex and seemingly 
contradictory qualities of pleasure can be understood as peculiarly constitu-
tive and destructive, embodied and disembodied, natural and socially con-
structed, political and personal, inconsequential and signiﬁ cant, good and 
evil, and serious and playful. Pleasure, accordingly, is experienced through 
multiple subjective lenses as linked to speciﬁ c discursive contexts. Despite 
its amorphous characteristics, pleasure is worthy of continued sociologi-
cal examination, particularly within the ﬁ eld of sport, which is intimately 
linked to participant desire to experience some form of pleasure. 
 More broadly, the critical aims of the selective scholars reviewed in 
this chapter (e.g. Wollstonecraft, Foucault, Nietzsche, Bentham, Bakhtin, 
Marcuse, Freud) can be conceptualized as broadly similar to what most con-
temporary critical researchers strive for; that is, the desire to offer critique 
and advocacy to improve quality of life, particularly for those who have less 
ability to exercise power. Within critical sport studies, for example, numer-
ous researchers have problematized various understandings and practices 
within sport (e.g. as related to gender, sexuality, violence, racism, disabil-
ity and injury) with the aim, we presume, to enhance the quality of life 
for sportswomen, sportsmen and youth. Despite this broad aim, relatively 
few critical sport scholars have explicitly examined sporting pleasures or 
how participants conceptualize a quality life. This seems somewhat remiss, 
as participation and consumption of sport is closely tied to the desire to 
experience pleasure (in one of its various forms). Indeed, in drawing from 
Aristotle, I suggest that happiness can be understood as the only ‘good’ that 
is always chosen as an end in itself and, correspondingly, the prime ‘good’ 
that comes from sport can be conceptualized as some form of pleasure. Yet 
we ask a more ethical question: can the cumulative experiences of sporting 
pleasures and pains constitute a life well-lived? 
 The following chapter takes heed of the advice that it is important to 
examine pleasure, but in recognition of the somewhat amorphous nature 
of pleasure asks: how best should pleasure be theorized? 
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across the Disciplines 
 Richard Pringle 
 ‘Detested sport,
 that owes its pleasures to another’s pain’ 
— (William Cowper, 1785) 
 ‘I adore simple pleasures. 
 They are the last refuge of the complex’ 
— (Oscar Wilde, 1891) 
 It is not Wimbledon, far from it, yet this second grade men’s interclub match 
has got me a little on edge. My opponent for the evening, the ‘robot’, has 
been mechanically returning my shots and, in moments of frustration, I’ve 
been making an increased number of unforced errors. I am breathing hard 
and deliberately walk slowly to retrieve the ball. The pain in my Achilles has 
returned and my palms are sweaty, making it difﬁ cult to grip the racket. The 
heat of the summer night is relentless and I wipe my hands once again on my 
shorts and use my sleeve to soak up the sweat on my brow. I’m only vaguely 
aware that I’m breaking social taboos by using my clothes in this manner. 
I move into position to return his serve and momentarily dance on my feet. 
The ball ricochets off of the top of the net and goes long. I’m pleased and 
move in a little closer for his second serve. I return it deep onto his back-
hand. He methodically plays it back down the line. I hit it harder this time 
and watch it arc onto his forehand with a pleasing top-spin bounce. Yet the 
ball returns with equal speed. I decide to play it onto his backhand once 
again but at the last moment resolve to drop it short. The indecision results 
in the ball hitting the net and falling on my side. The game’s lost, but I have 
a smile on my face; it’s a simple pleasure to be out on a summer’s evening 
having a hit. 
 This vignette of a fairly mundane sporting pleasure lacks the excitement 
of narratives of extreme sports, grand victories or elite competition. I am 
not surﬁ ng the hole in a slab, getting big air while snowboarding or playing 
in the grand ﬁ nal in front of a stadium of rapturous fans. Yet the pleasures 
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gained on the court have lead me to play tennis once or twice a week, most 
weeks of the year, for the last decade. I contend that these seemingly simple 
(but often under-examined) pleasures can be understood as  productive , as 
they are related to my desire to keep participating. My brief tennis vignette 
also subtly reveals the interplay of the body (e.g. sweat/pain/skill), psychol-
ogy (e.g. frustration, focus) and the socio-cultural context (e.g.  men’s com-
petitive tennis), in the production and experiencing of sporting pleasures 
(and displeasures). Yet the complex nature of pleasure, as already illustrated 
in Chapters 2 and 3, creates an issue with respect to how to theorize pleasure 
in order to examine it. Should embodied sporting pleasures be examined via 
sociological, psychological or biological lenses, or perhaps via some form of 
interdisciplinary theorizing? This chapter examines this issue, via analysis 
of sociological, psychological and biological theorizing and the problem of 
how to read pleasure across the disciplines. 
 THE CASE FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY READINGS 
OF SPORTING PLEASURE 
 Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning (1986) argued that an understanding of 
sporting emotions could not be adequately examined within only one of the 
academic disciplines. In their study of sport and the quest for excitement they 
highlighted the interconnectedness of the socio-cultural, psychological and 
bodily dimensions of social life and argued for the beneﬁ ts of interdisciplin-
ary analyses of sporting pleasures. Their promotion of interdisciplinarity was 
not new, as the advantages of examining a topic from multiple perspectives 
had been recognized much earlier. In the 1920s and 30s Marcel Mauss (Emile 
Durkheim’s nephew) discussed the ‘tripartite integration of the physiological-
psychological-sociological’ (cited in Probyn, 2004: 234) in order to promote a 
rapprochement between psychology and sociology and with desire to produce 
‘a more holistic and body-aware sociology’ (Ignatow, 2012: 4). Gabriel Igna-
tow (2012: 5) contended that it is only in recent years, however, that sociolo-
gists have returned to Mauss’s advocation for a ‘holistic position regarding 
the interactions of the bodily and mental dimensions of social life’. 
 Elspeth Probyn (2005), for example, argued for the beneﬁ ts of incorporat-
ing interdisciplinary research with respect to her innovative examination of 
shame (which is a more speciﬁ c emotion than the multifarious concept of plea-
sure). She advised that, instead of ignoring knowledge constructed within dif-
ferent disciplines, such knowledge could be critically appropriated and used: 
 Rather than dismissing or ignoring ideas about biology, psychology, 
and the innate nature of shame, let’s see what these ideas do. This is 
not to say that arguments about the physiology are any truer than those 
about its cultural expressions; it is to ask how very different ideas might 
mutually inﬂ ect and extend what we know. (p. xiii) 
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 The increased interest in interdisciplinarity has been fueled, in part, by 
the assumption that ‘disciplinary research has become too narrowly spe-
cialized’, parochial and is now providing ‘diminishing returns’ (Krishnan, 
2009: 2). Michael Atkinson (2011) appears to concur with Krishnan’s 
assumption, as he recently asserted that the sociology of sport is in dan-
ger of becoming too focused on a small range of topics and that the criti-
cal messages emanating from the ﬁ eld tend to circulate too narrowly. The 
broader academic growth in interdisciplinary research has also occurred in 
relation to the increased recognition of the complexity of social life, such as 
the recognition that the ‘nature versus nurture debate is a false dichotomy’ 
(Maguire et al., 2002: 184). John Evans and Brian Davies (2011: 263) even 
boldly asserted that all dualisms, once deconstructed, have ‘been found 
wanting, incapable of adequately addressing the complexity of embodied 
subjectivity . . .’. The increased recognition of the complexity of human 
lives has encouraged some critical scholars to promote boundary crossing 
among disciplines as a pragmatic strategy for enacting social change. Mary 
Fonow and Judith Cook (2005: 2225), for example, argued that: ‘It will 
take interdisciplinary teams of feminist researchers in different locations 
to carry out the types of research that our new conceptions of agency and 
activism demand’. 
 Despite the alleged advantages of interdisciplinary research, it has not 
generated signiﬁ cant attention within the sociology of sport (for exceptions 
see the report by the  Tucker Center for Research on Girls and Women in 
Sport, 2007; Avner et al., 2013; Thorpe, 2012a; Vertinsky, 2009). I assume 
that this is primarily because interdisciplinary research is difﬁ cult to do: 
as each discipline (and its underpinning paradigm) has its own language, 
epistemological beliefs and rules of legitimation. Theoretical understandings 
and concepts, accordingly, ‘cannot be simply borrowed across disciplines 
without mobilizing disciplinary boundary struggles’ (Papoulias and Callard, 
2010: 50). The issue of how to negotiate competing, or perhaps incommen-
surable, theoretical perspectives has accordingly made the task of develop-
ing a rapprochement between sociology and psychology, or the production 
of a more body-aware sociology, difﬁ cult. 
 Boundary struggles are also evident within the broad study of pleasure. 
Deborah Lupton (1998) noted, for example, that two prime  discursive 
understandings of pleasure tend to circulate in the literature and complicate 
analysis: one discourse positions pleasure as primarily an inherent human 
phenomenon and the other as broadly socially constructed. The view of 
pleasure as an inherent phenomenon typically regards pleasures as tied 
to the biological workings of the body, whereas the socially constructed 
view tends to suggest that pleasures  materialize via discursive practices of 
diverse descent. Lupton cogently argued that any discussion or analysis of 
pleasure can be understood as a subjective practice that draws upon select 
discourses (and/or theories) that are themselves contingent on speciﬁ c socio-
historic contexts. The subjective use of discourses/theories of pleasures, more 
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pointedly, works to focus attention on speciﬁ c ways of understanding plea-
sures while simultaneously obscuring other ways. Lupton thus intimates 
that an interdisciplinary analysis of pleasure is a fraught task, given the ten-
sions that exist between theoretical/discursive perspectives. 
 Despite such a discouraging intimation, Robert Donmoyer (2006) sug-
gests that it is still of pragmatic sense  to at least read the work stemming 
from other disciplines that concern the same topic. He explained that in 
socio-cultural ‘ﬁ elds, one must consider issues from a range of paradigmatic 
perspectives precisely because . . . what can be seen by examining the world 
through one perspective or paradigm may not be visible from the vantage 
point provided by another’ (Donmoyer, 2006: 23). 
 In this chapter, with particular respect to recognizing the alleged advan-
tages (and challenges) of  reading across the disciplines, I critically review 
diverse theories of sporting pleasures. I selectively focus on theories linked 
to sociology, biology and psychology. In doing this, I follow Norbert Elias 
and Eric Dunning’s (1986) call to study people ‘in the round’ with an inter-
est in knowing what different understandings of pleasure (and sport) can be 
gained via the employment of different theoretical lenses. 
 I begin this chapter by reviewing sociological research that has speciﬁ -
cally theorized sporting pleasure. Next, I turn my attention to biological 
understandings of sporting pleasures. I turn to biology, in part, because of 
recent claims about the biological dimensions of emotional life. For exam-
ple, Mary Immordino-Yang and Antonio Damasio (2011: 116) assert that 
‘modern biology reveals humans to be fundamentally emotional and social 
creatures’. They correspondingly claim that: ‘the study of emotions, creativ-
ity, and culture is ripe for interdisciplinary collaborations among neuroscien-
tists, psychologists and educators’ (Yang and Damasio, 2011: 128). Having 
examined the inﬂ uence of the social and biological on sporting pleasures, 
I turn to psychology to examine what is known about human ability to 
manage pleasures via training the mind. I speciﬁ cally examine Csíkszentmi-
hályi’s concept of ﬂ ow, given his contention that people who have a higher 
frequency of ‘ﬂ ow’ experiences are happier and have an enhanced quality of 
life. In the ﬁ nal section, I offer insight about the beneﬁ ts and weaknesses of 
reading theories of pleasures across the disciplines. 
 SOCIO-CULTURAL THEORIES OF SPORTING PLEASURE 
 With a few exemplary exceptions (e.g. Duncan and Brummett, 1989; Elias 
and Dunning, 1986; Wright and Dewar, 1997), the topic of pleasure lurked 
in the background of the sociology of sport throughout the 1980/90s, 
somewhat ‘like a ghostly shadow; neither fully present nor fully absent’ 
(Coveney and Bunton, 2003: 162). As in the wider discipline of sociology, 
analyses of social problems typically took precedence over the study of plea-
sure (O’Malley and Valverde, 2004). 1 The topic of pleasure was seemingly 
treated as ‘a taken-for-granted concept that need(ed) no further exploration’ 
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(O’Connor and Klaus, 2000: 370). This was remiss, as the politics of plea-
sure have real consequences. Lionel Tiger (1992: 6) acknowledged, for 
example, that: ‘there is a ﬁ erce endemic contest in many communities about 
who gets pleasure, which pleasure, when, with whom, and with what cost or 
tax’. The absent presence of sporting pleasures was, however, noted by some 
researchers. Jim McKay, Jennifer Gore and David Kirk (1990: 60) lamented 
that the sporting or physically educated body was ‘seldom portrayed as a 
pleasurable site for ecstatic, aesthetic, vertiginous, autotelic, sensuous and 
holistic experiences’. Joseph Maguire (1992: 118) similarly asserted, with 
respect to socio-cultural analyses of lived experiences of sporting pleasure, 
that: ‘(w)e are dealing here with a relatively unexplored landscape’. 
 In the last decade, with respect to the broader turn to the cultural and 
emotional/affective dimensions of social life, socio-cultural analyses of sport 
pleasure have gained increased attention. The growth in scholarly interest in 
sport pleasure has spurred examinations via a now-diverse range of social 
theories. Researchers, for example, have examined the socio-cultural artic-
ulations between sport and pleasure via: affect theory (e.g. Booth, 2008; 
Evers, 2006), Bourdiuean (e.g. Flectcher, 2008; Thorpe, 2012) and Deleuz-
ean theorizing (Pronger, 1999; Roy, 2013), edge theory (e.g. Laurendeau, 
2006; Lyng, 1990, 2005a; Olstead, 2011), ﬁ gurational sociology (Elias & 
Dunning, 1986), poststructuralism (e.g. Bridel, 2010; Fiske, 1991; Pringle, 
2009; Smith, 2000; Maguire, 2008; Thorpe, 2011) and postmodernism 
(Stranger, 1999). Richard Giulianotti (2005: 116) has further reported that 
interpretive and phenomenological approaches are ‘particularly germane for 
assessing intense corporeal experiences as lived, embodied practices, rather 
than in Cartesian terms that separate the mind and body analytically’. 
 Although a diverse range of sporting pleasures have now been examined, 
the pleasures of seemingly dangerous, deviant or extreme sports have gained 
speciﬁ c attention (e.g., Booth, 2008; Bridel, 2010; Donnelly, 2004; Evers, 
2006; Finn, 1994; Fletcher, 2008; Laurendeau, 2006; Le Breton, 2000; 
McNamee, 2007; Møller, 2007; Olivier, 2006; Olstead, 2011; Pringle, 
2009; Rinehart and Sydnor, 2003; Stranger, 1999; Thorpe, 2012b). These 
pleasures have often been examined in an attempt to understand why a 
growing number of individuals purposefully seek risk and how the post-
modern condition relates to this growth (e.g. Celsi et al., 1993; Le Breton, 
2000; Møller, 2007; Stranger, 1999). The online description for Jason 
Laurendeau’s (2012) book on BASE jumping, for example, begins by ask-
ing: ‘How does a human being get to the point where he or she considers 
jumping from deadly heights, simply for the thrill of it?’ John Smallwood, 
in commenting on the recent death of Caleb Moore during the 2013 
Winter X Games (after Moore crashed his snowmobile while attempting a 
backﬂ ip), raised a similar concern with why sport participants would volun-
tarily risk serious injury or death: 
 So I say it’s insane when I see some teenager shoot 30 feet into the air 
out of a halfpipe to do twists and ﬂ ips on a skateboard or a snowboard; 
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or when I see some free climber risk a fatal drop just to reach a summit; 
or when I see a young man trying to do a backﬂ ip on a snowmobile or 
a motocross bike. (¶ 1) 
 Yet the athletes who take seemingly ‘extreme’ but no doubt calculated 
risks expect to gain something in return, whether it is experiences of thrill, 
prestige, social capital or money (all of which are tied to pleasures). 
 Mark Stranger (2011) argued that to understand extreme sport participa-
tion it is necessary to examine how participants construct meanings about 
the sporting activity and social context that they are embedded within. In the 
following section I follow this advice by examining three socio-cultural 
theories that have been speciﬁ cally, and somewhat uniquely, developed to 
understand the pleasures of sport. I ﬁ rst examine Stephen Lyng’s edge the-
ory, then Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning’s quest for excitement thesis and, 
lastly, Mark Stranger’s postmodern theorizing on extreme surﬁ ng. 
 Edgework, Figurational Sociology and 
the Postmodern Sublime 
 Stephen Lyng (2005a: 5) synthesized ‘Marxian and Median ideas relating 
to the dialectic between spontaneity and constraint in social action . . . that 
give rise to “alienation” (Marx) and “oversocialization” (Mead)’ to inform 
the study of risk takers in late modernity. His challenge was to ‘explain how 
life-threatening experiences come to acquire a seductively appealing charac-
ter in the contemporary social context’ (Lyng, 2005a: 5). Lyng argued that 
the tension and alienation felt by workers in increasingly bureaucratized and 
disciplined workplaces results in few opportunities for spur-of-the-moment, 
innovative, self-realizing actions. To compensate for this predicament, Lyng 
(2005a: 4) speculated that some people are encouraged into ‘edgework’ 
activities, such as BASE jumping, free climbing and high-speed motorbike 
racing, where individuals negotiate the edges between ‘sanity and insanity, 
consciousness and unconsciousness, and . . . the line separating life and 
death’. The negotiation of the ﬁ ne line between such boundaries is assumed 
by Lyng to produce the thrill of edgework. Successful negotiation of risk 
activities, according to Lyng (1990), demands high levels of skill, control 
and concentration. Moreover, the greatest potential pleasure demands the 
greatest skill as it rests on the notion of ‘being able to  control the seemingly 
uncontrollable ’ (Lyng, 1990: 872). The experiences of pleasure, control and 
personal authorship, Lyng theorized, are alluring as they compensate for the 
dehumanizing conditions of post-industrial capitalism and allow possibili-
ties for discovering new forms of embodied existence. 
 Jason Laurendeau’s (2006, 2008, 2012) research on perceptions of 
risk/control, gender and social interactions within skydiving/BASE jump-
ing has drawn from edgework theorizing. His intriguing research reveals 
a depth of understanding about the culture of skydivers. Yet his research 
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does not directly support Lyng’s underpinning assumptions about  how the 
social conditions of late modernity are linked with the voluntary pursuit of 
risk (although I note that Laurendeau does not speciﬁ cally interrogate the 
skydiver’s motivations for risk taking). I suggest that Laurendeau’s work 
 indirectly illustrates shortcomings in Lyng’s thesis, as he reveals how play-
ing at the ‘edge’ does not constitute escape from the suspected problems of 
late modernity. More pointedly, he reveals how skydivers are still subject to 
numerous forms of external and internal controls and various relations of 
power (e.g. gender relations). In this manner, Laurendeau does not portray 
skydiving as a context that necessarily allows for spur-of-the-moment, inno-
vative and self-realizing actions. 
 Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning’s (1986)  quest for excitement  thesis has 
similarities to Lyng’s notion of compensatory edgework while also drawing 
indirectly on Freud’s argument that civilization is based on the subjuga-
tion of the pleasure principle. They argued that the smooth functioning of 
advanced societies is dependent on people being ‘able to maintain a fairly 
even and stable control over their more spontaneous libidinal, affective and 
emotional impulses as well as over ﬂ uctuating moods’ (Elias, 1986: 41). 
However, the costs associated with life in so-called civilized societies produce 
stress and, correspondingly, modern societies have developed a compensa-
tory range of leisure activities, including sport and television, that allow 
for mimetic expression of excitement and emotions that induce a cathartic 
response. The ‘well-tempered excitement’ (Elias, 1986: 48) experienced in 
sport, they argued, is produced by the creation of balanced tensions that 
do not have the same risks associated with other life situations yet can still 
evoke anxiety, pain, despair and euphoria. Thus, the pleasures of sport 
revolve around feeling alive through experiencing various emotions within 
relatively safe and controlled contexts. 
 Although Lyng’s (2005a) and Elias and Dunning’s (1986) theories offer 
valuable insight into the peculiar pleasures of sport, their attempts to con-
struct a ‘single, all-embracing theory’ (O’Connor and Klaus, 2000: 371) 
capable of accommodating the ﬂ uidity and multiple subjective experiences 
of pleasure has several weaknesses. Frith (1982: 503) had earlier argued that 
the possibility of a single theory of pleasure was ﬂ awed because ‘the con-
cept refers to too disparate a set of events, individual and collective, active 
and passive, deﬁ ned against different situations of displeasure/pain/reality’. 
More speciﬁ cally, Lyng (2005a) and Elias and Dunning’s (1986) theses fun-
damentally treat sport pleasure as a ‘response to circumstances—a reaction, 
a compensation, a transcendence’ (Donnelly, 2004: 43). Although some 
individuals may participate in edgework activities or sport as a form of 
reaction to life stresses, such explanations are not universally tenable. Many 
adults, for example, begin and  enjoy participation in sport as children, 
before one could convincingly argue that they are dehumanized, alienated 
or stressed via the pressures of civilized/modern life. In addition, as Peter 
Donnelly (2004) argued in relation to Lyng’s work, it appears a simplistic 
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generalization to suggest that people take voluntary risks in edgework leisure 
activities due to poor job or life satisfaction. Mark Stranger (1999), with 
more sting, argued that Lyng and Elias and Dunning undermine the plea-
sures experienced within sport and edgework activities, as these pleasures 
are not deemed signiﬁ cant enough to account for the direct involvement in 
the activity. That is, the pleasures of BASE-jumping or sport participation 
are supposedly not sufﬁ cient enough to motivate participation. 
 To explain the current popularity of high-risk sport, speciﬁ cally big 
wave surﬁ ng (which is currently dominated by male participants), Mark 
Stranger (1999) extended the work of Lyng (1990) and Elias and Dunning 
(1986) through drawing on Huizinga’s (1970) call to examine the aesthetic 
elements of play in combination with the postmodern recognition of the 
increased aestheticization and stylization of life. Stranger rejected the notion 
that sportspeople in search of thrill operate rationally in response to the 
social conditions. Through an extensive ‘surf safari’ ethnography he argued 
that ‘the allocation of “meaning” to risk-taking behavior is not so much an 
intellectual process as an affectual one that is based on desire rather than 
the ego; images rather than words . . . “Kantian intuition” rather than a 
“Kantian logic”’ (p. 270). This seemingly irrational response allows surfers 
to construct a belief system that positions surﬁ ng, irrespective of the risk, as 
‘good in itself’ (p. 270). 
 To explain this irrationality, Stranger drew on Kant and Lyotard’s writ-
ings on sublime judgment. Sublime judgment in Kantian terms is associated 
with the blurring of emotions linked to an understanding of the power, hor-
ror and beauty of nature. The mountain climber, for example, supposedly 
experiences the awe and terror of the mountain as sublime. Jean-François 
Lyotard (1994: 92) suggested that the contradictory and sublime feelings 
of ‘pleasure and pain, joy and anxiety, exaltation and depression’ medi-
ate a dedifferentiation between sign and signiﬁ er and reality and image. 
Stranger concludes that the aestheticization of surﬁ ng is driven by a sublime 
appreciation of the ocean and surf action so that the surfer, as blinded by 
emotion in pursuit of ecstasy and transcendence, operates with a distorted 
interpretation of risk: 
 The postmodern nature of surﬁ ng’s sublime is such that the distinc-
tion between the appreciation and the experiences become blurred. This 
dedifferentiation between the sign and signiﬁ er distorts any rational 
assessment of risk. Images of the sublime act upon the surfer’s ‘faculty 
of desire’, and in combination with the aestheticized perception of risk, 
override or circumvent the fear of personal harm. (Stranger, 1999: 273) 
 Although I am intrigued by Stranger’s turn to postmodern theorizing, it 
does not fully resonate with my own experiences. As a fair-weather surfer 
of limited ability I do not seek large waves to maximize thrill nor do I have 
overt concern about my image while surﬁ ng my longboard (or ‘log’ as keen 
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surfers might refer to it). In this respect, I suspect that I am not blinded by 
emotion when surﬁ ng. But I still enjoy the ‘rush’ of dropping in on a wave 
and the challenge of attempting to ride the face. The ‘rush’, or what surf aﬁ -
cionados call ‘stoke’ (Booth, 2011: 50), is vaguely similar to catching a wave 
when body surﬁ ng or boogie boarding, but standing on the water when 
surﬁ ng literally changes one’s perspective and appreciation. In my view, the 
rush—which is apparently the aspect of surﬁ ng that can encourage addictive 
behaviors—is tied to the thrill of accelerating the body while attempting to 
maintain balance. Yet Stranger does not adequately unpack the embodied 
experiences of stoke. 
 Surﬁ ng is undoubtedly linked to other pleasures such as the joy of being 
in the water, the social connections and identities formed via surﬁ ng and 
the possibilities for attaining a ‘ﬂ ow’ state (which is one important form of 
pleasure). Yet the embodied sensations and rush of catching the wave seem 
paramount. Thus, Stranger’s (1999) somewhat disembodied account seems 
remiss. His ﬁ nal sentence, a quote from a professional surfer (cited in Booth, 
1995a: 205) appears to contradict his prime argument, as it suggests that 
surﬁ ng simply ‘feels good’. The pro-surfer crudely exclaimed: ‘I surf for the 
same reasons I perpetually ﬂ og myself to the heights of orgasmic pleasure—
because it feels good’ (Stranger, 1999: 274). Such a comment works to dis-
miss the postmodern theorizing purported by Stranger. Conversely, I doubt 
whether Stranger would analyze masturbation and subsequently theorize 
that it involves a ‘postmodern incarnation of the sublime that distorts ratio-
nal risk assessment’ (Stranger, 1999: 265). Nevertheless, it is also remiss to 
simply accept that a sporting experience simply ‘feels good’. 
 There are many social theories that can be used to examine the ‘feel good’ 
aspect of sport and movement (e.g. phenomenology, interpretivism, etc.), 
but in recent years affect theorizing has gained attention. My concern with 
Stranger’s postmodern thesis has resonance, correspondingly, with why a 
number of researchers have turned to affect theorizing. That is, the increased 
interest in affect theorizing has been purported as a reaction to the  alleged 
limitations of postmodern/poststructural thought and its apparent neglect 
of ‘matter, biology and energetic forces’ (Liljeström and Paasonen, 2010: 1). 
Marianne Liljeström and Susanna Paasonen argued: 
 . . . that there has been an overuse of textual metaphors in cultural 
theory since the 1990s (as in the readings of bodies, landscapes or arti-
facts as texts to be interpreted or ‘decoded’ without accounting for their 
materiality): a broad range of intellectual concerns are bypassed or even 
lost if focusing solely on the semantic and the symbolic. (Liljeström and 
Paasonen, 2010: 1) 
 This argument asserts that poststructural/postmodern theorizing neglects 
the ‘biological or material’ in favor of reading the body as a text. Although such 
an argument is subject to debate (e.g. see Larsson, 2012; Wetherell, 2012), 
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in the following section I examine what is known about sporting pleasures 
from studies emanating from the biological sciences. 
 BIOLOGY AND SPORTING/MOVEMENT PLEASURES 
 The ‘fear fall’ or the ‘big drop’ or whatever it was called dominated the 
skyline of the local amusement park. I’d often seen it from the motor-
way, but it looked more ominous closer up. My two boys had coerced 
me into taking them to the theme park in order to celebrate a recent 
birthday and they were now attempting to coerce me into riding this 
‘tower of pointless risk’. I had no real qualms about riding the tower—
at least I think I thought not—but nevertheless wasn’t all that keen. 
I told them: ‘well . . . we will need to see if you are both tall enough 
to take the ride’. I was conﬁ dent that my youngest son would be too 
short but added another proviso: ‘and have a look at the length of the 
queue. If it’s too long, we’ll leave it’. They both raced to the bottom of 
the tower and my younger son soon yelled back: ‘we’re in luck Dad, 
we’re both tall enough and there are only two people in the line’. His 
excitement was palpable. ‘What?’ I thought to myself. ‘Why are there 
only two people in the line?’ Without further time to think, we were 
strapped into the ride, with our bodies rising into the blue sky and our 
legs kicking free. As the ride paused for effect at the tower’s pinnacle, 
I had time to check my loose restraint safety system and ﬁ nd a but-
ton. I wondered if I pushed it whether the seatbelt would un-buckle? 
I then had a moment of panic, as I thought that my younger son would 
undoubtedly ﬁ nd this button and push it. I leaned over to check his 
restraint system and the plummet began. ‘Jeeeesus’, I unexpectedly 
yelled. And with the momentary weightlessness my sons and I hollered 
with excitement. Soon we were back on the ground and I was surprised 
to ﬁ nd myself laughing with genuine animation, talking at great volume 
and seemingly unaware that others were looking at me a little strangely. 
I didn’t care, I was experiencing a distinct body rush, it was tangibly 
electric and I loved it. 
 The vignette above refers to an incident from several years ago. Its occurrence 
encouraged me to reﬂ ect further about the complexity of sporting/movement/
body pleasures. I had not been expecting much of a thrill from the amuse-
ment ride—a ride that took place in a controlled consumer environment, 
free from  real risk—so the distinctly tangible and electrifying body rush was 
unexpected. It was, however, similar to experiences I’ve had at the end of 
a fast ski run or catching a wave. At times I have even laughed excitedly—
perhaps hooted is a more apt adjective—while experiencing these move-
ment thrills. I speculate that the amusement park ‘rush’ was likely related to 
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some physiological or neurological response, possibly the release of massive 
amounts of ‘fright and ﬂ ight’ hormones, as my surprisingly pleasurable reac-
tion appeared to transcend the social. 
 In a previous study on rugby pleasures (Pringle, 2009), my adopted theo-
retical position drew from Foucault and revolved around skepticism that 
pleasure was ‘the simple product of biological, psychological, or personal 
appetites’ (Pringle, 2009: 214), as I accepted: 
 . . . that human experiences of pleasure are constituted, negotiated, 
and organized through available discourses and are simultaneously the 
product of certain forms of training or disciplining. Different systems 
of thought and mechanisms of power in different epistemes, therefore, 
shape how humans experience, understand, manage, and use pleasure. 
Pleasure, in this manner, can be understood as a multifaceted, complex, 
subjective, and, at times, seemingly contradictory emotional experience. 
(Pringle, 2009: 214) 
 My electrifying response to the thrill ride, however, encouraged me to 
think more about the  unconscious workings of my body. I surmised that 
the socio-cultural context and my body played a complex role in how 
I experienced and made sense of the amusement park ride. Yet I was uneasy 
to suggest that biological responses played an  active role in this complex 
process. Such a suggestion, I believed, would counter my anti-essentialist 
and social-constructionist positions. I was also aware that within the soci-
ology of sport, understandings of the body were dominated by social-
constructionist views and, conversely, biological knowledge was seldom 
considered. Perhaps this was simply because biological dimensions were 
taken for granted by sociologists of sport or, more likely, deemed irrelevant 
to socio-cultural concerns, given ‘our’ social focus. Alternatively, biological 
knowledge was perhaps marginalized because it has been linked with the 
problems of genetic determinism and was, therefore, viewed as a poten-
tially dangerous topic (e.g.  The New York Times Magazine dropped plans 
to print an adaption of Jon Entine’s 2008 text,  Taboo: Why Black Athletes 
Dominate Sports and Why We’re afraid to Talk About It , due to editorial 
concerns of a public backlash). 
 Despite such risks, a number of prominent critical researchers from 
diverse disciplines (e.g. Connell, 1995; Massumi, 2002; Probyn, 2005; 
Sedgwick and Frank, 1995; Thrift, 2004; Wetherell, 2012) have advocated 
the importance of re-considering the relevance of biology for understand-
ing socio-cultural issues. Andrew Sparkes and Brett Smith (2012: 168) have 
highlighted how a growing number of researchers are now exploring and 
undertaking ‘more sensuous forms of scholarship in sport and physical cul-
ture’. This increased interest in the senses and embodied pleasures reﬂ ects a 
concern that previous research about the moving body ‘ignored the ﬂ eshy, 
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messy, material (biological) and sentient body along with the lived practical 
experiences of those who inhabit . . . “real” bodies’ (Sparkes and Smith, 
2012: 168). In this section, I follow this lead and examine the role of the 
biological in relation to movement pleasures. I begin by providing a case 
history of scientiﬁ c examinations of ‘runner’s high’ and then consider how 
such knowledge might be theorized to enrich socio-cultural understandings. 
 SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF RUNNER’S HIGH 
 I have not experienced runner’s high, but it has been variously described as 
a sense of euphoria experienced at the end of an endurance run, of peace 
or relaxation while running, alleviation of pain or boundless energy. The 
phenomenon is well known by runners and many I have talked to report 
that they have experienced it, but that it is a somewhat elusive state. Most 
of these runners assumed that it was related to a release of endorphins and/
or associated with the development of a transcendental state due to a pro-
found connection between the running ‘body’ and mind. These assumptions 
perhaps stem from related biological and psychological research. So what is 
the biological knowledge of getting ‘high’ from running? 
 Michael Sachs (1980) ﬁ rst examined runner’s high in an attempt to 
connect its occurrence to various psychological factors (e.g. relaxation, 
distraction, alleviation of personal problems, hypnotic susceptibility, tran-
scendence). Sachs subsequently examined running as a potential source of 
therapy or of addiction. By 1985, vigorous exercise had been correlated 
with reductions in anxiety and the development of a sense of wellbeing; 
hypothesized causes included endorphin release and monoamine metabo-
lism (Morgan, 1985). Researchers had already found that plasma levels of 
ß-endorphin, a morphine-like substance originating in the body, were sig-
niﬁ cantly elevated after aerobic exercise (Carr et al., 1981; Pierce et al., 
1993). These endorphins have also been found to be produced in times of 
pain, excitement, sexual activity and through consumption of spicy food. 
Concerns were raised, however, that ß-endorphins could not be source of 
runner’s high due to the blood-brain barrier, which was assumed to prevent 
the endorphin from affecting the mental state. Sforzo and colleagues (1986) 
subsequently found that circulating ß-endorphin levels could not cross the 
barrier, as the molecules were too big. In addition, the usage of ß-endorphin 
blockers did not appear to prevent the occurrence of runner’s high. The 
notion of endorphins and runners high was subsequently assumed by some 
to be a ‘myth perpetuated by pop culture’ (cited in Dietrich and McDaniel, 
2004: 536). 
 Attention turned to examination of other neurotransmitters, including 
other endorphins, dopamine, ACTH, serotonin and endocannabinoids. 
Dietrich and McDaniel (2004), for example, found that exercise increases 
blood serum levels of endocannabinoids and that these naturally occurring 
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neurotransmitters produce psychological states that closely parallel several 
experiences described as similar to the runner’s high. They claimed: 
 Activation of the Endocannabinoids and exercise endocannabinoid sys-
tem also produces sedation, anxiolysis, a sense of wellbeing, reduced 
attentional capacity, impaired working memory ability, and difﬁ culty in 
time estimation. This behavioural proﬁ le is similar to the psychological 
experiences reported by long distance runners. (Dietrich and McDaniel, 
2004: 539–540) 
 Although different researchers examined the inﬂ uence of different neu-
rotransmitters, interest in endorphins was rekindled by the research of 
Henning Boecker and colleagues (2008), who found evidence that brain 
endorphins were inﬂ uenced by exercise and connected with states of eupho-
ria. Their study involved brain scans of ten experienced distance runners 
who had all previously experienced runners’ highs. The scans were able 
to map the workings of the endorphins after strenuous running. Findings 
revealed reductions occurred to opioid receptor sites in the frontolimbic 
region of the brains of the runners, a region known to play a key role in 
emotional processing and the generation of affective states. More speciﬁ -
cally, these reductions were closely correlated with the runner’s self-reported 
accounts of euphoria. Boecker and colleagues concluded that the endog-
enous opioid system played a speciﬁ c role in the generation of the runner’s 
high. In a more general view, they suggested: 
 . . . it might also be assumed that opioidergic effects in frontolimbic brain 
structures mediate not only some of the therapeutically beneﬁ cial con-
sequences of endurance exercise on depression and anxiety in patients 
(Morgan 1985) but also the addictive aspects of excessive sports, where 
injured athletes continue their training in spite of detrimental conse-
quences to their health . . . (Boecker et al., 2008: 2530) 
 In this manner, Boecker and colleagues (2008) connected the results of 
their neurological study to social issues (e.g. running addiction, depression, 
anxiety). 
 Rod Dishman and Patrick O’Connor (2009) cautioned that, although 
the study by Boecker et al. was innovative, it should  not be assumed that 
the ‘truths’ about the runner’s high are now known. In contrast, they sug-
gested that no single neurotransmitter could explain mood states, as they 
depend on complex interactions between numerous other physiologic and 
neurologic factors. Dishman and O’Connor neglected, however, to com-
ment on the various social and psychological dimensions that interact with 
endogenous factors. 
 So how should a critical sociologist make sense of these biological ﬁ ndings? 
On the one hand, I suggest it seems reasonable to conclude that biological 
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factors (i.e. brain endorphins) potentially play a role in shaping  some runners’ 
experiences of pleasure. Yet, if this is the case, then can it also be assumed 
that ‘biology’ plays a productive role in shaping running desires, motiva-
tions, identities and relations of power? Such a contention, for some, might 
be dangerously close to biological determinism, whereas for others, it might 
underestimate what they believe is a closer link between culture and biology. 
Biocultural synergy theorists, for example, ‘argue that biology and culture 
are mutually dependent and continually transform each other throughout 
the organism’s lifetime’ (Levenson, Soto and Pole, 2007: 782). Lisa Black-
man’s (2008) interpretation of embodiment similarly rests on the notion that 
‘nature’ and ‘culture’ are not separate entities that interact but that ‘they pro-
duce each other in such a way that it is impossible to disentagle one from the 
other’ (Blackman, 2008: 35). 
 Regardless of one’s position, the pragmatics of how to represent bio-
logical and sociological knowledge within accounts of sporting pleasures 
are under-examined. If sociology of sport researchers are to produce such 
accounts, at the least, we need to draw on theories that acknowledge the 
possibilities of the interweaving of biology and the socio-cultural. In the 
following section, I examine Raewyn Connell’s concept of body-reﬂ exive 
practices as one such theoretical possibility. 
 Body-Reﬂ exive Pleasures 
 In her critical analysis of masculinities and gender relations, Raewyn Connell 
(1995: 60) provocatively argued that bodies share in ‘social agency, in gen-
erating and shaping courses of social conduct’. She acknowledged that the 
materiality of bodies matters, as bodies can do certain things and not others 
and are, therefore, ‘substantively in play in social practices such as sport, 
labour and sex’ (Connell, 1995: 58). She argued further that bodies could 
also be recalcitrant as they ‘disrupt and subvert the social arrangements 
into which they are invited’ (Connell, 1995: 58). She illustrated this point, 
somewhat explicitly, by drawing from the reﬂ ections of one of her inter-
viewees, Don Meredith (a pseudonym). Meredith told Connell of a surpris-
ing sexual experience and his pleasant reaction to it. Meredith stated: ‘She 
really touched a spot well and truly’ (Connell, 1995: 60). This embodied 
experience subsequently encouraged his recalcitrant desires to eventually 
partake in a homosexual relationship. 
 Connell referred to Don Meredith’s experience as a ‘body-reﬂ exive prac-
tice’ (Connell, 1995: 61) and suggested that Meredith’s experience was 
‘not simply a matter of social meanings or categories being imposed on 
Don’s body, though these meanings and categories are vital to what hap-
pens’ (Connell, 1995: 62). Instead, she asserted, body-reﬂ exive practices 
call or interpolate these meanings and categories ‘into play, while the body 
experience—a startling joy—energizes the circuit’ (Connell, 1995: 62). In 
this seemingly iconoclastic manner, Connell suggested that: ‘agency does not 
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seem too strong a word for what Don’s sphincter, prostate gland and erectile 
tissues . . . managed between them’ (Connell, 1995: 61). 
 Connell’s (1995) thesis rested on the assumption that the anatomical 
structures of the body, in relation to their neurology and physiology, play an 
 active role in shaping social performances, interactions and contexts. The 
body’s ‘agency’ was therefore assumed to shape how humans make mean-
ings of certain pleasurable experiences: 
 Through body-reﬂ exive practices, bodies are addressed by social pro-
cesses and drawn into history, without ceasing to be bodies. They do 
not turn into symbols, signs or positions in discourse. Their materiality 
(including material capacities to engender, to give birth, to menstruate, 
to open, to penetrate, to ejaculate) is not erased, it continues to matter. 
The social process of gender includes childbirth and child care, youth 
and aging, the pleasures of sport and sex, labour, death from AIDS. 
(Connell, 1995: 64–65) 
 Connell’s reassertion of the biological inﬂ uence of social life appeared to 
run counter to the then-dominant theoretical position within sociological 
studies that centered on what Papoulias and Callard (2010: 32) called ‘the 
“social construction” of whatever object or phenomenon was under analy-
sis’. Connell’s thesis, accordingly, encourages further consideration about 
how biology is enmeshed with the socio-cultural. 
 Bryan Turner (1984: 1) argued that the body was initially neglected by 
social theorists because: ‘Any reference to the corporeal nature of human 
existence raises in the mind of the sociologist the spectre of social Dar-
winism, biological reductionism or sociobiology’. Anti-essentialists, as an 
example, have long been concerned about attempts to naturalize behaviors 
and/or abilities in relation to the apparent functioning of particular bodies 
(e.g. ‘sexed’ or ‘raced’ bodies), as such attempts can be used to justify social 
injustices and stall possibilities for social transformation. 
 Connell, however, was not guilty of biological determinism in promoting 
her theory of body-reﬂ exive practices. Although she suggested that it is nec-
essary for bodies to be seen ‘as sharing in social agency, in generating and 
shaping courses of social conduct’ (Connell, 1995: 60), she did not suggest 
that bodies determine behavior. More pointedly, Connell gave preference to 
the ‘social’, as she understood bodily experience as a form of ‘propriocep-
tive consciousness’. Yet this prioritizing of the social body over the physi-
ological body has also generated critique. 
 Peter Douglas (1996), for example, suggested that Connell positioned 
the body as ‘nothing more than the awareness of physiological excitations 
by consciousness’ (Douglas, 1996: 112) and, therefore, was ultimately con-
cerned with how individuals’ construct meanings about bodily sensations. 
Douglas lamented that Connell did not fully bring the ﬂ eshed body into 
social theory, but indirectly reproduced ‘the culture/nature dichotomy in 
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the guise of a conscious subject/material body (or mind/body) dichotomy’ 
(Douglas, 1996: 112). 2 Douglas argued further that Connell’s prioritization 
of consciousness meant that her theoretical position subsequently ignored 
the workings of genes, hormones and brain structures and closed ‘off any 
dialogue with the insights provided by ﬁ elds such as genetics, neurophysi-
ology, embryology, endocrinology, primatology and evolutionary theory’ 
(Douglas, 1996: 112). He added: ‘To assert that these ﬁ elds have no contri-
bution to make towards an understanding of the social “agency” of bodies 
is both dogmatic and unhelpful if the body is to become a meaningful pres-
ence in social theory’ (Douglas, 1996: 112). 3 
 Yet for many years, socio-cultural researchers have been reluctant to draw 
from the biological sciences. Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995), for 
example, noted in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek manner that one of the key 
assumptions that constituted ‘good’ socio-cultural theory from the 1980s to 
the mid-1990s was that: ‘The distance of any such account from a biological 
basis is assumed to correlate near-precisely with its potential for doing jus-
tice to difference (individual, historical and cross-cultural), to contingency, 
to performative force and to the possibility of change’ (Sedgwick and Frank, 
1995: 1). In more recent years the apparent need for socio-cultural theo-
rists to distance themselves from biological sciences has been questioned. 
Indeed, nine years after Sedgwick and Frank’s (1995) observations, Nigel 
Thrift (2004) offered a new set of assumptions about what constituted good 
socio-cultural theory. He asserted provocatively that: ‘Distance from biol-
ogy is no longer seen as a prime marker of social and cultural theory . . .’ 
(p. 59) and that ‘naturalism and scientism are no longer seen as terrible sins’ 
(Thrift, 2004: 59). 
 Although Thrift’s (2004) claims about what constituted good theory 
may have contemporary currency in some ﬁ elds of socio-cultural study 
(e.g. affect theorizing), his assumptions would likely be debated within sport 
sociology at present time. Relatively few sociologists of sport appear to 
have reduced their distance from biology or embedded science within their 
research (see as exceptions Booth, 2011; Thorpe, 2012). Douglas Booth 
(2011: 54) commented that the interface between the biological and social 
is ‘currently little understood’ and ‘we know very little about the neurobiol-
ogy and psychophysiology of pleasure induced by movement’ (Booth, 2011: 
154). 4 At a broader level, affect theorists who have allegedly ‘recalibrated 
the relationship between (cultural) theory and science’ (Papoulias and 
Callard, 2010: 30), such as Brian Massumi (2002) and Nigel Thrift (2004), 
have generated signiﬁ cant research interest but have also been subject to 
stern critique. Concern has been raised that Massumi and Thrift cherry-
picked psychobiological ﬁ ndings in order to primarily support their under-
pinning political arguments (Papoulias and Callard, 2010; Wetherell, 2012) 
(see Chapter 8 for discussion of affect theorizing in relation to the pleasures 
of viewing the Olympics). 
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 Although I am supportive of attempts to blend the biological and the soci-
ological to enhance understandings of sporting pleasures, my provisional 
exploration suggests it is clearly a difﬁ cult task to do well. Margaret Wetherell 
explained this difﬁ culty by drawing from Donna Harraway’s string anal-
ogy: ‘it is like holding two pieces of string and discovering that they 
are just the ends of the most enormous, chaotic, knotted ball that needs 
to be unraveled’ (cited in Wetherell, 2012: 50). Indeed, there are difﬁ cul-
ties with 1) selecting (and understanding) alternative disciplinary knowl-
edges, 2) working within competing theoretical frameworks and 3) limited 
exemplars of what constitutes good boundary crossing. There is still value, 
however, in reading across the disciplines and in conceptualizing that the 
relationship between the social/discursive and bodies/physiology can oper-
ate in a reciprocal manner. 
 In this chapter thus far, I have considered the place of social context 
(e.g. as related to extreme sport pleasures and the postmodern condition) 
and biology (e.g. endorphins) in the shaping of sporting pleasures; these 
are factors that individuals have seemingly little ability to control. In con-
trast, individuals have some ability to control their own ‘thinking’. In the 
following section, accordingly, I turn to psychology and examine Mihály 
Csíkszentmihályi’s notion that an individual can enhance his/her feelings 
of happiness through controlling consciousness, and, that sport is a prime 
context within which this can occur. 
 PSYCHOLOGY: FLOW, HAPPINESS AND SPORT 
 Mihály Csíkszentmihályi’s (1990) seminal work on the psychology of opti-
mal experience  has  had considerable inﬂ uence within happiness studies, 
positive psychology and to a lesser extent sport and exercise psychology, 
yet it is rarely drawn upon within the sociology of sport. In this section, 
I examine his concept of ﬂ ow to consider the possibilities of a rapproche-
ment between psychology and sociology and to gain a rounder comprehen-
sion of sporting pleasures. 
 Csíkszentmihályi (1990) proposed that individuals are  happiest when 
they are in the ﬂ ow state: a state of consciousness that produces a feeling 
of involvement, concentration and absorption; a state without ego, where 
one becomes lost in the activity so that there is little awareness of time or 
effort. Flow, he reported, produces a sense of transcendence and is so enjoy-
able that individuals desire to repeat the activity. From this brief deﬁ nition 
of ﬂ ow, it might be assumed that ﬂ ow is akin to an ‘out of it’ experience, 
perhaps similar to the pleasurable and potentially habit forming effects of 
drugs or alcohol, where one’s identity and anxieties can be momentarily 
lost in a state of intoxication. Yet Csíkszentmihályi (1997) clearly differ-
entiated the ﬂ ow state from intemperance by emphasizing that ﬂ ow occurs 
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when challenges are high and skills are used to the utmost. He was critical 
of passive leisure, as he believed it required little skill or challenge (e.g. 
watching sport). 
 To help justify his particular claims about optimum experiences, Csík-
szentmihályi differentiated pleasure from happiness. He deﬁ ned pleasure as 
‘a feeling of contentment that one achieves whenever information in con-
sciousness says that expectations set by biological programs or social con-
ditioning have been met’ (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990: 45). Sleep, rest, food and 
sex, he suggested (as similar to Aristotle, see Chapter 3), can all be pleasur-
able activities but they may not make an individual happy. He claimed that 
happiness, in contrast, is similarly linked to meeting a prior expectation or 
desire, but also conveys a sense of achievement and of moving forward. The 
self, he claimed, grows in complexity as a consequence of performing enjoy-
able activities and of being in the ﬂ ow state. Yet being in the ﬂ ow state does 
not mean that individuals also feel happy, as to feel happiness an individual 
must focus on her/his internal state and this would disrupt the ﬂ ow experi-
ence. Csíkszentmihályi suggested, accordingly, that it is only after immer-
sion in the ﬂ ow state that an individual can reﬂ ect and recognize that the 
experience was enjoyable and, thus, recognize retrospectively the feelings of 
happiness. 
 Csíkszentmihályi argued that ﬂ ow is the key to a quality life. His research 
ﬁ ndings suggested, for example, that individuals who often experience the 
ﬂ ow state have higher self-esteem, tend to be happier and are less prone 
to stress-related illness. In apparent agreement with some Eastern philoso-
phies, Csíkszentmihályi concluded that it is the ability to be totally absorbed 
in the challenge of an activity that is the prime ingredient in the constitu-
tion of a satisﬁ ed life. Similar sentiments have been expressed by the French 
philosopher Alain (1868–1951), who stated: ‘A man is occupied by that 
from which he expects to gain happiness, but his greatest happiness is the 
fact that he is occupied’ (in Holt, 2006: 20). Alain’s point is that it does not 
matter what one is absorbed in, as it is the process of absorption that cre-
ates happiness. But if this is the point, I start to question Csíkszentmihályi’s 
devotion to ﬂ ow, as I wonder whether the idea of total absorption in a chal-
lenge, irrespective of what the challenge is, is something that humans should 
strive for to achieve happiness. 
 Csíkszentmihályi (1990: 2) reported that his major discovery was that 
happiness ‘is a condition that must be prepared for, cultivated and defended 
privately by each person’. Although he recognized that happiness was an 
elusive goal, he nevertheless claimed that an individual could work at con-
trolling her/his consciousness and have greater opportunity for experiencing 
ﬂ ow states and achieving happiness. 5 He noted that participation in a sport 
could provide a good opportunity to experience ﬂ ow and gain happiness. 
 Csíkszentmihályi (1990: 51) claimed that games and sports have been 
‘developed over the centuries for the express purpose of enriching life with 
enjoyable experiences’. Yet, as many ex-sport participants know, sport 
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participation does not come with a guaranteed outcome. Sport psychologist 
Susan Jackson (2000: 135) stated that, ‘although sport begins as an activity 
viewed as fun, it can yield a mix of positive and negative emotion’. This 
recognition has underpinned her examinations of the connections between 
ﬂ ow and sporting experiences with a particular desire to know how to 
enhance the positive experiences of sport participation. The results from 
Jackson’s studies suggest that athletes who perform at their best (i.e. peak 
performances) tend to describe their experiences in a manner that matches 
the characteristics of ﬂ ow (e.g. see Jackson and Kimiecik, 2008). That is, 
athletes talk of a narrow focus of attention, calmness, feelings of control 
and conﬁ dence and positive affects. Yet athletes can also experience the ﬂ ow 
state and perform below their best. Thus, they can be totally absorbed in 
the sporting activity, participate with conﬁ dence and feelings of enjoyment 
but also perform relatively poorly. Irrespective of an athlete’s performance 
levels, the experiencing of ﬂ ow is recognized as ‘a motivating factor to par-
ticipate in sport on a regular basis’ (Jackson and Kimiecik, 2008: 385), yet 
evidence also suggests that athletes experience ﬂ ow relatively infrequently. 
 Somewhat ironically, in my view, a key element of sport— competition—
 has been postulated as a prime factor that decreases the likelihood of expe-
riencing ﬂ ow, as competition encourages athletes to focus on the outcome 
or the extrinsic aspects of the experience, and such a focus can disrupt the 
feeling of being totally absorbed in the activity. Surfers, for example, report 
greater experiences of ﬂ ow while free surﬁ ng in comparison to participating 
in surf competitions (Jackson, 2000). 
 In an attempt to understand how to induce ﬂ ow states in sport com-
petitors, sport psychologists have examined the psychosocial mechanisms 
that correlate with ﬂ ow experiences. Findings suggest that athletes who are 
conﬁ dent, intrinsically motivated, optimally aroused and who use precom-
petitive plans are more likely to experience ﬂ ow during sport competitions 
(Partington, Partington and Olivier, 2009). Yet such knowledge does not 
necessarily help athletes experience ﬂ ow, as such psychosocial variables 
are difﬁ cult to control in the extrinsically focused and dynamic context of 
competitive sport. An athlete can only feel conﬁ dent, for example, if she/he 
believes that they can perform to a certain level and have a good chance of 
winning. 
 Csíkszentmihályi’s concept of ﬂ ow is typically recognized as a valuable 
contribution to understandings of sporting pleasure and many readers may 
resonate with the concept. Yet, as with any theory, it has also been the sub-
ject of critique. Karen Fox and Gordon Walker (2002: 17) suggested that: 
‘Csíkszentmihályi presents people’s experiences as if they were self-evident 
and in no need of explanation regarding race, class, culture, ethnicity, abil-
ity, sexual orientation, cultural forces, power situatedness, and so forth’. 
In other words, they argued that experiences of ﬂ ow within sport can be 
understood as constituted/mediated by a host of socio-cultural factors, but 
these factors have not been typically subject to interpretation or critique. 
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For example, ﬂ ow has been typically represented as a positive and desirable 
state to strive for, yet there has been little analysis of the power relations 
associated with experiencing ﬂ ow in a sporting context. It is possible, for 
example, that one athlete’s ability to achieve a ﬂ ow state might be to the 
detriment of another player’s enjoyment and, over time, his/her continued 
participation in that sporting activity. In this sense, the ﬂ ow state could 
potentially promote and suppress levels of happiness simultaneously. Analy-
sis of ﬂ ow, accordingly, demands a broader socio-cultural critique of the 
sporting environment and the associated workings of power to determine, 
in part, whether the ﬂ ow state—beyond the individual athlete—is a key 
aspect for promoting happiness more broadly. 
 Karen Fox and Gordon Walker (2002) have also raised concern that 
Csíkszentmihályi’s focus on the balance between challenge and ability works 
to marginalize many other sporting pleasures. For example, there is little 
challenge associated with watching televised sport, yet many sport fans gain 
immensely from viewing  their teams and athletes (see Klugman, 2013). In 
contrast, Csíkszentmihályi would likely regard this form of sporting activ-
ity as passive and, accordingly, as a leisure activity that does not improve 
the quality of life. Sport fans would disagree with such biased assertions. 
Csíkszentmihályi’s dismissal of so-called passive sporting pleasures is accord-
ingly akin to ignoring the complexity, nuances and subtleties of sport as a 
socio-cultural phenomenon. 
 Leonard Wankel (1997) raised a similar issue in discussing the limitations 
of the concept of ﬂ ow. Wankel suggested that sport participants do not make 
distinctions between enjoyment and pleasure, as Csíkszentmihályi does, 
and that their reports on what they enjoy goes far beyond the ‘matching 
of perceived skills and challenges’ (Wankel, 1997: 103). Although Wankel 
acknowledged the importance of Csíkszentmihályi’s work, he argued that 
the ﬂ ow experience is just one of many enjoyable aspects associated with 
sport and that these diverse aspects need to be considered to fully under-
stand pleasurable sporting experiences. 
 As a further cautionary note on the concept of ﬂ ow, it is also apparent 
that the experiencing of ﬂ ow can be detrimental to an individual. As Csík-
szentmihályi (1990) acknowledged, ﬂ ow can have a negative aspect when 
one becomes addicted to the experience, ‘at which point the self becomes 
captive of a certain kind of order, and is then unwilling to cope with the 
ambiguities of life’ (Csíkszentmihályi, 1990: 62). Sarah Partington and col-
leagues’ (2009) examination of the dark side of ﬂ ow in association with 
addiction to the thrill of big wave surﬁ ng is enlightening. Their interview 
study revealed that surfers often experienced ﬂ ow and were subsequently 
seduced to attempt to surf bigger, faster and correspondingly more danger-
ous waves. They concluded: ‘Surfers talked of being addicted to the euphoric 
feelings experienced, and were willing to continue to surf despite family 
commitments, injury or potential death, to replicate these sensations’ (Par-
tington, Partington and Olivier, 2009: 183). In this manner, they illustrated 
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that the experiencing of ﬂ ow does not necessarily lead to growth and a qual-
ity of life, but at times to a problematic dependence on feelings of euphoria 
and total absorption. 
 Like Wankel (1997), I recognize ﬂ ow as a particular form of pleasure 
that can be gained while playing sport. Yet I am aware that Csíkszentmi-
hályi’s theorizing acts to position alternative sporting pleasures as inferior, 
ﬂ awed and/or socially insigniﬁ cant. For example, the ecstatic pleasures of 
fans celebrating a victory on the buzzer, the mundane pleasures of jogging 
(see Chapter 7), the ascetic pleasures of body-building or the social plea-
sures of feeling part of a team are all marginalized via the concept of ﬂ ow. 
The everyday lives of numerous sport participants and fans revolve around 
a range of these pleasures and, as such, have considerable social signiﬁ cance 
and deserve greater examination. 
 FINAL WORDS: ON THE MERITS OF 
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 
 In this chapter I examined the possibilities of gaining a more holistic or 
rounder understanding of sporting pleasures through reading across the dis-
ciplines. I also aimed to promote thinking outside the boundaries, encour-
age a more ‘body-aware sociology’ and challenge dualistic thinking that 
proposes pleasure as either biologically or socially constructed. Through 
undertaking this endeavor I now accept that our psychologies, social con-
texts, experiences and biologies all play a role in shaping our diverse under-
standings of what is pleasurable in sport. I even accept the possibility that 
the biological and socio-cultural work in an entangled and reciprocal man-
ner in the production of pleasures. Yet, given the difﬁ culties associated with 
undertaking interdisciplinary research, I am not advocating that sociologists 
of sport should undertake such research. Nor do I think that this review will 
promote a rapprochement between psychology and sociology. 
 Moreover, I suggest it would be problematic to attempt to assimilate 
sociological, biological and psychological theories into one explanatory nar-
rative of sporting pleasure. Firstly, such a grand theory would be destined 
for failure given the malleable, multiple and contradictory characteristics 
of pleasure. Secondly, it would be a very difﬁ cult task given the competing 
epistemologies and research approaches. Indeed, I could not bracket out my 
own paradigmatic biases in the writing of this chapter and, as such, they 
are evident in relation to my critiques of Lyng’s edgework theorizing and 
Csíkszentmihályi’s concept of ﬂ ow. 
 More broadly, I suggest that all researchers have paradigmatic biases 
(including those who study the biological dimensions of pleasure via the sci-
entiﬁ c method) and tend to gravitate towards using particular theories that 
resonate with their paradigmatic views. Within this book we do not pro-
mote a particular theoretical lens for the examination of sporting pleasures. 
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Although we ﬁ nd attempts to offer singular, all-embracing theories of plea-
sure somewhat problematic, we recognize that all theories have strengths 
and weaknesses and that there is value in examining pleasure from multiple 
perspectives. We, accordingly, draw on diverse theories (e.g. affect theoriz-
ing, queer theories, Foucauldian), concepts (e.g. subjective wellbeing, eudai-
monia) and research approaches (e.g. autoethnography, poetic sensibilities, 
in-depth interviews, textual analysis) to examine and reveal the complex, 
diverse and ﬂ uctuating character of sporting pleasures. 
 Although there were clear contrasts and contradictions between the soci-
ological, biological and psychological theories reviewed, there was also a 
degree of overlap: all of the theories suggest that experiences of pleasure 
(e.g. ﬂ ow, thrill, runner’s high) can motivate ongoing sporting involvement. 
Pleasures, as such, can be habit forming and shape routines, interactions, 
identities and risks of injury. In this respect, adults should think carefully 
about the sporting activities that they encourage youth to experience. 
 NOTES 
 1 . A cursory scan of articles published in journals concerned with the socio-
cultural analysis of sport throughout the 1980s and 1990s could afﬁ rm 
O’Malley and Valverde’s (2004) broad thesis. Indeed, the overwhelming focus 
on sporting issues would create the impression that sport is deeply problematic: 
a social institution that is overtly sexist, racist, homophobic, violent, nation-
alistic, discriminatory, ageist, disableist, highly commodiﬁ ed and corrupt. The 
sporting world, accordingly, was not primarily portrayed as a context that has 
capacity to generate excitement, inspiration, passion, love and pleasure. Yet 
the sporting world can simultaneously be understood as a social problem and 
as a source of pleasure. 
 2 . Similar criticisms have been directed at Foucault’s ideas on the production of 
docile and disciplined bodies. Lisa Blackman (2008) contended that although 
Foucault was concerned about how ‘bodies’ become disciplined, his ideas 
illustrated that the workings of disciplinary power primarily work on minds 
rather than bodies; thus, she alleged that Foucault privileged the social and 
subsequently propped up a mind/body dualism. Chris Shilling (1997: 79) simi-
larly argued that, ‘Foucault’s epistemological view of the body means that it 
virtually  disappears as a material phenomenon’. He added: ‘the body tends to 
become an inert mass controlled by discourses centered on the mind (which 
is treated as if abstracted from an active human body)’ (Shilling, 1997: 79). 
Shilling’s concern of the dominance of the social over the body is reﬂ ected in 
the following observation of patriotic sport fans ‘moved’ by hearing a national 
anthem: ‘If tears well up in their eyes, this discourse of nation has become 
powerful enough to produce involuntary physiological responses in those 
subject to it’ (Miller et al., 2004: 86). The ‘physiological’ is thus deemed by 
Toby Miller and colleagues to be subject to social discourse, but the reciprocal 
notion that biology can impact discursive understandings is rarely considered. 
 Håkan Larsson (2012) suggested that such critiques of Foucault misun-
derstand his prime arguments. Larsson argued that Foucault’s understanding 
of the materiality of bodies, offers a viable ‘alternative to the conventional 
and dualist understanding of the relationship between mind/subject and body/
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object’ (Larsson, 2012: 7). Larsson drew from Foucault’s detailing of his gene-
alogical approach to illustrate that bodies (which breath, reproduce, digest 
etc.) do not exist in some alternative reality prior to social understanding but 
‘materialize’ simultaneously with the social. Thus bodies are always biologi-
cal and social entanglements. Judith Butler (1990) clariﬁ ed this contention by 
stating: 
 The body gains meaning within discourse only in the context of power 
relations. Sexuality is an historically speciﬁ c organization of power, dis-
course, bodies, and affectivity. As such, sexuality is understood by Foucault 
to produce ‘sex’ as an artiﬁ cial concept which effectively extends and dis-
guises the power relations responsible for its genesis. (Butler, 1990: 92) 
 Foucauldian analysis does not, however, embed scientiﬁ c understandings of 
bodies within its theorizing but encourages researchers to critically analyze 
how such knowledge is enmeshed with the workings of power in the produc-
tion of particular bodies. Thus, Foucauldian analysis primarily encourages 
critique of the discursive effect of scientiﬁ c knowledge. 
 3 . In opposition to Douglas’s criticisms concerning the perpetuation of a mind/
body dualism, Ian Wellard (2012) drew from Connell’s concept of bodily 
reﬂ exive practices to examine how bodies, and associated pleasurable capaci-
ties, inﬂ uence understandings of self within physical education. He argued 
that Connell’s theorizing encourages examination of the dialectical relation-
ship between the social, the embodied and bodily practices. Such examination, 
he illustrated, is of importance within physical education as it can be used as 
a framework to help students develop reﬂ exive understandings of movement 
pleasures. 
 4 . However, a small number of socio-cultural scholars of sport have drawn on 
the concept of ‘affect’ (which can have linkages to biology) to examine embod-
ied pleasures (e.g. Booth, 2008; Evers, 2006; Humberstone, 2011; Pavlidis 
and Fullager, 2013; Thorpe and Rinehart, 2010a). 
 5 . In contrast to Csíkszentmihályi’s conclusion, David Lykken and Auke Tellegen 
(1996: 189) fatalistically suggested from their study of over 3000 fraternal 
and identical twins that: ‘it may be that trying to be happier is as futile as try-
ing to be taller and therefore is counterproductive’. 
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and Pleasure 
 Jayne Caudwell 
 The title of this chapter conjures up lists of potential topics for discussion, 
most of which remain signiﬁ cant to the study of sport. Here are a few exem-
plars I offer for consideration, and the imagination, in terms of their indi-
vidual and collective connections with sport and feminism: 
 . . . aesthetics and pleasure, beauty and pleasure, carnivalesque and 
pleasure, femininity and pleasure, pleasure and danger, pleasure and 
patriarchy, pleasure and pornography, the politics of pleasure, fatness 
and pleasure, spectator pleasure, queerness and pleasure, discipline and 
pleasure, guilty pleasure . . . 
 As a has-been lesbian feminist as well as a radical feminist; a current 
queer feminist, poststructuralist feminist and sport feminist; and at times a 
wannabe non-feminist (I return to this in the conclusion), it is difﬁ cult to 
know where and how to start this chapter. Perhaps one easy place, for me, 
is to re-work the claim: ‘The pleasure of the rich is the labour of the poor’ 
(Elias, cited in Tester, 1989); in other words, to focus on gender relations 
within sporting contexts and the idea that ‘the pleasure of men is the labour 
of women’. Or, as stated by Paul Willis (1994: 35): ‘the female athlete is ren-
dered a sex object—a body which may excel in sport, but which is primarily 
an object of pleasure for man’. Such a focus would be easy to achieve and 
a recent public event (at least in the UK)—Wimbledon tennis—provides a 
somewhat ridiculous reminder of how women athletes are expected to serve 
as ‘beauties’ for the pleasures of the traditional hetero-patriarchal male gaze: 
 I just wonder if her dad [Marion Bartoli], because he has obviously 
been the most inﬂ uential person in her life, did say to her when she 
was 12, 13, 14 maybe, ‘listen, you are never going to be, you know, a 
looker. You are never going to be somebody like a Sharapova, you’re 
never going to be 5ft 11 [ sic ], you’re never going to be somebody with 
long legs, so you have to compensate for that. You are going to have to 
be the most dogged, determined ﬁ ghter that anyone has ever seen on the 
6244-599d-1pass-005-r01.indd   64 4/3/2015   12:35:25 PM
Studying Sport, Feminism and Pleasure 65
tennis court if you are going to make it . . .’ (John Inverdale, BBC Radio 5 
Live, commentating on the winner of the women’s singles, 2013) 
 To concentrate on this and similar incidents certainly addresses some of 
the items on the list of possible pleasure-related topics for feminist scrutiny. 
Also, it allows a critical exploration of long-standing feminist debates; for 
example, discussions within key texts such as Naomi Wolf’s  The Beauty 
Myth (1991). And yet, we know gender relations are a complicated set of 
lived social and cultural schemas. Another troublesome—for me anyway—
example of how complicated gender relations are for some people in some 
societies is reﬂ ected in the recent public debates, again in the UK, concerning 
the launch of a new journal:  Porn Studies. 
 The editors, Feona Attwood (Middlesex University) and Clarissa Smith 
(University of Sunderland), and Routledge are pleased to announce the 
launch of a new journal devoted to the study of pornography. 
 Porn Studies  invites submissions for publication, commencing with its 
ﬁ rst issue in Spring 2014. Articles should be between 5000 and 8000 words. 
Forum submissions should be 500–1500 words. Book reviews should 
be between 800 and 1500 words. Submissions will be refereed anony-
mously by at least two referees. (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/cfp/
rprncfp.pdf) 
 One of my points here is how topics concerning women, gender and 
aspects of pleasure—aesthetics and pleasure, beauty and pleasure, feminin-
ity and pleasure, pleasure and patriarchy, pleasure and pornography, the 
politics of pleasure, spectator pleasure, guilty pleasure—are re-presented 
through UK institutions such as the BBC and Routledge Publishers. In other 
words, the feminist politics of pleasure appear to be largely ignored in pub-
lic, institutionalized forums. Public discourses, reﬂ ected by the ease with 
which John Inverdale presents his highly hetero-patriarchal gender logic and 
the mundanity of a new  Porn journal alert, appear to conceal the depth and 
range of tensions surrounding gender relations and pleasure. 
 For the purpose of this chapter, I trace two pleasure-related themes perti-
nent to sport from the list above. By doing so, I aim to offer a particular view 
of the feminist study of sport and pleasure, albeit merely a slice of the fuller 
picture. The two themes selected have been somewhat artiﬁ cially separated 
out for the purpose of writing. First, I discuss sport, femininity and pleasure. 
Within this discussion, the emphasis is on women and Western practices of 
beautiﬁ cation. For a long time, feminists have problematized the natural-
izing and normalizing of feminine beauty: ‘Taught from their infancy that 
beauty is woman’s scepter, the mind shapes itself to the body, and roaming 
round its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its prison’(Wollstonecraft, 1992: 
132). Patriarchy, heteronormativity and neoliberal capitalism—to name 
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a few structural systems—co-operate in processes and practices of beau-
tiﬁ cation. However, the politics of beauty and the politics of gender are 
not straightforward. As Colebrook (2006: 132) suggests, it is not simply a 
question of ‘. . . is beauty good or bad for women?’ Instead, beauty relates 
to embodiment, sensual enjoyment and pleasure as well as to ideologies of 
the aesthetic. 
 Second—and as I have suggested not wholly independent of the ﬁ rst 
theme—I consider sport, sexuality and pleasure. More speciﬁ cally, I explore 
the concept of  jouissance , which has been used variously to refer to joyous-
ness, enjoyment, deep pleasure and sexual orgasm (the latter is the case 
within French language and meaning). I turn to the French feminists Hélène 
Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva to offer a new way to consider 
sport and the social signiﬁ cance of pleasure. 
 SPORT, FEMININITY AND PLEASURE 
 If we follow the line of thought laid down by feminist Mary Wollstonecraft 
and later by feminists Germaine Greer (1970), Simone de Beauvoir 
(1976[1949]), Naomi Wolf (1991) and Sheila Jeffreys (2005), we can con-
clude that female beauty—manifest through traditional embodiments 
of femininity—ultimately functions to oppress women. For many femi-
nists, feminine beauty becomes a ‘beauty myth’ (Wolf, 1991), because any 
pleasure and power women might believe beauty grants them is false. As 
Colebrook (2006: 131) highlights: 
 . . . the real effect and intent of the beauty myth was the maintenance 
of women in a subordinate position: as long as women’s only means of 
power and persuasion was through the body, there could be no genuine 
liberation. 
 Within this kind of feminist theorizing, feminine beauty serves to lure, 
manipulate and debase women. Women, through the embodiment of feminin-
ity, become passive objects of a patriarchal cultural construct, namely feminine 
beauty. However, in terms of the pleasure project, perhaps an interesting ques-
tion to ask is: to what degree might there be productive potential in feminin-
ity and feminine beauty? In addressing this question, Colebrook (2006: 132) 
goes some way to providing a response for us when she considers if ‘. . . the 
concept of the beautiful and its associations with pleasure, non-cognition and 
the particular, might itself form a counter tradition’. She explores the idea of 
how feminine beauty can provide counter tradition by turning to philosophies 
of the aesthetic and making a challenge to current philosophies of aesthetics. 
In particular, she argues that: ‘Prior to the establishment of a discourse on aes-
thetics, the concept of beauty had always involved considerations of pleasure, 
judgment, value, life, social esteem and ethics’ (Colebrook, 2006: 135–136). 
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By re-considering these aspects of beauty, she argues we are able to engage 
with beauty in a more nuanced way, a way that takes us further than the senti-
ments of the ‘beauty myth’. 
 Before we can view feminine beauty as pleasurable, it is worth noting 
Colebrook’s general approach to a feminist politics of beauty. For instance, 
she advocates a framing that positions the pragmatic over the moral, that 
is: ‘. . . how is beauty deﬁ ned, deployed, defended, subordinated, marketed 
or manipulated, and how do these tactics intersect with gender and value?’ 
(Colebrook, 2006: 132). Moving from this starting point, her overall aim is 
to redeem aesthetics (as well as a philosophy of aesthetics) and to retrieve 
female beauty/beautiﬁ cation from contemporary commercial industries and 
markets of spectatorship. Thus, she makes concerted attempts to liberate 
the pleasures of the feminine and beautiful from the manufactured. 
 For the purpose of discussion in this chapter, Colebrook offers a way 
forward. She does this by ﬁ rst acknowledging that gendered, misogynist and 
sexist assumptions work to deﬁ ne beauty, which we witness in John Iverdale’s 
commentary about Marion Bartoli, and second, by suggesting that ‘. . . the 
experience of the beautiful  as feeling  can be neither explained away nor 
reduced to its political uses and abuses’ (Colebrook, 2006: 134). From the 
point of view of the latter, it is clear that women, speciﬁ cally sportswomen, 
are so much more than passive, one-dimensional objects for the male gaze. 
In other words, Bartoli’s feminine and sporting subjectivities are far more 
intricate and complicated than Iverdale is able to impose. 
 With the aim of furthering the feminist analysis of femininity and plea-
sure in physical activity contexts, I turn to three areas in which women 
participants claim enjoyment via the feminine. These are Burlesque, Roller 
Derby and the ﬁ gure of the Lesbian Femme (cf. Caudwell 2006). 
 Although burlesque is not viewed a sport, it undoubtedly provides an 
interesting starting place for a discussion of femininity and pleasure in phys-
ical activity contexts. In burlesque, feminine subjectivities are re-shaped 
and re-cast via caricature and extravaganza. These aspects—caricature and 
extravaganza—intend to subvert the structures of traditional forms of femi-
ninity and challenge conﬁ gurations of gendered being. Similar to Bakhtin’s 
(1984) take on carnival and the carnivalesque (see Chapters 2 and 3 for 
discussions on Bakhtin), the event (burlesque) suspends familiar rules and 
regulations surrounding the feminine, and therefore provides opportunity 
for pleasurable, albeit ritualistic, acts of femininity. 
 Following a Bakhtinian line of thought, carnivalesque, and by exten-
sion burlesque, mess with the usual hierarchies of power and subordination 
apparent in societies and cultures. This messing and messiness of normative 
hierarchies functions to rupture the norms. However, according to Bakhtin, 
individuals are never entirely free of tradition and the orthodox, but, impor-
tantly, in these moments of rupture they are free to indulge in fun, enjoy-
ment and the sensual. It is these dimensions of pleasure that are signiﬁ cant 
to this study of sport. 
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 Burlesque has a long history, within which there have been shifts in 
genre and popularity. Past and present subcultures of burlesque are fertile 
ground for feminist analysis, especially the seemingly pleasurable attachment 
women participants—both women performers and women spectators—
have to the feminine. These pleasures relate to adapting and re-creating the 
feminine, which can include the embodiment of excessive forms of feminin-
ity. In her article on ‘Showing the Girl’, Debra Ferreday (2008) scrutinizes 
the ‘new’ burlesque—as opposed to burlesque of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 
19th centuries—for its feminist and queer potential. She does not disregard 
the long histories of burlesque, and in summing up her argument references 
the broader subcultures of burlesque in their capacity to: 
 . . . powerfully dramatize the fact that femininity is not reducible to 
a single object or practice: that feminine identities are multiple, and 
may be experienced as pleasurable. However, it is not enough simply to 
claim that femininity is always a source of parodic pleasure. Like drag, 
burlesque also works to destabilize the ways in which dominant femi-
nine identities become normalized (2008: 49). 
 Ferreday’s research consistently engages with the tensions between the 
feminine, the pleasurable and a feminist politics of feminine beauty. Through 
a focus on burlesque websites and online fan communities, she charts the 
ways the subcultures appropriate feminist sensibilities. However, similarly 
to Colebrook, she remains mindful of broader feminist debates surround-
ing women’s beauty, processes of beautiﬁ cation and consumer cultures. In 
a lengthy discussion of  Red Lipstick (52) she makes the important, and 
perhaps overlooked, point that it is too simplistic to assume women are 
duped into femininity, and that women’s feminine embodiments are merely 
a matter of adding on ‘whatever society is selling’ (Ferreday, 2008: 52–53). 
Borrowing from Sabina Sawhney (2006), Ferreday posits: 
 Feminism seems to be relying on the notion that the authentic identity of 
woman would be revealed once the drag is removed. That is to say, when 
her various ‘clothes’—racial, ethnic, hetero/homosexual, class textured—
are removed, the real, genuine woman would appear whose identity 
would pose no puzzles. (Sawhney, 2006: 5 in Ferreday, 2008: 52) 
 This is a signiﬁ cant insight, and it is at this juncture, with these feminist 
arguments in mind, that I move to consider the reemergence of roller derby 
and its relationship with femininity and pleasure. 
 The historical and contemporary analyses of roller derby often document 
the juxtaposition of this full contact sport with notions of Western [white] 
femininity (Carlson, 2010; Finley, 2010; Pavlidis, 2012; Storms, 2008). Much 
of the research captures the productive links between women participants’ 
various embodiments of the feminine and womanhood, and the apparent 
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aggressive nature of the activity. Ethnographic research (see Carlson, 2010; 
Finley, 2010; Pavlidis, 2012) of roller derby subcultures reveals the poten-
tial for women and girls to take a Do-It-Yourself (DIY) approach to deﬁ n-
ing their own femininities and feminine subjectivities during roller derby 
participation. 
 Her hair is in child-like pigtails, her tattoos glare through strategically 
placed holes in ﬁ shnet stockings, and a short skirt reveals the pink pant-
ies that match the tight T-shirt altered to provide the most potent view 
of breast cleavage. The image portrays the outlandish, extravagant con-
ventions of sexuality associated with the tawdriness of “pin-up girls.” 
And yet the salience of knee pads, shin pads, elbow pads, and helmets 
resist simple assessments of sexualized femininity, as do facial scowls 
and the brutish postures through which she powers her way around the 
skating rink. (Finley, 2010: 359–360) 
 The contrasts and seeming incongruities evidenced in the above descrip-
tion demonstrate the scope of roller derby—as well as other ‘aggressive’ 
sports—for providing women the opportunity to make messy traditional 
notions of femininity, especially in competitive sporting contexts. Like the 
hyperbole in burlesque, the DIY femininity in roller derby might seem a 
smack in the face to some forms of feminism. And yet, many women par-
ticipants testify to how much they enjoy the embodiment of the feminine. 
 Various studies (Carlson, 2010; Finley, 2010; Pavlidis, 2012) highlight 
the role of satire, parody and mockery within roller derby subcultures and 
the ways these aspects undermine traditional notions of femininity, espe-
cially the idea of emphasized femininity. This turn to humor, the amusing 
and comical suggests laughter and fun. At this level of the humorous, roller 
derby provides women an enjoyable sport/leisure opportunity to be both 
competitive and playful. Pleasure is gained through exaggeration and the 
dramatic, theatrical, creative and expressive. For example, Carlson (2010) 
shows how skaters develop enjoyable derby personas and derby bodies 
through names and clothing, and Finley (2010) analyzes how these strate-
gies serve to positively reclaim pariah femininities such as ‘bitch’, ‘slut’ and 
‘witch’. 
 Within sport studies literature, much has been made of the gender apol-
ogetic as well as the gender unapologetic (cf. Broad, 2001). Emphasized 
femininity sits within the idea that women are complicit in the production 
of traditional gender relations through the passive reproduction of extolled 
heterosexual femininity. Carlson, (2010), Finley (2010) and Pavlidis (2012) 
document the ways roller derby women disrupt and alter these familiar 
meanings of sporting emphasized femininity. For instance, Finley (2010) 
argues that, via anachronistic imagery, roller derby women reveal the absur-
dity of the social construction of traditional gender relations and concomi-
tant femininity. Carlson (2010) and Pavlidis (2012) focus on the productive 
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potential of subcultural style as a means to contest the lineage between femi-
ninity, gender relations and legitimized heterosexual desirability. Drawing 
from connections with punk rock, subcultural style and the work of Dick 
Hebdige (Carlson, 2010), they show how music and gender politics (Pavlidis, 
2012), and chaos and appearance (Carlson, 2010) function to generate plea-
surable feminine subjectivities for roller derby women. 
 In the introduction to his book  Subculture: The Meaning of Style , Hebdige 
(1979) tells of the sparse conditions facing Genet’s (1966[1949]) imprisoned 
thief. Of signiﬁ cance, to this prisoner, is a tube of Vaseline: ‘This “dirty, 
wretched object”, proclaiming his homosexuality to the world, becomes for 
Genet a kind of guarantee—“the sign of a secret grace which was soon to 
save me from contempt”’(Hebdige, 1979: 1). For Hebdige, objects such as a 
tube of Vaseline carry remarkable signiﬁ cance in terms of subversion (‘secret 
grace’), refusal and revolt (‘to save me from contempt’). They are implicit to 
breaking the so-called natural order and they reﬂ ect the power of subordinate 
groups to triumph within such obdurate order and ordering (e.g. prison). 
 I think we can assume that subordinate groups gain pleasure during these 
moments of expression (via objects and style), and successful rebellion. This 
is why scholars of roller derby have turned to Hebdige’s work. Perhaps of 
greater signiﬁ cance, however, is the scope for exploring the sensual, pleasur-
able meanings attached to the object: a tube of Vaseline. In this instance, 
Hebdige falls short of such an explicit analysis, and I wonder how a queer 
lens might interpret the following passage: ‘. . . I turn the back of the regula-
tion sheet towards me. Smiles and sneers, alike inexorable, enter me by all the 
holes I offer . . . ’ (Genet, 1966[1949] in Hebdige, 1979: 1). Although plea-
sure is not Hebdige’s main project in his treatise of style, is it worth wonder-
ing how Genet’s prisoner gains pleasure in such harsh, bleak and presumably 
brutal homophobic conditions. The symbolic value of a tube of Vaseline, the 
images conjured by the references to turning the regulations away, holes and 
entry, might suggest that this prisoner’s sexuality provides some pleasures in 
spite of the palpable institutionalized and omnipresent hostility. 
 By no means directly related, but nevertheless a return to how roller 
derby women experience their embodied sexuality, Carlson (2010: 433) 
writes: ‘Importantly, skaters are not simply women-turned-Amazons; their 
mini-skirts, bras, and panties suggest a sexually availability that is belied by 
the aggression implied by their weaponry and injuries’. It is apparent, in the 
roller derby literature to date, that women are maneuvering within tradi-
tional femininity and producing feminine subjectivities that behold pleasure 
through asserted feminine style. Finley (2010) argues that this maneuver-
ing extends beyond individual women and can be described as intragender. 
In other words, she studies the relations between femininities and between 
women and demonstrates how this might help us identify emerging expres-
sions of pleasurable femininity in sport. A speciﬁ c example, provided by 
Finley (2010: 375), is ‘derby crushes’. This is when women, regardless of 
their sexuality, ‘. . . love to watch another woman skate’. 
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 The potential pleasures within intragender relations in sporting contexts 
might be further explored through a consideration of the ﬁ gure of the les-
bian femme. As a way to pick up this discussion, I start with Erica Rand’s 
declaration: 
 . . . I love spectating consensual gender, just as I love participating in it. 
Skating suits my strong identity as femme, and while I don’t want ﬁ gure 
skating to require femininity, I experience it, as I’ve said, as an expres-
sion of mine. (2012: 98) 
 In her book  Red Nails, Black Skates (2012), Rand offers an eloquent and 
fascinating account of her experiences of skating. In the text, she identiﬁ es 
as a ‘. . . queer femme dyke’ (p. 52); ‘. . . yep, a femme jock’ (p. 98), and 
explores the many aspects of femme (p. 5, 52, 115), superfemme (p. 165) 
and her ‘. . . own pleasures in gender’ (p. 98). Related to contexts both 
on the ice and off the ice, Rand provides insights into the pleasures of the 
queer erotic: ‘Personally, I love being the object of someone’s taste for queer 
femmes, which makes me feel recognized and possibly in for a great time . . .’ 
(Rand, 2012: 233). She goes on to claim that ﬁ guring skating, especially at the 
Gay Games, was not the ‘event for spectators in search of butch eye candy’ 
(Rand, 2012: 5). 
 At the same time as celebrating the femme (and butch), Rand is careful 
to highlight the ways femininity remains unﬁ xed and how slippages occur 
when moving between athletic and non-athletic subjectivities. Clearly, sport 
and physical activity have a signiﬁ cant bearing on feminine subjectivity and 
the relationships go beyond the sentiments captured by John Inverdale in 
his commentary on Wimbledon Champion Marion Bartoli. Insights such 
as Rand’s from women who identify as lesbian femme and/or queer femme 
provide wealthy testimonies to challenge stagnant and traditional notions 
of femininity. 
 Femme and butch are coherent terms within non-heterosexual cultures. 
But, as many have warned, these subjectivities are not simply replicas of 
normative heterosexual genders (Caudwell, 2006), they are not always erot-
ically inﬂ ected (Rand, 2012) and there are misconceptions of both within 
sexual stereotypes (Walker et al., 2012). With these warnings in mind, the 
femme-butch aesthetic does offer scope for the exploration of pleasure as it 
relates to sport. As with burlesque and roller derby, lesbian femme subjectiv-
ity is replete with pleasures of the feminine for the women involved. 
 And yet, we have been slow to acknowledge physically active women’s 
agented relationship to femme. My ﬁ rst realization of the productive poten-
tial of the feminine, as opposed to the feminine as a duped subjectivity, 
was during ﬁ eldwork within a lesbian-identiﬁ ed football team (2006, 2007). 
Despite the appearance that femininity was often dismissed as a non-viable 
footballing body, the femme players were active in their pleasures of par-
ticipation. These pleasures ranged from the ways they adorned their playing 
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attire to embodied displays of the curvatures of hips and breasts and talk 
of make-up. There was also the tacit recognition by femme players of the 
importance of the so-called butch back line, which is the last line of defend-
ers positioned in front of the goal and goalkeeper. Rand (2012: 115), bor-
rowing from Patrick Caliﬁ a, makes an interesting point, and one which 
I now ﬁ nd relevant to an analysis of the lesbian-femme footballer: 
 He (Caliﬁ a) was warning butches not to let their own display of chiv-
alry and masculine prowess fool them into having a misogynist sense 
of superiority over femmes. When you’re out in the rain dealing with 
a dead battery, Caliﬁ a wrote, there’s a good chance that those femmes 
waiting in the warm coffee shop know as much about jump cables as 
you do. You can chose to view them as helpless, or you can appreciate 
their participation in the gendering that animates butch/femme erotics 
and prize the way they honor your masculinity with a respect too scarce 
for butches in a society with rigid sex and gender norms. 
 This discussion of femme-butch relations and erotics serves to highlight 
the nuanced operations that subvert prevailing and traditional notions of 
gendered subjectivity. It comes after discussion of the potential for assumed 
heterosexual femininity—in burlesque and roller derby—to reconﬁ gure 
women’s relationships with the pleasures of the feminine (and butch). More-
over, it provides an appropriate preamble for discussions of sexuality and 
women’s pleasure. 
 SPORT, SEXUALITY AND PLEASURE 
 Jouissance 
 “I ﬁ nally had an orgasm and my doctor told me it was 
the wrong kind” 
— Polly, in Woody Allen’s ﬁ lm  Manhattan (1979) 
 ‘. . . what is most strictly forbidden to women today is that they 
should  attempt to express their own pleasure’
—(Irigaray, 1985: 77) 
 Few scholars within sport and leisure studies have explored the concept of 
jouissance. Even fewer have engaged with the so-called French feminists 
Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. Notable exceptions include 
Montserrat Martin’s (2011) Irigarian framing of female rugby subjectivities 
and Simone Fullagar’s (2002) use of Cixous’ ‘feminine jouissance’ to explain 
women’s travel and tourist subjectivities. 
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 Prior to the contributions of Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva, the concept 
of jouissance was embedded in a Freudian-Lacanian model, with emphases 
on psychoanalysis and the phallus. Sigmund Freud’s notion of  The Plea-
sure Principle (1895) and later his work on  Beyond the Pleasure Princi-
ple (1921) helped establish pleasure as an always-present instinctive drive 
linked to the male libido. Initially, Freud viewed pleasure-seeking as rela-
tively unproblematic; however, later he began to document the relationships 
between pleasure and pain, pleasure and death (death-drive) and immortality 
(see also chapter 3). Jacques Lacan continued (in the late 1930s-1970s) 
some of Freud’s focus through an exploration of the possible boundaries 
between pleasure and pain, and Lacan’s concept of jouissance seems to exist 
at, and beyond, the thresholds of pleasure and within zones of pain. 
 As with Freud, Lacan’s treatise considered pleasure in the development 
of phallo-centric sexuality, relating it to the moment of male orgasm (pre-
ejaculation), the death-drive, castration-complex and lack/loss (Freudian 
terms). Put simply, the Freudian-Lacanian model presented a male-centric 
view of sexuality (male orgasm) ‘where sex is always related to death’ 
(Ives, 2010: 73). That said, Lacan also drew on the works of Karl Marx 
and his idea of surplus-value and, as a consequence, Lacan coined the term 
 plus-de-jouir (surplus-jouissance). In this way, he initiated different questions 
about the value of some pleasures. By highlighting the rampant insatiability 
and dissatisfaction implicit in desire (sexuality) he moved beyond Freud’s 
notions of death-drive and castration-complex. 
 The coming together of psychoanalysis and Marxism, according to 
Kingsbury (2008), is apparent in the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 
(1930s) and more recently in the work of Slavoj Žižek (late 1980s-present). The 
theoretical fusion of psychoanalysis and Marxism has encouraged analysis 
away from a wholly psychic domain—with its emphasis on the phallic econ-
omy of pleasure—and instead has prompted a turn to pleasure and society, 
history and subjectivity. More speciﬁ cally, Žižek demonstrated how pleasure 
functions alongside ideology, alienation, exploitation and commodity-
fetishism (Kingsbury, 2008). Clearly, these are important broader develop-
ments and they signal the expansion of the Freudian-Lacanian model of 
pleasure/jouissance. 
 Although Lacan (1972–3) and Žižek (1994) acknowledge a speciﬁ cally 
female jouissance, of greater signiﬁ cance to the feminist project of pleasure 
are the developments of the concept of jouissance by Roland Barthes and 
the poststructuralist movement. Speciﬁ cally, Barthes’ work on  The Pleasures 
of the Text (1973) helped inform Kristeva’s ideas, in particular her thoughts 
on the jouissance of the text and the text as jouissance  (Ives, 2010). For 
Barthes, the pleasure of the text has two dimensions:  plaisir (pleasure) and 
 jouissance (bliss). The former is described by Barthes (1975[1973]) as  texte 
lisible  (readerly/readable text). In this version, pleasure (plaisir) reﬂ ects the 
enjoyment of passivity and recognition. The text presents homogeneity and 
unity, and the reader is not challenged; their subject position remains unmoved 
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and traditional literary codes remain intact. The  texte scriptible  (writerly/
writable text) presents an open, exploded, indeterminate text. Such a compo-
sition allows for fractured subject positions, re-interpretations, slippages and 
a re-establishing; it can be written anew and this aspect is viewed as blissful 
(jouissance). It is the latter, speciﬁ cally the scope for rupture and the possi-
bilities to re-interpret language and re-invent meaning, that underpinned the 
work on pleasure by French feminists Cixious, Kristeva and Irigaray. 
 Feminism in France has a long history, and can be mapped back to wom-
en’s liberation and the ﬁ ght for women’s rights during the years of the French 
Revolution (1789–1799). However, the idea of a distinctive French femi-
nism emerged more recently, during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Reﬂ ect-
ing the developments in feminist theory and activism in other parts of the 
so-called Western world, French feminism appears to have taken a more 
philosophical and literary turn. Perhaps inﬂ uenced by Simone de Beauvoir’s 
(1976[1949]) work on Woman as socially constructed as the Other, Cixous, 
Irigaray and Kristeva are known for their individual and collective femi-
nist contributions to debates surrounding philosophy, literary critique and 
psychoanalysis. Through a focus on women and the feminine, they have 
challenged existing male models of thought and the phallocracy of reason, 
which operate at a fundamental level to silence and exclude women. More 
speciﬁ cally, French feminists developed the term phallogocentrism to denote 
the focus on men and the masculine in the production of meaning and the 
exclusion of women from social existence. 
 Through the feminist lens of the 2010s, the work of Cixous, Irigaray and 
Kristeva might be viewed as essentialist, given their critique of maleness, 
emphasis on sexual difference and advocacy of women’s ways of knowing 
and being. In defense of Irigaray, Martin (2003: 2) argues that she ‘. . . is a 
philosopher of change who cannot be reduced to some essentialist position’. 
On reﬂ ection, the now-familiar term ‘strategic essentialism’ seems more apt. 
Clearly, the contributions of the French feminists must be considered in the 
context of historical developments of theory and philosophies of change. As 
a consequence, their works have relevance to the study of sport and pleasure. 
 Refusing to repress female sexuality, and connecting it both literally and 
metaphorically to pleasure, Cixous asked ‘What is feminine jouissance?’ 
(1986: 151). In her questioning she explores the embodiment of pleasure and 
how pleasure can be put into words, language and written text. Phallogo-
centrism, according to the French feminists, operates to construct a mono-
lithic, singular and unitary model within which women become the silent, 
negative image of male sexuality. Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva argued for 
a deconstruction of this established one-sided view—which they identiﬁ ed 
as informing broader epistemological projects—and for recognition of the 
multiple, limitless, diffuse, abundant and inﬁ nite nature of being. Therefore, 
their various projects aim to avoid the assimilation of female sexuality, plea-
sure and subjectivity into existing male-centric ontologies, and they offer 
new ways to create new meanings and knowledge. 
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 Irigaray’s project of rewriting Freud and Lacan disrupts the isomorphic 
unity and replaces it with a series of dense, poetic, parodic discourses, 
in which female repression is unleashed and the female unconscious is 
allowed to explode into academic patriarchy. Irigaray’s specular project 
disrupts the insistence in phallic, patriarchal sexuality on one organ 
(penis), one orgasm or pleasure (male), one identity (male), one model 
of representation (masculine). (Ives, 2010: 47) 
 The focus on female libidinal economy and female bodily rhythms by 
Cixious, Kristeva and Irigaray is subject to critique; however, their works 
opened up the synesthetic of sexuality by introducing the morphology of the 
female genitalia  1  ; by emphasizing the multiplicity of female sex organs and 
by advocating an all-over eroticism and embodied multi-sensuality. Through 
explorations of the previously private spheres of the sexual and embodied, 
and the sharing of these thoughts (referred to as extrimacy in Lacanian 
terms), they help multiply and diversify notions of pleasure. 
 Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva made signiﬁ cant contributions to the devel-
opment of feminist poststructuralism via their emphases on deconstructing 
existing models of jouissance, the diversity present in emerging models of 
[sexual] pleasure and the impossibilities of ﬁ xing down a stable sexual sub-
jectivity. They also advocated new ways of writing the sensual, spiritual and 
effervescent aspects of sexuality and pleasure. Through ﬁ ction, dramatic writ-
ing and poetry, they provided linguistic and literary challenges to the rigidity of 
existing representations of pleasure. At times, they captured the mystic, magi-
cal and cosmic, and highlighted ‘unnameable jouissance’ (Kristeva, 1981: 16). 
 Throughout their works, there are acknowledgements of the difﬁ culties 
in re-writing meanings, especially in relation to jouissance. This is because 
jouissance—despite its legacies of male power—functions beyond language 
and culture. Perhaps this is also the case for pleasure, so that once jouissance 
is incorporated in to expressions of pleasure something is lost. Similarly, in 
their works, any attempt to deﬁ ne female sexuality is recognized as prescrip-
tive. These points might make the feminist pleasure project un-representable. 
And yet, for me, Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva provoke important feminist 
critique, of which I offer an example below. 
 During the men’s football World Cup in South Africa (2010), the British 
media posed the question: ‘Is scoring a goal better than sex?’ thus alluding 
to the synergies between sport, sexuality (sexual acts) and pleasure. Sci-
entized responses followed (e.g. references to testosterone, etc.) and these 
onto-epistemological models gave reason and meaning to this seemingly 
male metanarrative of sport and pleasure. 
 Starting with a Barthesian approach, this simple question—is scoring a 
goal better than sex?—might appear as  texte lisible.  As such, the question 
is a readable text in which there is passive recognition of the unity between 
men’s football, goal scoring, sexuality and pleasure (plaisir). The striker, 
the ball, the goalkeeper and the goal provide easy analogy with the act of 
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male-penetrative sex (for a similar analysis of competitive male team sport 
and penetrative sexual references see Brian Pronger, 1999). The analogy sits 
easy within the popular cultural contexts of football and the sport media. 
This act of successful penetration (scoring a goal) symbolizes pleasure at the 
level of the normative and monolithic. The question and the act of scoring 
might be understood through Irigaray’s insight in to the singular ‘. . . one 
organ (penis), one orgasm or pleasure (male), one identity (male), one model 
of representation (masculine)’ (cited in Ives, 2010: 47). For example, taking 
a shot followed by the passage of the football into the goal is, symbolically, 
a very linear, progressive and one-dimensional form of pleasure. Within this 
reading, traditional subjectivities (of male footballer) and codes of sporting 
pleasure (scoring) remain unbroken. 
 But what of  texte scriptable and a Barthesian turn to re-interpretations of 
the blissful in sport? Perhaps, for a deeper discussion of this to happen, we 
have to ask new, more sophisticated, questions. Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva 
went some way towards posing new questions and their works concerned 
with  l’ecriture feminine  2  helped change theories of sexualities and embodi-
ment within both feminism and psychoanalysis. However, within the study 
of sport, too few new questions regarding sport and pleasure exist. That said, 
Heather Sykes (2011: 98), in her invaluable text  Queer Bodies , considers ‘the 
theft of enjoyment’. She introduces the idea of queer pleasures through a turn 
to the game of dodgeball in physical education lessons, and the assumption 
that it offers a playful alternative to traditional curricula activities. 
 Before considering Syke’s contribution, I take a moment to introduce 
enjoyment since this and the work of Žižek feature in her analysis. Enjoy-
ment, according to Kingsbury (2008: 50), is ‘. . . one of Žižek’s most endur-
ing theses’. Žižek considers enjoyment a political issue, arguing that it both 
upholds and disturbs the emotional dimensions and mechanisms of class 
and racialized ideologies and relations, nationalistic movements and the 
capitalist production and consumption of commodities. By linking enjoy-
ment with a broader politics and the political economy, Žižek moves from 
the extrimacy of pleasures evident in the works of Lacan, Cixous, Irigaray 
and Kristeva to the material worlds of the politico-socio-cultural. In this 
way, enjoyment does not only take place in the minds and bodies of individ-
ual subjects (their private worlds); it plays a role in broader social, cultural, 
political and economic power relations. 
 Sykes (2011) situates her analysis of ‘the theft of enjoyment’ within a 
broader politics of physical education and sexualities, genders and fatness. 
She considers dodgeball, played during school time, as one form of physical 
activity that continues the traditional sporting processes of idealizing some 
bodies and marginalizing other [queer] bodies: 
 Dodgeball, it seems, is the archetypical space within PE in which nor-
matively bodied students repeatedly confront their own annihilation, 
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their own abject relation to queerness, while emerging with the illusion 
of being unscarred and unscathed. (Sykes, 2011: 100) 
 Fun—for those with normative, able and athletic bodies—is premised on 
the presence of queer bodies. Success in dodgeball, unlike scoring a goal in 
football, is based on the explicit exclusion of others. The game, sporting suc-
cess and pleasure, according to Sykes, entails both excitement and horror. The 
idea of the horriﬁ c connects discomfort and pain to pleasure, and Sykes refers 
to ‘the awfulness of fun’ (2011: 99). In this way, she poses new questions 
about pleasure that relate to fractured subject positions, slippages and the 
re-establishing of meaning by normative physically active bodies ( texte script-
able ). However, at this moment in time, there is little by way of the ruptures 
and re-inventions of meaning, and/or writing anew, queer pleasures. Perhaps 
queer pleasures are implicit in ‘the theft of enjoyment’. In other words, there 
might be some pleasure in the illicit nature of the incongruities between the 
overriding cultures of competitive sport and the messiness of queer bodies. 
Here we might return to Genet’s prisoner and his tube of Vaseline, and begin to 
imagine how the aberrant and abhorrent are peppered with pleasure. And so, 
for example, there might be pleasures in conceding a goal in competitive sport. 
Yet we know little of these pleasures; this is because in rendering them, mistak-
enly, as insigniﬁ cant, they have not been subject to sustained critical analysis. 
 Working from the basis that French feminists have challenged existing 
models of pleasure, especially the concept of jouissance, and that  Queer 
Bodies  offer potential for re-interpretations of enjoyment in sporting contexts, 
I wonder how pleasure might be registered within a feminist-queer frame-
work. Can we queer the apparent jouissance  within the scoring goals-sex 
analogue, which, currently, appears male-dominated? Can we re-queer the 
horrible fun of excluding queer bodies during dodgeball? 
 One way—there are many more—might be to pay more attention to transi-
tioning bodies and how transgender subjectivity opens new ways to experience 
body parts and embodied sensuality (see Davy, 2012), especially during moments 
of physical activity. In a similar way to how the French feminists questioned 
the phallogocentrism of Freudian-Lacanian model of pleasure/jouissance, 
can queer scholars and transgender bodies challenge existing assumptions 
related to pleasure and embodiment? Perhaps interesting questions might 
be: do new sensual, erogenous and erotic body zones appear and develop 
for transgender athletes? If so, how do these new sensations shape sporting 
pleasures at different levels, such as the personal, interpersonal and cultural? 
 CONCLUSIONS 
 In the end, I return to my wannabe non-feminist statement made in the intro-
duction to this chapter. I do this through a consideration of Sara Ahmed’s 
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recent turn to the idea of  Feminist Killjoys . In several on-line commentaries 
(e.g. http://feministkilljoys.com and http://sfonline.barnard.edu/polyphonic/
ahmed_02.htm), Ahmed (2010) asks important questions about happi-
ness. For example, ‘does the feminist kill other people’s joy by pointing out 
moments of sexism? Or does she expose the bad feelings that get hidden, 
displaced, or negated under public signs of joy?’ (¶12). As feminists, many 
of us develop advanced and well-informed responses to incidents of abuse, 
injustice, oppression, prejudice and subjugation. As activist and academic 
feminists, we are often willful—as Ahmed points out—in our communica-
tion of these responses. We are also skillful in providing rational, coherent 
and convincing arguments; these treatises are serious declarations, which are 
made in earnest and accompanied by intensity. Many feminists are angry. 
 Clearly, I do want to be a feminist, and the idea of a wannabe non-
feminist is a fantasy moment in which I imagine I will no longer be a killjoy, 
no longer be intense, serious and rational. And I will no longer be angry. In 
other words, I will be free to be happy and free to—perhaps irrationally—
‘laugh out loud’. Or, will I? 
 In terms of pleasure and living a meaningful life (I think this was one 
of Richard’s initial questions at the beginning of this book project), maybe 
one way forward for feminists and other political and social activists is to 
acknowledge pleasures regardless of their size and impact (Bob makes this 
point when he refers to pleasures small and large, see Chapter 2). In many 
ways, Genet’s homosexual prisoner and the harsh reality of how lives are 
structured, fortiﬁ ed and regulated both haunt and horrify me. At the same 
time, I recognize individual agency and I am inspired by the work of femi-
nist writers, and other social activists, who document humor, satire, sub-
version and the generative dimensions of social existence, compassion and 
humanity. And yet I’m still unsure, sometimes, of when to laugh. 
 In an article entitled ‘Laughing within reason: on pleasure, women, and 
academic performance’, Erica McWilliam (1999) examines modes of plea-
sure and rationality. She discusses, among other things, how carnival and 
fun might offer women in the academy the potential for pleasure. Starting 
with a moment in a university committee meeting, when a woman laughed 
the wrong way—too loud and therefore irrationally—for the likes of a male 
colleague, she unravels the importance of feminists’ laugher to a broader 
feminist politics. Drawing on Foucault’s (1985: 2–3) work, she interrogates 
‘feelings such as pleasure and rationality’ and argues that pleasure-as-fun 
has been produced ‘outside bourgeois traditions of conduct’, in other words, 
beyond the walls of universities. 
 McWilliams’ discussions have left me with some lingering thoughts and 
questions. For instance, does fun ever escape rationality? Do structures of 
feminist politics inform an ethics of pleasure? And must feminists laugh 
within reason? Some of the answers lie within this chapter. For some 
women who are participants in burlesque and roller derby, fun does escape 
the conventions of heteronormative-gendered rationality and femininity is 
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re-created for self-pleasure. Similarly, feminist theoreticians such as Cixous, 
Irigaray and Kristeva have re-written philosophies, and arguably ethics, of 
pleasure through a challenge to male-dominated models, which are steeped 
in male-centric ontologies, thus providing women with epistemologies of 
pleasures that are related to sexuality and acts of sex. 
 Finally, must feminists laugh—experience pleasure—within reason? Well, 
of course not, and of course we must. Pleasure is a complicated political 
issue for feminists, and this chapter has sidestepped the contentious topic of 
sexuality, pleasure and pornography, which was hinted at in the introduc-
tion. Perhaps it is easier, and therefore more satisfying, for me not to address 
this issue at this moment in time. 
 NOTES 
 1 .  Luce Irigaray, through her focus on ‘This sex which is not one’, introduced 
the idea of women’s two lips (labia) as a means to diverse and self-sustained 
pleasures for women. 
 2 .  This term was introduced by Cixous in 1976 and can be interpreted simply as 
‘feminine writing’. Her intent was to challenge the marginalization of women 
and the feminine in structures of language and the symbolic order of represen-
tation. The term functions to disrupt phallogocentric rationalism and provide 
a perspective from the female body. 
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 Poetic Orientations 
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 The aging sportsperson: is this term an oxymoron, despite contemporary 
pleas that older folks can compete, can challenge and forestall physical 
deterioration (cf. Grant, 2001; Grant and Kluge, 2007; Iso-Ahola, Jackson 
and Dunn, 1994)? Despite exceptions like George Foreman, 1 Bernard Hop-
kins, 2 Al Oerter, 3 Libby Callahan, 4 Dara Torres, 5 David Tua 6 and 71-year-old 
Japanese dressage rider Hiroshi Hoketsu, 7 who were still internationally 
competitive into their ﬁ fth decade (and beyond), it is undeniable that each 
individual older body is capable of less than when it was a younger body. 
The age of Olympians varies widely, however, depending upon country and 
type of activity: for example, at the London 2012 Olympics, the average 
age ‘for the equestrian events [is] 38’ (Hughes and Rogers, 2012), while 
female gymnasts at the Beijing (2008) Olympics averaged 18.6 years of age 
(Gymbit, 2008). A website even has video footage of a 63-year old Japanese 
gymnast named Wakamatsu (Gymbit, 2008) swinging on the high bars and 
attempting an iron cross. 
 Interestingly, when we think of aging sportspersons—whether male, 
female, transexed, transgendered, straight, gay or bisexual—Western audi-
ences typically think of Western examples, so that a reinforced and natural-
ized ethnocentrism exists within even sport studies. But remarkable (albeit 
singular) examples of Eastern athletes makes one wonder if there are dif-
ferent attitudes toward aging (and thus, perhaps, differing social, political, 
symbolic support systems) that are exempliﬁ ed in older, pleasurable partici-
pation within sport practices. 
 In this chapter, I provide a series of exemplars examining pleasure within 
and through sport for older individuals: by example, I hope to tease out 
some of the discussed themes of pleasure, demonstrating both the ubiquity 
of pleasure as it attaches to sport and physical activity and a speciﬁ c series of 
illustrations of both  Western and  Eastern popular cultural artifacts regard-
ing attitudes toward the aging body. In order to do this, I draw upon a com-
parative, dominant Western set of attitudes toward aging. 8 With singular 
examples, I hope at least to demonstrate a wide variety of human responses 
to aging—andthereby disrupt taken-for-granted Western (hegemonic) views 
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and ideologies that tend to re-create salient aspects of Western postmodern-
ist societies. 
 It is enough to know that aging, while deemed to be a rather solitary 
project, is ‘performed’ by most human beings in widely variable manifes-
tations. In addition, the experience of aging is located within the senses: 
humans infer aging through sight (for example, age spots, and wrinkles), 
texture (skin thickness, toughness, moisture, pliability, elasticity), smell 
(odiferousness), hearing (acuity, texture of voice, volume, clarity), sharpness 
(of mind, of verbal wit, of physical response), ﬂ uidity (of joints, impinge-
ments, acceptance) and other bodily senses, such as responses to demands of 
pressure, balance, power or stamina (respiratory, muscular, perseverance). 
But, as astute humans age, they also infer their own ‘aging’ through—
typically—awareness of declines in such sensual abilities. 
 There are, of course, different ethos—and different worldviews—extant 
within larger societies regarding aging, even characterizing such a seemingly 
clear-cut concept as ‘decay’. Inﬁ rmity, for some societies, is a marker of 
a life well-lived, or an outward indication of inner wisdom. Additionally, 
some attitudes within societies tacitly promote either a celebration or an 
avoidance of aging through interventionist and pro-active measures such as 
body modiﬁ cation, various types of aromatics (such as perfume and cologne 
(cf. Weston, 2004) or an increase in vigorous physical activity. 
 These types of interventions are thus not only contemporary; they are 
also historical, and of course attitudes toward such interventions may vary 
by geographical location, locale, mores and practices, and many other soci-
etal factors. As celebratory of ‘aging’ (or ‘youth’), for example, the MƗori 
 moko (facial tattoo) recounts one’s history, ancestry, life journey—and of 
course the moko is intended to adorn one who has had an extensive, rich 
and remarkable life (Nikora, Rua and Awekotuku, 2003; Simmons, 1997; Te 
RangikƗheke, Grey and Simmons, 2007). As Ngahuia Te Awekotuku says: 
‘[moko] is a symbol of integrity, MƗori identity and prestige, as well as a 
reﬂ ection of whakapapa [genealogy] and history’ (in ‘MƗori culture’, 2013). 
 Beauty and its pleasures are not universal. To assure subjective forms 
of ‘beauty’—albeit through relatively long processes of ‘shaping’—ancient 
Chinese girls ‘receive[d] a foot massage followed by every single toe being 
manually broken then bound tightly in cloth. The foot would be unwrapped 
and re-wrapped tighter until her feet reached 4 inches long’ (Catalano, 
2013: ¶5). (This is a contemporary practice as well, though not so univer-
sally applauded.) Such body modiﬁ cations assured the recipients a culturally 
positive response, based on speciﬁ c subjectivities regarding beauty—and 
were also attempts to mitigate the inevitability of aging: a beautiful moko 
or gracefully trained feet assured their owners of respect and admiration 
throughout their lifespans. 
 The presence of perfumes, cosmetics and deodorants not coincidentally 
implies a societal legislation (often reﬂ ecting class bias) against ‘decay’ in all 
6244-599d-1pass-006-r01.indd   81 4/3/2015   12:35:37 PM
82 Robert E. Rinehart
of its forms or suggestions. Perfumes and cosmetics in ancient Egypt were, 
according to Chaudhri and Jain (2009), utilized to mask and modify natural 
processes of life (and, by inference, aging and death processes): 
 In Egypt, as early as 10,000 BC, men and women used scented oils and 
ointments to clean and soften their skin and  mask body odor . Dyes and 
paints were used to color the skin, body and hair. They rouged their 
lips and cheeks, stained their nails with henna and lined their eyes and 
eyebrows heavily with kohl. (¶1, emphasis added) 
 Throughout ancient India, Rome and Egypt—as well as the Middle Ages 
in Europe—the use of perfume was intended to provide a means of sexual 
attraction and an approximation of spirituality. In other words, aromas—
stemming from oils, incense and unguents—were used to create alternate 
pleasurable scents in the presence of malodorous aromas: ‘The deceased 
who were not naturally sweet-smelling might be made so. . . . corpses were 
washed and anointed with sandalwood oil and turmeric’ (Aftel, 2001: 192). 
Scent was a means to mask and overwhelm unpleasant odors, contagion 
smells and the rot of decay. Historically, where there was distaste for the 
signs of aging (admittedly, one among many sources of odors), individu-
als and groups intervened to mitigate it, to create a pleasance from an 
abhorrence. 
 Of course, in many contemporary Western nation-states, this  contesta-
tion with aging has become an even more creative, if naturalized, stance: 
breast modiﬁ cation and ﬁ rming, liposuction, injections of potent drugs like 
Botox (Botulinum toxin), not to mention athletically relevant surgical inter-
ventions to stave off physical deterioration, have become relatively normal-
ized procedures in Western society. As Gergen and Gergen (2000: 289) put 
it, ‘Fighting body fat, graying hair and balding pates, age spots, varicose 
veins, yellowing teeth, and facial wrinkles [is] pervasive even among those 
in their 30s and 40s’. 
 In the following sections, I examine some popular cultural reﬂ ections of 
cultural attitudes toward aging, primarily through an examination of poetry 
dealing with aging. By looking at a written form that often signiﬁ es deep 
cultural understandings and attitudes, we may discover societal and cultural 
attitudes toward a well-lived life, physical enjoyment and pleasure, and even 
towards sport-like activities. This strategy parallels Denzin’s (1991a) look at 
societal attitudes toward alcohol use through examination of popular ﬁ lms 
of different historical eras. 
 In slight contrast with a dominant Western model that privileges com-
petition, and, in some cases, capitalist ethos and tenets, there exist in the 
world societies where a relative acceptance of aging occurs. There is a whole 
range of practices regarding dying, ranging from senilicide among Inuit dur-
ing times of famine (cf. Kjellström 1974) to artiﬁ cially-elongated periods of 
sickness, weakening and dying, with medical interventions often altering 
6244-599d-1pass-006-r01.indd   82 4/3/2015   12:35:37 PM
Aging Bod(ies) and Pleasure 83
drastically the time period of decay and eventual death. These practices 
marking the processes and end points of life mirror many of the attitudes 
toward aging populations in a variety of societies, and even within each 
society there may be radically different practices and attitudes. 
 METONYMIC POETICS 
 Since many readers will be familiar with dominant Western practices toward 
aging and so-called declines of the lifespan, I use poetic exemplars from 
Western and Eastern cultures alike to explore some of the ranges of ‘seri-
ous’ attitudes people have toward aging—sometimes explicitly, sometimes 
by inference—and the aging body. This discussion is not meant to imply 
global truth, but rather to open up examination of alternative ways of being 
in the world. 
 The  pleasure of a ‘good death’—except in a combative, and gloriﬁ ed, 
sense during battle—is something unspoken in much of Western contempo-
rary society. Can one die pleasantly? Can one wither away happily? Is it a 
part of pleasance to accept the inevitability of death? This possibility of a 
‘good death’ becomes a vital touchstone for how we subjectively experience 
the ‘pleasures’ of the aging body, in anticipation of its certain biological 
death. Thus, looking at some the pleasures to be found in aging bodies and 
in the actual process of aging, I explore the populist concept of Wabi Sabi 
and apply it to terms of selected historic poetic writings, speciﬁ cally drawn 
from works by Lu Yu (701–762) and three Korean sijo poets. 9 
 The Western aging body has been (and I use the passive voice deliber-
ately) measured, scientized, medicalized and viewed as a ‘health and wellbe-
ing’ object of discourse (e.g. Huber, 1997). In some ways, this has produced 
a body that is imbricated with a certain narrow type of ‘self-knowledge’. 
This aging, self- and other-policed body has the ability to comprehend itself 
in ways formerly unheard of, if only through just this deliberate emphasis 
on measurement, scientization and medicalization. 
 If we look at the inevitable process of aging, however, as both a public 
and a private concern—in terms of its aspects of pleasure—we see that the 
rough generalities of scientiﬁ c discourse (the ‘one size ﬁ ts all’ mentality) 
fail to achieve accurate resonance regarding many of the actual lived and 
embodied experiences of aging adults. The scientiﬁ c framing doesn’t ﬁ t the 
lived reality. 
 In addition, this very scientization fails to engage with questions regard-
ing quality of life and subjectively lived realities resulting in responses that 
may be framed as pleasurable. For example:  what might be the pleasurable 
moments that aging individuals can identify in their daily lived lives? How 
are they differentially constructed through intersecting forms of discourse? 
And:  what might poetic rhetorics and logics tell us about those stereotypes 
of popular culture that scientiﬁ c rhetorics and logics do not? 
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 Of course we can only truly speak with any authority about our own 
experience. Or rather, we can only do that with any  embodied authority, for, 
cognitively, we can aspire to ‘put ourselves in the other’s place’, to empa-
thize. And our own experience is contextualized based on how we ‘wear’ 
our bodies, how we  produce our bodies through pain and injury; ailment, 
both traumatic and gradual; types of usage; care, wear and tear (cf. Alon, 
1996; Dawson-Cook, 2007; Feldenkrais, 1972, 1981); and our reactions to 
aging, use and violence: how we simultaneously produce, experience and 
conceive our bodies. 
 One’s standpoint matters a great deal: as American poet Arthur Guiterman 
writes, 
 ‘Youth’ is the ailment that hindereth thee; 
 ‘Age’ is the sickness that conquereth me. (1921) 
 In this brief couplet, Guiterman reﬂ ects (later, Dylan Thomas, in ‘Do Not 
Go Gentle Into That Good Night’ will portray it similarly) that the natural 
process of aging is a contest, an agonistic pursuit, where there are ‘good 
ﬁ ghts’ that ennoble the individual in her/his accommodation to age. 
 Aging ‘successfully’ is judged against culturally perceived standards, and 
of course this ‘competitive’ model is gendered (cf. Kohn, 1992). The poets 
who generally view aging as a struggle or contest have generally been deeply 
immersed in male culture. In addition, as Gilligan (1992) has pointed out, 
an ‘ethics of care’ has become a  gendered logic, but it doesn’t have to be. 
‘Care of the aging self’ is something that Western, patriarchal, competitive 
societies simply do not teach their male citizens, and this hegemonic view 
carries over to the whole fabric of the societies. Similar to an apprecia-
tion of the arts, aesthetics and beauty in sport (cf. Lowe, 1977; Rinehart, 
1998b), both denial and appreciation of aging and the pleasures of aging 
are simply complex social constructions (cf. Boxill, 1988) that, created, can 
be un-created. 
 REFLECTIONS OF THE WEST 
 Some examples of Western poems that touch on key attitudes towards aging 
and/or decay follow. These poems reveal the motifs of ‘ﬁ ghting the good 
ﬁ ght’, resistance to bodily decay and degradation and a desperate striving 
for control over time. Taken together, it is safe to say that the poems reﬂ ect 
societal attitudes toward aging and death that show a general sense of com-
petitiveness, capitalist striving and anticipation of a rhetoric of improve-
ment (cf. Sutton-Smith 1997). 
 Dylan Thomas’ ‘Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night’, though a 
complex and quite brilliant poem, reﬂ ects a stereotypical Western agonis-
tic and combative bias—resulting in personal anger—at his own father’s 
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impending death. But, as poems do, it locates itself in a societal angst—as a 
masculine sense of solitary agency: 
 Do not go gentle into that good night, 
 Old age should burn and rage at close of day; 
 Rage, rage against the dying of the light. 
 On one level, this stanza suggests that not only the physical body, but 
also the spiritual self, should retain control over all life processes, including 
the process of dying. This ‘rage’ against the unfairness of death, this contin-
uation of activity despite any contraindications, seems to be a highly West-
ernized stance. Upon deeper reﬂ ection, however, ‘Do not go gentle into that 
good night’ could signal a recognition of balance within life, and a desire to 
hold onto the physical ‘other’ for just a while longer: the conditional word 
‘should’ (‘old age should burn and rage’) implies this paradoxical sense of 
impotence within the sense of inevitability. 
 Dylan Thomas’ ‘The Force That Through the Green Fuse Drives the 
Flower’ works with powerful natural images to liken a human lifespan to 
the inevitable forces of nature: Thomas, while celebrating life forces, simul-
taneously laments the coming death of an individual: ‘the hand that whirls 
the water in the pool/Stirs the quicksand; that ropes the blowing wind/Hauls 
my shroud sail’ evidences the inevitable tensions between selected points 
within life, decay and death. 
 In expressing the sublime nature of natural processes with the ﬁ nite 
nature of human existence, however, Thomas also demonstrates a resistance 
to the inevitability of aging. It is a less demonstrable resistance than that in 
‘Do not go gentle’—perhaps because the narrator of ‘The force’ is speaking 
for himself, and the narrator of ‘Do not go gentle’ is railing on behalf of his 
father—but it is still a deep unwillingness to accept things as they inevitably 
are. I see these two poems as exemplars of a Western stance toward aging 
that is both resistant and agonistic, reﬂ ecting a worldview that believes in 
its ability to  control nature, physical forces and, symbolically, time itself. 
 Perhaps one of the key concepts that bears discussion regarding pleasure 
and apprehension of pleasure—particularly within the institution of sport—
is the idea of competition. In terms of pleasure, Western sports(men)—for 
even now, in an age of relative equivalence in sporting realms, sports is still 
a pleasurably patriarchal endeavor—have been driven to learn about the 
satisfactions of competition within capitalist societies. This socializing has 
become a hegemonic imperative for what it means to be(come) a man. Alﬁ e 
Kohn (1992) has detailed the sometimes-destructive forces of competition 
that result in, paradoxically, less pleasure and happiness for individuals than 
outright acceptance and joy, and less actual productivity and overall ‘fun’ 
for those deriving from a society that drives and stresses competition. 
 In Western societies, older adults have, rather than rejecting competi-
tion in favor of more sedentary and reﬂ ective lives, embraced the ethos of 
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competition even up to their moment of death (usually ﬁ gurative, though 
exceptions abound 10 ). This failure to reject the competitive spirit of youth 
is relatively novel and unique to contemporary Western society, abetted by 
a constellation of forces, including a heightened sense of the salience of 
individualization, medical practices and attitudes toward dying (and insti-
tutionalized for-proﬁ t medicine), mediated discourses that nudge attitudes 
stressing a societal preference for youth culture and of course a(n) (extreme) 
valorization of the exceptional physical body. 
 Boy babies are given professional sports teams uniforms to wear. Univer-
sity females are taught to fear playing paintball. Former cricketers ask to 
have their ashes scattered over the cricket grounds, or their bodies buried 
within the pitch itself (‘Carisbrook’, 2010). Competition has colored our 
beings, sometimes from our ﬁ rst to our last breath—and it often overpowers 
many of the aesthetic, processual and actual pleasures that are generally not 
derived from the simplistic binaries of winning or losing a game. 
 Gardening, however, a relatively low impact activity (though, just as it 
can be shaded as ‘gendered’, anything can be made competitive: one only 
has to look at televised reality shows—for example, ‘cooking shows’—as 
an example), is more often practiced by older than younger people. One of 
the reasons given is that it is a more sedate physical activity than exercise or 
sports (cf. DiPietro, 2001; Grant, 2001). 
 But there may be more to it: gardening, planting seeds in the ground, is 
a life-afﬁ rming gesture. (The acts of tilling previous plantings, re-planting, 
managing—all forward-looking endeavors deeply-felt within the psyche 
of gardeners—overtly fulﬁ ll the ﬁ rst premise of Dylan Thomas’ ‘The force 
through the green fuse drives the ﬂ ower’.) To garden is to hope for the 
future, for generations to come, for continuity. Perhaps after seeing so much 
pain, hurt and deliberate violence in the world, aging people are convinced 
that competition as it is enacted—that is, zero-sum competition, not compe-
tition with oneself to test one’s own limits—can be anti-life in many ways, 
or, at the least, comprises activities for younger, more hot-blooded youth. 
 The turn from generic, dominant, often macho, forms of sport to alterna-
tive, communal, cooperative physical activity—certainly not comprising a 
hegemonic critical mass, but for some youth—is a similar gesture, and bodes 
well for the future. Just as communal gardens are ﬂ ourishing in Western cit-
ies, and front-yard gardens challenge dominant ways of existing in a neigh-
borhood, so too do more performative, artistic, self-actualizing forms of 
sport and physical activity indicate that there is, indeed, a resistant minority 
still challenging some of the status quo norms of sporting culture. This too 
can be seen as a turn towards ‘sporting pleasure’, just as recognizing joy in 
mundane motion, happiness in the interconnectedness of the whole body 
(being mindful of the quick ﬁ x, for example), and celebrating the more usual 
types of pleasures—scoring a try, coming from behind to win, knowing 
one’s physical limits and somehow exceeding them—are delightful forms of 
bodily hedonism. 
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 While many of the readers of this book will live in the Western world—
with its own imbedded worldviews—many of us also know about and 
celebrate some Eastern sensibilities regarding fate and inevitability. The 
interpenetration of Eastern-oriented martial arts and other body practices 
into Western leisure pursuits and lifestyles has helped create interest in non-
hegemonic (Western) ways of living in the world. 
 WABI SABI AND MORE 
 If we were to apply a traditionally Eastern angle (possibly stemming from 
Japanese/Buddhist traditions) to a non-integrative view of the body, 11 per-
haps we might use the philosophical concept of Wabi Sabi—a sense of 
perfection within the inevitability of imperfection (cf. Gold, 2004). In this 
worldview, 12 for example, 
 Appreciation—emotional appreciation, artistic appreciation, apprecia-
tion on every level—is an important part of living Wabi Sabi. . . . Appre-
ciation manifests joy. We don’t need to live by some impossible standard 
to have a joyful contributive, ‘enlightened’ existence. (Gold, 2004: 29) 
 In Wabi Sabi, the very appreciation of one’s own body—its limitations, 
imperfections, abilities and so forth—becomes a source of joy, of pleasure. 
 As Wabi Sabi frames the discussion, putting everyday concerns and dis-
appointments in perspective, it is important to remember how many of us 
may relate to our aging bodies. In terms of how our bodies and selves relate 
to the physicality of intentional bodily movement, we may both cognitively 
and affectively recall how our gut bubbled in anticipation of the ﬁ rst pitch, 
the starter’s pistol or the ﬁ rst contact of any sort in a combative sport. Or 
how we sat, amazed, realizing that stretching something as basic as the 
quadriceps is now very tight. We may feel a palpable amazement at our 
lessened ﬂ exibility and reduced capacity: a sense of wonder at the basic 
deterioration of control over our own bodies. We may stem the ‘advancing 
tide’ by engaging in yoga, or Pilates or self-rendered programs. 13 Many of 
us involved in sports studies may, in fact, view our own bodies more as sites 
of loss and diminished relevance simply because we were previously at such 
an apex of physical capability. 
 For that is what it really comes down to: aging—especially for bodily 
active people—is the recognition of a simple lack of  perceived (and, eventu-
ally, real) control over our own bodies. Rarely, except in imaginative antici-
pation, do we pre-‘recollect’ our aged selves while we are younger. But of 
course it can be done, at least cognitively. 14 
 For example, Lennon and McCartney’s ‘When I’m Sixty-Four’ was a 
light-hearted look at how two people might age together, how they might 
adjust each to the other’s changing bodies—but the  caveat for that song was 
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that it was about loyalty: the aging process (‘you’ll be older too’) was, as in 
all relationships, reciprocal. It’s an idealistic song, a song that relies upon 
the concept of everlasting love, in this case. It is joyful, pleasurable, and 
cognitively anticipates the solace of grandchildren: ‘Grandchildren on your 
knee/Vera, Chuck, and Dave’. 15 It is not embodied, or sensory, but rather 
reﬂ ects a future without aches, pains, inﬁ rmities or limitations. 
 Clearly, there are both objective and subjective/interpretive dimensions 
to the aging body, and sometimes these two dimensions blend. An objective 
aging reality—looking at the lines on one’s face in the mirror, for example—
is often mitigated by the philosophical stance of having ‘good days and 
bad days’. Gubrium and Holstein (2003) discuss Kathy Charmaz’s (1991) 
work, which focuses on the everyday lived lives of adults with illness, either 
chronic or acute: 
 Assuming that one recovers from an acute illness, the illness runs its 
course fairly quickly and those affected return to their “normal” lives, 
once again taking their now relatively transparent bodies for granted. 
In contrast, those suffering from serious chronic illness live in rela-
tion to their illnesses for long periods. . . . individuals can construct 
their illnesses in distinctly different fashions. (Gubrium and Holstein, 
2003: 220) 
 The objective reality of the illness, then, affects the subjective or inter-
pretive focus of the actual person—their attitude, the ‘pleasure’ they derive 
from day-to-day living. But it goes the other way as well. Limits, if there are 
such, are within  parameters of limitations, based more on perceptions than 
on a static and objective reality: ‘Neither the subjective contours of embodi-
ment nor the objective status of the body determines the other’ (Gubrium 
and Holstein, 2003: 219). Pleasure, then, is a concept and affect that is cre-
ated by its negative capability—in its absence of pain, illness, fear; but it can 
also become a self-celebration in and for its own right. 
 Attitudes toward aging may percolate to the surface, presenting as frus-
trated anger, reluctant acceptance or even more dedicated and strenuous 
training. However, the bemusement that older humans may feel towards 
this aging process is one that, if we live long enough, we all will face. Haruki 
Murakami, the novelist of  Norwegian Wood , states this existential truth 
this way: 
 My peak as a runner came in my late forties. . . . Things continued at 
[a] stable plateau for a while, but before long they started to change. 
I’d train as much as before but found it increasingly hard to break three 
hours and forty minutes. . . . What was going on here? I didn’t think it 
was because I was aging. In everyday life I never felt like I was getting 
physically weaker. But no matter how much I might deny it or try to 
ignore it, the numbers were retreating, step by step. (2008: 11–12) 
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 Murakami characterizes his physical ‘peak’ in terms of an objective time, 
which of course in running a marathon is never objective, consistent or 
comparable: the courses change and the conditions (weather, competition, 
attitude) always change. And yet this reliance on ‘measuring’ aging through 
objective measures—fundamentally a Western trope—discounts people’s 
individual experience of physical aging. 16 
 So: we experience this process of living—this process of aging, of simul-
taneous growth and decline—idiosyncratically, uniquely. Fit and ‘trained’ 
bodies may experience their bodies more acutely than those who are not 
absorbed in recording and assessing their own capabilities and limitations, 
so the peaks and valleys, gains and losses, of physical pleasure might be 
more pronounced for those who are more in tune with their bodies. 
 While there are shared experiences with others (e.g. gaining of perspec-
tive through a series of imbricated experiences), there are also perceptions, 
functions, abilities, senses that are speciﬁ cally locked in to one individual’s 
experience and that are ﬂ uid, context-speciﬁ c and contingent. Murakami, 
writing in the existentialist style that has come to deﬁ ne his greater works, 
seems fascinated by his own aging—and his attitude reﬂ ects a certain kind of 
bemused pleasure at watching himself age (and simultaneously diminish). 17 
 Murakami’s looking to his own self as a solitary exemplar for the aging 
process is a part of a larger project dealing with the third space where pub-
lic issues meet private concerns. But, as Sotirin (2010) points out, drawing 
from Deleuze and working within a poststructuralist frame, we can priv-
ilege ‘an implicit yet critical dimension of autoethnographic work as the 
basis for the distinction [between personal and public] . . . [that will] grasp 
the speciﬁ city of any particular time, place, or thing’ (Section 6, ¶1). Using 
the concept of ‘radical speciﬁ city’, Sotirin argues for autoethnographies 
that simultaneously celebrate uniqueness and the singularity of any given 
experience—along with its concomitant ineffability—as forms of research 
that are ‘distinctively critical, creative, and afﬁ rming’ (Section 7, ¶5). 
 Seen in this way, aging is both a profoundly private and a selectively 
public issue—witness the acceptance of it by graceful individuals, and the 
policy puzzles over public health care for seniors—but the embodied aspect 
of aging, the physicality of it, the pleasurable and not-so-pleasant aspects of 
it, remain  largely private and idiosyncratic (cf. Sotirin, 2010). That is why 
I now turn to poetic expressions of these private ‘troubles’: the poetic form, 
done well, manages simultaneously to convey general truths and individual 
speciﬁ cities. 
 Poetry—and a poetic sensibility towards prose (cf. Rinehart, 2010)—
serves as one type of marker of societal attitudes toward issues like aging. 
How does a society see its aging populations, how might it negotiate aging 
and how would one be expected to age (e.g. gracefully, with honor and 
respect; a threat to dwindling food supplies; a necessary evil to be tolerated; 
a burden dismissed)? Through the lens of poetry—though it is artistic—
parameters of possible attitudes towards aging may emerge. These poetic 
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expressions, already hinted at within Dylan Thomas’ poems and Beatles’ 
lyrics from ‘the West’, signify somewhat different attitudes toward aging in 
‘the East’. 
 REFLECTIONS OF ‘THE EAST’ PRE-MCLUHAN 
 Lu Yu (701–762), living twelve hundred years previous to Dylan Thomas 
(and the Beatles), 18 wrote a poem about aging that puts a positive spin on 
the physicality of aging. 
 Written in a Carefree Mood 
 Old man pushing seventy, 
 in truth he acts like a little boy, 
 whooping with delight when he spies some mountain fruits, 
 laughing with joy, tagging after village mummers; 
 with the others having fun stacking tiles to make a pagoda, 
 standing alone staring at his image in the jardiniere pool. 
 Tucked under his arm, a battered book to read, 
 just like the time he ﬁ rst set off for school. (Lu Yu, 2012) 
 Such a stance, where a seventy-year-old man ‘acts like a little boy’, indi-
cates Lu Yu’s belief in the power of mind and mindset to shape and ﬂ avor 
one’s approach to aging. It is remarkable that, in the 21st century, an every-
day (that is to say, non-athletic) aging person who would frolic in such a 
way as this 8th-century poem describes would generally be seen as frivolous, 
or as behaving inappropriately. The speciﬁ cs of ‘spy[ing] some mountain 
fruits’, ‘tagging . . . mummers’, and ‘stacking tiles’ convey ‘universal’ and 
empathic moments of joy,  because of their presence within aging. Lu Yu’s 
poem, however, does not deal with the process of physical death, but rather 
celebrates key pleasurable moments of life. 
 In Lu Yu’s poem, the aging body—and the aging athletic body—works 
in contraindication to such societal strictures as assigning utilitarian values 
to everything the body does. I don’t view the poem as uncritically celebra-
tory of youth; rather, I see it reﬂ ecting a holistic worldview that does not 
fall into Western-based Cartesian duality (indeed, is unaware of Rene Des-
cartes!) and that merges the best of different lived ages together: the paired 
‘old’/’young’ statements are not only fond remembrances of physical capa-
bility, but also cognitive markers of different ways of enjoying the various 
things that the ‘old man’s’ body could do. 
 While the term ‘frivolity’ connotes uselessness in some aging bodies, 
in this poem it appears to be a key link to pleasure: the old man enjoys 
‘act[ing]’, ‘whooping’, ‘sp[ying]’, ‘laughing’, ‘tagging’, ‘stacking’, ‘standing’ 
(implying a transition to a more thoughtful way of being in the world) and 
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‘staring’ at the pool, deep in thought. In the Western world, the image of 
the  irascible aging body is dominant: Clint Eastwood’s performance at the 
recent Republican National Convention is one example. 19 The (ironic) basis 
for the textual rhetoric that was Eastwood’s performance stems from an 
Eastern philosophy, where age is equated with wisdom, so that when an 
aging adult speaks there is a reverential hush due to an expected insight and 
perspective. 
 As it is for the aging mind, so too for the aging body. When 20 (as my son 
is), there is no question whether one will jump down from a four-foot ledge: 
it is seen as a challenge, a test of one’s plyometric ﬁ tness. When in one’s 
60s—even in a physically active body—there is at least a slight reticence to 
‘take the chance’ based on the possibility of injury. 
 These various attitudes reﬂ ect aspects of both disengagement theory 
and activity theory. Disengagement theory was ﬁ rst developed in 1961 by 
Cumming and Henry; it attempts to explain why some individuals initi-
ated a slow and gradual dwindling of activity and of their engagement 
with ‘life’ that reﬂ ected their own recognition of the inevitability of death. 
Activity theory, stemming from 1940s work by Russian psychologist Alexei 
Leont’ev, essentially suggests that people remain active in their ‘continua-
tion of role performances’ (Harris, 2007: 84), replacing one activity with 
another. Either theory potentially synchronizes with acts and perceptions 
of pleasure during aging, as it is the articulation between (hegemonic, ideal-
ized) societal ideologies and the individual’s matching to them that often 
creates satisfaction. But the sense of continuity—of energy forming into dif-
ferent outward actions—is synchronous with Wabi Sabi. 
 WABI SABI, POETRY AND PLEASURE 
 Wabi Sabi, as a philosophical stance, requires reﬂ ection. In a consumer cul-
ture, where ‘more recent’ is somehow linked to ‘better’, and where ‘faster’ 
is perceived as ‘more hip’, slow, reﬂ ective thought has often been replaced 
by near-constant stimulation. For example, those with terminal illnesses 
become subjects of their own documentaries—remain busy, up to the very 
end—and often haven’t time for reﬂ ection, for appreciation of the trajec-
tories of their lives. Wabi Sabi reminds us to seek ‘pure freedom, joy and 
creativity’, as they are the ‘intentions of the Universe’ (Gold, 2004: 83). I 
take that as the beginning of understanding a simultaneously individual and 
group reaction to (and with) aging, to what pleasure in the physically aging 
body means both privately and publicly. 
 The Korean  sijo is exemplary of a tradition of pastoral, metaphysi-
cal poetry, older than haiku, but stemming from an ancient Chinese tra-
dition. Traditionally, it is a three-line poem, with 14–16 syllables in each 
line. Important facets of the sijo, according to Gross (2012, citing Elizabeth 
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St. Jacques): ‘. . . never lose sight of the three characteristics that make sijo 
unique: basic structure, musical/rhythmic elements, and the twist’ (¶8). 
 With these elements in mind, we can look at four sijo for their literal and/
or metaphorical reﬂ ections on physical aging (I brieﬂ y give  an interpreta-
tion of these sijo—as with all interpretations, these reﬂ ections are meant for 
discussion and debate.) In these four tone poems, we glimpse the ephem-
eral nature of joy and pleasure within an aging person—indeed, within 
all ages. 
 The spring breeze melted snow on the hills then quickly disappeared. 
 I wish I could borrow it brieﬂ y to blow over my hair 
 And melt away the aging frost forming now about my ears. 
 —U T’ak (1262–1342) (in Gross, 2012) 
 This sijo asserts the inevitability of the physical aging process, yet also 
calls for moments of youthfulness. It is gentle in its remonstrance toward 
aging, using words like ‘melt’ (as opposed to ‘ﬁ ght’ in ‘Do not go gentle’) to 
ask for a bit more time—it is a celebration of the imperfection of shortened 
time, a request to work with aging, not to oppose it. 
 The second sijo returns the poet back to a natural, natured state. 
 You ask how many friends I have? Water and stone, bamboo and pine. 
 The moon rising over the eastern hill is a joyful comrade. 
 Besides these ﬁ ve companions, what other pleasure should I ask? 
 —Yon Son-do (1587–1671) (in Gross, 2012) 
 Yon Son-do’s narrator, in an aging that is implied rather than explicit, 
comes to realize the fundamental connectedness of life elements—including 
the human body—and is satisﬁ ed with his place in the scheme of things. 
In this sijo, Yon Son-do relates the natural, enduring world to the stead-
fastness of friendship, posing the celebration of loyalty and inter-reliance 
together. 
 The third sijo is more explicit, less metaphorical. While still celebrat-
ing the processes of aging, the poet ironically points out that his mind 
grows sharper while his outward body (Wabi Sabi) grows ever more imper-
fect (‘the years pile up on my body’). The obvious juxtaposition of the 
two elements exempliﬁ es a wisdom of acceptance that is subtle, gentle and 
sublime. 
 Mind, I have a question for you—How is it you stay so young? 
 As the years pile up on my body, you too should grow old. 
 Oh, if I followed your lead, Mind, I would be run out of town. 
 —Anonymous (in Gross, 2012) 
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 While this sijo is more whimsical than the others, it gently reminds us 
that the balance between mind/spirit and body is more complex than Rene 
Descartes may have posited and than Western populist culture assumes. 
 The fourth sijo expresses a hope for a transformative act—for the poet’s 
body to ‘become a lovely swallow’—and for this act to create a new pleasance: 
 My body, in its withering, may become a lovely swallow. 
 Under the eaves of my loved one’s home I’ll build my nest of twigs. 
 After dusk I’ll ﬂ y aloft and glide gently to his side. 
 —Anonymous (in Gross, 2012) 
 It is difﬁ cult to resist a Judeo-Christian interpretation of this poem, but if 
we might, we see that the wish for mobility, for having done ‘good deeds’, 
for preparing for the future (and generations of the future) is packed within 
this simple sijo. 
 While these sijo each demonstrate Korean attitudes toward aging—where 
scientism and explicit discourse is seen as somewhat crass (to what degree this 
is a result of the poetic form, to what degree agrarian attitude, is unclear)—
they also exemplify precepts of Japanese Wabi Sabi: they are ‘perfect 
moment[s] in a most imperfect place—a sublime experience engraved as a 
treasure. . .’ (Gold, 2004: 117–118). They importune the reader to seek quiet 
moments of joy, to savor the pleasure derived from such moments as gentle 
and sublime facets of the process of aging. As such, they serve as islands of cel-
ebration, as archipelagos leading to a mainland ﬁ lled with new perspectives. 
 FINAL TOUCHES 
 My contention in this chapter was to demonstrate differing possibilities for 
worldviews toward the aging body, to disrupt the hegemony of Western 
views. This discussion has been deliberately counter-scientiﬁ c, counter-
Western-hegemonic, and as a result it has also over-simpliﬁ ed and general-
ized very complex societies and worldviews. The West’s dominant discourse 
has naturalized such attitudes toward the aging athletic body as one that 
‘ﬁ ghts the good ﬁ ght’, that continues to exemplify a dominant, masculine 
ideal of the sporting body. In short, the dominant Western attitude towards 
aging, decay and death sees a body as one that ‘loses a battle’ with disease; 
that never backs down or gives up; that sees cancer as the enemy. This is 
not surprising in a context of science, where prediction and control are two 
major rationales for study. 
 Contrariwise, some of the examples I have shown from the East’s domi-
nant discourses have presented an aging athletic body as one that may try 
to blend in with natural processes of aging, that may gracefully exemplify 
the aging process itself, and celebrate it within a worldview that accepts 
imperfection and decay as beautiful, aesthetic ways of performing one’s life. 
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In this worldview—increasingly homogenized (as we see with Murakami)—
death, decay, decline and dying are all seen as natural processes, inevitabili-
ties that we may accept, embrace and welcome. Which view may give more 
pleasure? 
 NOTES 
 1 .  Foreman, an Olympic gold medalist, won the heavyweight boxing title from 
Michael Moorer at age 45 in 1994 (cf. Anthony, 2008). 
 2 .  Hopkins was 46 when he won the WBC, IPO, and The Ring titles in May of 
2011 (‘Golden oldie’, 2011). 
 3 .  Oerter won gold in four consecutive Olympics in the discus, ﬁ nishing in 1968. 
However, ‘In 1980, at age 43, he threw 227–11, a career best and the second 
longest in the world that year’ (Litsky, 2007). 
 4 .  Callahan was 56 years old in 2008 when she competed in the 25-meter pistol 
at the Beijing Olympics (‘American shooter’, 2008). 
 5 .  Torres made the US Olympic swimming team at age 41 (Michaelis, 2008). 
 6 .  Age 40, Tua fought Alexander Ustinov in his last professional bout (Lewis, 
2013) 
 7 .  While Hoketsu was the oldest athlete at the London Olympics, ‘there are 187 
athletes over 40 at this year’s [2012] games’ (Hughes and Rogers, 2012).  
 8 .  Of course, this strategy is problematic, not least because, as a series of broad 
strokes, it denies individual exceptionalities. As the focus on this type of study 
may possibly increase, such generalities (racist, sexist and ageist) may be more 
deeply examined, but for now, opening up the discussion about different forms 
of pleasure and aging bodies will have to sufﬁ ce. 
 9 .  As the contemporary world is more and more a homogenized, globalized one, 
it seems reasonable to explore the fundamental (and yet somewhat stereotypi-
cal) ethical groundings of attitudes towards aging. Thus, I have not looked 
at contemporary poetry from either Western or Eastern (and that bifurcation 
itself is problematic) cultures, but at poetry that seems to stand as somewhat 
emblematic of those cultural broad strokes regarding the aging body. While 
it is certainly not my aim to provide a cause-effect relationship, or to gloss 
over many of the subtle differences, broad strokes will have to sufﬁ ce as an 
opening gambit. The basis for this piece is that ‘competition’, in the way it 
presents in contemporary physical life, however, is a social construction (cf. 
Berger and Luckmann, 1966), and, as such, it can be deconstructed—or at 
least interrogated. 
 10 .  As one example, Phillips points out the rarity of ‘death by competition’, this 
from the New Zealand Masters Games: 
 A death at Masters Games is a rarity and it was unfortunate that a 51-year-old 
local ridge runner died last week. This is only the fourth death in 11 Games 
in Wanganui since 1989, the others coming in swimming (an elderly visit-
ing woman), squash (a local male player) and touch football (a Palmer-
ston North man). A minutes silence was observed in the main marquee in 
memory of the ridge runner with event organizer Allan Caird and Games 
chairman Leigh Grant offering their condolences to the man’s family. Since 
the inaugural Games in Wanganui 20 years ago more than 72,500 competi-
tors, some of them in their 90’s, have competed. (2009) 
 11 .  Throughout, I use mediating terms like ‘traditionally’ and ‘hegemonic’. This is 
deliberate: it is reductionistic, racist and simplistic to characterize one culture 
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a certain way. But, in ‘doing’ research of the ‘other’, broad strokes are ways 
of beginning the conversation. To date, there has been very little discussion of 
things ‘Eastern’ in Western sport scholars’ discussions. Some exceptions, of 
course, apply, but—again, dominantly—the discourse surrounds (typically 
unexamined) Western worldviews. 
 12 .  Arguably, the aspects of pragmatic acceptance of  what is are not simply 
conﬁ ned to Eastern traditions, but also ﬁ nd expression in Dewey’s Ameri-
can pragmatism, Blumer’s ‘Symbolic Interactionism’ and in traces of other 
worldviews—the modernist notions of constant progress and achievement, 
however, are somewhat antithetical to these stances, partially because of a 
lack of tacit acceptance of the  now . 
 13 .  Note how, for example, then-49-year-old Courtney Cox (Hollywood star of 
‘ Friends ’ and ‘ Cougar Town ’) has been so characterized in a magazine article 
title: ‘Courteney Cox: Fighting my age is “a constant daily vicious battle”’ 
(Patel, 2013).  
 14 .  And actors, putting themselves in roles where they have not actually experi-
enced bodily the ‘feel’ of aging, or grief, learn to ‘embody’ accurately the feel 
of something outside their ken. See, for example, Brad Pitt’s enactment of 
Benjamin Button (Fincher, 2008) in  The Curious Case of Benjamin Button , 
Dustin Hoffman’s role of Jack Crabb in  Little Big Man (Penn, 1970), and the 
actors communicating deep grief in the play  Rabbit Hole (Lindsay-Abaire, 
2006; see also Poole, 2012). Actors put on these affective states often having 
not experienced them in their own lives; rarely do we, though, except as chil-
dren,  enact future possible states of feeling.  
 15 .  With thanks to Jay Coakley for mentioning this song as an example of legiti-
mized popular culture views of aging in the West. 
 16 .  There are other forms of aging, as well, which implies that there may be dif-
ferent ‘ages’ for different kinds of ‘peaks’: intellectual, physical, emotional, 
spiritual peaks may all, to some degree, be conceived similarly to this sense 
of a physical peaking. Again, this rationalization process—of an organism 
that doesn’t simply keep growing (e.g. spiritually)—may be quite different 
culturally. 
 17 .  This relation of personal experience to shared societal ills is not unlike 
C. Wright Mills’ (1959: 186) conception of public and private concerns: 
. . .  [the social scientist’s] public role has two goals: What he [sic] ought to 
do for the individual is to turn personal troubles and concerns into social 
issues and problems open to reason. . . . What he [sic] ought to do for the 
society is to combat all those forces which are destroying genuine publics 
and creating a mass society. . . . Only then might society be reasonable 
and free. 
 18 .  Again, I am aware of many difﬁ culties with even discussing these concepts in 
such reductionistic terms, given the incomparability of time eras, geographical 
and political systems, and so forth—but since some of the same characteriza-
tions occur in depictions of both West and East (cf. Said, 1979), my charac-
terizations fall under the rubric of ‘idealized’ notions of West and East. As Ibn 
Warraq points out of Said—implying him to be a cultural relativist: ‘he has 
no interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam 
really are’ (Warraq, 2007: 31). But Said got the discussion started, beginning 
with broad strokes (admittedly challengeable). Even Warraq himself struggles 
with the term ‘the Other’:  
 . . . a phrase I am reluctant to use, for its use implies a certain attitude or 
acceptance of certain mental clichés, but the realiation that there is no 
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easy and succinct way to get around it has led to my temporary verbal 
surrender . . . (12) 
 Clearly, reductionistic language is clumsy, over-simpliﬁ cation is awkward and 
language itself is sometimes halting and lame, but making the attempt to con-
tinue the dialogue is still important. 
 19 .  Eastwood, after having spoken for eleven minutes to the Republican National 
Convention, in a conceit addressed to President Obama, presumably sitting in 
a chair next to him, defended his speech partially on the basis of his age (he 
was 82 years old at the time of the speech): 
 ‘One advantage of being my age is that you know what can they do to ya?’ 
Eastwood said in an interview with CNN. ‘You just have fun and do what 
you think and then you can say what you think, you don’t have to edit 
yourself’. (‘Clint Eastwood’, 2012, ¶2) 
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 Jayne Caudwell 
 And I could hear the lords and ladies now from the grandstand,
 and could see them standing up to wave me in: ‘Run!’ 
 —(Sillitoe, 1958: 46) 
 People yelled, cheered, pressed in against me, radios blared,
 my tears were dry, so I yelled and cheered too
 and wind whipped leaves down the street 
 as more runners came by, more and more thousands, 
 until it seemed that they ﬁ lled the whole city, 
 and that all of us, all of us, were running. 
— (Levin, 1997: 296) 
 Colin, the young Borstal lad and runner in Alan Sillitoe’s story ‘The Loneli-
ness of the Long-Distance Runner’, ignoring the commands from the ‘lords 
and ladies’ to ‘run’, stood still before the ﬁ nishing line. In Richardson’s ﬁ lmic 
version of the book, Colin smiles as he stands waiting to be beaten. He delib-
erately fails to ﬁ nish in ﬁ rst place, blatantly breaking the rules of sporting 
competition as well as the expectations of his governors. The book’s young 
character is anti-authority and anti-establishment, and Sillitoe’s narrative is 
often viewed as an astute critique of post-WWII British class system, class 
privilege, ever-emerging capitalism and promulgated ideals surrounding 
competition and success. 
 In Jennifer Levin’s story ‘Her Marathon’, Celía, struggling with a hang-
over and on her way to get breakfast, witnesses Alberto Salazar running the 
New York City Marathon. Impressed and inspired by the runners and the 
occasion, she decides to take up running. Levin writes how Celía, depicted 
as an overweight lesbian mother with a butch girlfriend who drinks a lot 
of beer, goes on to complete her ﬁ rst running event: the Women’s Mini-
Marathon in Central Park. 
 Both of the above short stories center personal experiences of running. At 
the same time, and not coincidentally, they capture important socio-cultural 
dimensions of class, gender and sexuality. They are dissimilar narratives, 
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but both protagonists are shown to relish the freedoms their running allows. 
In each text, Colin and Celía enjoy their early morning runs. Colin is let 
out like an owned racehorse to run the surrounding ﬁ elds and woodlands. 
Under these circumstances, running provides a sense of liberty and indepen-
dence. This is something he savors: 
 . . . and as soon as I take that ﬁ rst ﬂ ying leap out into the frosty grass of 
an early morning when even the birds haven’t the heart to whistle, I get 
to thinking, and that’s what I like. . . . It’s a treat, being a long-distance 
runner, out in the world by yourself with not a soul to make you bad-
tempered or tell you what to do . . . .(Sillitoe, 1958: 10) 
 Celía, after years of inactivity, decides to run regularly and frequently. 
She too takes pleasure from her moving body and the embodied feelings 
associated with the motion and rhythm of running: 
 The mornings got darker, closer to winter, but every once in a while I’d 
wake up easier when the alarm hit, sometimes even with a feel of burning 
red excitement in my chest and throat, like running was something plea-
surable, good, a gift. . . . Thighs move like water, arms pump rhythm. The 
feet did not want to stop. Those days I’d stay out longer—half an hour 
more—with happy buzzing like music in my head. (Levin, 1997: 301) 
 Capturing the pleasures of running—the seemingly intangible dimension 
of human movement—is not achieved easily via traditional academic 
approaches. Many sport scholars are prone to objectify and make scien-
tiﬁ c the body’s motion. Referring to sport studies, Markula and Denison 
(2000) explore how it is possible to research and write about the motion 
of the body (running and dance) without turning human movement in to 
a disembodied practice. They highlight the potential of ﬁ ction to capture 
embodiment. Through reference to Rinehart’s (1998c) work about skate-
boarding, they make an important turn to the aesthetic, sensate and visceral 
of moving bodies. More recently, Bairner—in his address of the ‘. . . main 
challenges that currently face the sociology of sport . . .’ (2012: 102)—
similarly explores the signiﬁ cance of ﬁ ction and semi-ﬁ ction, arguing that 
they ‘provide valuable sociological insights into the world of sport’ (p. 111). 
 In the two stories cited above, distance running, written through evoca-
tive prose, is presented as vividly and palpably pleasurable. Running is pro-
duced through these texts as embodied, and as a personal pleasure. 
 More broadly, it is apparent that distance running is contingent on socio-
cultural location and there are valuable scholarly contributions that dem-
onstrate the ways class, gender, sexuality, age and ability (Abbas, 2004; 
Allen-Collinson, 2011; Atkinson, 2008; Grifﬁ n, 2010; Leedy, 2009; Smith, 
2000; Tulle, 2007; van Ingen, 2004) impact running, and are re-inscribed 
through running. Feelings of pleasure do feature in some of these studies. 
However, runners’ pleasures are often connected to achievement: recording 
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times and distances. These outcome-orientated principles of sporting com-
petition (achieving, beating, placing and winning) are mimetic of capitalist 
ideologies (Brohm, 1978 and Sillitoe, 1958) and Bale (2004) successfully 
identiﬁ es the links between running and modernity, rationalization and 
standardization. More speciﬁ cally, he compares the shifts in contemporary 
running cultures to the processes of production that underpin capitalist 
societies: 
 Fordism has its analogies in running. Fordist foot-running involves pro-
duction (of races) being geared to capital equipment (the standardized, 
synthetic 400-metre track), the optimization of processes (interval run-
ning), a growing division of labour and a standardization of outputs 
(a few Grand Prix spectacles). It is tightly organized with little, if no, 
space for deviations. (Bale, 2004: 71) 
 Bale’s critique can be extended and applied to recent interventions gov-
erning human movement, especially distance running: the use of the Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS), for example. The advertising of these products 
and the meanings given to distance running through such advertising are 
steeped with notions of performance efﬁ ciency and productivity, echoing 
not only Fordism, but Taylorism too. Like Fordism, Taylorism involves 
rationality and standardization as well as empiricism, best practice, knowl-
edge transfer and work ethic. The hyperbole is easy to see in this Nike 
advertisement: 
 More from your run 
 Train like you mean it 
 Map runs, track progress, and get the motivation you need to keep 
going. The Nike+Running app tracks distance, pace, time and calories 
burned with GPS, giving you audio feedback as you run. Automatically 
upload to nikeplau.com to see runs, including your route and elevation. 
 Extra Motivation 
 Activate a Powersong to help blast you toward a new record. The App 
also gives you positive feedback from some of Nike’s top athletes. 
 Challenge yourself 
 Push for your longest, farthest, and fastest run yet. Take on yester-
day, last Tuesday, or a personal best. 
 (nikeplus.nike.com/plus/products/gps_app/) 
 The advertisements for Global Positioning Systems for running carry all 
the hallmarks of efﬁ ciency and productivity. They provide stark remind-
ers of how the capitalist principles of Fordism and Taylorism feature in 
contemporary running cultures. The moving body is subject to principles 
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of progress and progression. The exercise laboratory becomes mobile and 
individualized. Running becomes a highly sanitized form of physical activ-
ity. Pleasure, we can assume, is tied to quantiﬁ able criteria, and it is about 
knowing and mastering. 
 In sport studies there is limited explicit engagement with running and 
pleasure. In this chapter, I draw on ﬁ ctions and non-ﬁ ctions, existing aca-
demic literatures and my own experiences (the personal and biographi-
cal) 1 to offer a socio-cultural analysis of running pleasures. This chapter, 
therefore, reﬂ ects a form of autoethnography and this approach, as Denzin 
posits, is a departure from traditional social science research. It requires 
different ways of writing, as well as of reading: ‘The writer asks the reader 
to submit to the text’s casual version of how and why something happened’ 
(2010: 89). 
 Overall, my aim is to challenge running cultures of achievement (track 
progress, distance, pace, time and calories burned) and running discourses 
of success (push for your longest, farthest and fastest run yet. Take on yes-
terday, last Tuesday or a personal best). I seek to move beyond pleasure 
as ﬁ xed to work-ethic because too often, as Ahmed points out, ‘Pleasure 
becomes an imperative only as an incentive and reward for good conduct, or 
as an ‘appropriate outlet’ for bodies that are busy being productive (‘work 
hard play hard’)’ (2004: 163). 
 A BRIEF AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
 I look down at the several pairs of running shoes on the ﬂ oor. ‘No pink 
ones,’ I tell him. 
 We look at each other and I get the feeling he submits to my steely-
eyed stare. We are both in our mid-to-late-forties and this is an inde-
pendent running shop tucked away from Brighton’s main drag. ‘Sam,’ 
he shouts down the stairs to his mate ‘No more pink ones.’ I continue 
to look at him. He is dressed in loose jogging pants and a faded Beachy 
Head Marathon T-shirt. He stands—feet shoulder’s width apart—
poised and balanced. Despite his baggy clothes it is easy to see that his 
body is lean and taut. I enjoy looking at him. 
 ‘Well, would you run in pink trainers?’ I ask. My voice is a little 
softer this time. He thinks for a split second. 
 ‘They don’t make them for men.’ 
 ‘Exactly,’ I retort. 
 He looks down at the running shoes and then at me. He adds, grin-
ning, ‘I have worn orange ones’. 
 When school ended, I was 16 and I had passed three O’levels: maths, phys-
ics and art. In art I made a clay version of the torso of Michelangelo’s David. 
It was green because the head of this male ﬁ gure was a bulbous cabbage: his 
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ribs, the veins of a cabbage leaf. I will never know why I made this sculp-
ture, but looking back, rather conveniently and very simplistically, it suits 
my current belief systems—I’m critical of so-called male knowledge. Also, 
rather paradoxically, I was drawn to David’s body. 
 Like many children born in the UK in the 60s, I spent much of my child-
hood playing outside. From the age of six to the age of 12, I lived with my 
family at a ‘boys’ school’ for young offenders, (‘naughty boys’), juvenile 
delinquents aged between 13 and 16 years. These boys were too young for 
the Borstal system, although some did end up there. My parents were resi-
dential social workers and for the last four years of our time at the school 
we lived in an apartment attached to a Unit. The Unit was home to 15 young 
men. Many of these young men were from nearby Birmingham and their 
ethnicities reﬂ ected both inner-city white working class and ﬁ rst generation 
Black British youth. 
 Despite latter-day media coverage of how such institutions housed abu-
sive behaviors, it was a safe environment for my younger brother and me, 
although, I have three memories of feeling discomfort. The ﬁ rst was when 
one of the white boys pushed me underwater at the swimming pool and 
tried to hold me there. The second was when a small group of them encour-
aged me to smoke a cigarette. And the third was accompanying one of the 
white boys, because he had asked my dad if I could go along with them, to 
visit his dad in Long Lartin Prison (later in life, I learned Long Lartin was/
is a Category A prison for inmates who are considered ‘highly dangerous’). 
The rest of my memories are about playing outside, playing football, climb-
ing trees, fences and walls, hanging and swinging from climbing frames, 
running across ﬁ elds and through woodland, holidays in Wales and canoe-
ing rivers and the sea. It all sounds very idyllic; the point is I was very active 
and my childhood was joyful because of it. 
 During some of these years, I played sport at Middle School (9–13yrs) 
and more formally in the school’s teams. I was on the cross-country team, 
probably because I could run, but I disliked almost every run and certainly 
every race. At this age, the focus on achieving and success made me nervous, 
nervous beyond my young emotional capacity. ‘Serious running’, as Bale 
(2004: 18) argues, ‘colonize[s] the bodies of youngsters’. I was very aware 
of my physical body, and the bodies of the boys I grew up with. I knew 
there was a link between physical activity and how we moved and what we 
looked like. However, at this age, I did not enjoy running in races. 
 As a young teenager, I was attracted to the torso of Michelangelo’s David. 
It resembled the soft musculature of the boys’ bodies I observed—and had 
playful physical contact with—in my childhood. I did not desire the bodies of 
the boys, or David; I was not drawn to their smooth, slightly muscled chests, 
arms and legs out of any childhood heterosexual attraction. These male bod-
ies evoked a wish to be exactly the same as them. I wanted muscles and 
I wanted to be strong and fast. I wanted the same joys and pleasures I assumed 
some of them took from running, jumping, climbing and play ﬁ ghting. 
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 It seems remarkable now, but in my late teens and before I left home at 
19 years old, I completed three half marathons. I was not a member of a 
running or athletics club; however, I was a member of the local hockey and 
rowing clubs. Running was part of the training for these sports. And, as 
Bale (2004: 16) makes the point, ‘[j]ogging and ﬁ tness running require 
getting people to run rather than taking pleasure in movement or simply 
enjoying themselves’. By my late teens I was conditioned in formal sporting 
competition. It was also the early 1980s, and organized marathons and half 
marathons were emerging as popular leisure activities in most UK towns and 
cities. 
 As a teenage girl, I participated in running for ﬁ tness (Bale, 2004) and not 
for pleasure. Also, I ran because I thought I could sculpt my body, not into 
a traditionally feminine-looking body, but into something more boy-like, 
which, I assumed would enable embodied pleasures. 
 GENDER, CLASS AND RUNNING 
 ‘ASICS has also created the Gender Speciﬁ c Space Trusstic, 
 as part of its aim to reinvent running shoes for women’ 
 Price: £105 
 Colour: Hot Pink 
 —(www.asics.co.uk, 2012) 
 Freedom to run where they like may apply only to certain groups, 
 often white, heterosexual males.
—(Bale, 2004: 69) 
 In the literature, running for men (Murakami, 2008; Smith, 2000) and for 
both men and women (Abbas, 2004; Atkinson, 2008; Tulle, 2007) is strongly 
linked with middle class-ness. The relationships between class and running 
are evidenced in the ways runners’ bodies hold and are given meaning. As 
Tulle (2007) argues, through her application of the ideas of Bourdieu, the 
runner’s body is a source of habitus and. as others highlight (Abbas, 2004; 
Atkinson, 2008), running cultures encourage and indulge middle-class cul-
tural capital. In this way, many aspects of running are contingent on class 
privilege and the embodiment of this privilege. Buying expensive, special-
ized footwear might be one manifestation of this privilege. 
 Another class-based privilege I am personally aware of is running in 
extraordinary locations. Bale has also made this point: ‘As a runner, one 
experiences many places at a variety of scales’ (2004: 73). 
 Pleasures: Placing Litanies 
 Edinburgh, Newcastle, York, Lake Thirlmere, Manchester, Leeds, Brad-
ford, Loughborough, Birmingham, Walsall, Bewdley, Stourport-on-Severn, 
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London, Shoreham-by-Sea, Brighton, Eastbourne, Oslo, Ishøj, Paris, 
Aix en Provence, Perpignan, La Manga, Zagreb, Skala Eressou, 
Nahariya, Masdar City, Bogor, Kimbe, Melbourne, Raglan, Napier, 
Wellington, Vancouver, Bangor, Denver, Chicago, Urbana-Champaign, 
New Orleans, Havana. 
 England, Norway, Denmark, France, Spain, Croatia, Greece, Israel, 
United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, United States of America, Cuba. 
 And so, it is with some pleasure I tell people I have run in many differ-
ent countries (places). I tell of the climates (tropical, sub-tropical, arid, dry, 
Mediterranean, temperate, cold) and runs through forests, woodlands, 
meadows, alongside lakes and on agricultural tracks, beaches and some-
times roads (spatial scales). I choose not to recount times and distances. 
 Talking about runs is not peculiar; other runners and writers of the sub-
ject (Bale, 2004; Murakami, 2008) often tell of their runs in what are for 
them faraway places. The stories of these runs often centralize the running 
environment—the climate, the terrain and the people. For me, these runs are 
about feeling place. The pleasures of being touched by a place are evoked, 
lived and re-lived through memories and narratives of these runs—what it 
felt like being there, running (cf. Hockey, 2005,2006). These connections 
with place and their natural and human environments are sensual pleasures. 
 Out of all of these places, the only purpose-built facility I ran on was in 
Bogor, Indonesia (Figure 7.1). At 6 am, I joined local people and ran circuits 
of a very worn and uneven red-rumble oval track. 
 Running in tropical environments is a highly sensual as well as physical 
and energetic experience. The surface of the skin is wet within minutes, the 
entire body becomes saturated and sticky and fresh oxygen feels like it is 
in short supply. In Bogor, and on previous occasions in Kimbe, Papua New 
Guinea, my runs were hot, gasping, drenched affairs, and extremely visceral 
because of the humidity and what this does to my body and breathing. 
I ran alone in Papua New Guinea, but in Bogor I joined Indonesian people 
as we made our recurring, variously paced, but nevertheless anti-clockwise 
laps. I shared their running/walking space and our random and sponta-
neous mutual glances, smiles and nods were wonderfully simple human 
interactions. These moments of recognition are customary on my regular 
hometown running routes, but to make small, ﬂ eeting unions with people 
in places that are unfamiliar somehow reafﬁ rms my beliefs in human kind-
ness and compassion. I would end these runs with soaked clothing, beads of 
sweat streaming down my body, slippery skin, a heavy pulse in my head and 
a massive sense of fulﬁ llment. Ahmed, in linking happiness to pleasure, sug-
gests that ‘[t]he perfect end is the end of all ends . . . ’ (2010: 26). Like Celía 
in Levin’s short story, I would ﬁ nish ‘. . . with happy buzzing like music in 
my head’ (Levin, 1997: 301). On occasions I would wonder if these sen-
sual endings were my jouissance; a pleasure that is so complete and deeply 
embodied that, for me, it has sexual undertones. 
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 The pleasures of running in unfamiliar places are not only cutaneous, 
sensual and about humankind and connectivity; they are not only about 
how air and skin interact, the feel of a sweaty, slippery, satiated body and 
how different people intermingle. Running in some hot places is also trans-
gressive, and this can provide an exciting edge, which is pleasurable in a dif-
ferent way. I have visited Dhaka in Bangladesh, but failed to run in this city 
space (instead, I used a gym to exercise inside). I did not run in Bangladesh, 
partly because of the lack of appropriate space and the exaggerated clamor 
of this heavily populated country. However, the main reason I abstained 
from running was because of how public places in predominantly Muslim 
countries such as Bangladesh are populated entirely by men and boys only. 
I felt very ambivalent about breaking in to these very traditional cultural 
spaces. I wanted to be sensitive to religious imperatives (even though I iden-
tify as atheist). I did not want to be offensive and take the privileges of 
a white middle-class woman to brusquely inﬁ ltrate these obviously male 
domains. However, I did want to rebel against such absolute gendered spa-
tial domination. Secretly, I wanted the pleasures of careering through—with 
my imagined-as strong, composed, woman’s body—these men-only spaces. 
 I was able to run the dusty pavements of Masdar City, a purpose-built 
grid arrangement of gated communities on the outskirts of Abu Dhabi. This 
Figure 7.1 Bogor, nr. Jakarta, Island of Java, Indonesia (July 2010). Taken by Jayne 
Caudwell
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felt possible because of the huge imported population of white professional 
employees from Europe, the USA and Australia who appeared to dislocate 
some of the cultural traditions of the country. However, there were no other 
runners, let alone women runners. Instead, the streets, pavements and arti-
ﬁ cial embankments were occupied, very subtly, by work gangs; men who 
were most likely from Pakistan. Much of the United Arab Emirates has been 
converted, via cheap labor from the Asian continent, into what might best 
be described through Baudrillard’s notion of hyper-reality. In what were 
desert lands and semi-permanent settlements, there are now facades of high 
rise buildings, manicured highways and large swathes of the greenest grass, 
old-world stores selling alcohol and fancy air-conditioned indoor shopping 
malls with the usual suspects (e.g. Starbucks and McDonalds). These West-
ernized trappings, absent in Bangladesh, somehow gave me license to run. 
 I would return from these runs with a dry mouth, a ﬁ lm of ﬁ ne sand on my 
teeth and broken lines of salt-stains contouring my cotton T-shirt and shorts. 
Despite the harsh dry heat, running the newly built pavements felt good 
because my moving body provided a very rare sight: a woman running. Run-
ning in United Arab Emirates seemed like an act of gender-politico deﬁ ance; 
it might not have been all that, but challenging and possibly breaking some 
established gendered norms provided me with a willful sense of gratiﬁ cation. 
 Clearly, pleasure is a complicated concept. It can be considered under 
the remit of affect and in her work on affect and emotion, Wetherell asks: 
‘How can the relays and ricochets of the human body be grasped, and the 
visceral put in touch with the social?’ (2012: 10). For her, the links between 
affect and the body involve an assembly of the relational (social) and the 
cultural. She argues: ‘Power, then, is crucial to the agenda of affect studies’ 
(p. 17). Running for pleasures—embodied pleasures, which are attached to 
the geographies of running in ‘exotic’ running locales, is undeniably linked 
to the relational (socio-cultural), namely class privilege. 
 My trips to Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh and the United 
Arab Emirates are very clearly enabled by my middle class-ness. That is, my 
ability to pay for regular and often expensive ﬂ ights, my class-based self-
conﬁ dence (in public spaces) as well as the many travel freedoms granted 
to UK passport-holders. These travel experiences are also dependent on 
the cultural capital of my family. Trips to the aforementioned four coun-
tries were to see and live with (for weeks at a time) my brother. He works 
in overseas agriculture development and without his privileged residency, 
I would never have been able to stay and move freely within these local 
communities. The extended list of places where I have run further reﬂ ects 
my class privilege, education, employment and opportunities to travel to 
conferences; moreover, working away from home and my largely uncon-
strained ability to take holidays and to visit friends, family and partners, for 
example, running through alpine forests on the outskirts of Oslo, running 
up remote dusty hills not far from Aix en Provence and running Raglan’s 
beautiful Te Kopua and Ngarunui beaches. 
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 Undeniably, some of my running pleasures are inextricably connected to 
broader structural social relations and individual cultural capital. My running-
for-pleasures biography continues to reify the already known links between 
running and middle class-ness. Additionally, it introduces running pleasure 
as visceral and sensual as well as related to place and personal politics. 
 THE RUNNER’S BODY-MIND 
 She has the most beautiful legs, hard, stripped down, with no 
wastage, 
 and her Achilles tendons are like ﬂ exible rock. Running does that 
for her.
 And then I think, damn, damn, damn. 
 I will not love her for those reasons . . . 
—(Maitland, 1997: 163) 
 The farther I ran, the more weight I lost, too. 
 In two and a half months I dropped about seven pounds, 
 and the bit of ﬂ ab I was starting to see around my stomach 
disappeared. 
 —(Murakami, 2008: 15) 
 The physical body is central to many accounts of running. In Sara Maitland’s 
story, entitled ‘The Loveliness of the Long Distance Runner’, Sally ﬁ ghts her 
desire to objectify her girlfriend’s body. In the narrative, both women are 
cognizant of how competitive sporting ideals, in particular those apparent 
in marathon running, collide with their lesbian feminist points of view. Sally, 
the non-runner in the relationship, asks her girlfriend, repeatedly, why she 
must run marathons. The reply is a mixture of rationale, including: ‘ “Call 
it sisterhood. You can’t do it alone. You need—” at which Sally rasps: “You 
need the competition; you need people to beat . . .” ’ (Maitland, 1997: 162). 
The two women’s differing opinions on marathon running remain unre-
solved throughout the short story. Yet Sally does ﬁ nd pleasure in looking at 
a woman-runner’s body: the woman she loves. And her girlfriend continues 
to relish long-distance running. 
 Haruki Murakami, a famous Japanese writer of successful contempo-
rary ﬁ ction, started running in 1982. He boasts at least one marathon a year 
(1982–2009) and a one-hour-a-day running regime. His book,  What I Talk 
About When I Talk about Running (2008), is an allusion to Raymond Carv-
er’s (1981) collection and short story— What We Talk about When We Talk 
about Love , in which Carver articulates the multiple meanings and elusive-
ness of love. Murakami’s title suggests intricate expressions of running. After 
enjoying his rather surreal and intriguing book  The Wind-Up Bird Chron-
icles , I anticipated his writings on running to be similarly unconventional. 
However, I discovered that he writes of (talks about) his own running through 
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his times, distances, body weight and disciplined routine. He expresses a pro-
gressive/competitive philosophy: ‘In long-distance running the only opponent 
you have to beat is yourself, the way you used to be’ (2008: 10). And, for me, 
some of his observations are mildly sexist: ‘Most of these girls are small, slim, 
have on maroon Harvard-logo outﬁ ts, blond hair in a ponytail . . . it’s pretty 
wonderful to watch these pretty girls run’ (p. 93–94). 
 Although Maivorsdotter and Quennerstedt (2012) highlight the aesthetic 
content of Murakami’s running through an analysis of his written text, 
I found the lack of an unusual and alternative embodied narrative of run-
ning disappointing. He admits he uses the physical disciplines and regimes 
of running to help manage his creativity as well as body weight. Despite 
echoing the instrumentality of running, these links begin to connect his run-
ning body with his creative mind. Still, I wonder what might have been 
the result of Murakami fusing the range of the ‘real’ of his marathon run-
ning and the diversity of the ‘surreal’ of his ﬁ ction writing. Would he write 
(talk) about his embodiment and the embodiment of other people (e.g. the 
Harvard women) differently? Would he write of pleasure differently? 
 Regular running, in most cases, does have an impact on the physical body. 
It makes some people’s bodies change shape and weigh less than they previ-
ously weighed. This might make them appear more physically attractive—in 
the dominant Westernized sense of physical [sexual] attraction. The achieve-
ment of this sexualized embodied aesthetic most likely motivates many run-
ners. In addition to competing against others/self and to achieving times and 
distances, runners often strive for visibly ‘ideal’ body morphology. Signiﬁ -
cantly, the ideal body cannot be bulging, excessive, overweight and slovenly. 
The ideal body is not a lazy body; it is the result of laboring, achieving and 
producing results, measured by time and distance, or even percentages of 
body fat. The runner’s body serves to signify efﬁ ciency, productivity, the suc-
cesses of individual toil, control and the ability to push through physical con-
straints and barriers. Running can become a physical fetish of achievement, 
and some running pleasures might best be described as painful and punish-
ing. This is evident in Atkinson’s study (2008) of the ways triathletes identify 
with agony, hurt and suffering. These feelings, when linked to endurance 
sport and in the context of Western capitalist lifestyles, are given meaning; 
they become pleasurable because they signify hard work (work ethic) and 
the ability to succeed, often against the odds. Such quantiﬁ able pleasures are 
meaningful for many runners. 
 But what of the pleasures of running that do not valorize the objective 
dimensions of size, shape, time, distance, winning and defeating? Within 
achievement-orientated discourses of running pleasures, the physical body 
remains central and the corporeal is the focus of measurement. Clearly, there 
exist alternative ways to explore embodied pleasures, even the pleasurable 
agonies of running. There are, as I have mentioned above, the aesthetic, sen-
sate, affectual and subjective feelings of running. Too few writers have made 
attempts to consider these. That said, Leedy (2009) does explore the con-
nections between women’s emotional landscapes and their running habits. 
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And Bale (2004) does raise slowness, playfulness and improvisation as sig-
niﬁ cant dimensions of running. These emotional and playful aspects have 
often been forgotten and/or omitted from studies of long-distance running. 
 ‘I Can’t Cry and Run at the Same Time’ (Leedy, 2009). 
 Raw Emotion 
 At 17 weeks, I miscarried. The geneticist at Barts Hospital told me our 
genes—the father’s and mine—were incompatible. I entered the Paris 
Marathon. 
 Ten years earlier, I took a job in Leeds. We’d been together for 
six years, including a previous move on my account. This time, she said 
she wouldn’t go. I entered the London Marathon. 
 Last year, another heart-felt loss; my receipt number for the Jerusa-
lem Marathon: 913799. I entered, but I didn’t take part, this time. 
 Long distance running can provide an anesthetic and a pleasant way to 
forget adversity. It can displace emotions surrounding loss, unhappiness, 
sadness, misery and depression. In her qualitative research, Leedy (2009) 
considers the usefulness of women’s narratives of running for broader agen-
das of social work practice, speciﬁ cally the mental health of women. For 
the ﬁ ve women in Leedy’s study, long distance running, usually competi-
tive, offset current and past experiences of loss, bereavement, anger, addic-
tion, stress and trauma. Running, for these women, provided sanctuary and 
solace; it permitted degrees of control and helped foster environments of 
accomplishment and self-worth. 
 Leedy’s analysis of her research participants’ testimonies slips easily into 
health promotion strategic frameworks, namely therapeutic functional-
ity, stages of crisis and crisis resolution. Additionally, from the research, 
she advocates two speciﬁ c types of long-distance running: self-efﬁ cacy and 
active coping. Clearly, physical activity, and in this case running, has been 
and continues to be viewed in functionalist and positivistic terms. Research 
from this perspective adopts epistemologies and methodologies that set out 
to uncover particular aspects of running—for example, women’s empower-
ment and wellbeing. Running, then, is viewed as a form of medicine and/or 
therapy on the road to regaining ‘normality’. 
 As I have argued from the onset, there are feelings of pleasure that exist 
outside of achieving normative outcomes, feelings and emotions that are 
much harder to analyze. For example, one of Leedy’s research participants 
told of how her running was ‘. . . glorious! Glorious!’ (2009: 85) and another 
spoke of her body’s motion and/in her running environment: 
 I think [there was] something about the repetitive movements, the 
relaxing rhythm of feet—breathing. I looked around and breathed the 
air and looked up at the sky and at the changes on the trail. (p. 87) 
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 In his work on the body, nudity and the beach, Obrador-Pons focuses on 
the ‘naked body itself, its movement and intensities as well as its interface 
with the environment’ (2007: 125). He does this because he wishes to move 
away from existing socio-cultural explanations of the body as produced 
wholly through discourse and the body as an object of representation. Fol-
lowing Massumi, he argues that the body within socio-cultural thinking has 
been made sense of through ‘ideas of objectiﬁ cation, resistance and inscrip-
tion’ (2002: 125). His challenge is to shift from the body that makes sense 
to ‘. . . an elusory and affectual body open to the world that feels and senses’ 
(2007: 125). 
 Others have turned to the senses and affect to help understand the physi-
cally active body. For example, there is Seville’s (2008) work on Parkour, and 
Straughan’s (2012) research with scuba divers. For these writers, embodi-
ment is in context; it involves a consideration of where the activity takes 
place and how spatial scales are implicated. Examples of spatial scales for 
divers are the sea, coral reefs, ﬂ ows of water, air supply and pressure. Urban 
architecture, cityscape, brickwork, surface textures and clothing are relevant 
to those people who practice Parkour. Place and its spatialities are meaning-
making in terms of affect and the body’s senses. In this way, embodiment ‘. . . 
becomes an important facet for thinking through emotional geographies . . .’ 
(Straughan, 2012: 20). Situatedness and sensation inﬂ uence emotional effects 
and can help form what Straughan refers to as ‘therapeutic landscapes’. It is 
place and space as well as embodiment that contribute to embodied sensa-
tion, for example, calmness (diving) and fear (Parkour). 
 Returning to Obrador-Pons’ approach (to the body) and its relevance to 
running; he starts from the premise that it is not about seeing or showing 
nudity, but about how the body feels. For example, the sensation of the 
sun and wind on exposed skin. If we make an analogy between the naked 
body and the running body, then we can argue that running ‘. . . is some-
thing more than scripting upon the body or liberating it from social norms’ 
(2007: 128). Running, for women, is not only about self-efﬁ cacy (empower-
ment) and active coping—it is an affectual practice. The research partici-
pants in Obrador-Pons’ study considered lying on a beach naked as ‘. . . a 
pleasant and comfortable feeling . . .’; one of the women said: ‘I like this 
feeling a lot’ (p. 130). 
 Perhaps, some pleasures are not easily captured in words and text; they 
might be beyond conscious re-presentation, even cognition. However, tap-
ping embodied sensation and holding in view the notion of therapeutic land-
scapes opens the way for the study of enjoyment, emotion and pleasures. It 
offers a lens of analysis that is not ﬁ xed on pre-coded cultural meanings that 
are attached to running (e.g. accomplishing times, distance and self-efﬁ cacy). 
 My participation in long-distance running, particularly marathon run-
ning, has in the past provided structure and an identiﬁ able regime to counter 
hard times. My turn to running reﬂ ects learned behaviors, including a sport-
ing stoicism, existing value-systems and the assumption that it will help 
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‘improve’ my emotional states. The shift to longer, more frequent runs was 
also possible because of an acquired physical capital (as well as acquired 
economic and cultural capital, as discussed earlier in this chapter). Over the 
last 40 years—since the age of ﬁ ve or six—my sporting ‘habitus’ (to bor-
row from Bourdieu) has developed to the extent that I experience almost 
constraint-free access to physical activity participation. As a consequence 
of this long-term involvement, my base-level ﬁ tness is sound. This sporting 
capital reﬂ ects a privileged ability-position, which means I can take up long-
distance running relatively easily. 
 For several reasons, I did not participate in the Jerusalem marathon. 
Some of these reasons were logistical. One reason was because I discov-
ered it would be impossible to run the streets of Jerusalem wearing a politi-
cally motivated T-shirt, one with a Palestinian ﬂ ag on it, for example. What 
also happened—during the ﬁ rst few months when I extended my running 
routes—was that I began to think about running for pleasures. I started to 
feel my body’s rhythms more keenly. Instead of being locked in to a deep-
rooted achievement-orientated mind-set, I ran for the sheer fun of it. 
 The Pleasures of the Plod 
 It is affect’s dramatic and turbulent qualities, along with the random, 
the chaotic and the spontaneous, which have marked it out as special 
for many. 
 This is misleading. Affect is about sense as well as sensibility. It is 
practical, communicative and organised. In affective practices, bits of the 
body get patterned together with feelings and thoughts, interaction pat-
terns and relationships, narratives and interpretative repertoires, social 
relations, personal histories, and ways of life. (Wetherell, 2012: 13–14) 
 . . . I skipped grocery shopping and just went home, 
 changed into some sweaty old things, 
 and I went outside into the wind and dark and I ran again, 
 very sweet and happy and like music, the way I had that morning,
 running off and onto curbs, twisting around cars and garbage cans 
and people, 
 I didn’t care. (Levin, 1997: 302) 
 Running is an embodied mobile practice; it involves sustained and repetitive 
bodily motion, which is usually understood as monotonous, even boring. 
Long-distance running is not often associated with the dramatic, turbulent, 
random, chaotic and spontaneous. These characteristics, as Wetherell (2012) 
highlights above, are often linked with affect and work to produce affect’s 
uniqueness. However, she goes on to argue that sense, sensibility, the prac-
tical and organized are signiﬁ cant to the ways affect becomes conﬁ gured. 
In this argument, she alludes to the jumbling of body, feelings, thoughts, 
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interactions, interpretations, relations and histories. I am arguing here for 
the insight that deliberate and slow pleasures can be just as affective as the 
sudden and dramatic. 
 In Levin’s narrative of the woman runner—Celía—these patterns of 
affect Wetherell describes become apparent. Running, in the second quota-
tion above, is no longer linear and monotonous. Instead, it is more akin 
with playfulness and improvisation. Combining how Celía moves her body, 
how she feels and thinks and how she interacts with the urban environment 
during nighttime provides an immediate and unusual narrative of the mean-
ing of running. There is a rhythm in the narrative, a rhythm that reﬂ ects 
both mindfulness and physicality: sweet, happy, like music, skipped and 
twisting. The ﬂ ow of movement is infectious and Celía’s running sounds 
blissful. In this case, running is an affectual practice (Obrador-Pons, 2007) 
and/or affective practice (Wetherell, 2012). 
 Like other forms of embodied mobility, participation in long-distance 
running is, most likely, organized and routine. Murakami’s one-hour-a-day 
running regime, as described in his book, is testimony to this. Some might 
imagine this apparent realm of repetition as banal and robotic, the quo-
tidian of such a running routine inspiring nothing but ennui. Maybe; but, 
considered differently, this assumed monotony (of running) provides open-
ings for [small] pleasures. These often-ephemeral pleasures can be related to 
running-rhythm. Running-rhythm can provide a backdrop for moments of 
joyful improvisations, playfulness, and even enjoyable melancholy. 
 Running is a relatively simple form of bodily locomotion. It does not 
involve complex and intricate movement patterns, but it does require syn-
chronicity and the balancing of a dynamic asymmetry. It can take time to 
realize a comfortable embodied style of running. And yet, over time, run-
ning becomes automatic, seemingly natural for many people. Like other 
embodied mobile practices, affect and emotion are implicated and ‘. . . efﬂ o-
resce with particular rhythms’ (Wetherell, 2012: 12). Like other forms of 
repetitive movements (e.g. rowing and swimming), running-rhythm, impro-
visation and playfulness have not been fully explored within sport stud-
ies. Having said that, rhythm, improvisation and playfulness are evident in 
Saville’s observations of Parkour: 
 . . . a certain level of maturity of the body to know a certain sequence 
of movements in relation to space leads to a type of immaturity, as the 
body in its excitement and playfulness ﬁ nds new mobile relations with 
materialities. (2008: 900) 
 In his work, Saville acknowledges how ‘mature’ participants of Parkour 
complete endless practice and rehearsal. It might be odd to consider pleasure 
emanating from cycles of repetition, reiterations and the drilling of move-
ment, and yet this is how, for example, great jazz musicians are able to cre-
ate improvisation in their play; they practice and drill scales for hours on 
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end. (The connections between running and music-making are not tenuous. 
Runners often have music in their heads, both imagined and pumped in via 
ear plugs). 
 Imagine preparing for a run. Standing, dressed, ready to run, and not 
having a pre-planned route. Instead, deciding directions—spontaneously—
along the way. Running straight on, taking a right or left turn, up a hill or 
down a hill. Like Celía: off and onto curbs, twisting around cars and garbage 
cans and people. How many long-distance runners do this? Planned routes, 
involving pre-set distances, are staple parameters. Not knowing where and 
for how long is anathema to most runners. Running is so crudely bound up 
with a competitive sporting ethos. After all, it is a so-called endurance sport 
and consequently it appears to demand a hyper-disciplined regime (plan-
ning, measuring, recording). Unlike team games, there is small scope for 
creativity and playful moments. 
 Imagine running . . . changing direction, getting lost, sometimes walking, 
sitting on a bench to admire a view, staying out longer—or shorter. Is it pos-
sible to recreate running-time as spontaneous and non-linear? 
 Imagine running and performing small-embodied motions. These move-
ments, like dance, are sometimes laced with fugitive emotions. 
 * * * 
 Today, the beach is empty. She decides to take off her T-shirt as she runs. 
A tricky maneuver and her head gets stuck inside the cocoon of white 
cotton. This amuses her and she runs for a while with her head gently 
trapped. A little later, she screws up the T-shirt and holds it in her hand. 
She smells the sea-salty air and takes a deep breath. She sucks in her 
stomach, expands her chest and squares her shoulders. This makes her 
laugh, loudly. Her body loosens; she feels cheerful and she runs with a 
grin on her face. 
 After running for some time, she wonders if her belly sticks out. She 
looks down: it does! She pushes it out as far as it’ll go. She arches her 
lower back, tilts forward from the hips and lets her feet stay in contact 
with the ground for longer. Then, she becomes aware of her pelvis, her 
insides and the organs that deﬁ ne her as woman: her soft tissues, many 
tubes, secretions and red, red blood. The thought reminds her of Frida 
Kahlo’s wonderfully grotesque artwork, the pictures of bleeding and 
injured women’s bodies. Suddenly, she feels sad. She extends her thighs 
and raises her heels, irregularly. Tentatively, playfully, she changes her 
stride-pattern. Her running becomes messy and not running in a straight 
line, she leaves zig-zags of footprints in the sand. As she goes, she feels 
deep within her guts a skein of energy. She smiles. 
 * * * 
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 Running, as is implied in the above illustrative example, is an unfold-
ing activity shaped by affective ﬂ ows in which happiness, uncertainty and 
sadness efﬂ oresce and cause ﬂ eeting and condensed moments of pleasure. 
Long-distance running allows for the solitary cogitation hinted at in this 
scene. However, few writers have commented on how reﬂ ection, musing 
and upheavals of thought are lived through the rhythms of the runner’s 
body. For the woman running on the beach, body and mind are entangled 
with meaning-making and this produces assemblages of affect. Running 
becomes a lively and sensual realm to explore these connections. She begins 
to improvise. She changes the speed of her heel lift, the reach of her thighs, 
the curvature of her spine and her running direction. She is not dancing  per 
se , but her movements reﬂ ect a sensibility of small dance-like motions as she 
continues to run. Her emotions, thoughts and feelings are heavily woven 
with and into her body dynamics. 
 There are few socio-cultural studies of the moving sport body that pay 
attention to the interlacing and imbrication of the emotional and physical. 
However, as Wetherell afﬁ rms: ‘Rightly, many of us are interested in devel-
oping more dynamic, sensual and lively accounts of social life’ (2012: 75). 
Perhaps, considering these and similar embodied sensations opens the way 
for a broader view of pleasures derived from sporting and physical activi-
ties. Such a project works to de-normalize the powerful disciplinary regimes 
of running cultures and practices. It introduces the playful aesthetics of run-
ning and might help encourage a broader following, which could, dare I say 
it, increase participation levels. 
 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 In this chapter I offer ideas on how running, and other similar repetitive 
movements, can be related to pleasure. I co-opt a range of literatures and 
personal experiences to show how running pleasures exist within the socio-
cultural contexts of class and gender relations. For example, middle class-
ness and running are known to be associated through cultural capital and 
habitus (Atkinson, 2008; Tulle, 2007) as well as the economic and material. 
I make visible my own location within class and gender relations and how, 
although my childhood was not scored by traditional middle-class values, it 
was highly institutionalized. Clearly, my current running-for-pleasures biog-
raphy is underpinned by privileged positions: whiteness and middle class-
ness. Because of this, class, ethnicity and gender remain central pillars to 
examining pleasures in this chapter. 
 However, my main argument is for a shift from understanding running 
pleasures as derived from producing and achieving times and distances—
recording, measuring, competing, beating and winning. In running, these 
discourses and cultures of achievement (efﬁ ciency and success) are profound 
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and pernicious; they are underpinned by a work ethic which, arguably, has 
helped promote religious morality and capitalist wealth accumulation. 
 Instead, I explore the possibilities of an inclusion of the aesthetic, sensate 
and visceral (Rinehart, 1998c) to an understanding of running and pleasure. 
I disregard traditional notions of success and accomplishment in favor of 
embodied sensations, emotions and affect. Places and landscapes of running 
emerge as central to this developing point of view. Borrowing from cultural 
geography, I make visible the role of space, spatiality and spatial scales (e.g. tem-
perature and humidity). In these discussions, integration, harmony and 
brushes with environments and peoples are more pleasurable than knowing, 
mastering and grasping these dimensions. Being touched by places, spaces 
and people provides a sense of wonderment as well as connectivity. This 
aspect is unusual, given that long-distance running is often viewed as indi-
vidual, monotonous and highly regulated. 
 Many runners do gain pleasure from measuring time, distance, their body 
weight and percentage of body fat. These measurements can provide com-
fort and reassurance. They offer a tangible reminder (McLoughlin, 2010) of 
hard work, discipline, efﬁ ciency and a conditioned body. These character-
istics are applauded in most Western societies and are therefore gratifying; 
running is an exemplar of modern virtue. Additionally, a focus on mea-
suring and accomplishing can function to depose feelings associated with 
trauma such as loss, unhappiness, sadness, misery and depression. Return-
ing to ‘The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner’, we learn—through 
Colin’s relationship to his running—of the recent gruesome death of his 
father. In the ﬁ lmic version of the book, Colin’s memories of his father are 
most vivid when he is running. Interestingly, in the academic literature there 
is some research (Leedy, 2009) on women’s emotionality, mental health (un/
happiness) and running habits, but little to date on men’s (see Stone, 2009, 
for an exception). 
 Rhythm, playfulness and improvisation help produce running as a bliss-
ful activity, an affectual and affective physical practice not associated with 
objective measurement of the body. In running, playfulness and improvisa-
tion encourage a de-disciplining and de-regulating of the runner’s body. They 
challenge the orthodoxies of running regimes by dislocating the rigidity of 
running ethos (planning, tracking, recording). In extreme cases, improvisa-
tion decimates the notion of pre-set running routes. It is hardly surprising 
that Global Positioning Systems (GPS), now available for runners to use, are 
completely void of metaphors of playfulness and improvisation. 
 Pleasures are evident in ﬁ ctional and semi-ﬁ ctionalized accounts as well as 
personal biographies of running. In these narratives of running-pleasures, the 
runner’s body is not reproduced as a physical object for multi-measurement 
(how fast, how long, how efﬁ cient, and how productive). Instead, running 
becomes aesthetic, emotional, playful, sensual and visceral. Seeking out the-
ses alternative explanations and interpretations is important if we want to 
realize the social signiﬁ cance of sport and pleasure. 
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 NOTE 
 1 .  One of the ways I capture the personal and biographical is through Flash 
Fiction. Flash Fiction ﬁ rst appeared as a named style of writing in 1992 in 
Thomas’ edited anthology entitled: Flash Fiction: Seventy-Two Very Short 
Stories. Flash Fiction is a form of short story writing. It is usually sudden and 
brief, although there are variations on how brief (wordage). 
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 8  When the Pleasurable Is Political 
 An Affective Analysis of 
Viewing the Olympics 
 Richard Pringle 
 Regardless of one’s passion or lack of interest in sport, the spectacle of 
the summer Olympics is difﬁ cult to ignore. They are the largest mega-
sporting event globally and, as such, are a phenomenon of political, eco-
nomic and social signiﬁ cance (Toohey and Veal, 2007). Coverage of the 
2012 London Olympics saturated the global media for 17 days and viewer 
interest was readily apparent. The BBC1’s television audience within the 
UK increased by 40% to secure more than a third of all viewers during 
their coverage (Plunkett, 2012). And within the US, NBC’s coverage of the 
Games has been described as the most-watched event in US history, with 
a reported 219.4 million viewers (Collins, 2012). Although the Olympics 
are undeniably popular, concerns have been raised that ‘sport serves as an 
economy of affect through which power, privilege, politics and positions 
are (re)produced’ (Silk and Andrews, 2012: 5) and, more pointedly, that 
sports ‘are commonly used to reafﬁ rm national and global processes of 
neoliberalization’ (Coakley, 2011: 67). Yet little is known about the (plea-
surable) experiences of watching the Olympics and the (political) mobiliza-
tion of its global audience. The recognition of this lack spurred me to write 
this chapter. 
 Initially, I became interested in this project as I became aware that my view-
ing response to the recent London Olympics seemed somewhat paradoxi-
cal. Let me explain: I am a stern social critic of the Games. I am critical 
of their exorbitant cost (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010; Toohey, 2008), the 
bogus governmental justiﬁ cations for this expenditure (Pringle, 2012), the 
disciplinary demands placed on athletes (Beamish and Ritchie, 2006) and 
the associated politics and history of corruption within the International 
Olympics Committee (IOC) (Booth, 2004; Hoberman 1995, 2011; Jennings, 
2011; Lenskyj, 2010). Yet I confess that I enjoyed watching the 2012 
London Olympic ‘spectacle’, the very spectacle that was the direct result 
of the excessive expenditure, bogus justiﬁ cations and dodgy politics that 
I disparage and have publicly critiqued. I confess further that at times I found 
myself watching the sporting performances with ﬁ sts clenched, mouth open 
and an uneasy feeling in my stomach. At other times, these embodied nerves 
gave way to feelings of awe and hoots of elation. Although a social critic 
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of the Olympics, I was also an embodied fan: a somewhat awkward self-
realization (see Chapter 9 for another analysis of sport fan pleasure). 
 My concern more broadly, however, is related to the assumption that the 
general viewing public (who potentially have not examined the critiques 
surrounding the Olympics) are possibly swayed by the pleasures gained 
through watching the Olympics and subsequently develop an apolitical 
stance or an  uncritical celebration of sport . 1 Garry Whannel (1993) dis-
cussed, for example, how sporting performances could produce moments 
of jouissance (feelings of bliss that transcend the limits of subjectivity) that 
allow the ‘temporary triumph of process over product’ (Whannel, 1993: 348). 
He explained further that these are moments ‘when the spontaneous inspira-
tion of performance escapes, ﬂ eetingly, the tendency of capitalist commodity 
production to transform all such cultural processes into calculated packaged 
objects for consumption’ (Whannel, 1993: 348). Whannel concluded that 
such moments of escapist pleasure ‘. . . symbolize a rare victory of people 
over the limitations that conﬁ ne us’ (1993: 348). 
 I agree with Whannel that moments of pleasure can work to obscure the 
workings of power and be uplifting. Yet I am concerned that the cumula-
tive effect of such pleasures does not induce freedom from the workings of 
power but potentially allows power to operate in a more insidious man-
ner. That is, in a more covert manner that might encourage sport fans to 
uncritically accept the political messages that are embedded within the sport 
media. These political messages are of concern, as critical scholars typically 
believe that they: ‘emphasise images and narratives consistent with domi-
nant ideologies in society as a whole’ (Coakley et al., 2009: 377). Numerous 
critical commentators, for example, have raised concerns that sport-media 
representations tend to promote hyper-masculine ideals, sexualize or ignore 
sportswomen, promote win-at-all-costs attitudes, emphasize stereotypes of 
race and disability, promote nationalism and, more broadly, support neolib-
eral ideals (Berstein, 2002; Coakley, 2011; Wensing and Bruce, 2003). These 
problematic representations can be understood as sport media constructions 
that have been produced via various visual, verbal and auditory techniques 
with intentions to create  pleasurable spectacles to hook viewers and make 
proﬁ ts (Wenner, 1998). 2 Thus, televised sport, viewing pleasures and the 
workings of power appear intimately connected. 
 Yet despite the socio-cultural importance of the sport media, relatively 
few scholars have undertaken reception studies to understand how audiences 
interpret the political messages embedded within televised sport (for excep-
tions see Bruce, 1998; Gantz and Wenner, 1991; Millington and Wilson, 2010; 
O’Connor and Boyle, 1993; Wilson and Sparks, 1999). And although vari-
ous scholars have analyzed the pleasures of viewing/reading sport represen-
tations (e.g. Booth, 2008; Duncan and Brummett, 1989; Rose and Friedman, 
1997, Whannel, 1993), empirical examinations of how sport viewing plea-
sures impact a viewer’s political understandings are rare (for an exception 
see Kennedy, Pussard and Thornton, 2006). 
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 Garry Whannel (1992) suggests that the rarity of political/pleasure audi-
ence reception studies relates to misguided assumptions that pleasures are 
self-evident and do not require analysis, and to the difﬁ culty of undertaking 
such studies, particularly via empirical examination. He astutely points out 
that the political outcome may not be a direct result of the pleasurable expe-
rience, but produced by other factors or forms of consumption. The politi-
cal impact may even occur in a manner that the viewer has no conscious 
recollection of (Maguire et al., 2002). 
 Given these difﬁ culties in examining the political impact of experiencing 
pleasure while viewing sport, Ellen Kennedy, Helen Pussard and Andrew 
Thornton (2006) turned to the concept of affect. In drawing from Lawrence 
Grossberg (1992: 16), they suggested that affect ‘is perhaps the “missing term 
in an adequate account of ideology”, because it gets at the way we individu-
ally invest in things in an embodied, passionate way, despite often cognitively 
knowing better’. In this chapter, following Kennedy, Pussard and Thonton 
(2006), I use my seemingly paradoxical viewing response of the Olympics as 
a case study to examine how mediated representations of the Olympics can 
induce viewing pleasures, as associated with the workings of affect, and in 
a manner that potentially shapes political concerns. Similarly to Lawrence 
Grossberg’s (2010: 310) aim to understand the political signiﬁ cance of popular 
music in relation to a ‘structure of feeling’, I examine the pleasures of watching 
the Olympics to understand  how the Games work  affectively  and  discursively. 
 The chapter is structured via several intersecting sections. I ﬁ rstly intro-
duce my concerns with the Olympic Games and then examine why the 
Olympics remain vastly popular in the public imagination. I do so by paying 
particular attention to Roland Barthes’ argument about sport and the pro-
duction of myth. I then raise issue with this Barthesian argument by suggest-
ing it rests primarily on a symbolic understanding and, accordingly, bypasses 
the affective/corporeal dimension of sport viewing pleasures. In relation to 
this concern, I introduce the concept of affect and discuss the social/political 
implications associated with the abstract workings of affect. Next, I draw 
on Brian Ott’s (2010) multi-modal approach for examining cinematic rheto-
ric and analyze my viewing response to two video clips of the London 2012 
Olympics. I conclude by discussing the importance of analyzing the work-
ings of affect in relation to the politics of sporting spectacles. 
 CRITIQUING THE SPECTACLE OF THE GAMES 
 The hosting of the Olympics involves: the conspicuous construction of 
sporting arenas and upgrades to infrastructure (Broudehoux, 2007); urban 
regeneration and destruction (Lenskyj, 2010); the (mis)calculation of risk 
and security costs (Toohey, 2008); economic impact studies (Owen, 2005); 
global marketing campaigns (Maguire et al., 2010; Real, 2010); national 
and international politics (Booth, 1995b); media bidding wars and the 
6244-599d-1pass-008-r01.indd   118 4/3/2015   12:36:01 PM
When the Pleasurable Is Political 119
expenditure of billions of pounds in relation to what Alan Tomlinson (2004) 
called the ‘Disneyﬁ cation’ of the Olympics. In times of austerity budgets 
and a global recession, the ﬁ nancial cost of hosting the Olympics is some-
what staggering (see Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). Although it is difﬁ -
cult to ascertain the ﬁ nal cost of hosting the London Games (2012) it is 
likely that the ofﬁ cial cost of £9.325 billion is a sizeable underestimation 
(Gibson, 2011). 
 The primary justiﬁ cations used by governments to legitimize the spend-
ing of signiﬁ cant amounts of public money in order to host the Olympics 
typically relate to economics, health beneﬁ ts, social cohesion and politics 
(Coakleyet al., 2009), but numerous studies have systematically debunked 
each of these justiﬁ cations (e.g. see Gieseck and Madden, 2007; Gold and 
Gold, 2010; Hogan and Norton, 2000; Kidd, 2010; Maguire et al., 2010; 
Owen, 2005). John Horne (2007: 92) concluded that the justiﬁ cations for 
hosting the Olympics ‘remain based on dubious, unethical and possibly illegal 
practices’. Despite academic recognition that the justiﬁ cations for the expen-
diture of billions of pounds on hosting the Games are seemingly unfounded, 
there was little public outcry about the staging of the London Olympics. 
Although protests such as the  No London 2012 campaign and the  Coun-
ter Olympic Network (with the apt acronym CON) formed, these groups 
gained only modest media coverage and little general public support. Coun-
ter to these minor protest groups, the Olympics saturated the global media 
and generated widespread celebration (Collins, 2012; Plunkett, 2012). 
 A seemingly simple question arises: how can the global popularity of the 
Olympics be explained? This question is of interest, not just with regards 
to understanding the economic and political signiﬁ cance of the Games, but 
also with respect to understanding the social processes that excite the public 
imagination and produce pleasures. There are numerous possible explana-
tions that could account for the global popularity of the Olympics. The pop-
ularity could be explained in relation to the intrigue of the competition, the 
workings of nationalism, the practices/techniques of global media networks, 
the sheer spectacle and commodiﬁ cation of the Games and the aesthetics 
and thrills of viewing the athlete’s embodied performances. Yet, in this chap-
ter, I am more interested in examining  how the image of the Olympics has 
been constructed, in part via media productions and the management of the 
IOC, to allow the Games to be globally celebrated in a seemingly uncritical 
manner. To examine this issue, I turn to Barthes’ (1972) writings on myth. 
 THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MYTHICAL 
STATUS OF THE OLYMPICS 
 Barthes’ (1972) reading of the Tour de France cycling extravaganza revolved 
around his understanding of the perpetuation of myth, in the sense that myths 
do not falsify reality but blur historical and cultural narratives so that the 
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reality, under examination, appears as self-evidently natural. He stated that 
‘the Tour is the best example we have ever encountered of a total, hence an 
ambiguous myth; the Tour is at once a myth of expression and a myth of pro-
jection, realistic and utopian at the same time’ (Barthes, 1972: 87). Barthes 
argued that myths work to enable one to uncritically enjoy the beauty of 
an object or phenomenon without having to wonder how it was produced. 
This mythical status accordingly allows fans of the Tour to gape unabashed 
with awe for the natural ability of the cyclists; in the process, the cyclists are 
positioned beyond mere mortals. Indeed, Barthes equated the athletes with 
Homer’s heroic warriors from the Iliad. This mythical status, he argued, con-
comitantly prevents the fans from viewing the hidden workings or critical 
dimensions of the tour: ‘What is vitiated in the Tour is the basis, the eco-
nomic motives, the ultimate proﬁ t of the ordeal, generator of ideological ali-
bis’ (Barthes, 1972: 87–88). Barthes enjoyed the romance of the Tour’s legend 
status and considered ‘doping’ inexcusable, as it destroyed the sublime myth. 
 Robert Beamish and Ian Ritchie (2006) drew on Barthes to argue that 
the Olympics are surrounded by a mythical aura so that they can be gazed 
upon as a spectacle of purity and of noble virtues. This mythical status, 
they argued, allows for the uncritical gloriﬁ cation of the Olympian’s body 
while simultaneously obscuring the Olympic links with fascism, corruption, 
human rights abuses, transnational business deals, dictatorships and drug 
scandals. The myth also works to obscure that the IOC has deliberately 
crafted this idealistic image. So how has the IOC been able to help produce 
this mythical status? 
 The IOC has long positioned and advertised the Olympics as a humani-
tarian movement underpinned by a unique philosophy called Olympism, 
which purportedly ‘seeks to create a way of life based on the joy found 
in effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal 
fundamental ethical principles’ (IOC, 1994: 10). The IOC has promoted 
the rhetorical virtues of Olympism primarily via educational programs and 
international marketing campaigns. Geoff Kohe argued that the Olympic 
education resources, which are distributed freely to schools in many coun-
tries, are based on uncritical and select interpretations of the past that ideal-
istically endorse the Olympic ‘movement’ as valuable in ‘promoting a better 
world through peace and understanding’ (2010: 483). The IOC has also 
drawn on the services of international marketing agencies (e.g. Saatchi and 
Saatchi) to orchestrate global media campaigns that promote the Olympics as 
a humanitarian institution. The ‘celebrate humanity’ advertising campaign, 
as an example, has used the services of respected international spokespeople 
(e.g. Nelson Mandela, Koﬁ  Annan, Christopher Reeve and Andrea Bocelli) 
to promote, in the words of the IOC (2004b: 3), the ‘truth that the Olympic 
ideals—the values of hope, friendship and fair play, dreams and inspiration, 
joy in effort—are universal and shared by all’. This campaign, which promoted 
the summer and winter Olympics of 2000–2008, screened over 6500 times 
on CNN worldwide (Maguire et al., 2010). 
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 Integral to the IOC’s promotion of a mythical reading of the Olympics 
has also been the requirement to promote or prove that the athletes are 
natural or pure, and that the sport domain is a level playing ﬁ eld (Cole, 
2000; Magdalinski, 2009; McCullough, 2010). Sara McCullough (2010: 3) 
reported that the ‘mythology of the “natural” athletic body—pure and 
untainted—remains crucial to the Olympic dream’. 
 The IOC has, accordingly, encouraged a regime of drug and sex test-
ing to ensure that the Olympics are supposedly a fair competition. Media 
coverage of sports doping, as Andy Miah (2010: 170) contended, ‘repeat-
edly demonise[s] drug-induced athletes’ but implies that such actions are 
‘attributable to a ﬂ aw in the athlete’s character’. This negative publicity 
does not typically extend to the broader sports world. In contrast, interna-
tional sporting organizations such as the IOC and the World Anti Doping 
Association (which was instituted by the IOC) are portrayed in the media 
as moral vigilantes attempting to rid the sporting world of ‘drug cheats’ 
and ‘sexual misﬁ ts’ to ensure the integrity of sport (Miah, 2010). CL Cole 
(2000) refers to the disqualiﬁ ed athletes as  boundary creatures to illustrate 
that they divide the normal from the abnormal and correspondingly buttress 
Olympic ideals/myths. In process, the sporting bodies that are allowed to 
compete are constructed as natural, ethical and hardworking: that is, they 
become bodies worthy of  gloriﬁ cation . 
 In this section, I have argued that the construction of the mythical status 
of the Olympian champion, as propped up by the workings of the IOC, is 
integral to allowing uncritical celebration of the athletes’ embodied perfor-
mances. Although I believe there is merit in this discursive argument I nev-
ertheless have two reservations about accepting it wholeheartedly. Firstly, 
I suggest that, given the number of drug scandals that have tainted the Olym-
pics and international sports in recent decades, sport fans might now be com-
placent about athletic doping. The viewing public, accordingly, is perhaps 
more suspicious of Olympian athletes than they were when Barthes (1972) 
originally wrote about the mythical/sublime status of the Tour de France 
athletes. For example, two athletes who had already served two-year bans 
for doping, Asli Apltekin and Tatyana Lysenko, won gold at the London 
Olympics with little public concern. Perhaps many sports fans now accept 
Robert Beamish and Ian Ritchie’s (2006: 115) observation that, ‘for better 
or worse, the use of banned substances and performance enhancing prac-
tices in high performance sports is an integral component of the human 
activities that currently constitute the entire international, high performance 
sport system’. I wonder, accordingly, to what extent that the mythical status 
of the Olympian champion is still, if it ever was, intact? 
 Secondly, I am aware that the argument presented operates primarily 
at a cognitive level, through an analysis of the construction of symbolism 
and myth. As such, it indirectly positions the Olympic fan as akin to a dis-
cursive dupe, as it rests on the assumption that he/she has been manipu-
lated in order to read the Olympians’ performances in a mythical light. This 
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argument, however, does not resonate fully with my own response in view-
ing the Olympics; I was critical of the Olympic spectacle but still gained 
pleasure in watching the Games. Despite my critical views of the Games 
and my conscious awareness that the athletes were not heroes worthy of 
uncritical worship, I was  drawn in to viewing the spectacle. In the following 
section, I draw on affect theory to offer another understanding concerning 
the uncritical celebration of the Games. 
 THE MEDIATED POLITICS OF AFFECT 
 Critical studies of media representations of sport have tended to focus on 
the links between the quality and quantity of representation and the pro-
duction and interpretation of intended meaning/discourse/ideology and 
associated relations of power. They accordingly focus on the cognitive and 
political dimensions, rather than the affective and corporeal. Yet by bypass-
ing the affective and corporeal dimension there is a risk that these stud-
ies produce limited insight for understanding the  popularity of sport media 
productions and, by default, the mechanisms associated with  how the politi-
cal messages are potentially inculcated amongst viewers. An additional risk, 
as Douglas Booth (2008: 32) contended, is that this form of media analysis 
could perpetuate ‘the theoretical determinism of structural analysis’, and 
limit understanding of the relationship between ‘publishers/editors/authors 
and readers’. In recent years, however, Brian Ott (2010: 41) reported that 
a growing body of scholars have begun to examine how ‘cinema appeals 
directly to the senses, how it sways viewers somatically as well as symboli-
cally’. This interest in the relationship between the somatic and the senses 
has been spurred by the turn to affect theorizing. In this section, I introduce 
affect theory and detail how I drew on the concept of affect to examine my 
embodied reaction to viewing the Olympics. 
 As a point of clariﬁ cation, ‘there is no single, generalizable theory of 
affect’ (Seigworth and Gregg, 2010: 3). Not surprisingly, affect has been 
deﬁ ned in multiple ways: DeChaine (2002: 86) deﬁ ned affect as ‘the inten-
sity that allows us to feel’, whereas Nathanson (1992: 49) drew from 
Silvan Tomkins to deﬁ ne affect as the ‘biological portion of emotion’; Brian 
Massumi (2002: 28) similarly differentiated emotion and affect by sug-
gesting that affect is autonomous but emotion is ‘owned and recognized’; 
Sara Ahmed (2010a: 29) described affect as ‘what sticks, or what sustains 
or preserves the connection between ideas, values, and objects’; and Clare 
Hemmings (2005: 551) suggested that affect ‘broadly refers to states of 
being, rather than to their manifestation or interpretation as emotions’. 
 Affect, accordingly, is typically understood as stemming from the body 
and  unconsciously inﬂ uencing how humans act/think/feel by inducing a par-
ticular state of being or a ‘non-conscious experience of intensity’ (Shouse, 
2005, ¶ 1). This intensity provides a motivation to act or prepares the body 
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for action but it does not determine set actions. Seigworth and Gregg (2010) 
reported that the recent interest in affect stems primarily from the work 
of Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995), who were inspired by Silvan 
Tomkins’ (1995) psychobiological study of affect, and Brian Massumi 
(1995), who drew from the work of Deleuze and Spinoza. 
 Affect can be linked to the thousands of sensations (e.g. sight, sound, 
smell, feelings of hunger) that continually impact and ﬂ ow unconsciously 
through (and around) a body. An infant, who does not have the language 
skills or previous experience to cognitively interpret the ongoing ﬂ ow of sen-
sations, displays the inﬂ uence of affect innately via facial expressions, vocal-
izations, skin color, breathing rate and posture (Shouse, 2005), for example. 
Over time, as the infant ages into an adult, she/he gains greater ability to 
make sense of the multiple affective sensations. Yet affects are notoriously 
dynamic and mobile in character (Wetherell, 2012); they continue to impact 
and ﬂ ow through and around the adult body unconsciously and can subse-
quently act to produce a personal state of being, or intensity, that individu-
als have little control over (Tompkins, 1995). 
 Affect is not contained in the body but can be transmitted between bod-
ies, so that a blurring occurs between the individual, the environment and 
others: one’s affective state can unconsciously inﬂ uence another’s. Elspeth 
Probyn (2010) drew from Deleuze to explain there is no such thing as a uni-
ﬁ ed person; rather, the subjective character can be regarded as an ‘affective 
assemblage of bodies of different orders and elements’ (Probyn, 2010: 78). 
Affect’s social impact is not, however, consistent amongst various people, 
nor predictable; nevertheless, its capacity to shape a large number of peo-
ple illustrates the political importance of examining the workings of affect 
(Massumi, 2002). Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) discussed the affective/
political interface within texts by suggesting: 
 What is important in a text is not what it means, but what it does and 
incites to do. What it does: the charge of affect it contains and trans-
mits. What it incites to do: the metamorphoses of this potential energy 
into other things—other texts, but also . . . political actions. (in Seidler, 
2001: 133) 
 Eric Shouse (2005) similarly highlighted that ‘the importance of affect 
rests upon the fact that in many cases the message consciously received 
may be of less import to the receiver of that message than his or her non-
conscious affective resonance with the source of the message’ (¶. 12). Music 
is an apt example, as the intended meaning of the music, as associated 
with the lyrics, is often of less importance than whether the music ‘moves’ 
somebody. 3 
 Affective resonance, deﬁ ned as the tendency to resonate with a display of 
an emotion from another person, is regarded as an important characteristic 
of affect (Tomkins, 1995). Daniel Stern’s (1985) analysis of communication 
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between an infant and parent without the use of language is a prime example 
of affective resonance. His observations of an infant reaching for and suc-
cessfully grasping a toy is telling: 
 As she grabs it, she lets out an exuberant ‘aaaah!’ and looks at her mother. 
Her mother looks back, scrunches up her shoulders, and performs a ter-
riﬁ c shimmy with her upper body, like a go-go dancer. The shimmy lasts 
only about as long as her daughter’s ‘aaah!’ but is equally excited, joyful, 
and intense. (Stern, 1985: 140) 
 Affective resonance, or what Daniel Stern (1985) called ‘attunement’, does 
not mean that affects are ﬂ awlessly translatable between people. Neverthe-
less, the transmission of affect between bodies or within particular contexts, 
such as in protest marches or on the football terraces, is of undoubted social 
and political inﬂ uence, as Eric Shouse (2005) explained: ‘Given the ubiquity 
of affect, it is important to take note that the power of many forms of media 
lies not so much in their ideological effects, but in their ability to create 
affective resonances independent of content or meaning’ (¶. 14). The 2011 
Vancouver Stanley Cup riot is one example of the problematic effects of 
affective resonance within a crowd. The riot happened after the defeat of the 
Vancouver Canucks by the Boston Bruins, and resulted in over 100 arrests 
and 140 injuries (including several police ofﬁ cers). Although it is difﬁ cult to 
attribute a deﬁ nitive explanation to complex social behaviour, there did not 
appear to be ideological grounds for the riots (as the riots were not linked to 
any overt ethnic or political tensions or the actions of disenchanted youth). 
Post-riot media discussion positioned blame on the actions of a few anar-
chists, the overconsumption of alcohol and inadequate crowd planning. Yet 
these ‘explanations’ miss the importance of affective resonance: the almost 
indescribable intensity associated with the domino effect of enthusiasm, 
passion, anger and energy that can form and spread when masses of bodies 
are tightly packed and produce a collective effervescence. 
 The social importance of affect is related, in part, to its abstract or 
unstructured quality. Yet these very qualities complicate how one can study 
the broader social/political inﬂ uence of affect. Faced with this difﬁ culty, 
Brian Ott (2010: 42) encouraged the use of an ‘affective register’ with 
respect to analyzing the politics of affect within the media. Brian Ott sug-
gested that as affect refers to an  intensity that allows  feeling , that analysis 
of the media could take place via consideration of potential ‘sensory experi-
ences (of color, light, sound, movement, rhythm, and texture), along with 
the feelings, moods, emotions, and/or passions they elicit’ (2010: 42). He 
drew from Lyotard to advocate a multi-modal approach for analyzing ﬁ lm/
media productions that combined the analysis of discourse and the use of 
an affective register to enable consideration of the interactions of ‘the aural 
with the visual, the sensory with the verbal, the narrative with the picto-
rial’ (Ott, 2010: 43). In addition, Ott encouraged the consideration of what 
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Marshall McLuhan (1988) termed ‘ground’, which refers to the context or 
environment created by the media: a context that an observer can be so 
drawn into that he/she loses touch with the immediate environment. 
 Brian Ott’s (2010) approach for recognizing and analyzing the media as 
a fully embodied experience, accordingly, involved the analysis of discourse, 
affect (or what he termed ‘ﬁ gure’) and ground (Ott deﬁ nes ground as the 
media-constructed context through which viewers process their understand-
ings) but with recognition that such an analysis is an art form and not a 
precise science. He acknowledged, for example, that his analysis ‘will neces-
sarily be selective and reductionistic’ but his ‘critical aim is not to account for 
every element and aspect of the ﬁ lm, but to suggest how its basic tenor and 
temperature function rhetorically’ (Ott, 2010: 44). To help represent this 
‘tenor and temperature’, Ott writes somewhat evocatively. In describing a 
dictatorial character from a ﬁ lm he states how he is shot in ‘extreme close-
up, making his worn, wrinkled face unnervingly immediate. . . . (so that) 
the audience can virtually touch the sweat oozing from his pores’ (Ott, 
2010: 45). In the following section I draw from Ott’s quasi-artful analysis 
strategy to examine two of the most popular YouTube video clips of the 
2012 Olympics. Given this analytical approach is more an art form than a 
science, I present my results with a degree of poetic sensibility (see Rinehart, 
2010a) and a speciﬁ c desire to highlight the visceral nature, sensations and 
intensities of viewing. 
 AFFECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
 Several days prior to the staging of the 2012 Olympics, I was in London on 
sabbatical. Although I had a socio-cultural interest in the Olympics, I had 
no desire to watch them live. In fact, I did not even want to be in London 
during the staging of the Olympics, as I was concerned about the crowds, 
cost and potential political unrest. Accordingly, I ﬂ ew out of the UK before 
the Games started. I arrived home in New Zealand after a welcome few days 
in Hong Kong and found that the Olympics were on their third day of cov-
erage. In a jet-lagged state, I lazily began watching TV and was drawn into 
the Games. It was at this stage that I realized I had a somewhat paradoxi-
cal relationship with the Olympics. Indeed, I felt like an alcoholic who had 
fallen off the wagon; I remained critical of the Games and the underpinning 
politics but was seduced by the spectacle. 
 Several months after the Olympics had ﬁ nished, I was reading Brian Ott’s 
(2010) paper on ﬁ lm analysis and the politics of affect and was reminded 
of my surprising viewing/affectual response to the Olympics. I was subse-
quently motivated to view YouTube clips of the Olympics, and found that 
I was still somewhat moved by them. It was at this point that I decided to 
analyze two of the clips in relation to Ott’s idea of a fully embodied experi-
ence. The two video clips analyzed were produced by the IOC and released 
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on their ‘ofﬁ cial Olympic channel’ via the internet. The ﬁ rst video, ‘Best of 
London 2012’, was preﬁ xed these words: 
 The London 2012 Olympic Games are now history, but their spirit will 
live on forever in the hearts of millions of people. Re-live some of the 
most exciting moments of these Games and watch the performances of 
the world’s greatest athletes in our highlights video! (Olympic, 2012a) 
 The 4.06-minute video clip begins with a ﬂ y-over shot of the Thames 
River and the iconic Tower Bridge with the background sounds of a large 
cheering crowd. Then, as the Olympic Stadium comes into view, a bell 
tolls and inspiring music kicks in. There is no commentary—it is all image, 
sound, splendor, a kaleidoscope of moving colors: bright purples, oranges, 
yellows, greens and reds, that interweave a poetry between light and dark, 
the ephemeral and permanent, the primitive with high technology, the past 
and future. A jazz ensemble of staccato images populate the screen in short 
bursts: team uniforms blend with ﬂ ashes of ﬁ reworks, cheering crowds meld 
under a river of ﬂ ags, a clay target explodes in the hazy mysticism of dust 
to dust, interlocking rings become a molten waterfall, bursts of ﬁ re escape 
from a starter’s gun. Nothing is solid, everything is moving, morphing, 
living, interacting, breathing. The roar of the crowd fades in and out. Moments 
of ecstasy punctuate the breathlessness of awe. The ‘ground’ is a space of cel-
ebration and excitement, a tribal-earthly pulsation, a ritual of belonging. I 
am drawn into this ground and embrace the carnivalesque atmosphere. 
 It is not until the 41st second that a sport image appears: a beach volleyball, 
launched from a jump serve, that is curving back toward earth. Then follows 
a cascade of spectacular sporting moments: a basketball shot from over half 
way, a reverse backhand water polo goal, an ace in tennis, a bullseye in archery, 
a sprinter ﬁ rst over the line. The technological aesthetic blends with the spec-
tacular: a slow motion back ﬂ ip, air bubbles escaping a swimmer underwater, 
a gymnast momentarily frozen in space before spiraling to the ground. 
 Yet what became patently obvious to me, admittedly after several views of 
the video clip, was that the purported Olympic highlights were  not the actual 
sports performances but were vibrant displays of human emotions. These dis-
plays dominated the sporting performances and held the sports in place. At 
the end of each sporting performance was a visceral display of emotion: an 
embrace, a smile, a tear, an ignition of elation, a hug, a kiss, a shake of disap-
pointment, a supportive touch. These displays allowed for moments of affec-
tive resonance: a sense of joy occurred when I watched others celebrating, and 
feelings of sadness upon the close-ups that intimated the dashing of dreams 
and the pain of loss. The display of emotions, more broadly, helped constitute 
the plot that enabled the story of the sporting performances to be told: the 
emotions were the glue that pulled the Olympic representations together and, 
as I will argue, offered an embodied justiﬁ cation for them. 
 Yet this was a highlights video, artfully produced to maximize audience 
delight. Perhaps, I thought, it would be very different from the screening of 
6244-599d-1pass-008-r01.indd   126 4/3/2015   12:36:01 PM
When the Pleasurable Is Political 127
a ‘live’ sporting event. Although I had already viewed what many regard as 
the premier event of the Olympics—the 100m men’s ﬁ nal—and was aware 
that Usain Bolt reclaimed his Olympic title, I decided to re-watch and ana-
lyze the race. The 13-minute clip was titled ‘Athletics Men’s 100m Final Full 
Replay—London 2012 Olympic Games—Usain Bolt’ (Olympic, 2012b). 4 
 The clip begins with an expansive view of the crowd and slowly focuses 
on the start of the 100m contenders. The accompanying soundtrack is the 
ubiquitous crowd roar: it is a sound that lasts the entire video clip, all except 
for the dramatic silence at the start of the race. The athletes’ uniforms are 
bright red, yellow, green and orange, tight ﬁ tting, with musculature on dis-
play. Camera ﬂ ashes are constant. As the athletes are introduced, to even 
louder crowd cheers, they momentarily perform for the global audience, 
they dance, salute, clown, wink, point, clap and nod with eyes wide. These 
introductory performances, however, are ﬂ eeting. After being introduced, 
their eyes quickly return to a glazed state and their bodies to their relentless 
movements: pacing, jumping, shaking, clapping, slapping. A raw intensity 
pervades this build up: it is a palpable display of nerves, concentration and 
anticipation. The commentator even encourages the viewers to pay atten-
tion to the ‘more pensive look of the defending champion’. Usain Bolt, as if 
on cue, crosses his heart and looks toward the heavens. 
 The starting gun goes after ﬁ ve minutes of emotional build up. The  dis-
cursive status of the Olympic champion—as a hero, as a mythical being in 
a Barthesian sense—is then afﬁ rmed by the commentators. We are told that 
Usain Bolt: 
 . . . emerged from the pack and powered his way to the line in the most 
emphatic way . . . that the King has retained his crown . . . that Bolt 
transcends the world of athletics once again . . . he is the superstar of 
world sport. (Olympic, 2012b) 
 In a slow motion replay, the commentator in a tone of ecstatic disbelief 
reports: 
 But look at this! This is the point that he moves away, but how can you 
do this? This is the Olympic ﬁ nal, it is not a heat, this is not a semiﬁ -
nal, it is the Olympic ﬁ nal and that should not happen but he is so far 
ahead of the rest . . . that was incredible . . . these are moments to be 
treasured . . . it is a moment of history. (Olympic, 2012b) 
 Bolt’s performance is presented as unbelievable, superhuman, sublime. 
The audience, as such, is discursively invited to uncritically celebrate this 
morally worthy/mythic Olympic champion. 
 The remaining eight minutes of the clip are primarily displays of emphatic 
celebration: crowd hugs, arm pumps, skipping, high ﬁ ves, ﬂ ag waving, 
clowning and smiles. I ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to watch without a smile. There are, 
however, two interspersed and brief shots of Asafa Powell, who injured his 
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groin and ﬁ nished last: his head is down, his Olympic dream destroyed. 
These brief displays of disappointment, perhaps symbolizing the fragility of 
the ‘loser’s’ body, do not disrupt the celebration of the champion. In con-
trast, they contribute to the emotional signiﬁ cance of the event. The sadness 
crafts the Olympic tale/myth as much as the joy. 
 The interplay of discourse, affect (or ﬁ gure) and ground (Ott, 2010) as 
presented in the live coverage of the Olympics 100m men’s ﬁ nal and the 
IOC’s highlight video of the 2012 Games worked to negate my critical con-
cerns of the Olympics: I became an embodied fan and believed, at least while 
immersed in the pleasure of the moment, that the Olympics were, as the IOC 
has purported, a celebration of humanity. My idiosyncratic embodied viewing 
response, in apparent deﬁ ance of my critical views of the Olympics, may not 
be similar to how other viewers would react to or understand the Olympics. 
Indeed, the abstract and unpredictable nature of affect and emotion means 
that viewing responses to the two Olympic video clips will be considerably 
varied and is shaped, in part, by viewers’ ‘personal politics, background and 
previous (rhetorical) experience’ (Ott, 2010: 48). Nevertheless, I support 
Brian Ott’s (2010) contention that, to understand how televisual representa-
tions can ‘move’ an audience, it is advantageous to consider the interactions 
between discourse, affect and ground. Moreover, given the global popularity 
of the Games, I also recognize that my ability to affectively resonate with the 
displays of athletic emotion and sporting performances was likely an experi-
ence shared with many Olympic spectators. Indeed, 1150 people were so 
moved by the ‘Best of London 2012’ video clip (Olympic, 2012a) that they 
were compelled to contribute comments to the web site. The majority of 
comments were from emotional fans, who wrote, as examples: ‘pure beauti-
ful and inspiring moments’ (MissVali9), ‘I almost cried’ (retroboydeccles), 
‘the best:)’ (Tashokk), ‘I loved the Olympics it was amazing’ (SuperTegster), 
‘Goosebumps every time I watch this. London 2012 was simply amazing. I’ll 
never forget it’ (Salvador716) and ‘I get shivers when i think back to all this!’ 
(freestyle pigeon). Comments about embodied viewing reactions—such as 
goosebumps, shivers and crying—were relatively common. There were also 
a number of idealistic or politically naive comments about the social value 
of the Olympics. ‘Amelia Dearie’, for example, commented: 
 this really only has 578,805 views?! this should be shown to every 
human being, its inspiring, put together really well! this just proves that 
the world can come together and compete and everyone enjoys it! no 
racism, no sexism, no nothing. at the end of the day, we are all human. 
(Olympic, 2012a) 
 And ‘fraserrg’ quixotically claimed: 
 I’ve been thinking a lot about the games and this video captures some of 
those thoughts. Bottom line is that in a world of economic crisis, political 
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incompetence, greed and secular intolerance the Games reminded us 
that they are not just an entertaining spectacle but that sport in general 
is a source of good, it teaches us tolerance and grace, it bridges cultures 
and above all it integrates us with our fellow human beings and shows 
us there is another way. Thank you London. (Olympic, 2012a) 
 In contrast to the idealism of these comments, a small number of com-
ments revealed that the Olympics could also be a source of tension, nation-
alism, homophobia and racism. For example, ‘xRyuBu’ responded to 
comments on the monetary inequalities in Brazil and the prospects of the 
forthcoming 2016 Olympics: 
 What? I wasn’t talking about the overall economy . . . about 70% of the 
country is poor by British standards, 30% of the country has ALL the 
money . . . Rio’s going to have a shite Olympics . . . Face it, it’s gonna 
be a bunch of tribesmen running around with spears stabbing hobo’s 
. . . (Olympic, 2012a) 
 A number of comments concerned with the men’s 100m ﬁ nal (Olympic, 
2012b) revolved around the issue of race and sporting success (e.g. ‘And 
not a white face was seen in that race: (’) and the apparent ‘misfortune’ of 
Tyson Gay’s surname (e.g. ‘lol, GAY–USA..I’M SO GLAD I DON’T HAVE 
THAT LAST NAME!!’). Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of com-
ments revealed that the viewers of the video clips were affected/moved by 
the Olympics. Gerald Griggs, Kathryn Leﬂ ay and Mark Groves (2012: 99) 
recently concluded that ‘viewing great sporting moments can take on an 
intense quality which’ can produce intense memories: as such, the viewing 
pleasures of the Olympics could theoretically shape one’s understandings of 
the Games and these romanticized meanings may not be ephemeral but have 
lasting impact. 
 I contend that the display of emotions within the Olympic videos helped 
craft the narratives surrounding the sport performances to provide coher-
ence and  meaning to the Olympic representations. Indeed, if the Olympics 
were represented  without the displays of athletic emotion and the roar of 
the crowd, the sporting performances would seem somewhat inane, possibly 
even meaningless. The affective resonance associated with the display of 
emotions and viewing pleasures worked to justify the importance and spec-
tacle of the Games. Athletic emotions, in this light, can be thought of as con-
stituting an embodied defense or corporeal retort to critical concerns about 
the seemingly inane nature of sport, the extravagant cost of hosting the 
Olympics, the corruption within the IOC, the excessive training demands 
placed on athletes and the increased risk of terror attacks during the Games. 
The representations of athletic emotions, thus, can be understood as a key 
factor that allows for an uncritical celebration of the Games. 
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 THE PLEASURES OF VIEWING SPORT: 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS? 
 This chapter was motivated, in part, by a desire to understand why the 
2012 London Olympics induced such widespread public interest but little 
critical concern, despite their exorbitant cost and lack of defendable justi-
ﬁ cations. And, like Robert Rinehart in his (1998b) examination of ESPN’s 
framing of  The eXtreme Games, I was interested in understanding how the 
audience  participated in the viewing experience. Through self-examination, 
I have illustrated that the display of athletic emotions prevalent in sport-
ing broadcasts  can operate in a manner that appeals directly to the senses 
and allows for the production of affective resonance and viewing pleasure. 
Further, I speculated that this resonance, in combination with the discursive 
(mythic) positioning of the Olympic champions by the commentators, can 
invite spectators to celebrate the Olympics in an uncritical manner. I con-
tend that this uncritical celebration, induced in part by corporeal intensities, 
can divert attention away from the signiﬁ cant political and economic issues 
that surround the Olympics to leave the Games relatively unproblematized 
in the public imagination. 
 I recognize the speculative nature of this conclusion and encourage further 
critical examination of the links between affect, the sport/media complex and 
politics. Indeed, Steven Shaviro (1993: vii) argued that it is important to ana-
lyze how the media ‘arouses corporeal reactions of desire and fear, pleasure 
and disgust, fascination and shame’ as these affective experiences ‘directly and 
urgently involve a politics’. Yet within sociological studies of sport, media 
analysis has tended to focus on the discursive and symbolic meanings of a 
text (for exceptions see Booth, 2008; Kennedy, Pussard and Thornton, 2006). 
These studies accordingly ignore or underestimate how sporting coverage, 
with its associated focus on athletic emotions, can draw viewers in at a vis-
ceral level and shape a viewer’s (unconscious) understandings of sport. The 
meaning of a text, as Lyotard (1984) suggested, is perhaps not as important 
as understanding the affective change it can induce and what politics it mobi-
lizes. In this case, I am concerned that the embodied experiences associated 
with viewing the Olympics could potentially mobilize a politics of apathy 
toward sport, a politics that resists the critical interrogation of sport (see also 
Chapter 11 with respect to discussion of consumerism and ﬂ attened affect). 
 Yet whether sport fandom mobilizes broader support for other political 
issues (e.g. neoliberalism, sexism, racism) is another question of relevance. 
Ava Rose and James Friedman (1997: 12) suggested: ‘The very pleasures 
involved in sports spectatorship may involve some degree of taking up the 
dominant position offered by sports texts . . . (for example) identifying with 
normative masculine points of view’. They also noted, ‘however, it would 
be simplistic to assume that any spectator who derives pleasure from TV 
sports spectatorship is unproblematically taking up the hegemonic values of 
television sports’ (Friedman, 1997: 12). Conversely, as Lawrence Grossberg 
(1992) illustrated, many fans of political activist rock music, as associated 
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with bands like U2, REM and Midnight Oil, can derive pleasures from such 
music without supporting the politics or even necessarily being aware of the 
group’s political messages. 
 At the least, in paraphrasing Simon Frith and John Street (1992), the 
power of the Olympics comes from its mobilization of its audience: a series 
of individual choices (to buy tickets to the Olympics, to watch on televi-
sion) ‘becomes the means to a shared experience and identity. The ques-
tion, though, is whether this identity has any political substance?’ (Frith 
and Street, 1992: 80). My answer to Frith and Street’s rhetorical question is 
‘yes’. But in making this claim I am not suggesting that fans of the Olympics 
are mobilized to any particular point on the political spectrum (left or right), 
but their uncritical fandom of sport allows billions of dollars/pounds to be 
‘sunk’ into the building of stadiums, accommodating athletes/coaches and 
trainers and defending the Games from potential ‘terrorists’. 
 Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser (2010), for example, provided 
a ﬁ nancial backdrop to the escalating security costs since 9/11 and the so-
called war on terror: 
 . . . Olympic security bills in the pre-9/11 context rose steadily from 
the 1992 Barcelona Games (US$66.2 million) through Atlanta 1996 
(US $108.2 million) and then Sydney 2000 (US$179.6 million). The 
post-9/11 security costs subsequently ballooned, through Athens 2004 
(US$1.5 billion), the Turin Winter Olympics in 2006 (US$1.4 billion), 
and the exceptional case of Beijing 2008 (US$6.5 billion) . . . (Giulianotti 
and Klauser, 2010: 50) 
 Kristine Toohey (2008: 438) similarly reported that the Athens Olympics 
‘turned out to be the most guarded Olympic games in history and the “biggest—
most expensive—peace time security operation ever”’. Toohey’s claim about 
Athens is now undoubtedly superseded by the London Olympics. 
 I highlight the ﬁ nancial cost of the Olympics in order to argue that the 
‘identities’ of the fans of the Olympics do have a political substance, as their 
uncritical support of the Olympics indirectly props up the sheer size and 
spectacularization of the Games. As such,  the pleasurable is political and 
deserving of critical interrogation, particularly given that some pleasures 
are hard to resist. 
 NOTES 
 1 .  Eileen Kennedy, Helen Pussard and Andrew Thornton (2006: 19) have simi-
larly raised concerns that the spectacle of major sporting events could shape 
sport fans’ passions and structures of feelings so that they are drawn into 
‘potentially retrogressive political positions (like the embrace of nationalism) 
by altering the inﬂ ection of their investments in the world’. 
 2 .  These representational techniques involve the use of multiple cameras, slow 
motion replays, close-ups, colorful commentaries, sound effects, music, 
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biographical sketches, the hyping of rivalries and the production of soap-
opera storylines (e.g. see Goldlust, 1987; Rowe, 2004; Wenner, 1998). 
 3 .  As an example, I am critical of the lyrics of Lynyrd Skynyrd’s  Sweet Home 
Alabama but years before I understood what I think the lyrics mean (they are 
often interpreted as a retort to Neil Young’s critique of racism within Alabama) 
I had fallen in love with the riff, a moving riff that still hooks me in when 
I hear it. 
 4 .  At the time of analysis of the clip, it had received 4,871,887 views (30 November, 
2012). 
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 . . . the vast majority of literature on sport fans focuses primarily 
upon 
 what is deemed to be ‘traditional’ (often masculine) patterns of 
support, 
 such as supporter chanting, group solidarity, aggression and 
‘resistance’. 
 —(Crawford, 2004: 33) 
 What’s so thrilling is the sheer range of potential emotions,
 over which I have absolutely no control . . . These emotions are 
produced by the narratives of 
the games, and the League or Cup competitions—simple, 
 but endlessly compelling. 
 —(Paula, email correspondence) 
 INTRODUCTION 
 It is almost taken for granted that fans of men’s professional football experi-
ence pleasure; otherwise, why would they attend live ﬁ xtures and/or watch 
games on various readily available media? And yet, contemporary discus-
sions on football fandom from a socio-cultural perspective tend to omit 
pleasure as an integral aspect of fandom. 
 Early studies of football fans in the UK (1970s-80s) show how predomi-
nantly working-class men appear to enjoy the aggression and violence associ-
ated with ﬁ ghting—for one’s team, club and territory. In these studies, there is 
some suggestion that fans gain satisfaction from their symbolic resistance (via 
crowd disturbances at live games) to middle-class governance of the game, 
and, more broadly, resistance to middle-class governance of their un/employ-
ment, education opportunities and daily lives. In this way, these studies of 
so-called football hooliganism infer pleasure as signiﬁ cant to some football-
fan [sub]cultures (Burford, 1992; Dunning et al., 1986; King, 1997). 
 In a more recent study of football-fan culture, Ruddock (2005) exam-
ines fan activity in the context of racism and West Ham FC’s signing of 
Lee Bowyer in 2003 1 . This is one of a few football-related, socio-cultural 
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explorations to address pleasure (more speciﬁ cally pleasure as problematic). 
Ruddock considers how the ‘study of football fans can inform contemporary 
debates in critical audience research, particularly around issues of pleasure 
and cultural citizenship’ (2005: 369). He goes on to show how rituals—
including practices of racism—within fan cultures taint football as a sport 
in which ‘. . . pleasure and politics coexist but never meet . . .’ (ibid., 373). 
 Another examination, which also implicates pleasure of football fandom, 
race and politics, is Farred’s exploration of his own life-long (since the age 
of seven) love of Liverpool FC, ‘. . . the pain and pleasure of living and 
dying with every Liverpool result’ (2002: 13). As a Black South African, he 
unpicks his enduring ‘Long Distance Love’ of the club, teams and players. 
His autobiographical account highlights his internal, complex anguish sur-
rounding Liverpool’s initial reluctance to sign a Black player and how his 
love of and passion for Liverpool and racial politics trouble his fandom. 2 
 More generally, pleasure related to football fandom is noticeable in 
[sport] psychology and [sport] management literature. In other words, there 
is some mention of pleasure in attempts to make sense of supporters’ (cus-
tomers’) behaviors, ticket-purchasing patterns and market trends (Tapp, 
2004; Wilson and Gilbert, 2005). 
 In this chapter, I draw on small-scale qualitative research with a Norwich 
City Football Club (UK) fan: Paula. In itself, this seems unremarkable, but 
this fan and research participant self-identiﬁ es as transgender, transsexual 
and queer. 3 Many football-fan [sub]cultures are known to be hostile and 
abusive environments (Jones, 2008; Ruddock, 2005; Silk, 2008), especially 
for members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex 
(LGBTQI) communities (Caudwell, 2011), and transgender, transsexual 
and queer subjectivities are profoundly stigmatized in most societies and 
cultures. This makes Paula’s fandom interesting because her voice is from 
the far margins. From a critical socio-cultural point of view, there is value in 
reading about Paula’s everyday experiences of football fandom. 
 I begin the chapter with a brief overview of sport-spectator pleasures, 
including mention of football fandom. This contextualization highlights the 
lack of research with same-sex attracted and gender-diverse individuals and 
communities. Following this, I interrogate the methodological issues sur-
rounding small-scale qualitative research. Then, I focus on Paula’s expe-
riences of her transgender, transsexual and queer subjectivities and her 
football fandom. Speciﬁ cally, I discuss her experiences of coming ‘out’ to 
the other—mostly male—football fans she knows and her on-going love of 
football. In the end, I aim to show football-fandom pleasures as complex, 
important and socially signiﬁ cant. 
 SPECTATOR PLEASURES, BRIEFLY 
 In 1989, Duncan and Brummett wrote of ‘types and sources of spectating 
pleasure’. Their study ‘explains the pleasures of televised sports viewing by 
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building on the work of media theorists’, and they claim ‘. . . three types of 
specular pleasure (fetishism, voyeurism, narcissism) are found in televised 
sports’ (p. 195). Their research is underpinned by the following research 
question: what makes sport spectatorship appealing and pleasurable for the 
fan? They are careful not to homogenize either spectator groups or the con-
cept of pleasure. And they go some way to differentiate, by highlighting that 
there are different types of sport events and different ways these events are 
observed, including interventions made by technological features that serve 
to enhance spectator satisfaction (e.g. 1970s/80s television technology such 
as ‘super slo-mo’). 
 Borrowing from ﬁ lm and cinema studies, Duncan and Brummett concen-
trate on the pleasures of looking (scopophilia). In other words, they focus 
on visual pleasures and visual medium. Elite, professional and competitive 
sports are now global phenomena, highly commodiﬁ ed mega-events and 
international and national spectacles. As such, in most Westernized/capital-
ist countries, it is difﬁ cult to escape looking at sport events and sportspeo-
ple. The viewing of mediated sport, according to Duncan and Brummet, 
can be classiﬁ ed in terms of pleasure derived from: invited/intended looking 
(fetishism); illicit looking (voyeurism); and looking that elicits identiﬁ cation 
(narcissism). 
 Acknowledging this line of inquiry, Merrill and Wann (2011) cite Duncan 
and Brummett (1989) as well as Guttmann (1996) and Madrigal (2006) to 
reiterate the relationships between sport spectatorship and voyeurism, the 
erotic and [heterosexual]physical attraction. They are not the ﬁ rst to con-
sider this nexus. Miller (2002), in his aptly titled book  Sportsex , pursues a 
similar project. Consumer cultures are relevant to these literatures. Miller 
(2002) tends to link athletes’ bodies with notions of commodity, while 
Merrill and Wann (2011)—shifting to the realm of consumer behavior—
view sport itself as visual commodity. In this vein, the latter concur with 
Stewart when he writes: ‘In terms of sport spectatorship, the value of the 
sport experience is now seen for its immediate fun and pleasure rather than 
any strong and prolonged feeling of tribal identity’ (2005: 287). 
 Immediacy suggests instant gratiﬁ cation and the consumption of sport, 
and sportspeople, as a form of consumer hedonism and hedonistic plea-
sures. In contrast, a large proportion of football fandom has been shown to 
be complex as well as sustained and incomplete. For instance, Jones (2000) 
and Giulianotti and Robertson (2004) emphasize football fandom as ‘seri-
ous’ and Crawford—drawing on existing literatures—spends time discuss-
ing the extent and depth of fan loyalty in his analysis of the ‘career of a fan’ 
(2004: 42–49). Additionally, Klugman (2009, 2013), Fleming and Sturm 
(2011) and Sturm (2012) make important turns to embodied passion, the 
visceral and affect within fandom. In this way, they provide signiﬁ cant criti-
cal readings of the often-contradictory nature of the deep devotion involved 
in supporting individual sportspeople, teams and clubs (usually professional 
sportsmen). For example, in Klugman’s studies, Australian Rules Football 
fans display robust and rowdy dissatisfaction and displeasure through 
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‘barracking’ their own team’s players, and yet they continue to attend 
matches and support the club and team. 
 Clearly, sport-spectatorship begets multiple and diverse pleasures and, 
as Crawford makes the point, ‘. . . fans can connect with, and experience, 
sport in many different ways and levels, and their actions can carry mul-
tiple meanings and readings’ (2004: 31). Here I focus on the experiences 
of one Norwich City FC fan to provide a partial—nevertheless previously 
unheard—point of view. 
 SMALL-SCALE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: A METHODOLOGY 
 The number of participants in a qualitative interview study can range 
from 1 to 100 
 (Markula and Silk, 2011: 93). 
 In many spheres, many of us no longer have to defend our qualitative stance. 
In some circles, qualitative methodologies are automatically assumed as 
creditable and legitimate, and debate has turned, instead, to the inner work-
ings of qualitative research. For example, Markula and Silk highlight these 
interior mechanisms through their advocacy of the ‘7Ps: Purpose, Para-
digms, Process, Practice, Politics of Interpretation, Presentation and The 
Promise of qualitative research’ (2011: x). Although these constituent parts 
appear as distinct and separate entities within a neat, easy-to-grasp rubric 
(‘7Ps’), they are worth bearing in mind, not least because they open ways to 
appreciate the value of small-scale qualitative research. 
 Simply put, this chapter is based on one semi-structured interview and 
follow-up emails with one Norwich City FC fan. In addition, however, it is also 
based on my on-going qualitative research involvement with football cultures, 
same-sex attraction and gender diversity, as well as getting to know Paula. 
 This chapter aims to offer ‘. . . purposeful research that is meaningful to 
a range of communities’ (Markula and Silk, 2011: 11). The ‘range of com-
munities’ might include those related to football, fandom, gender, sexuali-
ties, and those who are transgender, transsexual and queer. Such an aim is 
set within the bounds of interpretive constructions of meaning-making: in 
other words, how Paula and I understand, interpret, tell and re-tell her expe-
riences of supporting Norwich City FC. Obviously, we are both implicated 
in how her football-fandom experiences are captured on the pages of this 
book. The representation is, of course, subjective, relativist and partial 
(cf. Denzin, 2010; Richardson, 2000); it provides a particular account of 
one person’s love of watching football. 
 There is political matter in this small-scale research. Paula’s fandom must 
be considered through an appreciation of her shifting and ﬂ uid sex-gender-
desire subjectivities (queer, boy, gay, transgender, man, transsexual, woman, 
queer) 4 and the absence of a similar standpoint within sport spectator/
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fandom literatures. Only recently have we witnessed alternatives to the 
many male-dominated football-fandom studies by, for and with men (cf. 
Jones, 2008; Pope, 2010 and 2012). Here, I provide a further contribution. 
 I travelled, by train, to Paula’s home in East London for the interview. 
The interview lasted one hour and ten minutes and was transcribed verba-
tim. On completion, the 13,000-word transcript was e-mailed (as an attach-
ment) to Paula for her scrutiny. E-mail contact was maintained after the 
initial interview took place (on 29th May, 2012) and, as is likely with induc-
tive qualitative research, I was able to ask further questions through this 
mode of communication. For example, here is a section of an e-mail I sent 
to Paula after I had transcribed the interview: 
 You said in the interview: “The thing is . . . I like this queer counter-
culture, but on the other hand I love football”. Can you offer more on 
this? Do your queer counter-culture and love of football co-exist? Do 
they overlap/merge in any ways? 
 A re-visiting of interview transcript through an on-going interaction with 
research participants is not always possible. And yet maintaining strong 
bonds with the people and communities we share our research with is an 
obvious way to explore the details and contradictions of the everyday. It 
also helps develop and expand useful research agendas. 
 MEETING PAULA MCVEIGH 5 
 At the beginning of 2011, I took on a voluntary role for a Brighton-based 
football campaign—The Justin Campaign. The campaign was initiated on 
May 2nd, 2008, ten years after the Black-British footballer Justin Fashanu 
took his own life. Justin Fashanu came ‘out’ as gay as well as bisexual dur-
ing the early 1990s. During his teenage years—in the late 70s and early 
80s—Justin showed incredible potential as a footballer, but his sexuality, 
ethnicity and lifestyle received severe criticism from various people within 
UK footballing institutions, including those in club management and sport 
media/journalism. 
 The main aim of The Justin Campaign, at its inception, was to make 
all football cultures safer for members of the LGBTQI communities and 
to help prevent others from feeling isolated and possibly taking their own 
lives because of abuse, hostility, prejudice and discrimination. During my 
18 months with the campaign I worked on various education projects 
and through this work I met many local and national people, all of whom 
shared—in different ways—the concerns and aims of The Justin Campaign. 
One of these like-minded people was Paula; she was also a volunteer. 
 I met Paula for the ﬁ rst time at a Brighton Pride LGBT Football Tour-
nament in August 2011. As with most of the campaign’s volunteers, her 
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personal links to football and Justin Fashanu 6 are well-developed and weave 
through her own football biography, as is evident here: 
 P:  Justin Fashanu was somebody, I mean, you can see it there [points]. 
I got a video, I think for my 13th birthday of highlights of Nor-
wich City games over the years, and Justin Fashanu’s famous goal 
against Liverpool was one of the real highlights of it. I remember 
the ﬁ rst time I watched it . . . being open-mouthed at how brilliant 
it [goal] was. Justin Fashanu was a name I kept hearing as I grew up 
in the 90s. My dad grew up just south of London, so Wimbledon 
was his team . . . John Fashanu 7 was there. We used to take family 
holidays in Torquay every summer, which is where Justin was play-
ing. So, he kind of came on to my radar and I gradually twigged just 
through innuendo, I didn’t really read the tabloids. I didn’t really 
know about Justin’s frequent tabloid appearances. But, through 
innuendo, I picked up that Justin was this gay player. His suicide in 
1998 hit me really hard, you know, he was a hero of mine. 
  J: How old were you then? 
 P:  I was 16. It hit me very, very hard. It just seemed like a horrible 
crushing turn of events at that age and it just made me think, you 
know, where is the place for me as a queer person who likes foot-
ball and wants to be involved with it? 
 (From interview transcript) 
 On May 2nd and 3rd, 2012, Paula and I attended two events held at 
the University of Brighton. The ﬁ rst was a Justin Student Football Festival 
and the second a one-day Justin Campaign Symposium: Campaigning for 
Change. We were both active participants in the events. We shared the wom-
en’s changing room space, played football alongside students and staff, posed 
for photographs holding placards inscribed with ‘Football v Transphobia’ 
and Paula contributed to a Football, Transgender and Transphobia panel. 
After these events, I wrote to Paula requesting an interview. She agreed. Since 
then, she has read and given verbal support to the accuracy of the interview 
transcript 8 as well as endorsing the content of the ﬁ nal version of this chapter. 
 THE INVISIBILITY OF PLEASURE 
 Thus we should discard the question ‘Did this researcher’s feelings 
affect the study?’ when we read ﬁ eldwork accounts and instead ask 
‘How did the researcher’s emotions play a part in the data collection 
and analysis of this group or setting?’ (Kleinman and Copp, 1993: 52) 
 For a long time now, many qualitative researchers have questioned the fal-
lacy of remaining emotionally detached during the research process. More-
over, those advocating a distinctly feminist methodology have developed 
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the concept of ‘reﬂ exivity’ to make transparent the role of the researcher 
(Wilkinson, 1988) and challenge the scientiﬁ c chimera of objectivity 
(Maynard and Purvis, 1994; Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). It is often 
acknowledged, and accepted, by a range of qualitative researchers—not 
only feminist researchers—that the researcher’s presence is as signiﬁ cant as 
the research participants’ (cf. Denzin, 2010). 
 After the interview with Paula I scanned the interview transcript for ref-
erence to ‘pleasure’. Finding few references I actively sought the word ‘plea-
sure’ through a word ﬁ nder. Paula had used the words ‘enjoy’, ‘fun’ and 
‘love’ many times, but she had not uttered the word ‘pleasure’. I, on the 
other hand, had said it several times. After making this observation, I wrote 
to Paula via e-mail and made this comment: 
 In the interview you talked about liking the aesthetics and drama of 
football. You were clear about not enjoying the abusive cultures appar-
ent in the game. You mentioned enjoying being part of a larger fan 
group both at the game and on the internet forum. Given how hyper-
macho fan environments can be and how transgender can be a margin-
alized subject position, I wonder if you could provide a bit more of the 
pleasures of being a Norwich fan? 
 Paula’s responses to the direct question concerning ‘. . . the pleasures of 
being a football fan?’ included a range of words that are synonyms for plea-
sure (e.g. ‘love’, ‘enjoy’ and ‘happy’), but no direct reference to ‘pleasure’. 
This becomes interesting for two reasons: ﬁ rst, because it demonstrates the 
invisibility of ‘pleasure’ in research on sport. For example, for those of us 
involved in sport, it might not be easy to articulate and/or describe the plea-
sures we experience. I suggest this is signiﬁ cant because it can be argued 
that the notion of pleasure  per se has been squeezed out of contemporary, 
competitive sport practices and cultures. If this is the case, then such silences 
open avenues for critique and are, therefore, political. Second, the use of 
the word ‘pleasure’ reveals something about my role within this research 
process. Interestingly, in discussions of methodology, we rarely hear about 
the pleasures of conducting research. 
 Since the interview with Paula, during times of reﬂ ection, I have consid-
ered how I felt at various stages of the interview process. I recognize that I 
enjoyed interviewing Paula and hearing her stories of football and football 
fandom. I felt very happy in her company and delighted that she had mostly 
positive experiences to recount. In fact, getting to know Paula and complet-
ing the interview-research process was pleasurable. This pleasure is worth 
unpacking because it provides ‘. . . an idea of the life worlds, and indeed 
challenges, facing the qualitative researcher’ (Silk, Andrews and Mason, 
2005: 8). Perhaps, more speciﬁ cally, my feelings of pleasure are useful in 
addressing an important question: ‘What dreams am I having about the 
material presented?’ (What issues am I pulling from my own biography and 
6244-599d-1pass-009-r01.indd   139 4/3/2015   12:36:11 PM
140 Jayne Caudwell
what emphasis have I given these?) (Silk, Andrews and Mason, 2005: 9). 
Dreaming has many connotations. For example, there might be researcher 
fantasies about discovery, originality and innovation. There are also visions 
and hopes, which are more akin to Martin Luther King’s eminent ‘I have a 
dream’ (August 27th 1963) speech. 
 My satisfactions during this research can be understood in the context 
of my previous qualitative work on football cultures and how lesbian 
(Caudwell, 1999, 2003) and gay male players (Caudwell, 2011), and one 
young transgender (Caudwell, 2012) player, experience a range of nega-
tive responses to their active involvement. Over the years, I have heard sto-
ries of abuse, bullying, discrimination, exclusion, hostility and prejudice. 
I anticipated similar testimonies from Paula, especially given her marginal-
ized subjectivities of transgender, transsexual and queer. Instead, she told 
me of how she is—mostly—accepted within football-fan culture and how 
much she loves supporting Norwich City FC. Clearly, we must be careful 
not to idealize Paula’s involvement; professional men’s football in the UK 
is not, by any means, a utopia of joyful inclusion. But, for Paula, being on 
the ‘terraces’ watching her team has been relatively easy and comfortable. 
For many reasons, largely to do with my own interests in football, same-
sex attraction and gender diversity, I was very keen to hear about Paula’s 
pleasant experiences. As Rand puts it, I ‘. . . got to dwell on other people’s 
enjoyment’ which is ‘. . . a pleasure in itself’ (2012: 57). In this way, I am 
emotionally involved in this research project. 
 As Ahmed suggests, understanding what other people’s lives are about—
including their pains and their pleasures—is integral to making connec-
tions for social justice work that recognize people’s histories, humanity, 
vision, and desires. Visceral pleasures, aesthetics interests, ‘freedom 
dreams’, and the ecstatic, as Robin D.G. Kelley argues, deserve hon-
our and visibility in our past, our present, and our visions of possible 
futures. (Rand, 2012: 245) 
 Like many academic activists I have dreams of a better future, and because 
of this I know I have exulted in Paula’s fandom. Clearly, my emotion-
location shapes the contents of this chapter. It also highlights the gradations 
of pleasure that are present in sport-related—namely football—research. 
PAULA: BECOMING A FOOTBALL FAN
I hated football until I was about eight years old and something suddenly 
switched in me, I’m not sure why. There were two things that piqued my 
interest. One of them was Crystal Palace getting to the FA cup ﬁ nal in 1990, 
although I didn’t end up supporting them. The other was England making the 
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World Cup semi-ﬁ nals that summer and all the fervor around that. So, that 
was what drew me into football and I started playing at school and it was all 
I’d do any break time; any possibility of playing football I would do it. And 
then, when I was ten, I realized I was transgender. I hadn’t really noticed this 
before and I hadn’t been an especially feminine child. I was in some ways, but 
not in that kind of much-more recognized girly-boy kind of way and . . . I just 
suppressed this really. I was actually at a rugby playing school for two years. 
I left there and went to a State secondary, which was a football school. I’d been 
playing football for three years or so, and decided I wanted to have a go at 
playing competitively. And so, I joined Town FC and played half a season for 
the U12s. I just found that there was something about me that didn’t ﬁ t. I was 
hiding my queerness, I guess. I already realized my sexuality was quite compli-
cated. I didn’t understand it. I didn’t really think I was gay, but I didn’t have a 
framework to understand my gender and my sexuality so I just kept it hidden 
and football was one of my means of doing that; if I played football, well, 
I intuitively knew that I’d get an easier ride from the guys at my school . . . 
the guys on the team. So I joined the team. I scored a couple of goals in 
the friendlies. But something about me didn’t ﬁ t the team-culture, even then. 
There were a couple of guys I got on well with but lots of guys I didn’t and, 
you know, this isn’t just a matter of sexuality. I think actually at that point, 
I think it was more a matter of class and education. I went to a private school 
and I was quite obviously quite bookish and was very, very bourgeois, middle 
class and the guys on the team weren’t. So I think the issues were actually 
more around class than anything else. But, I found I didn’t really get on with 
the guys on the team. If they don’t like you, they won’t pass the ball to you. 
And so you don’t impress, you lose conﬁ dence and it becomes a vicious circle. 
So, I quit the team after half a season and I wanted to go to City FC, but Town 
FC wouldn’t let me break contract. So I ended up not joining them either and 
it kind of soured me on competitive football. I wasn’t really good enough to 
make it worth ﬁ ghting all these barriers. I ended up going to the local State 
school . . . but, I wasn’t good enough for the ﬁ rst XI, so I’d play for the School 
B team. But, actually, the teachers in the school paid more attention to the 
ﬁ rst XI. The B side would play friendlies. I wouldn’t always get in the team 
because I wasn’t in with the kind of people I needed to be in with to get in. 
I think I had a couple of games at left back or something, which wasn’t really 
where I was suited and I just gave up on it. By year ten, I just stopped play-
ing, except once a week in PE lesson. I found that there wasn’t really a place 
for me. I started exploring music more and started reading Oscar Wilde and 
started to discover this queer culture that suited me and so there was this 
weird tension. I would go with my dad—by this time I’d decided, for some 
reason, I was going to support Norwich, and my dad and I would go to three 
or four games a season together; a couple in London and maybe in Norwich 
once or twice a year. I just found there that my sexuality and gender weren’t 
an issue.
  J: At the ground do you mean? 
P: At the ground, you know it didn’t, it just didn’t come up.
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 Paula’s football-fan biography is not unusual. As Farred reveals, such ini-
tial commitment can be understood in terms of the ‘arbitrariness of fandom’ 
(2002: 6). It reﬂ ects patterns of childhood engagement, family and early 
afﬁ liation with a particular team. Additionally, it suggests a so-called induc-
tion period (Crawford, 2004), which has been followed by her sustained 
support of Norwich City FC. This is despite living in various parts of the 
UK to study and work. 
 During the interview, Paula talked about her more recent fandom. 
Strong themes to emerge were her love of Norwich City FC, football, talks 
about football and other fans. However, the chanting she has witnessed 
at games complicates her love of all four. More generally, pleasure has a 
close relationship with disgust, and I explore this contradiction more fully 
below. 
 Given the literature on fandom and the pleasures of looking, and the case 
that there had been no reference to the love of looking at football players, 
I asked Paula (in a follow-up e-mail) about desire and her football fandom. 
She replied: 
 I’ve never felt desire (or voyeurism) at football games. Not sure why—
perhaps partly that’s because desire is not what I’m looking for in that 
situation. I won’t rule it out entirely though, but perhaps I just don’t 
ﬁ nd footballers sexy. 
 (Paula, e-mail correspondence) 
 As with many football fans, sexual (heterosexual, same-sex, queer) 
attraction appears low down on registers of pleasures. 
 ‘I GOT OUTED: SOMEONE POSTED IT ON THE FORUM’ 
 Even when the game is going badly, there’s something about the 
camaraderie, the shared emotions that I really enjoy, and there’s 
something strangely comforting in watching your team get ham-
mered in a crowd full of fellow fans. 
 (Paula, e-mail correspondence) 
 During the interview, Paula talked about coming out at different times in 
her life. At 16, she came out as ‘gay and a cross dresser’. Reﬂ ecting on these 
identities, she said about ‘gay’: ‘It just seemed the nearest and best under-
stood’. ‘Crossdresser’ because transgender wasn’t a term that was available 
to her at that time and transvestite had connotations she disliked. Together, 
gay and crossdresser allowed for ‘all sorts of queer behaviour’. Later, 
I asked Paula if transgender was a good word for her. She was adamant: 
‘The idea of transgender saved my life, really.’ When Paula began to identify 
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as transgender she was working and therefore had money to go to Norwich 
City games more frequently: 
 . . . my transgender identity and exploration didn’t stop me going to 
games. I mean I would go to the games as male, which is how I was liv-
ing at the time. I had long hair, but otherwise was male-identiﬁ ed and 
recognizable as male. I didn’t tell my friends at the games that I had this 
parallel identity. (From interview transcript) 
 In 2009, Paula started to come out as transsexual. At this time, she con-
templated how her friends and family would respond to her transitioning. 
She believed friends would be ‘okay’ and her family would ﬁ nd it ‘challeng-
ing, but I think we will get there’. She thought her job and social life would 
require some ‘managing’. Another important concern for her was ‘well, can 
I still go to football?’ She remembers transitioning on a Saturday: ‘I think it 
was the 2nd of May; it was the day I emailed all my friends saying: I’m Paula 
now.’ Her football-fan friends were not included in this e-mail. However, a 
couple of them were Facebook friends with her, and they noticed that she had 
changed her proﬁ le details. Changing Facebook information was actually a 
‘nice’ way for Paula to come out. It meant she could ‘come out to everybody 
without necessarily having to utter these loaded words: “I am transsexual”’. 
 Before Paula was able to explore her own ways of coming out to the 
rest of her football-fan friends she got outed by another fan on a football-
fan forum. Paula was active on the forum and enjoyed the exchanges of 
information, football knowledge and the appropriately jovial nature of this 
Internet space. She thought the forum was a place where her ‘transsexuality 
didn’t stop me interacting with people’. At the same time, Paula was writing 
a column for a national newspaper. The column was about her experiences 
of transitioning. Another fan posted a link to this newspaper column on to 
the football forum. He also posted: ‘look, this is that person’s column’. 
 P:  A few people said ‘ah you cruel bastard just because he looks like a 
girl’ and a few other people said ‘no, it really is his thing’. In the end 
I had to go on there and say ‘yeah, I wrote that’. And, then there 
was this really weird thing because the forum hadn’t had to deal 
with someone transitioning before. 
  J: Did you feel exposed? 
 P:  Yeah, it was heart-in-mouth. Actually, it worked out really well, 
because I don’t know how I would have handled coming out to all 
of my friends at the game . . . I ended up being really glad it had 
happened. (From interview transcript) 
 With time, Paula and some of the other fans used the forum less and less. 
Instead they switched to Facebook would see each other at games. 
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 P:  There is a big group of people I go with [to football]. One of them, 
my friend Luke . . . at Norwich they’re all Luke’s friends. Luke said, 
‘we all still want to see you and be your friend, if you want to have 
a chat, just drop me a line’. And I said, ‘Luke that’s really lovely, 
but it’s quite simple, I’m known as Paula, she and her and other 
than that you don’t have to do anything’ . . . Next time I saw them, 
I went to a home game, October that year against Middlesborough. 
He said ‘how do you want me to introduce you to everyone?’ I said 
‘as Paula’. He said ‘great’. I went to the game, I went to the pub 
with them afterwards, we went to dinner together. It was really 
easy, really simple. 
  J: Loads of blokes? 
 P: Yeah, they all treated me as female and that was that. 
 (From interview transcript) 
 “I LOVE GOING TO WATCH NORWICH [EVEN 
THOUGH I KNOW THEY HAVE BEEN ON A SUSTAINED 
RUN OF BAD FORM FOR ABOUT 4 YEARS]” 9 
 In his piece on Long Distance Love, Farred describes—through a language 
of love—‘growing up a Liverpool football club fan’. He refers to his ‘. . . 
beloved Liverpool . . .’ (2002: 6) and describes his feelings as ‘. . . endur-
ing love, blind, rock-solid faith, and abiding passion’ (p. 10). He tells of 
his ‘. . . love affair with the central midﬁ elders Graeme Souness and Steve 
McMahon’ (p. 7), and stresses that ‘[a]s much as I loved Keegan . . .’ (p. 8), 
‘I love Graeme Souness above all other players . . .’ (p. 17). Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, he is unable to explain ‘the moment that I ﬁ rst fell in love . . .’ and 
he claims that his is ‘. . . a love that was consummated before it was under-
stood, narrativized, or even articulated’ (p. 11). 
 Verbalizing what it is, exactly, that conjures ‘. . . enduring love, blind, 
rock-solid faith, and abiding passion’ (p. 10) is difﬁ cult, near impossible. 
As a researcher, accessing the logics of such love (and pleasure) is not easy. 
During the interview with Paula, I tried to probe for some kind of rationale: 
  J:  . . . there’s something about the game, watching the game, watching 
the team move the ball? 
 P:  Yeah, very visceral, kind of aesthetic thing for me. I just love watch-
ing football. A really great team move or an individual run or 
[pause] there are so many things I love about football. That dynamic 
between the players and the crowd, just the sheer high drama of it. 
I don’t like any of the culture that comes with it. But I just thought 
I love the sport so much I just have to try and [pause] at worst ﬁ nd 
my own space in that culture and at best try to change it. 
 (From interview transcript) 
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 Paula ﬁ nds the ‘creative possibilities’ of football endearing. In a recent 
discussion, Kreft (2013) recognizes the aesthetic appeal of football. He 
argues that the: ‘Aesthetic attraction of football is not a sign of alienation, 
manipulation or ideology—it is just what it appears to be: a sign of rare 
pleasure’ (p. 19). And yet Paula points out that ‘. . . loads of my friends hate 
football because the sport doesn’t have the distinctive aesthetic appeal that 
it has for me.’ She also acknowledges that there are times when football has 
made her ‘very embarrassed to like it’ and that certain chants and songs 
make her ‘wince’ and that she ‘hates them’. 
 Love has a tricky, and perhaps turbulent, relationship with pleasure. Both 
are elusive. Describing what it is that people like and love about sport (foot-
ball), what it is they ﬁ nd pleasurable, does seem to involve the visual and 
aesthetic as well as the sensate (e.g. felt atmosphere and felt drama). And 
yet, pleasure also collides with what is not pleasurable. In this way, it is not 
a pure concept. 
 In football-fan contexts, what is enjoyable sits within a broader culture 
that is often at odds with pleasure. For instance, Farred exclaims: ‘In no 
other part of my life would I have been able to tolerate such incongruence 
between my cultural investment and my politics’ (2002: 21). Such incongru-
ence can be intense, and while it does not appear to contaminate feelings 
and expressions of pleasure, it does haunt and make uneven some fans’ 
experiences of pleasure  vis à vis the personal and political. 
 Paula has a friend, Ben (‘who was doing a PhD in the works of Thomas 
Pynchon’). Ben is a Southampton FC supporter. Together they ‘talk about 
football all night and literally, we’d have to go off on our own to sit in the 
football corner . . . it drove everybody crazy, but we really enjoyed it.’ When 
I asked Paula if she liked having football knowledge and exchanging this 
knowledge with others, she said, ‘absolutely, I love talking about football . . . 
I’ve always found—even in queer spaces or these kind of high-cultural 
spaces—people who like football as much as me . . . whether they’re queer 
or not, Ben is a straight guy, he’s always been in monogamous heterosexual 
relationships’. 
 Football, speciﬁ cally ‘fanspeak’ (Ruddock, 2005) can help change the 
boundaries of [football] citizenship. Ruddock argues that some football fans 
might be ‘. . . willing to abandon certain elements of tradition to explore 
new ways of being’ (2005: 372). For example, Ben and Paula appear to be 
abandoning their middle-class, high-culture context. Ben abandons a tradi-
tional male-heterosexual football-fan identity and Paula abandons explic-
itly queer subjectivities. Ruddock, focusing on this idea of a suspension of 
tradition, explores the possibilities for pleasures based on cultural inclusion 
(e.g. football cultural inclusion). More speciﬁ cally, he draws from Barthes: ‘. . . 
Barthes’ seminal text locates the political aspects of pleasure in the follow-
ing dynamic: “Imagine someone who abolishes within himself [sic] all bar-
riers, all classes. All exclusions …”’ (p. 372). Pleasures in this sense and for 
some people are about willingness ‘to desert what you are and what you 
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know’ (p. 375). Ben and Paula appear to be doing this when they ‘talk about 
football all night . . .’. 
 Paula and Ben’s fanspeak and football-friendship provide one small 
example of how traditional boundaries and distinctions surrounding gender 
and sexuality can dissolve. During the hours they spend together, recounting 
stories of Southampton FC and Norwich City FC, they both enjoy a form 
of football-fan citizenship. Paula’s sense of belonging and cultural inclusion 
is held together by their football knowledge, their respect of each other’s 
knowledge, their joy in sharing, telling and listening to this wisdom. In this 
one-to-one situation, they have abolished traditional and exclusionary cat-
egories of sex, gender and sexuality. 
 However, as Ruddock goes on to discuss, these seemingly utopic moments 
can be fragile, especially when there are obdurate, unjust and unpleas-
ant broader politics. Referring to football in Israel and the work of Sorek 
(2003), Ruddock suggests that despite Arab fans feeling a sense of belonging 
in football stadia, their football fandom (collective citizenship) can never 
change their minority, and inferior, status in Israel. Momentarily, football 
fandom does dislocate and rupture notions of Israeli citizenship; however, 
it never permanently alters the oppressive relations of power in the country. 
In this context, Ruddock concludes: ‘. . . pleasure is based on the ability to 
build and defend, not abolish categories’ (2005: 375). 
 In one of the follow up e mails with Paula, I asked her about ‘standing 
on the terraces’: 
 My favorite thing about standing on the terraces is the way I can vanish 
into the crowd. Everyone is focused on the match, so I can lose myself in 
conversation about the team and the tactics, the songs that people sing 
and the back-and-forth between the two sets of fans, incidents on and 
off the pitch . . . I like the way that my gender doesn’t really matter . . . 
we’re all ﬁ xated upon the match, and for this time, our individual and 
collective emotions are broadly the same. 
 (Paula, e-mail correspondence) 
 The pleasures Paula experiences through fanspeak or in situ—at foot-
ball stadia and on the terraces—are evident. However, from a critical per-
spective, some of these pleasures might conceal, through fantasies of liberal 
democracy (Ruddock, 2005), the socio-cultural and socio-political unpleas-
ant (e.g. the subordination of Arabs in Israel and transphobia in sport gener-
ally) as well as warn us ‘of pleasure’s conservative potential’ (p. 384). And 
yet Paula did not report experiences of abuse and harassment in terms of 
her own subjectivity. She did, however, ﬁ nd many aspects of football-fan 
culture unpalatable. 
 It might be useful to think about football-fandom pleasures as haunted 
by displeasures and the unpleasant. I am not promoting a binary model of 
pleasure; instead, I am suggesting sport-related pleasures are evanescent, 
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ﬂ uid and in ﬂ ux. Displeasures and the unpleasant are not only to do with 
broader regimes of social, cultural and political injustice (as in Israel), they 
are also about much smaller, intense moments of human indecency, which 
are often to do with racism and xenophobia. These moments—in football 
contexts—are frequently wrapped up as expressions of humour. 
 . . . but, he [Ben] has this problem with football because he’s an intel-
lectual with a taste for modernist literature and how do you handle 
it when [pause] . . . one story he recounts . . . one of the Portsmouth 
players was a guy called Lomana LuaLua who was Congolese and he 
went to play in the Africa Nations Cup and got malaria, Ben said, the 
next Southampton game there’d be a big crowd singing ‘Lualua has got 
malaria’. 10 
 (From interview transcript) 
 Paula also talked about her experiences of watching a League Cup game 
between Brighton and Hove Albion FC (BHAFC) and Gillingham FC. 
The game was at Brighton. It is common for away fans, in this case 
Gillingham, to sing homophobic songs at BHAFC home games, because 
the city of Brighton and Hove has the largest ‘out’ population of LGBTQI 
people in the UK. Paula recounts what happened after a popular song 
(‘does your boyfriend know you’re here?’) was sung at Brighton fans: 
‘I heard someone yell, “oh fuck off, you bunch of pikeys”, using this kind 
of regional stereotyping against Kent 11 , and the Gypsy population there’. In 
other examples, when Norwich City FC plays Liverpool FC or Everton FC, 
songs about unemployment and theft are rife (the city of Liverpool is 
stereotyped in a way that exaggerates men’s criminal activities) and away 
fans sing, to the tune of Sloop John B, ‘I want to go home, Liverpool is a 
shithole’. 12 
 The above incident surrounding the player Lualua led to further discom-
fort and disgust for Paula, and her friend Ben. 
 . . . and how do you . . . the same player, he was playing for the Republic 
of Congo in the Africa Nations Cup and his son died during the tourna-
ment. Ben said he went to the next game and was really worried that 
people would sing songs . . . he was relieved to ﬁ nd that they didn’t. 
This is the kind of dilemma . . . it’s terrible, football culture is such that 
you can be a football fan and go to a game and feel a genuine sense of 
relief that nobody sings a song about somebody’s infant son dying. The 
culture can be that abhorrent. 
 (From interview transcript) 
 Many sport cultures, especially men’s professional sport, are sites for 
discourses and displays of so-called banter. Football songs and chants—in 
the UK—are often aligned with, and framed through humor, the comical 
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and funny. However, in his analysis of microaggressions and microinsults 
in men’s cricket in England, Burdsey argues: ‘. . . [ J]okes can underpin divi-
sive and exclusionary aspects of sporting subcultures, and they represent a 
powerful and symbolic means by which minorities are marginalized from 
dominant player collectives’ (2011: 273). Such jokes and joking are exem-
plars of Ruddock’s notion that ‘. . . pleasure is based on the ability to build 
and defend . . . categories’ (2005: 375). 
 More broadly, and in relation to the comedy industry, there have been 
on-going debates over what counts as funny and why it counts as funny. 
For instance, Wagg (2011), in his critique of the British comedian Bernard 
Manning, demonstrates the unapologetic sexist, racist and homophobic 
nature of traditional British stand-up comedy. He claims there has been 
‘a negligible relationship between comedy and politics, and comedy was, by 
and large, seen as a separate and sanctioned universe of discourse in which 
things said did not matter outside that universe: facilitating the familiar 
comment “It’s just a joke”’(p. 170). Comedy, jokes and laughing are funda-
mental to feelings of pleasure, but, as many see it, large parts of the comedy 
genre are problematic. As Burdsey (2011) concludes from his study with 
South Asian English male cricketers, ‘that joke isn’t funny anymore’. 
 In terms of gender and sexuality Paula does enjoy certain aspects of fan 
culture and being with other fans gives her a sense of belonging. For exam-
ple she said: ‘. . . there’s a woman called Beth who hangs out with us and 
I remember the ﬁ rst time I met her. I did feel this real kind of relief and 
happiness, like there’s another woman. So, yeah, I love the guys to bits, but 
I would like a bit more female company’. 
 It is often difﬁ cult for the spheres of gender and sexuality and football to 
merge in productive ways for people who do not identify as heteronorma-
tive. Paula made this statement in the interview: ‘[t]he thing is . . . I like this 
queer counter-culture, but on the other hand I love football’. In a follow-up 
email (see above) I asked her to explain this further. She wrote back, mak-
ing the point that queer and football do not co-exist because ‘mainstream 
football isn’t queer at all’ and that most queer spaces do not include foot-
ball. Despite these disparities, Paula suggests that the ‘gulf is ideal’ because 
at football her gender diversity and queer sexuality are, for the time being, 
forgotten about, suspended: ‘I spend a lot of my time reading, writing and 
thinking about queer culture and politics, and football could not be a better 
release from that’. She also added: ‘one of my favorite things about going 
to the games is not worrying about it [her body]—I take far less time over 
my appearance when going to the football then I do when going almost 
anywhere else, which is very liberating’. For Paula, there are pleasures in 
these freedoms, pleasure in forgetting, and unlike the rest of her daily life, 
Paula can, literally, ‘vanish into the crowd’. She can become the observer 
of others and not the focus of often-judgmental observations and cruel 
banter, which has happened in other spheres of her life (e.g. walking home 
at night). 
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 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 What is apparent from my communications with Paula is that she loves 
football, loves watching football, loves watching Norwich and loves talking 
about football. We can assume that this love produces a certain amount of 
pleasure. It is unusual to hear the voice of a transgender, transsexual, queer 
fan of Norwich City FC. Moreover, it is refreshing to hear how this fan has 
mostly positive experiences related to her sex-gender-sexuality subjectivi-
ties. This is signiﬁ cant, because as Rand claims: ‘. . . if an anti-oppression 
vision of a just and good world includes pleasure, then pleasure as an end, 
not just as a route to knowledge, matters, too’ (2012: 10–11). 
 This chapter does present pleasure ‘as an end’. It focuses on Paula’s plea-
sures surrounding football and my pleasures in hearing about her positive 
experiences of a culture I have, for a long time, critiqued. However, her 
football pleasures are actually quite complicated and it is worth highlighting 
some of these complications. 
 For many football fans (cf. Farred, 2002; Ruddock, 2005) the pleasures 
obtained from following and supporting a men’s professional football team 
are constantly plagued by displeasures and the unpleasant. For fans that 
adopt anti-homophobic, anti-sexist and anti-racist (and anti-capitalist) 
personal politics, the popular and dominant cultures of most football-fan 
groups engender discomfort. The aesthetic (style of play), visceral (sheer 
joy) and sensate (felt drama) pleasures of standing (or sitting down) on the 
terraces and watching your team are not ﬁ xed and enduring. Instead, these 
pleasures are affected by the soundscape within stadia and the idiosyncratic 
crowd chanting at UK football grounds (and, more broadly, the relentless 
commodiﬁ cation of the game). At live football ﬁ xtures, moments of plea-
sure are frequently punctuated. The boundaries between the pleasant and 
unpleasant are porous, and it is possible to feel both pleasure and displea-
sure simultaneously. For example, Paula talked about watching a good team 
or individual move on the ﬁ eld of play and, at the same time, hearing a 
terrible and abhorrent football chant. Clearly the sensate—the visual and 
auditory—do not always align, and there can be incongruence that might 
be unbearable for some. In these contexts, pleasure might be understood 
through notions of play-off and resolution. In other words, how do fans rec-
oncile their love and passion for football when they know there are distress-
ingly troublesome aspects? For Paula, and her friend Ben, it is not simply 
a matter of ignoring the unpleasant. It is more complicated, and their plea-
sures appear on an emotional (happy) landscape pockmarked with anguish 
and revulsion. 
 Some of Paula’s pleasures stem from a suspension of her world outside 
of the football stadium. This is not in relation to her personal politics, but 
more in terms of her own sex-gender-sexualities subjectivities. The crowd, 
collectivism and sometimes-shared emotions mean that her presence is unre-
markable and unobtrusive. For her, this is an enjoyable position to be in. 
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 Finally, as Paula pointed out at the beginning of her story of becoming a 
fan, [middle] class plays a role in some of the pleasures she, and other foot-
ball fans, are able to access and/or the unpleasants they are able to avoid. 
For instance, both Paula and Ben are postgraduates; the column that was 
posted on the fan forum is from a UK left-wing quality newspaper. This 
paper is usually read by the so-called middle classes. By inference I am not 
suggesting that the (male) working classes, which are signiﬁ cantly repre-
sented at live men’s professional football in the UK, are not able to help 
include a football fan who identiﬁ es as transgender, transsexual and queer. 
However, some of Paula’s pleasures (being part of a friendly and welcom-
ing fan group) are, most likely, contingent on class and ethnicity, as well as 
other shared social locations. 
 NOTES 
 1 . At the time, Lee Bowyer had a reputation for racist violence. 
 2 .  Pope’s recent work (2012) on women fans of men’s football (and rugby),‘The 
love of my life’, continues this emphasis on ‘love’. However, her work provides 
a broader analysis of types (‘hot’ and ‘cold’) of women’s fandom in relation to 
women’s gendered identities (masculine and feminine). 
 3 . At the time of interview, Paula identiﬁ ed as a transgender-queer woman. 
 4 .  These shifting subjectivities must not be read as linear or chronological, 
despite appearing so through written words on a page. 
 5 .  ‘Paula McVeigh’ was selected by the research participant. It is a pseudonym 
and helps to achieve conﬁ dentiality and anonymity during the research pro-
cess. The name was selected purposely because it carries particular meanings 
(related to Norwich City FC) and some readers might recognize its etymology. 
 6 .  Justin Fashanu started his professional football career at Norwich City FC in 
1978. He was 17 years old and stayed with the club until 1981. During this 
time, he scored 35 goals in 90 appearances. 
 7 .  John Fashanu is Justin Fashanu’s brother. In the media, John responded nega-
tively to Justin’s publicly self-declared sexuality. 
 8 .  Since the interview, Paula has been approached by others, including governing 
bodies of sport, for interviews. As a way to avoid repeating lengthy interviews, 
she asked me if she could send our interview transcript to those asking for 
interviews with her. I agreed to this. 
 9 .  Paula read the ﬁ nal version of this chapter. She made ﬁ ve comments. One 
of the comments was related to this quotation. It reads: ‘This run covered 
2005-summer 2009, when I started transitioning. They’ve been miraculously 
good ever since’. 
 10 .  Ben supports Southampton FC. Southampton FC and Portsmouth FC are 
long-standing local rivals. 
 11 .  In the UK, ‘pikey’ is slang and a pejorative term for Gypsies and travellers. It 
is also viewed as an ethnic slur. Kent is the county in the far South East corner 
of England. It is known as the ‘Garden of England’ because of the crops that 
are grown and harvested there. The region’s population of workers is often 
transient (e.g. fruit pickers). 
 12 . This song is sung by away fans at many clubs, not only at Liverpool FC. 
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 10  Aesthetic Pleasure and Sport 
 The Case of  Love + Guts: 
Skateboarding Killed the Art Show 
 Robert E. Rinehart 
 There are clear linkages between aesthetic pleasures and sport, physical 
engagement with the world and the exerting body (or embodied movement) in 
contemporary Western society. However, competition has often trumped the 
intrinsic pleasures of sporting—and even embodied movement—activities. 
The intrinsic pleasures of sport—including an appreciation of the beauty in/
of sport (cf. Lowe, 1977) and aesthetics—have been subsumed by extrinsic 
types of pleasures: more hyperbolic, yet more transitory, somewhat akin to 
the sudden ﬂ ash mobs Kathleen Stewart (2007: 66) describes in  Ordinary 
Affects . ‘Such trajectories and metamorphoses are . . . forms of contagion, 
persuasion, and social worlding’. But the term  aesthetics has also come to 
mean the relationship between values and the senses (cf. Bourdieu, 1984) 
and, in this regard, sport and aesthetics are inextricably connected. 
 The relationships between beauty and sport—this performative ‘dance’ 
of sport—are much more than just dynamics between how we comprehend 
the world and what we judge within that apprehension. As Barthes (2007: 9) 
writes about bullﬁ ghting: 
 There is something else in the torero’s style. What is style? Style makes 
a difﬁ cult action into a graceful gesture, introduces a rhythm into fatal-
ity. Style is to be courageous without disorder, to give necessity the 
appearance of freedom. Courage, knowledge, beauty, these are what 
man opposes to the strength of the animal, this is the human ordeal, of 
which the bull’s death will be the prize. 
 For Barthes, beauty and style and the aesthetic of the bullﬁ ght are what 
create the limitations of ‘what sport is’. But clearly, sport involves this sense 
of beauty, of grace, of almost unimaginable economy—so that sport, done 
well, nearly always touches on the sublime and ineffable aesthetic. 1 
 Formally, the aesthetic is a branch of philosophy dealing with the nature 
of art, beauty, taste—put more broadly, the term aesthetics constitutes 
‘a kind of object, a kind of judgment, a kind of attitude, a kind of experi-
ence, and a kind of value’ (Shelley, 2009: ¶ 1) based within a host of cultural 
and natural artifacts. Thus, what characterizes the aesthetic is situational, 
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partial, open-ended, open to discussion, teased out by inﬂ uences of culture, 
taste and preference. If there are any universal agreements on what has 
come to be known as aesthetic, they are quite rare. 
 Sport and things relating to the physical body—in contrast with the 
 strictly cognitive, for physical activities include the cognitive—ﬁ t well with 
the study of aesthetics. For where else might we ﬁ nd bodies in full exertion, 
demonstrating the current limits, ranges and hopes of human effort, exem-
pliﬁ ed through such a complex array of sensory and emotional—and often 
silently pleasurable—positionings? 
 Historically, the study of emotions, for example, has been fraught with 
differing viewpoints regarding whether or not humans have  basic and  uni-
versal  emotions, or whether human emotions are critically dependent upon 
interaction with social forces. To demonstrate the range of complex views 
on just what emotions  are , it is helpful to remember that the 1st Century 
Li Chi counts seven basic emotions (joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, dislik-
ing and liking); the Stoics ﬁ ve (pleasure/delight, distress, appetite and fear). 
Spinoza emphasizes pleasure, pain and desire; Sylvan Tomkins counts eight 
pairs of similar ‘basic emotions’ (enjoyment/joy, interest/excitement, surprise/
startle, anger/rage, contempt/disgust, distress/anguish, fear/terror, shame/
humiliation), 16 in all; and Plutchik (1980) argues for eight basic emotions, 
which, like primary colors, constitute the ‘stuff’ of more complex emotions 
(joy, sadness, trust, disgust, fear, anger, surprise, anticipation) (cf. ‘Emotion 
classiﬁ cation’, 2012). My point is not to delve into the plausibility of any 
of these theories—as this example is a parallel to both the nature/nurture 
arguments of the study of pleasure as well as of an appreciation of aesthetics—
but rather to point out the social-constructedness of humans’ acknowledge-
ment of such a seemingly elemental issue as ‘basic emotions’. 
 When a body is holistically involved, engaged in partial or full exertion, 
kinesthetic awareness, tactile sensoriness, pressure, hearing, smell, taste all 
occupy the self to varying degrees, along with the visual, which some would 
describe as the ‘primary sense’ in the 21st century (cf. Serres, 2008). In the 
matter of aesthetics of the body, these are matters for philosophers, not sci-
entists, 2 for sport and exercise philosophers more than for sport and exercise 
physiologists. Questions relating to taste and aesthetics, which relate cultur-
ally to pleasure—for example:  how does one culture characterize beauty?— 
so far have been most successfully discussed in the realm of the social sci-
ences and humanities. 
 The term ‘aesthetics’ implies pleasure, primarily because of its links to 
‘beauty’. 3 But art can be disturbing, challenging and disruptive—often the 
antithesis of beautiful. Might the appreciation of such art—of such puzzles 
of art—be pleasurable too? When a new way of apprehending the world 
(Berger, 2009) gains purchase, a whole new set of pleasures may accrue. 4 
 But perhaps we need to nuance this concept of the aesthetic, of aesthet-
ics, more carefully. For example, is there a distinction between a ‘disinter-
ested’ appraisal of art (be that visual art or, in the case of skateboarding 
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audiences, performance/performative art) and the actual ‘doing’ of some-
thing (cf. Sheppard, 1989: 72)? After all, in the case of  Love + Guts and 
Bowl-a-Rama (skateboarding art show and worldwide skateboarding com-
petition, respectively), consuming art has been deliberately conﬂ ated with 
actual skating by the skaters/artists and tour producers. The popular culture 
merging of skating with art works serves to advantage both, but doesn’t 
provide much clarity of concept. 
 Unpacking such a term as  aesthetics helps to provide a bit of distinc-
tion between skateboarding, doing art related to skateboarding and appre-
ciating both skateboarding and skateboarding art. Potential for pleasure(s) 
exists at any point, within any subject position. Sheppard points out that 
aesthetics have been viewed, generally, in one of two ways: looking at the 
intrinsic commonalities of the objects of our gazes {‘all works of art have 
something in common’ (1987: 2); and ‘examin[ing] . . . the interest we take 
in such objects’ (ibid.)}. If we go back to Walter Pater’s studies of aesthetics 
in the Renaissance, we ﬁ nd a degree of openness toward the very objects of 
aesthetics: 
 The objects with which æsthetic criticism deals, music, poetry, artis-
tic and accomplished forms of human life, are indeed receptacles of so 
many powers or forces; they possess, like natural elements, so many 
virtues or qualities. 
 . . . The æsthetic critic, then, regards all the objects with which he 
[sic] has to do, all works of art, and the fairer forms of nature and 
human life, as powers or forces producing pleasurable sensations. . . . 
(1966: 259) 
 Certainly, these broad categories surrounding aesthetics and the aesthetic 
object serve to contextualize what we are about in regard to pleasure and 
beauty in sport. Not only is ‘art’ the object of aesthetic scrutiny, but also 
things natural—and even human life—are considered within the aesthetic 
realm. For example, American football, arguably a ‘macho’ type of game/
sport, became the site of National Football League (NFL), which produced 
videos normalizing war within a patriarchal culture and also celebrated the 
artistry and aesthetic pleasures of ‘beautiful’ catches by receivers (accompa-
nied by classical music) during the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Archer, 2010). The 
interplay of natural with human-created objects of aesthetic gaze combines 
with a cognitive facility to gain greater or lesser pleasure from differing 
objects of that gaze. 
 But, more speciﬁ cally, ‘. . . when we experience a very special kind of 
pleasure—namely, aesthetic pleasure—it is legitimate to issue a positive crit-
ical judgment about that pleasure’s object’ (Battin et al., 1989: 199). Thus 
judgment is included in our assessment of pleasures: more complex and fas-
cinating objects tend to arrest our attentions—drive our aesthetic passions—
before simplistic and boring objects. In Kantian terms, the judgment of taste, 
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then, is negotiated by our own fascination and ‘mental facilities . . . being 
stimulated’ (Battin et al., 1989: 37). 
 In this regard, Foucault’s overall project and speciﬁ c work on Manet 
bears mentioning. According to Bourriaud (2009: 13): 
 Foucault is less interested by what the image says than by what it 
produces—the behaviours that it generates, and what it leaves barely 
seen among the social machinery in which it distributes bodies, spaces 
and utterances. . . . Foucault tries hard to articulate the implicit and 
invisible strategies that conﬁ ne painting, to render visible what it shows, 
but equally what it conceals. 
 A major part of Foucault’s project was thus to excavate signiﬁ cant 
moments from social movements and mores: in institutions, in sexuality and 
in art. In assessing Manet, Foucault has created a judgment of taste: that is, 
Manet’s various techniques and strategies only serve to enhance Foucault’s—
and presumably, all viewers’—appreciation of the artistic project, as evi-
denced by Manet creating a rupture in the ways viewers ‘see’ art. 
 In contemporary culture, the concepts of taste (cf. Bourdieu, 1984), 
beauty and aesthetic pleasure certainly rely upon a modernist sense of bina-
ried elitism that is interpellated with the existence of a popular acceptance of 
such naturalized structures as mass and elite culture, high and low art (and 
food, dress, sporting practices) and the hierarchical distinctions between 
such cultural sedimentations. There is within contemporary culture, then, 
an acceptance from most members of a given group of what is both proper 
and natural for membership in the groups. Studying only key ‘moments’ 
in key actors’ lives (e.g. Manet, for Foucault) is somewhat akin to histori-
ans studying only generals and nation-state leaders. And yet the heightened 
aesthetic appeal of an object that is more complex and therefore fascinat-
ing provides the major paradox of studying massive, populist movements. 
Nevertheless, the overriding hegemonic acceptance of such a paradox—as 
well as a bedrock sense of democratic egalitarianism—necessitates deeper 
examination of presumably ‘less profound’ events, key ﬁ gures and move-
ments (see also Chapter 7 on mundanity). 
 While, obviously, the ‘object’ of study within this chapter (e.g. the 
Love + Guts art show and Bowl-a-Rama) will no doubt be less notable 
and remarked-upon than the work of Manet, the signiﬁ cance of its ‘implicit 
and invisible strategies’, at the level of pleasure, is worth noting. 
 But, in the case of both Manet and skateboarding art, the very objects 
of study—the art of the visual and the art of the performative—serve as 
an exemplar of what they produce. 5 How then, do skate-art conﬁ gurations 
work to produce certain kinds of skating subjects: how are they conﬁ gured 
within the social production of skater as rebel, skater as aesthete, skater as 
hedonistic pleasure-seeker? 
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 In addition, what kinds of pleasures might accrue from viewing such art 
and such skating performances? 6 If we follow Droney—and I suggest his 
take is both savvy and insightful—we should look at this skateboarding 
art not simply visually, but also contextually. Droney (2010: 99) examines 
the conﬂ uence of street art and corporate marketing in Los Angeles: while 
the artists insist on their resistance to mainstream culture, there are ‘ironies 
inherent in this ostensible resistance, and . . . artists are aware of, enjoy, and 
seek to maximize the ironic qualities of street art [where they create] . . . 
irreverent and self-contradictory artwork’. 
 In some ways, this chapter extends previous work done by Atencio and 
Beal (2011), who explored the  Beautiful Losers exhibition in terms of a 
re-colonization of (disinterested) symbolic capital by and for ‘outsider’ 
masculine identity formations. Atencio and Beal see  Beautiful Losers as a 
populist art form that ‘creates a social order that privileges “renegade” or 
“outsider” masculinity’ within ‘which the creative classes and their disposi-
tions [simultaneously] are privileged in post-Fordist economies’ (2011: 2). 
However, my aim is to examine the  Love + Guts show in terms of its oppor-
tunities for skaters’, public and artists’ pleasures (sometimes, these bifur-
cated identities merge within individuals). On the way, I intend to discuss 
tensions within the show and skateboarding subculture itself that may lead 
to pleasure and to displeasure. 
 IMPORTANCE OF PERFORMANCES 
TO AUDIENCE PLEASURE 
 The apprehension of art changed, according to Foucault, with the work of 
Manet: Manet, like Flaubert, signiﬁ es to Foucault one of the ‘ﬁ gures of rup-
ture’, one of the ‘tipping points in the ﬁ eld of knowledge’ (Bourriaud, 2009: 
13–14); this sense of ‘rupture’ resonates with Denzin’s (1989) discussion of 
four types of epiphanies: major, cumulative, illuminative and relived. Each 
of these, primarily based on time differences and degrees of  aha! or  Eureka! 
moments, nevertheless contributes to signiﬁ cant life-changes in the individual. 
 To Foucault, Manet changed how viewers perceive and apprehend (and 
thus experience pleasure in) visual art: ‘. . . at the heart of the great change 
wrought by Manet to painting . . . [is the] invention of the picture-object, this 
reinsertion of the materiality of the canvas in that which is represented . . .’ 
(Foucault 2009: 31). Certainly, musings about viewer positionality, lighting 
external or internal to the painting itself and spatiality within the limitations 
of a tangible canvas represent critical, epochal changes in art, perhaps akin 
to the perception of dimensionality on a ﬂ at surface. These insights, and 
the discussion of them, lead to a depth of pleasure that derives—yet is also 
separate—from a holistic appreciation of the work. 
 The skating art in  Love + Guts,  though not nearly so profoundly inﬂ u-
ential (as we shall see), still signiﬁ es and represents several key, albeit 
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superﬁ cial, moments of pleasure. There is the derivative, inﬂ uential and/or 
incidental relationship between the actual act of skating and its representa-
tion in the art. Cutri (2009) has explored the relationships between surfers 
who are artists (and artists who are surfers). The creative aspects of skate-
boarding and doing art about skateboarding certainly include possibilities 
for improvisation (cf. Caudwell, 2010), self-direction, pursuit of vision—all 
potentially pleasurable activities. In addition, there is a certain playing out 
of masculine hedonism in the early 21st century; a less overt response to 
layers of corporatization, consumerism and the barrage of advertising; and 
a retroactive shift in gender relations, which may result in pleasures both for 
those who welcome a return to well-deﬁ ned gender roles and to those who 
relish uncertainty and change. 
 Much of this work locates within a dominant, late-capitalist moment, 
where popular art, music, video and so forth, proliferate. In reacting to and 
situating within these dominant subcultural moments and artifacts, as an art 
show,  Love + Guts —and the individual participants—must perform accom-
modations, derivations and oppositions to such invisible but insistent cul-
tural forms. 7 The studying ‘down’ of less profound, 8 mass cultural moments 
such as the  Love + Guts exhibition (as opposed to the oeuvre of Manet, 
for example) demonstrates an aesthetic that paradoxically strives for subtle 
and ironic resistance within consumer culture (cf. Droney, 2010). This kind 
of a show may, in fact, illustrate a series of ordinary pleasures that exhibit 
the  range between both ‘high’ cultural, cognitive and aspirational pleasures 
and more bodily, sensory and fundamental pleasures. 
 And yet we live in a time where modernist worldviews still hold great 
currency, and simple binaries proliferate. Perhaps many contemporary 
sportspersons have been inculcated with the modernist notion of a Cartesian 
mind-body dualism for so long that it has become an entrenched ‘truth’ 
that any individual is either primarily cognitive or primarily action-oriented. 
Thus there is, even within some academic cultures, a strong functionalist 
sense that results in this type of anti-intellectualism. Dewey’s pragmatism, 
for example, has been wrong-headedly conﬂ ated with an impatience for 
action—just the opposite of his call for experiential learning to ground us in 
the senses. Eschewing intellect—in this case, for aesthetic appreciation—is 
just as foolhardy as solely relying upon intellect in favour of the physical/
sensual. 
 CONTEMPORARY AESTHETICS AT PLAY 
 In somewhat sharp contrast to Walter Pater’s positive enthusiasm for peak, 
‘gemlike’ moments in life, Paul Simon, in ‘Dangling Conversation’, got it 
right, at least for this contemporary age of anomie: we live in a time where 
 renditions of visual impressions have overwhelmed even the visual impres-
sions themselves. His lyric, alluding to the virtual shadows of real people 
and the paucity of genuine contact between human beings, lets the listener 
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knows that the disconnect humans feel with each other is palpable, present 
and unresolvable. In a sense, Simon’s lyric might work to highlight a series 
of pictures of pictures of pictures, not unlike Baudrillard’s sense of a simu-
lacrum: ‘. . . abstraction . . . is the generation by models of a real without 
origin or reality: a hyperreal’ (1994: 1)—there is no mirror, no map, no 
origination, just simulation. For the artists of  Love + Guts , theirs is second-
order simulacrum, a commodity with an originary which is, of course, the 
skating itself. Their statuses as skaters are highly visible, both within the 
exhibition and in the marketing materials regarding it. But for many audi-
ences, absent of skating experience, the third-order simulacrum is what is 
portrayed: the art itself becomes its own originary, without a ‘real’ original 
or with an imagined original, an artifact of a land constructed by popular 
culture and longing. Much of contemporary culture revolves around this 
modernist/ postmodernist dance, with the third-order simulacra relying on 
the cultural ‘knowledge’—or effervescent belief 9 —that there once was an 
original. 
 Simon’s ‘Dangling Conversation’ points to a disconnectedness between 
two lovers, two human beings trying to (re?)capture signiﬁ cance with each 
other despite a lack of overt affect, despite an encroaching ﬂ atness of con-
temporary life (cf. Bauman, 2003), despite contemporary social alienation 
and personal feelings of ennui. Compare this sentiment with Pater’s ‘to burn 
always with this hard, gemlike ﬂ ame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in 
life’ (1966: 267): clearly, though both are talking about the objects of aes-
thetic gaze, the worldviews are sharply in contrast. 
 But the disconnection I am talking about between the apprehension of 
the Bowl-a-Rama skateboarding competition and the  Love + Guts art exhi-
bition is one between the primacy of experience and a simulacra of that 
experience: in either case, the effects repeat each other like the mirrors in 
a funhouse. Or rather, like mirrors in a funhouse reﬂ ecting a holographic 
shadow: the unexperienced appreciation of actual skating. 
 However—and this caveat matters in what might be seen as ‘pleasure’ 
in contemporary life—both types of experience themselves may still remain 
embodied and sensual and, on their own merits, create some degree of aes-
thetic appreciation for the viewer. Also, both are, in some senses, simultane-
ously primary and secondary experiences. 
 BENJAMIN’S AESTHETIC OF REPRODUCTION 
 The obvious contemporary layering of primary experience by both second-
ary and tertiary re-creation and experience harkens back to Walter Benjamin’s 
thoughts regarding mechanical reproduction, but it also touches on Denzin’s 
characterizations of a cinematic society in an age where excluded groups ‘are 
victims of anhedonia, they are unable to experience pleasure’ (1991: viii). 
The scopophilic gaze that contemporary audiences take for granted—often 
without pleasure accruing—must enter into discussion of an art show about 
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skateboarding. Pater’s heightened principle of ‘gemlike ﬂ ame’, in the con-
temporary moment, recedes into a ﬂ atlining aesthetic moderation. 
 How do viewers to the  Love + Guts 2012  art exhibition experience plea-
sure? The complexity, craft and genius of the artwork is likely not compa-
rable to Manet’s, but this question of experiencing pleasure entails more 
than that: do skateboarders, like surfers, ﬁ nd describing the act of skating 
to be practically impossible? Thus, is the art an attempt to recapture the 
so-called ineffable nature of skating (somewhat akin to the ‘stoke’ that surfers 
claim), or the ‘ﬂ ow state’ of ‘optimal experience’ (cf. Csíkszentmihályi, 
1990, 1996), using a visual medium to somehow replicate two seemingly 
inexpressible cultural texts? If the very concept of pleasure has migrated 
from appreciation of  symbolized skating, for example, to only becoming 
representations of acts of the actual skating itself, we have lost something 
quite valuable: we have given up the effort at facilitating appreciation by 
non-participants of experiences that they do not necessarily share. We have 
somehow bought into the hierarchical and naturalized rhetorics of ‘inef-
fability’ or ‘stoke’. 
 To many touched by modern technologies, Walter Benjamin’s conception 
of exactitude between copies sings out as an obvious truth: as we reproduce 
actual lived experience, the reproduction—even if an exact copy in every 
way but one: for example, the temporal element—drops farther away from 
some of the affective devices of the actual lived experience. And it matters 
little whether the reproduction is visual, auditory, tactile or of any of the 
other dozens of ways humans apprehend and/or comprehend the world—
the reproduction is still a reproduction. 
 The fact remains, however: though we eschew anything other than 
primary experience, in our paradoxically coterminous society, we mostly 
touch, smell see, and/or hear the world through the secondary, the tertiary 
and nearly endless echoes (cf. Battin et al., 1989). Contemporary humans 
increasingly experience the world at a second, third or fourth remove. 
And, in a lived experience that grows more technologically complex, vir-
tual worlds rush to emulate the sensate, the sensuous, the primal. Thus, the 
actual playing of a sport or exerting ourselves in a physical activity conveys 
us back to the primacy of aesthetic, embodied enjoyment like little else in 
contemporary life. And yet, in contemporary society, we can also learn to 
appreciate non-direct experience. This is the stuff of pleasure at a second, 
third or fourth remove in the 21st century. 
 While Benjamin’s essay concerns mechanical reproduction of art works, 
implying an exactitude from the original to the reproduction that is his-
torically remarkable, current views of such ‘reproduction’ include accurate 
electronic, technologically seamless reproduction creating visual, auditory 
and frequently other sensual cultural ‘memories’. The move to a humanly 
undetectable reproduction makes the ‘authenticity’ of primary or second-
ary ‘experience’—at the level of human sensory reception and detection—
a somewhat moot point, since secondary experience is, for all intents and 
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purposes, indistinguishable from its source (if in fact there is a detectable 
source or originary). 
 Furthermore, this move calls into question the rigid borders we have cul-
turally drawn around what counts as the ‘aesthetic’. The reproduction itself 
is an event, just as the  being thereness of live attendance is an event—both 
fraught with value, pleasure and their own particular, idiosyncratic beauties 
and values (cf. Rinehart, 1998a). Still, as Bourdieu (1984) cautions us, we 
constantly compare experiences and rank their statuses accordingly. One of 
the concerns of this chapter is how we ascertain and rank various pleasures. 
 Witness, for example, the televisual experience of a 2012 London Olym-
pics event. There is pleasure in a New Zealander being able to ‘see’—albeit 
on taped delay—Usain Bolt winning the 100 meters (see Chapter 8), or 
Kiwi darling Valerie Adams’ valiant effort putting the shot, since the 
reproduction of its ‘happening’ (again and again) is more real in many ways 
than actually having been a spectator at the event (cf. Baudrillard, 2002)—
which is itself removed from actually being Adams, actually performing the 
event. 
 Some of the ways watching Valerie Adams on television 10 is more ‘real’ 
include: shared experiential memories with a majority of the New Zealand 
public (to be nostalgically recovered later); deeply imbedded ‘epiphanic’ 
(and later, epigramic/totemic) images from Adams’ moments of glory; indi-
vidual and group audience effects that result in emotions and affect such 
as collective disappointment, pride and joy at the Valerie Adams’ ‘story’, 11 
which was readily known, reproduced, consumed and re-reproduced (that 
is, gone into the pantheon of ‘sport stories’ a culturally literate Kiwi draws 
from) for and by a Kiwi viewing public, press and popular culture. Know-
ing the ‘story’ enhanced one’s status, and thus, by extension, one’s plea-
sure in being culturally competent. However, there is a limited audience for 
Love + Guts 2012 : it lacks the massiﬁ ed reach of the London Olympics 
2012 or, really, anything so televised. 
 BAUMAN’S AESTHETIC FLATNESS 
 . . . Sound and sight seem to make equal parts of these impressions. 
 . . . The next memory . . . was much more robust; it was highly 
sensual. 
  . . . It still makes me feel warm; as if everything were ripe; 
humming;
 sunny; smelling so many smells at once. . . . The buzz, the croon, 
the smell, all seemed to press voluptuously against some membrane; 
not to burst it; but to hum round one such a complete rapture of 
pleasure that I stopped, smelt; looked. 
 But again I cannot describe that rapture. It was rapture rather than 
ecstasy. 
 —Virginia Woolf, from  Moments of Being , 1985: 66. 
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 This layering of primary, secondary and tertiary experience—that is, the cre-
ation of hierarchies—also reﬂ ects what Zygmunt Bauman sees as a ‘consumer 
life [that] favours lightness and speed’ (2003: 49). This second connection 
between the produced, the reproduced and the consumer is less obvious 
than the simple reproduction of primary artifacts: Bauman speaks of a 
 homo consumens , a contemporary being that doesn’t just live to buy and 
accumulate, but that buys, uses, disposes and buys more, a being that gains 
pleasure from buying, using, disposing of and re-buying. 
 In this way, the accumulation of material culture within the social sci-
ences has become a fast and rather ﬂ attened scape for the reproduction of 
that which is visual: photos, paintings, ‘high’ and ‘low’ art, video technology 
and so forth, proliferate within the visual. Similarly, Gillian Rose writes of 
DeBord’s ‘society of the spectacle’, and of most contemporary culture becom-
ing ensnared in an enhanced recognition—if not appreciation—of visual 
culture: ‘the ways in which the visual is part of social life’ (Rose 2012: 4). 
Yet without material ‘distinction’—which runs counter to Bourdieu’s thesis, 
in some key ways—the ﬂ attening of affective  response remains the most 
salient feature in this onslaught of visual images. 
 Of course, Virginia Woolf’s discussion of children’s ability to recapture 
‘strong memories’ (1985: 67) or ‘exceptional moments’ (1985: 71) runs coun-
ter to Bauman’s thesis: Bauman is talking about a 21st-century ‘aesthetic’ for 
and by adults; Woolf harkens to a time of innocence and unﬁ ltered experi-
ence, a time, perhaps, that is pre-self-conscious: 
 . . . the peculiarity of these two strong memories is that each was very 
simple. I am hardly aware of myself, but only of the sensation. I am 
only the container of the feeling of ecstasy, of the feeling of rapture. 
Perhaps this is characteristic of all childhood memories; perhaps it 
accounts for their strength. Later we add to feelings much that makes 
them more complex; and therefore less strong; or if not less strong, less 
isolated, less complete. (1985: 67) 
 Woolf’s layering adds the possibility that, as Bauman has intimated, the 
 homo consumens is ﬂ attened by complexity, by too much ‘stuff’, which 
makes the experience of each set of ‘stuff’ less immediate, less powerful. 
This nuanced, contextualized reading of historical placement matters: it is, 
I think, what Rose means when she writes of ‘the ways in which the visual is 
part of social life’ (2012: 4), because of course the visual has  always been a 
part of social life, just not in its current assemblage. In this regard, perhaps 
it is fruitful to examine sites of visual research more fully. 
 When Rose speaks about a critical visual methodology, she looks at three 
sites: the ‘site of production . . . the image itself . . . and . . . its audiencing’ 
(2012: 19). For  Love + Guts 2012 , the production, of course, is funda-
mentally the artist/skateboarders. 12 The image itself—examination of some 
of the dominant as well as recessive meanings—is, of course, a part of the 
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evidence of this study, though it seems a middle ground between production 
and consumption. However, the site of audiencing—in terms of the ‘image 
encounter[ing] its spectators or users’ (ibid.) in relation to  Love + Guts and 
Bowl-a-Rama—is of primary interest for this case study. ‘Audiencing’ is a 
ﬂ attened space that celebrates an ephemeral engagement, snap judgement(s) 
and the alacrity of disposable experiences—or is it? 
 PATTERNS IN A SNAPSHOT ETHNOGRAPHY 
 Some of the photos 13 of the artwork at the travelling  Love + Guts show in 
Wellington, New Zealand, on display at Manky Chops gallery from Febru-
ary 9–12, 2012—and, of course, the  being there to take such photographs—
comprise the bulk of the object of this case study.  Love + Guts has been 
going on since 2005: it began in Southern California, said to be the child of 
founders Steve Olson, Lance Mountain and Pat Ngoho (‘Pat Ngoho|What’s 
your boggle?’ 2012). The 2012 incarnation of this show, held at a tempo-
rary storefront sponsored by the Manky Chops gallery (the main gallery is 
on Cuba Street; this temporary gallery is across the street, roughly, from 
where the Bowl-a-Rama occurs), was juxtaposed rather seamlessly with a 
worldwide skateboarding tour (Bowl-a-Rama), and sponsored by sporting 
eyewear and apparel manufacturer Oakley: the show itself is an attempt 
to make more overt the artistic, improvisational skater-self blend with the 
embodiment and physicality of actual skating (cf. Cutri, 2009). 
 In the sense of writing an ethnography into existence, the ‘stuff’ of this 
piece is considered a ‘snapshot’ ethnography: that is, it is a non-traditional, 
non-exotic locale wherein compressed time is a major element of the object 
of the ethnography (Janzen, 2008; Jeffrey and Troman, 2004; Kupritz, 
1998; Walford, 1991, 2001). Of course, there are differences between ‘com-
pressed’, ‘snapshot’, ‘blitzkrieg’ (cf. Rist, 1980, cited in Jeffrey and Troman, 
2004), ‘zooming’ and ‘documentary’ ethnographic approaches, as Jeffrey 
and Troman (2004) distinguish. But in the current snapshot examination, 
 Love + Guts (the exhibition), already its own text, becomes a modiﬁ ed text, 
and I am the modiﬁ er. When you, an audience of readers, receive my modi-
ﬁ cations/interpretations, you further alter its makeup, values, ethos. In that 
sense, it could be argued, all ethnography is a form of ‘snapshot’ ethnog-
raphy, as it always is co-created, by the object of the writing, the author(s) 
of the writing and the reader(s), all of whom bring to the work different 
sensibilities: but that discussion is for another time. 
 When contemporary sport forms trumpet their positions of opposition 
or sell themselves by announcing how they are uncommon, one should 
approach their rhetoric with a certain healthy dose of skepticism. Indeed, 
the louder they proclaim that they are anti-corporate (and yet are co-actors 
in the dance of  homo consumens),  the more they may lead one to suspect 
that they protest too mightily. Usually, they are not only a part of what 
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Becky Beal has termed ‘endemic’ advertising—‘ad placement where it is 
native or natural to its market’ (McFarlin, 2012)—but also a part of a sym-
biotic ‘dance’ (Beal, cited in Cutri, 2006) between endemic and non-endemic 
(or ‘demographic’) advertising. In this mutually beneﬁ cial relationship, the 
endemics, coming from a position of ‘insider’ status in the market, use the 
non-endemics’ ﬁ nancial capital to gain market share. The non-endemics 
gain new niche markets by their association with what is seen by insider 
consumers as more ‘authentically’ placed companies. They tend to use the 
mantle of ‘authenticity’ or ‘originary’ (as opposed to ‘posers/poseurs’ and 
‘pretenders’), which brings up the question of corporate ‘authenticity’: but 
skateboarders, though they have a history, reinvent that political history 
every generation. 
 What Beal has referred to as the ‘dance’ between endemics and non-
endemics is played out in the  Love + Guts world exhibition of skateboard 
art. This show ‘in 2007 . . . formed a partnership with Oakley’ (‘Pat Ngoho’, 
2012), which resulted in a skateboarding competition that is accompanied 
by Love + Guts . While Oakley is associated loosely with an alternative 
sporting market through its primary sales item, sunglasses for sportsper-
sons, it would probably be classiﬁ ed more toward the side of non-endemic 
 within the niche of skateboarding: its Frogskins line of sunglasses, where 
they ‘resurrected the original tooling from the early’ 80s’, begins at US$120 
(‘Oakley Men’s Store’, 2012), not above the line for middle- to upper-class 
skaters, but certainly also not a  de rigueur status/identity marker. So Oakley’s 
contribution certainly forms a certain portion of the contemporary skate-
boarder’s sense of pleasure. 
 As well as the unstated yet assumed sensual linkages between sporting 
sunglasses—originally created for a Motocross (MX) niche market in the 
mid-1970s—and skateboarding, 14 there is an implicit assumption among 
these relatively new, action, extreme, alternative sport forms that they  natu-
rally link with both music and art. The explicit rendering of music with 
sporting contests could arguably be codiﬁ ed at least as far back as the ‘mod-
ernist’ age, as Pierre de Coubertin’s 1906 ‘Consultative Conference on Art, 
Letters, and Sport’ suggested that 
 . . . the IOC should create ‘ﬁ ve contests of architecture, sculpture, music, 
painting and literature for original works directly inspired by sport, 
such contests henceforth to become an integral part of the celebration 
of each Olympiad’. (de Coubertin, 2012) 
 In addition, Leni Reifenstahl’s documentary use of Herbert Windt’s stir-
ring, militaristic accompaniment in the visually stimulating and aesthetically 
appealing 1936 Olympic and Third Reich tribute,  Olympia (Riefenstahl, 
1938) brought a nationalistic and patriotic pleasure to many of its viewers. 
So, while alternative sports sponsors—and some participants—have indi-
cated that music and sport combinations are a new innovation for sport 
(linking back to ‘music videos’ perhaps), history shows it differently. 
6244-599d-1pass-010-r01.indd   162 4/3/2015   12:36:26 PM
Aesthetic Pleasure and Sport 163
 There is an interesting feel to  Love + Guts , especially juxtaposed with the 
actual skating event. Borne by artistic sensibilities, skateboarding (and other 
so-called alternative sports) and skateboarders proclaim their connection 
to the spontaneous, to the avant-garde, to resistance to utilitarian instru-
mentality: in other words, the ethos of skateboarding and other extreme 
sports has historically stemmed from an anti-authoritarian stance where the 
process of doing the activity holds more weight than the end result. This 
stereotypical, populist view of skateboarding and skateboarders aligns with 
a populist, stereotypical view of art and artists (though, in both cases, Bau-
man’s sense of an omniscient consumer culture is more the standard). As 
an aside, the populist and stereotypical views of both skateboarding and 
art are highly idealistic and romanticized notions, reinforced by the tales of 
‘starving artists’ and ‘street kids rising out of the ashes’ which prevail in the 
Western world’s media representations of creative endeavors. 
 But the rhetorical devices proliferate within skateboarding art, and, as, 
Wetherell has asserted, patterns exist: ‘. . . affect does display strong pushes 
for pattern as well as signaling trouble and disturbance in existing patterns’ 
(2012: 13). This is a signiﬁ cant statement, if only to remind us that discern-
ing patterns within what appears to be (perhaps deliberately) chaotic may 
require a new sort of seeing. 
 Wetherell also points out that these 
 . . . interweaving patterns often form affective ruts. . . . Swirling and dis-
solving emotion . . . precipitates in social formations, becoming distinct 
ways of doing things, familiar ﬁ gurations repeated often  ad nauseam . 
(2012: 14) 
 I suggest that the  Love + Guts show has followed a pattern of collective 
affect (cf. Verkaaik, 2003) and a form of Durkheimian ‘collective efferves-
cence’ (1976)—affect, emotion and identiﬁ cation with both skateboarding 
and art—that ‘people experience . . . [which] make them do things they 
usually would not do’ (Verkaaik, 2003: 17). Rather than totally decrying 
such postmodern sites as  Love + Guts , however, Stjepan Meštroviü sug-
gests that Durkheim might embrace them, perhaps seeing them as ‘sacred 
site[s]’ that celebrate ‘the genuinely human sentiments’ surrounding them 
(1992: 134). Moreover, much like the discussion of skateboarding art in 
Southern California (Atencio and Beal, 2011), the  Love + Guts version is 
calculated to produce this collective affect among a select group of male 
skaters. For while the art works are aesthetically marginal, the effects of 
them work to produce an insider knowledge and feeling that provides a 
close-knit (mostly) boys’ club. 
 The ‘patterns’, then, emerging from this type of popular cultural exhibi-
tion (both Bowl-a-Rama and  Love + Guts 2012 ) include membership in a 
boys’ club that proclaims its anti-establishment status while embracing the 
rewards of establishment semi-membership. Viewers to the exhibition expe-
rience pleasure on one level at ‘seeing behind the curtain’, understanding 
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the ambivalent dynamics that make a worldwide tour like this happen—and 
then by pretending to forget. Their pleasure is so transitory and superﬁ cial that 
it requires no real depth, no anguish at the hypocrisy, no self-reﬂ exive angst: 
seeing the art is just another ‘moment’ within the pattern of ﬂ atness. But 
the insider status that accrues from having been to the competition, having 
seen the exhibition ﬁ rst-hand, generates a heightened form of capital for 
audiences. 
 Within the  Love + Guts art show, as its audience may browse through it, 
there is an abiding overall sense of counter-hegemonic display and opposi-
tional worldview while, simultaneously, the show is sponsored by Oakley 
and driven ﬁ nancially by the dollars of  non-edgy wannabe pseudo-dropouts. 
Each piece itself displays multiple meanings and multiple readings. How-
ever, on the face of it, this show itself is a capable demonstration of Beal’s 
point regarding endemic/non-endemic tensions, and much of the artwork 
appears satisfying because of its very predictability. 
 LOVE + GUTS ‘TEXT’ 
 The work from  Love + Guts 2012 is created by—and primarily for—male 
skaters only. At some level, the artwork is intended for their shared plea-
sures. It is little surprise then, that the expected and predictable themes 
largely reﬂ ect a dominant male discourse, and adherence to what Hughes 
and Coakley (1991) termed the ‘sport ethic’. 15 Paradoxically, though framed 
within a counter-hegemonic discourse (e.g. Atencio and Beal, 2011; Beal, 
1996; Droney, 2010; Rinehart, 2005), these examples of skateboarding 
remain somewhat tame, contained, and consistent within larger discourses 
of hyper-masculinity. From a broader view, however, the malleability of the 
skateboarders/artists to align with such dominant themes reduces the qual-
ity of the art to a level that makes most, if not all, of the works non-critical 
‘commercial art’. There is nothing inherently wrong with ‘commercial art’, 
except when it is housed in a vehicle—like the  Love + Guts show, aligned 
with Bowl-a-Rama—that protests its oppositionality to normative culture, 
to the very enterprise of commerce. 
 While the distinction between commercial art and ‘message’ art (art 
for social justice, as one example) itself is fraught with problems—not 
the least of which is a non-critical acceptance of an implied high/low art 
distinction—it also means that the art, while professing to be avant-garde 
and boundary pushing, merely works as a tool for self-promotion. Though 
some of the art is visually stimulating, as social commentary—and a forma-
tion to push social justice through a sport-art dynamic—little of it brings 
any new, oppositional or even reﬂ exive stances to this new amalgam called 
‘skateboard art’. 
 I now look at selected representative photos of pieces of art from the  Love + 
Guts exhibition in Wellington, 2012, in terms of three major motifs:  nostalgia 
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in skateboarding, pain and suffering in the self-objectifying object,  and the 
place of girls and women.  I will brieﬂ y discuss these strains, with fairly 
superﬁ cial and dominant readings, using visual exemplars from the show. 
 NOSTALGIA IN SKATEBOARDING/PAEANS 
TO SKATEBOARDING 
 The brief introduction to the Manky Chops Gallery (see Figure 10.1), which 
exhibited  Love and Guts , works to heighten the sense of nostalgia and 
respect for 1970s skateboarding culture. The title of the exhibition is ‘Empty 
Culture: An Artistic Rendition of the Swimming Pool’, so many of the art-
works include some reference to backyard (California) swimming pools. 
 In an overt homage to the celebrated ﬁ lm  Dogtown and Z Boys , the 
nostalgic trope of emptying a backyard pool and skating it becomes further 
reiﬁ ed. The occasional use of capitalization lends a quirky credence to the 
poster, which is meant to establish a worshipful tone towards these then-
teenagers: 
 . . . they would . . . drain the remaining water so they could skate 
it while the house owners were out. Hunting out new pools quickly 
became an obsession when a good pool would become too crowded, or 
the neighbours called the Cops . . . and so, vertical skateboarding was 
born, and inﬂ uential hard core pool skaters transformed skateboarding 
into the minor religion that it is today. 
 This was a time that arguably has been recreated and self-valorized, often 
by males in their 40s or 50s, as a ‘golden age’ for skateboarding, and, since 
they run many of the companies with the ﬁ nancial clout to skew the mes-
sage, their readings of several motifs from the past tend to become dominant. 
 Toby Jenkins’ ‘Solitude’ (see Figure 10.2) is a painting of the wall of a 
drained-out backyard swimming pool, with the distorted glass housing for 
the light recalling the 1970s. The blue tiling below the pool coping also is 
from that decade—the aquamarine blue is a signiﬁ er of the ‘California back-
yard swimming pool lifestyle’ in so many popular culture artifacts—and it 
cuts through the color choices of many of the other artists in the show. The 
heightened mirror-effect on the underwater light cover, with an idealized 
skateboarder dropping in, adds to the nostalgic mood of the piece. The 
viewer is meant to put himself (and, at  Love + Guts , they are all  hims ) into 
the place of the skater dropping in—but, as in Manet’s  Bar at the Folies-
Bergere , the perspective of an absented and/or reﬂ ected artist situates the 
viewer in a visual conundrum (cf. Foucault, 2009). This perspective use of 
an in-pool light ﬁ xture as the reﬂ ective device provides both nostalgia for 
skating and a postmodern sense of bricolage within the art itself. These are 
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 Photo: R. Rinehart, February 2012 
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 Figure 10.2 ‘Solitude’, Toby Jenkins, artist 
 Source: http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_20/ Accessed 10/09/12 
sites for potential celebration of a pleasurable, satisfying sense of pleasure—
pleasure that seemingly will last into old age. 
 Mike Spittlehouse’s ‘Forever Rolling’ (see Figure 10.3 top) and ‘Mike’s 
Will’ (see Figure 10.3 bottom) could exemplify a Westernized stance toward 
aging—one where the skater resists aging by skating to the very end. The 
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Figure 10.3 ‘Forever Rolling’ and ‘Mike’s Will’, Mike Spittlehouse, artist
 Source: http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_02/ Accessed 10/09/12 
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cartoon-like rendition of both the skater in the wheelchair and the distorted 
backyard swimming pool—and the perfect echoes of aquamarine with sky, 
pool, shirt, tiling—lend a whimsical, childlike feature to the work. In addi-
tion, the fact that the chaired man’s eyes cannot be seen creates a universal 
mystique to his gesture, as if all aging male skaters will easily identify with 
his attitude of self-sacriﬁ ce in the name of skateboarding (though he is not 
really skateboarding). 
 In the second piece, the wall of a swimming pool is tagged with ‘Take 
my ashes when I’m gone, mix with cement and make a coping block Mike’. 
The theme of nostalgia and an homage to the omniscience of skateboarding 
points to an idealist reading that insiders to skateboarding are, in Belinda 
Wheaton’s (2000) term, ‘lifestyle’ sport participants who tend to exemplify 
the mainstream sport ethic, having incorporated many of the ethos into 
their everyday lived lives. For example, some (primarily male) loyalists to 
various cricket programs and football clubs (in Germany and Argentina) 
have requested that their remains be buried underneath or near the playing 
ﬁ eld. 16 The precept that this dedication to sport reﬂ ects is that ‘Being an ath-
lete involves refusing to accept limits in the pursuit of possibilities’ (Hughes 
and Coakley, 1991: 363). 
 Clearly, the rhetorics of Spittlehouse’s two works resonate with the nos-
talgic and single-minded logics that a committed member of the subculture 
of skateboarding might be expected to demonstrate. This ideological ‘state-
ment’, housed within the  Love + Guts exhibition, prompts young skaters to 
idealize such nostalgic single-mindedness, but also to replicate narrow and 
constraining gendered identities (which resonates with  the place of girls and 
women , below). 
 Chad Ford’s series of duplicated photographs (see Figure 10.4), set in 
a sextych, attempts to recall parts of the decades of the 60s and perhaps 
70s: there are girls in rather conservative bathing suits sitting on the edge 
of a drained (aquamarine) backyard pool, there are children in a blowup 
(aquamarine) wading pool (which really has nothing to do with skateboard-
ing), there is what appears as a real-estate advertisement for a California-
lifestyle home, featuring the requisite backyard pool and lolling sunbathing 
women—but the prominent feature is the sign that informs the viewer that 
there is a bomb shelter in the backyard. During the early 60s, it must be 
recalled, American children were witness to the Cuban missile crisis, and 
in California early ‘survivalists’ constructed underground bomb shelters in 
case of a nuclear attack. 
 The edge between a fond recollection of those childhood fears and the 
pleasure at surviving that time—indeed, hedonistically ﬂ ourishing despite 
it!—resonates with older Americans, but also is a part of the cultural bag-
gage that is repeated again and again in popular culture. 
 Ford’s display and placement of the photos also recalls a nostalgic past: 
like the arranged photos of a family, these paralleled pieces (in their simple, 
rustic frames) subtly echo the decade of the 60s (skateboarding long past), 
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 Figure 10.4 ‘Drain it, ride it’; ‘Early Release’; ‘Dive In’; ‘Dive In’; ‘Early Release’; 
‘Drain it, ride it’, Chad Ford, artist 
 Source: http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_25/ Accessed 6/3/13 
but with a difference: the photos are not artistic, presumably not staged as 
art. These are contextualizing photos, photos meant to elicit affect for the 
time, for the imagined and imaginary past (cf. Shaw, 1989). 
 PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THE SELF-OBJECTIFYING OBJECT 
 The depersonalization that begins in sexual objectiﬁ cation 
 is what makes violence possible; for once you have 
 made a person out to be a thing, you can do anything 
to it you want. 
 —John Stoltenberg, 1990,  Refusing to be a Man : 54–55. 
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 Figure 10.5 ‘Get rotten’, Brydie Hall, artist 
Source : http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_15/ Accessed 10/09/12 
6244-599d-1pass-010-r01.indd   171 4/3/2015   12:36:33 PM
172 Robert E. Rinehart
 ‘Get Rotten’ (Figure 10.5), by Brydie Hall, is a depiction of an extracted 
tooth superimposed over a swirling mass of skulls. This work indicates a 
visual acceptance of pain and injury—which are seen as an inevitable part of 
the life of skaters. Presumably, this is an indication of the acceptance of pain 
and decay, all swirling down into a Styxian whirlpool ﬁ lled with skeletons, 
bottles of poisons and gravestone markers with RIP written across them. 
This mass of decline is overseen by a large tooth with a single seeing eyeball 
and the words ‘Get Rotten’ in front of a cartoon skyline of a city. There are 
also bats ﬂ ying above the city. All these elements combine to present the 
impression—when this art is aligned within the  Love + Guts 2012 show—of 
city street skaters who are risking their very bodies for skateboarding. 
 There is an alignment with the masculine motif of celebrating the tough, 
the stolid, the resolute, but there is more at play here: there is a singular 
moment of acceptance of self-violence. As Stoltenberg reminds us, 
 . . . a man shuts off his capacity for ethical empathy—whatever capacity 
he may ever have had—in order to commit an act of depersonalization 
that is ‘gratifying’ essentially because it functions to fulﬁ ll his sense of a 
selfhood that is authentically male. (1990: 55) 
 But it doesn’t stop there: the ‘pleasure’ that a man derives from harming 
others whom he has depersonalized ultimately results in grievous self-harm—
which, like picking at a scab, is at some level ‘pleasurable’, but which, in the 
last instance, becomes an act of self-abnegation. Pleasure, as de Sade reminds 
us (Gillette, 2005) depends upon its obverse—pain—for its very existence. 
 It is not apparent that Brydie Hall intended these reﬂ ections upon his 
work, but when the work is coupled with other works that celebrate self-
harming, the viewer of art must engage, as an act of aesthetic involvement. 
 Jake Mein’s photo of a bleeding palm, titled ‘Adro hand’ (Figure 10.6) 
shows the hand thrust forward pridefully towards the camera, effectively 
covering the face of its owner. The hand itself becomes disembodied, as if 
the pain that is occurring can be somehow compartmentalized from the 
visual reds of the blood. Set within three other works, Mein’s ‘Adro hand’ is 
perhaps the most arresting image. 
 This work again indicates a depersonalized objectivity that gloriﬁ es pain 
and suffering. This ethos aligns neatly with Hughes and Coakley’s sport 
ethic that an athlete will accept risks and play through pain. This is doubly 
reinforced in a male sport culture where evidence of injury signiﬁ es align-
ment with the dominant ethos of how to become a ‘proper’ sportsperson. 
The disembodiment of body parts—the synechdochic representation of the 
bloody hand for the bloodied and resilient whole person, for example—
works in this piece to form an afterimage of ‘battle-hardened’ male skater. 
This is, of course, both self-harmful and other-harmful (as it models hyper-
stoicism), and is exclusionary of females (cf. Davis, 1997). 
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 Figure 10.6 ‘Adro hand’, Jake Mein, photographer 
 Source: http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_13/ Accessed 10/09/12 
 THE PLACE OF GIRLS AND WOMEN IN  LOVE + GUTS 2012 
 Mostly, girls and women are absent. The aesthetic of  Love + Guts is exclu-
sionary of females. The artwork is generally of abstractions, male subjects 
or male subjects with female as object. As can be seen from some of these 
photos of selected artwork, women can loll around a pool, supplying audi-
ence for the males, or women can be completely absented. But women can 
also be the sexualized objects that work to demonstrate, reproduce and 
reify male supremacy (cf. Stoltenberg, 1990). There are several depictions 
of nude or semi-nude females, cartooned caricatures detached from the 
skateboarding sub-culture, as if the skating pool of the 1960s and 70s was 
a golden age for male supremacy, not the advent of a global women’s libera-
tion movement. 
 Shannon Rush’s ‘Untitled’ (Figure 10.7) depicts a pointy-headed female, 
sitting, with sagging breasts drooping across her front, legs cut off at the 
ankles and a heart-shape settled into her crotch. It is a line drawing, and it 
passes as amusing and inoffensive in a grouping of four (three drawings: in 
addition to ‘Untitled’, one with 24 aligned cartoon faces; another featur-
ing a stack of bodies in a pyramid; the fourth piece is a t-shirt with three 
nun-like—or monk-like—faces and a cross emblazoned across a black 
ﬁ eld). It is its very mundanity, its ordinariness, that perplexes: why must 
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 Figure 10.7 ‘Untitled’, Shannon Rush, artist 
 Source: http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_17/ Accessed 18/03/13 
the drawn person be naked, why the heart at the crotch? It is perhaps the 
taken-for-granted-ness of the objectiﬁ cation, the severed feet, the helpless-
ness of the ﬁ gure, that is most disturbing. This is not a female form that in 
any way demonstrates empowerment, or, for that matter, any life-afﬁ rming 
characteristics. This is a victim, an immobile object of the viewer’s gaze. 
 Similarly, Wade Burkit’s ‘Drawings’ (Figure 10.8) is carelessly rendered: 
the ﬁ gure is a disembodied set of line-drawn breasts, partially nippled, with 
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 Figure 10.8  ‘Drawings,’ Wade Burkit, artist 
Source : http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_09/ Accessed 18/03/13 
no abdomen or body behind—just a simple right edge that could be an 
arm, could be a torso. The woman, cigarette signifying a certain comfort or 
perhaps swagger, has raven hair, full thick lips (which, stereotypically, may 
signify a person of color), one heavily made-up right eye, and a black and 
closed left eye. It is disturbing, but not as social commentary: it disturbs in 
the utter repetition of the absence—again—of any females in the show who 
are empowered, strong, assertive, equal to males. This object of our gaze, 
apparently,  is a bit ‘sassy’, and, in fact, may have been taught a lesson: she 
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 Figure 10.9 ‘Non Compliance’ and ‘Six Fingers’, Cam Ward, artist 
Source:  http://manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts_08/ Accessed 10/09/12 
has been punched in the left eye perhaps because of her attempts at swagger 
(a black eye is not a usual skateboarding ‘injury’).  
 Cam Ward’s ‘Non Compliance’ (see Figure 10.9 left) and ‘Six ﬁ ngers’ 
(see Figure 10.9 right) reﬂ ect a male-centered outlook sometimes seen 
elsewhere in prison art shows: an adolescent obsession with caricatures of 
females and the placement of females within their male-dominant worlds. 
It has antecedents in woodcuts from the Kama Sutra, but the connection to 
skateboarding is rather oblique, if present at all, and smacks of a consumer-
ist cynicism that ‘sex sells’. By using a caricatured naked female performing 
fellatio, and another of a male dominating a female, Ward performs an act 
of marginalization of girls and women—from everyday society and from 
skateboarding, except as sex objects. 
 ONE CONCLUSION: A MALE AESTHETICS OF PLEASURE 
 The alignment of sport and art via marketing is not a new innovation—yet 
Oakley and the other sponsors promote  Love + Guts as a transgressive, 
hip, counter-culture art show that resists dominant sport formations and 
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ethos. But when we look at the actual art, we can see that it reﬂ ects domi-
nant, mainstream values—adherence to the sport ethic, patriarchal hege-
mony, and even misogynist stances—and that, at its core, it is yet another 
reproduction of a boy’s club of sport formations. Are there, as in Dorney’s 
ﬁ eldwork in urban Los Angeles’ street art, ironic ﬂ ashes that enhance and 
complicate the pleasure of viewing? Or has the realization of this sport/art/
marketing matrix resulted in a cynical, lowest-common-denominator type 
of massiﬁ ed ‘art’ that reﬂ ects a modernist kitsch? Or—and more likely—is 
the result of  Love + Guts more complicated, more ﬂ uid, more dynamic than 
the simple binaries detailed here? 
 This skateboarding art show gains and engenders pleasure for its 
participants—the skating artists, the competitive skaters—but it also reiﬁ es 
a subject-object dynamic that is very satisfying for adolescent males: if we 
can subjugate girls and women, they will help to reinforce the gender order. 
Housing this ethos within a dynamic of publicly accessible art provides 
a training ground for young misogynists, and it hegemonically reinforces 
a form of sexual and gendered stratiﬁ cation that proclaims the ‘naturalness’, 
the seamless commonsensical nature, of these power relations. Acceptance 
of such images—and it is hard to resist them—concomitantly means an 
acceptance of a stultifying and restrictive gender binary. 
 Moreover, many of the works reﬂ ect consumerist, televisual, second-level 
culture and produce, as a whole, the effects of alienation, elitism and anomie 
from others, but, fundamentally, from self. They hierarchize the skating over 
the art, rather than producing the declared intended effects of bringing art 
to the fore in skating circles—that is, rather than challenging the so-called 
hard masculinities with a softer vision of artistic and aesthetic masculinity, 
they accede to the dominant, stereotypical images of sporting male culture. 
 In addition, rather than contesting standard hegemonic forms of ‘easy 
pleasure’, this traveling skateboarding art is akin to a boy’s club (like the 
barbershop of old) where what it is to be a man is highly dependent upon the 
suppression of everyone else. Small pleasures accrue to the winners; unsatis-
factory hopes accrue for everyone else, and some (like girls and women) are 
stampeded—and lost—in the process. 
 NOTES 
 1 .  It is of interest, of course, that the example of bullﬁ ghting centers on an 
assumption of maleness in sport. Western ‘sport’, by deﬁ nition almost, has 
been framed and claimed by and for men. Thus, the examination of an aes-
thetic or aesthetic beauty—stereotypically connoted as softer, subjective and 
‘female’—within a male-dominant sport like skateboarding works to disrupt 
naturalized expectations. 
 2 .  And yet Thrift (cf. 2008), Law (cf. 2004), Latour (cf. 2005) and others have 
attempted to classify and categorize such matters of aesthetics, taste and 
distinction. 
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 3 .  For an extended discussion of general aesthetics (and pleasure), see Sheppard 
1989 and Battin et al., 1989; for a look at postmodern aesthetics, see, e.g. Foster 
1983). 
 4 .  These new ways of apprehension may be due to technological advances, new 
ways of ‘seeing’ or, in many cases, both. 
 5 .  This chapter will only look at the appreciation of both skateboarding art and 
skateboarding, not at the  doing of skateboarding and skateboarding art. 
 6 .  I have made the argument elsewhere (Rinehart, 1998) that sporting perfor-
mance could be assessed in terms of its performative aspects: like performance 
art, it is embodied, practiced, choreographed, improvisational and requires 
audience for its display. 
 7 .  See Raymond Williams,  Marxism and Literature , for classic delineations of 
dominant, residual and emergent categories of cultural formations. 
 8 .  Discussions of less or more profound, historical, signiﬁ cant, notable or ‘clas-
sic’ are fraught with political, cultural and virtual power relations, which are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, some sources might include: Fuku-
yama, 1989; Lowenthal, 1985; Stewart, 1993; Stewart, 2007. 
 9 .  The concept of effervescence, of course, stems from Durkheim’s work on reli-
gion and the relationships of peoples to their totemic animal or vegetable. 
See Durkheim (1976). I am grateful to Oskar Verkaaik (2003) for triggering 
this connection while pointing to the fun that collectives experience while per-
forming acts of ‘collective aggression’ and ‘ethnocide’. 
 10 .  Clearly, the visual technologies—and their reception—create, promote and 
satisfy different elements of consumption. My intention is not to conﬂ ate 
two-dimensional recreations such as photographs, television, ﬁ lm, video and 
internet modalities, or to envision a template of compare/contrast between these 
offerings. Rather, I am simply attempting to describe, from an audience point 
of view, some of the elements of experiencing consumption of such popular 
culture that may result in identiﬁ able pleasures. Thus, I draw from cinematic, 
television and other kinds of visual studies for a quite different purpose than 
description. The fact remains, however, that there are signiﬁ cant, noticeable 
and detectable differences in the quality of electronic production in presenting 
an Olympics for viewer consumption: witness some of the technical and logis-
tical practices of broadcasts ranging from Melbourne 1956 to Sydney 2000 
(cf. Wenn, 2000). 
 11 .  The story of Valerie Adams, already a household name in New Zealand before 
the 2012 Olympics, included her somewhat disappointing silver medal place-
ment in the shotput, the Belarus competitor testing positive for drugs and 
Adams subsequently, belatedly (and contentiously), receiving the gold medal 
weeks later: ‘The International Olympic Committee said Ostapchuk tested 
positive for the steroid metenolon’ (Wilson, 2012). Many viewers in New 
Zealand were understandably moved to believe that Adams had been cheated 
of the moment on the victory stand and all that meant. 
 12 .  Though of course a case could be made that the various art galleries (Manky 
Chops in Wellington, e.g.) are ‘producers’ as well, but this is wandering rather 
far aﬁ eld. 
 13 .  I took photos of the art on the wall, mostly as triggers for the feel, heft and 
ambience of the exhibition. For this chapter, I have used the photographs of the 
artwork from the Manual Magazine ‘Love + Guts exhibition’ website (http://
manualmagazine.com/2012/02/09/2012-love-and-guts-exhibition-catalogue/
2012-loveandguts), accessed between September 2012 and March 2013. 
 14 .  Oakley has expanded its market share to include 11 ‘action’ sports; in addi-
tion, they have links to the London 2012 Olympics (including tennis, road 
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cycling (plus Tour de France), triathlon and track and ﬁ eld), motorsports and 
selected ‘performance’ sports (‘Oakley Sports’, 2012). 
 15 .  The ‘themes’ detailed within this chapter are, of course, debatable. This is one 
reading of the work—a different study, examining viewpoints of the audience, 
would undoubtedly ﬁ nd slight variances in interpretation. 
 16 .  Scattering of ashes at various cricket grounds is a not-unheard-of practice, 
but, for Old Trafford, ‘Generally it is something they only do for people who 
have association with the club, e. g. former players, ofﬁ cials, Lancashire Mem-
bers and supporters’ (‘Cricket grounds’, 2013). In Germany, football club 
Borussia Dortmund offers cemetery sites ‘just for football supporters’ (‘Dortmund 
fans’, 2008). 
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 11  Anhedonia and 
Alternative Sports 1 
 Robert E. Rinehart 
 Anhedonia (anƍhƝ dōƍnƝ ԥ), n.  Psychol. lack of pleasure  or of the capac-
ity to experience it. 
 —The Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language, 1969: 58 
 CONTEMPORARY AFFECTS 
 The 21st century: a millennial shift, with its requisite technologies that argu-
ably separate us all from each other—we communicate with colleagues two 
doors down on the computer, by e-mail; we text on phones instead of meet-
ing for a coffee; some of us even experience sexual gratiﬁ cation via our tech-
nological devices, eschewing the risk of rejection from another real person 
in favor of the instrumentality of efﬁ cient, disposable sex with . . . ourselves 
(cf. Bauman, 2003). But don’t just take my word for it. Zygmunt Bauman 
points out a similar phenomenon: ‘the advent of virtual proximity renders 
human connections simultaneously more frequent and more shallow, more 
intense and more brief’ (2003: 62). Seeming—or apparent—pleasure isn’t 
necessarily  actual pleasure. 
 In short, in many areas, we have replaced human interaction with human-
machine or human-material-object interaction. 2 But accompanying this 
social withdrawal is a concomitant explosion of often solitary, often narcis-
sistic, frequently self-centered and selﬁ sh physically active behavior—termed, 
variously, lifestyle, action, extreme, outdoor challenge, ‘whiz’ and alternative 
sports. The names, of course, matter, but that is not my primary pursuit here; 
the fact that these activities have been counted, and numbers of participants 
estimated, with projections for proﬁ ts deriving from such activities is what 
really matters. 
 The activities reﬂ ect an American—and in many ways, international—
subcultural attitude, favoring what Roger Caillois (1961) termed  vertigo 
pursuits: activities high on the scale of dizzying, disorienting, thrilling experi-
ences. These experiences are, almost by deﬁ nition, momentary, transitory and 
ephemeral: indeed, for participants, this is one of the pleasing effects. Their 
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sensory experience is here and gone. They become memories almost as soon 
as they are enacted. From a psychological perspective, their allure is aligned 
with the ‘intermittent rewards’ that they grant participants, the momentary 
fractious frisson that pervades their very capture. Because of their very struc-
ture, you simply cannot hold onto these experiences long: that fact, paradoxi-
cally, makes them all the more coveted, all the more objects of desire. 
 Thus, the pleasure effect of thrill sports—the name itself gives away the 
sense of it— is the rush, the unwieldy loss of control, perhaps the seeming 
pushing of limits. But it is more than that: the pleasure effect, like most 
of these ilinx-prevalent activities—which have morphed into these kinds of 
sports and events—is in the re-narrativizing of them, the nostalgia effects 
that they produce. These nostalgic shadows, like the lingering traces of 
human bodies at Nagasaki and Hiroshima, imply the horrifying events of 
their participation, but the instance of their making is only momentary. 
And like the victims in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the participants of these 
activities have been impacted by a global (really, grobal) tsunami of changed 
sensibilities and altered realities. The mixed metaphor—atomic bomb and 
tsunami—points to the real effects and lasting consequences of momentary 
disaster: the survivors of such unimaginable onslaught have a lifetime to 
re-remember them, to re-narrativize them. In addition, the instantaneous-
ness ﬂ ash of change forms an almost inverse relationship with its appre-
hension. All that remains is a dull, ﬂ attened, stunned affect, an unsettling 
recognition of the sublime power of the instant. 
 Thus,  samplers of these alternative sport activities, recounting the momen-
tary rush of excitement or terror, usually do not experience what Denzin 
terms ‘a major epiphany’ (2001: 145–46), but rather are closer to the ‘relived 
epiphany’, where one singular event casts new meaning on future events. 
For example, someone who decides, on a lark, to bungy jump into a river 
during holiday might relive that moment and see him or herself in a dif-
ferent light in the future: as a daring risk-taker. She can also purchase the 
video ‘evidence’ of that jump, which has been neatly packaged and mar-
keted to sport tourists. (Strangely, this ‘objective’ evidence often—after time 
forgotten—doesn’t match our recollection of the experience itself.) Or he can 
boast to his mates about his fear and courage. Conversely, of course, the 
experience of jumping may affect that person so that they seek more calm, 
mundane, ‘safe’ activities in the future. Clearly, the event has impacted 
them. Nonetheless, the reﬂ ection upon the experience is a key element in the 
experience of pleasure. 
 But in an age of almost constant messages, advertising and corporate 
branding—ever more creative and subtle, even subliminal—the question 
remains: to what degree does the experience affect and inﬂ uence participants? 
To what degree do they experience, and embed, these depthless moments of 
pleasure? Or do they simply tick the experience off, running to the next thrill, 
forgetting or dismissing the current experience? A series of peak experiences, 
run one after another without pause, may become muddied experiences, and 
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the pleasure that accrues quickly may become empty and average. In a very 
real sense, these blurred experiences represent postmodern angst. 
 Denzin’s discussion of epiphanies is important for applying the sense of 
ﬂ attened affect to contemporary sport forms. He writes: 
 In whatever form, bizarre, frightening, dramatic, or mundane, such 
contact [with the terror and repressive taken-for-grantedness of the 
postmodern] produces a shock of recognition in terms of lifestyle, and 
personal meaning. At the level of collective lived experiences, the epiph-
anic approach aims to identify how different social and cultural group-
ings. . . . attach themselves to and come to grips with those traces of 
postmodernism that invade and become part of their lives. (1991: 13) 
 Similarly, contemporary sport forms have sought to re-create the same 
experience, the same bodily experience, of participation in physically active 
sports or experiences by compressing the temporal element of the experience: 
the experiences are more efﬁ cient, more ﬂ ash, more attention-getting—and, 
in a capitalist world, a more saleable commodity. But has the postmodern or 
contemporary body kept up with this onslaught of compressed time, which 
is becoming rather commonplace in all sports forms? 
 In mainstream sports, we have a media-inﬂ uenced trend toward shorter 
events (e.g. 20–20 cricket, rugby sevens), presumably because the attention 
span of audiences has shortened, but also due to a greater choice for spec-
tators. The quick shortened version of sports therefore gains a maximum 
audience. This version, while not endorsed by traditionalists of these sports, 
allows for a greater commoditization. It’s about the money. 
 For alternative sports, similar trends have occurred. In fact, alternative 
sports may have begun this trend, with their method of MTV-style quick 
shots, rather than following the whole trick: this foreshortened version 
of the trajectory of sport  implies the whole event, but certainly doesn’t 
deliver the whole event. The satisfaction of what Jayne Caudwell (2014) 
terms ‘mundane motion’ in physical activity has been subsumed by Kroker, 
Kroker and Cook’s (1989) postmodern implosion, as evidenced in their 
 Panic Encyclopedia : the instant ﬁ x of culture through a series of ‘panics’. 
 One moment can certainly become deeply felt and profound in one’s life 
(cf. Denzin, 2001): the way that some extreme sport athletes experience the 
rush—that is, the sense of Stephen Lyng’s ‘risk’ (Lyng, 2005a, 2005b)—may be 
‘an escape to a sensual universe of emotional intensity and self-determination’ 
(Lyng, 2005b: 31). Lyng admits that ‘. . . edgework does not allow one to 
 transcend the extant social reality of consumer culture; the experience merely 
represents an extension of that reality’ (2005b: 33, emphasis in original). Yet 
a certain assumption of Lyng’s thesis is that edgework—that is, the practice of 
risk taking in a variety of ﬁ elds—‘is a response to the over-determined char-
acter of  modern social life. . .’ (2005a: 5, emphasis added) that occurs more 
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frequently and with greater intensity in the late 20th and early 21st century 
than ever before. 
 I suggest that Lyng’s characterization of a risk factor in these ‘life-threatening 
experiences [which] come to acquire a seductively appealing character in the 
contemporary social context’ (Lyng, 2005a: 5) has been, like many medi-
ated late-modern and poststructuralist realities, somewhat hyperbolic. To 
state that true ‘edgework’ motivates a surprising amount of individuals 
in their pursuit of ‘life-threatening’ endeavors is, I believe, overstating the 
case. Compared to such motivations as the sense of freedom from watch-
ful adult supervision/surveillance, the sense of empowerment, the sense of 
camaraderie with mates and/or the sense of self-efﬁ cacy that she (or he) 3 
can derive from participation in these alternative activities, true ‘edgework’ 
seems relatively rare. Surrounding oneself with fellow ‘edgeworkers’—who 
are aggressively ‘alternative’ to the mainstream—does not mean that the 
world in general has followed along. (Similarly, to admit to a gnawing sense 
of anhedonism does not measure the degree of such ﬂ attened affect, only 
that it has increased in the contemporary moment.) 
 I do want to believe in Lyng’s proposal, but I think he premises the ubiq-
uity of edgework on an assumption of contemporary culture that parallels 
Gonzo journalism, as interpreted by Hunter S. Thompson. By his own admis-
sion, Thompson was an aberration to mass cultural values, not a standard of 
them; an alternative, not a mainstreamer; an exception, not a rule.  There are 
those who are attracted to police work, extreme sports, even performance 
art, primarily because of these pursuits’ so-called edginess, but as extreme, 
action, alternative and other kinds of sports and activities have grown in 
popularity, there is likely less and less relationship with the percentages of 
people who begin simply because of its self-promoting sense of ‘edginess’. 
Studies simply haven’t borne this out either way (see also Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of edgework). 
 Robert Putnam’s 4 thesis regarding a decline in (speciﬁ cally) American 
‘social capital’ pushes this sense of contemporary malaise in different ways. 
He points out obvious trends towards civic disengagement in the United 
States, commenting that ‘networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms 
of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust’ 
(1995: 67). Accounting for a heightened ‘technological social-capital for-
mation . . . [which is] “privatizing” or “individualizing” our use of leisure 
time and thus disrupting many opportunities for social-capital formation’ 
(Putnam, 1995: 75), Putnam hints at how social capital reduces while the 
commodiﬁ cation of contemporary life rises. Some grass-roots sectors of the 
lucrative alternative, extreme, action and outdoor challenge sports might 
still be bucking this trend toward a lessened ‘social-capital formation’, 
but the commodiﬁ cation process works insistently to objectify and thus 
de-humanize participants. When athletes consciously seek to become ‘models 
of consumption based on . . . fan identiﬁ cation’ (Rinehart, 1998a: 407), they 
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draw away from community concerns and have become seduced by greater 
self-centered and-individualized interests. 
 The caveat, of course, is the conditional nature of what one can gain from 
solely focusing on the end product, on the result, on the utilitarian. Just as in 
mainstream sports—where a good model can be attenuated and perverted 
by those who deliver it—so too can participation in adventure, action, out-
door challenge and other alternative-to-the-mainstream types of activities 
become commodiﬁ ed and, thus, altered by others with more power than 
the participants. Participants who seek commodiﬁ cation begin the process 
of loss of civic engagement (read: primary identiﬁ cation with mates, with 
peers) as soon as they decide to become a commodity. Interestingly, this 
aspect of commodiﬁ cation, at least in the early 21st century, seems to wash 
out any grounding, fundamental edginess and alternative nature of these 
sport activities themselves. In objectifying both the pursuit of ‘more shallow, 
more intense and more brief’ (Bauman, 2003: 62) physical interactions, the 
very process of commodiﬁ cation inculcates values that teach many partici-
pants how to evade and ignore long-lasting pleasures while ironically  feeling 
they remain deeply embedded in highly pleasurable experience. 
 COMMODIFICATION: THE PROCESS 
 Much of the recent study of these types of activities (alternative sports) has 
based itself upon the ‘representations and commodiﬁ cation of the sports 
within consumer culture’ (Ormrod, 2009: vi). That is to say, there has been 
an insistence that these sports have become commodiﬁ ed through a process 
that is irrevocably linked to consumerism and consumer culture. But what 
is commodiﬁ cation? 
 Simply stated, commodiﬁ cation is the economic process by which 
something—some process, some previously unvalued object—becomes 
an economic object for commerce. Moor (2007: 132), however, points 
out some of the ‘ubiquitous’ ways that sports scholars have used the term 
‘commodiﬁ cation’—often resulting in less-than-nuanced ways of conceptu-
alizing ‘the ways markets and market logic are introduced into’ football. 5 
She also sees that many of the uses of the term by sport scholars ‘to refer 
to any instance of commercial activity by clubs (and fans) blunts its useful-
ness . . .’ (Moor, 2007: 132). 
 Andrews and Ritzer (2007), following Ritzer (1993, 1998, 2005, 2006), 
locate commodiﬁ cation within a dynamic relationship of global and local, 
with the effects of this relationship resulting in somewhat shared integration 
of global and local (glocal), or in the global inﬂ uence effectively impacting 
and altering the local (grobal). Thus, in discussing anhedonia and alternative 
sports, the process of commodiﬁ cation has come to mean those objects or 
processes which, along the continuum of global and local, and along the pres-
sure- and fault-lines of glocal and grobal, have gone from activities for their 
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own sake to activities which are done with an instrumental eye to creating 
an economic object for commerce, where the local commodity (e.g. athlete) 
bends to the will of the global (e.g. trans- or multi-national corporation). 
Control has shifted. 
 In some ways, looking at branding, iconography and the cultural capital 
that sediments and accrues in these alternative sports objects and processes 
depends upon a recognition of the grobal; what Ritzer calls the ‘imperialistic 
ambitions of . . . corporations, organizations’ (2006: 338) always tinges and 
impacts even the local grass-roots participants. As a simple example, we 
only have to look to grass-roots skaters (skateboarders or inline skaters), 
those out skating in small groups, informally: it is important to remember 
that, as soon as their images hit the internet, they have become a functional 
part of the commoditizing machinery. Almost gone 6 are the days when they 
crafted their own boards out of wood, or somehow fabricated trucks or 
skates into a viable unit. In the 21st century, having the ‘right’ equipment—
that is, the most functional, stylish and currently fashionable, within one’s 
means—has become a fundamental (and naturalized) requirement of par-
ticipation in action and extreme sports. 
 But the concept of the grobal and glocal also ranges beyond the mere com-
modiﬁ cation of tools and objects. Just as marketing for lifestyle in the 1970s 
and 80s changed the way consumerist culture operates, so too it changed what 
objects and processes could be commodiﬁ ed (cf. Goldman and Papson, 2000). 
 For example, Richard Tinning and Lindsay Fitzclarence (1992) discuss 
physical education students in secondary schools in Australia. 7 They deter-
mined that these postmodern subjects/consumers desired to become ‘pro-
ducers of their own biographies’ (p. 299) wherein they became engaged in 
their own eclectic senses of what constituted physical activity, but not in the 
packaged forms of institutionalized programming. 
 In other words, these students ‘are active in accepting or rejecting the 
messages that physical education (and the media) presents’ (Tinning and 
Fitzclarence, 1992: 299), they self-choose activities and they look toward 
very pragmatic reasons for engaging in any activity. They are demonstrat-
ing some agency, but within (and against) narrow conﬁ nes of institutional 
culture. Though Tinning and Fitzclarence did not use the terms ‘glocal’ and 
‘grobal’, they were describing the inﬂ uences of both—synthesized and ‘colo-
nizing’ global and local cultural inﬂ uences—within that emerging world of 
secondary physical education in Australia. 
 It is noteworthy that Tinning and Fitzclarence’s study was published in 
1992, just after the emergence of explicitly neoliberal agendas in both the 
UK and the USA. The uncanny and misguided senses of Reagonomics and 
Thatcherism, which effectively dismantled the essential Western govern-
mental role of encouraging egalitarian opportunities for their citizens, is, of 
course, still in play 20-plus years later. We see the effects of neoliberalism in 
the privatization of sport, leisure and educational delivery systems, among 
many other de-centralized mechanisms (cf. Giroux, 2012). 
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 One of the purported goals of neoliberalism was to reverse the trends of 
liberal democracies as well as ‘social democratic states (such as Scandanavia 
or Britain in the immediate post-war period)’ (Harvey, 2005: 71). Previ-
ously, these states, according to Harvey, 
 . . . had long taken key sectors of the economy such as health care, edu-
cation, and even housing out of the market on the grounds that access 
to basic human needs should not be mediated through market forces 
and access limited by ability to pay. (Harvey, 2005: 71) 
 Of course, the whole process of neoliberalism reduces the government’s 
contribution, and increases pressures on individuals: this structural ‘shap-
ing’ by neoliberal philosophies and actors thus returns us to the entrepre-
neurial statuses of would-be commodiﬁ ed action-sport participants. 
 We see the effects of neoliberalism in tertiary institutions that insist 
their employees use their ‘branding’—for example, Microsoft Power Point 
presentations—to compete in an educational climate that is driven by mar-
ket proﬁ ts. Just as athletes become commodiﬁ ed, and sport formations 
become commodiﬁ ed, so too do large institutions—until commodiﬁ cation 
itself seems to be a natural thing. But its very ubiquity leads logically to 
forms of anhedonism. 
 The incentives for what X-Games Gold Medalist inline skater Arlo 
Eisenberg once—less than 20 years ago!—fondly termed ‘lifestyle choices, 
in artistic presentations of the self as skater’ (in Rinehart, 1998b: 404) have 
clearly been inﬂ uenced heavily by a West-driven, and now grobal, neolib-
eral agenda. And the process of commodiﬁ cation—with its logics of the 
inverse relationships between becoming an object of the free market and the 
experience of joy and pleasure—just as clearly reduces the initial pleasures 
of participation for individuals. This is the slow slide from play to work, 
especially for successful activities, writ large on the now-commodiﬁ ed alter-
native, extreme, action, lifestyle, outdoor challenge scene. 
 But each of these categories has its own story. In the next section, I will 
attempt to sketch out how some of the similarities—and differences—
between the commodiﬁ cation practices of these different physical activities 
may be playing out. This is, however, an initial effort, and I suggest that 
scholarly follow-up is necessary. 
 OBJECTIFYING LIFESTYLE, ALTERNATIVE, EXTREME, 
ACTION AND OUTDOOR CHALLENGE ‘SPORT’ 
 Why would someone want masses of people to essentially take over their 
preferred activity? If there is joy in the discovery, participants tend to go 
back to it—which means that they want equipment, sites, acceptance: but 
not too much. They don’t want to have to struggle for ﬁ nite waves, limited 
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space or contentious territory. When participants grow older, some want to 
stay in the activity at any level: in addition to participating at senior levels, 
many alternative participants have tended to follow the mainstream model, 
where players become coaches and managers, but they also become writ-
ers for niche magazines, which allows them access to travel and the sport; 
they become entrepreneurs who fashion new types of equipment or ways to 
contest their sport; they, like Stacy Peralta 8 , become ﬁ lmmakers and control 
the historicizing of their own origination myth. But all of these activities 
work to nudge their sport towards deeper forms of mass acceptance and 
commodiﬁ cation. 
 The deﬁ nitional terms of  lifestyle ,  extreme and action ,  alternative and 
 outdoor challenge and outdoor education all have varied places within 
the continuum of purely grass-roots to highly commodiﬁ ed forms of non-
mainstream activities. The following comprises brief sketches regarding 
possibilities for study of these activities—and suggests how they may relate 
to overall possibilities for pleasure/anhedonia within such activities in the 
21st century. 
 Arlo Eisenberg, back in the mid-1990s, pointed out some differences 
between inline skating and skateboarding. Skateboarding had a history, a 
committed core base and skateboarders  knew who they were; but inline 
skating, at the time (and arguably still) was a loosely created formation 
(and identity) at the mercy of multi-national corporations, like ESPN, 
Disney and so on. Inline was considered a ‘lifestyle’ for many participants. 
In some cases—those ‘sports’ with a weakened ‘core’ of participants, for 
example—the  lifestyle ‘sports’  (a term which, itself, seems oxymoronic) , 
stemming from a genuine need to resolve the dissonance of the terms ‘life-
style’ and ‘sports’, in many cases acceded to a neoliberal, self-centered capi-
talist commodiﬁ cation model. We only have to witness the way these sports/
activities have been studied—with the researchers’ own privilege dampened 
(one exception might be something like Joanne Kay and Suzanne Laberge’s 
(2003) diatribe against Warren Miller skiing ﬁ lms) as they travel around the 
world. The simple act of (classed and privileged) reﬂ exivity on the parts of 
researchers might go a long way toward exhuming the buried remains of 
Thorstein Veblen’s 1899 classic,  Theory of the Leisure Class , and creating 
research lines that examine class, privilege, Western privilege, subtle forms 
of imperialism and colonization within lifestyle sports (1979) . 
 However, other  lifestyle sports , given their aesthetic, ﬁ nancially and 
symbolically privileged positionalities and academic history (cf. Wheaton, 
2004) have, at the level of practitioner, a very great chance of resisting such 
commodiﬁ cation. Activities like windsurﬁ ng, sky surﬁ ng, parasailing, para-
gliding, kitesurﬁ ng—and more—wall many people out of becoming core 
members simply because of their cost. For example, at the Raglan (NZ) 
KiteSurﬁ ng website, one may purchase a kitesurﬁ ng board ranging from 
$799–1399 (NZ); one kite (the Edge 2013 7M) lists at $1590 (NZ) (‘Raglan 
KiteSurﬁ ng’, 2013). Yet the core members who are adherents are relatively 
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unaffected by the temptations of the marketplace. As in many of these 
activities, ﬁ nancial considerations may limit numerical ‘core’ membership 
to mere ‘sampler’ membership within the club. In some ways, this is a delib-
erate, albeit covert, strategy to enhance stratiﬁ cation practices—put simply, 
the wealthy covertly form exclusionary clubs. As a result, commodiﬁ cation 
of such activities, as signaled by media attention and massiﬁ cation of par-
ticipation, is relatively low. Self-reported pleasure and self-gratiﬁ cation is, 
conversely, fairly high. 
 However, commodiﬁ cation of the actual lifestyle is quite another thing. 
Since at least the mid-1800s, there has been a capitalist move to incorpo-
rate the middle class into (high culture) taste cultures (Cross, 1990), which 
results in not only an effort towards incorporation of objects, accouterments 
and things surrounding these activities, but in the commodiﬁ cation of the 
actual lifestyle itself (cf. Bourdieu, 1984). While Wheaton (2007), following 
Redhead, posits a more ﬂ uid approach to the rigid markers of subculture, 
culture and the ilk, the identity issues she discusses also admit to an encroach-
ing commodiﬁ cation process of the very idea of lifestyle (cf. Wheaton, 
1998, 2007). 
 Somewhat in contrast to lifestyle sports,  extreme and action sports have 
largely become commodiﬁ ed. Of course, this general statement can easily 
be challenged: many  participants at the grass-roots levels have clearly not 
become commodiﬁ ed. But multi-national media corporations like ESPN and 
Sky TV have made it their mission to incorporate these kinds of sport activi-
ties so that the general public identiﬁ es with them as ‘extreme’ or ‘action’ 
sports forms (however, there is participant ‘push-back’: many participants 
choose intentionally to identify with any moniker other than ‘extreme’: as in 
all things, it remains contested ground). Yet the mere acceptance of the activ-
ities as ‘sports’ signiﬁ es that the move towards massiﬁ ed incorporation—
objectifying both the participant and the activities—has already begun. The 
word ‘extreme’ itself has been a marketable entity (along with ESPN’s ‘X’) 
for nearly twenty years (Rinehart, 1998b). 
 For example, the process of commodiﬁ cation for the same inline skaters 
that Eisenberg was hailing as lifestyle participants—kids who basically saw 
inline as a form of transportation, or a way of self-labeling themselves (as a 
skater), or as a form of active resistance to dominant youth models—back 
in the 1990s has gone quite a ways farther: 
 . . . the processes of icon making and commodiﬁ cation are interdepen-
dent. In fact, many of the athletes  seek to become commodities, ﬁ nd-
ing lucrative careers through the process. This process is not unlike a 
symbiotic relationship, where companies, consumers, and individual 
athletes alike share (but not equally) in the proﬁ ts. (Rinehart, 2003: 30) 
 And now, extreme and action sports (the terms are largely indistinguish-
able) are considered by most to be accepted mainstream sport activities. 
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 Alternative sports , almost by deﬁ nition, may remain resistant to the dom-
inant. But it is important to remember that the activities that are loosely 
deﬁ ned by the term ‘alternative’ keep changing (cf. ‘avant garde’ in Rinehart, 
1998b). However, the compressed temporal element of contemporary life has 
impacted upon the time that something truly remains alternative: with both 
time and space compression, by dint of electronic technological advances and 
the naturalization of acceptance of such advances, hot ‘alternative’ activities 
quickly become recognized, commodiﬁ ed and mainstreamed. Sometimes 
this results in a cycle that resembles a quick fad; other times it means that 
that which has been alternative becomes mainstream very quickly, only to 
be replaced by something differentially alternative. The public appetite is 
voracious—almost like the span of a news cycle. 
 Outdoor challenge and outdoor education models, though often deliv-
ered from an institutional (educational) setting, have also fallen into the 
trap of a vaunted, and relatively unexamined, global neoliberal educational 
model where it is up to individual schools (or private enterprises), rather 
than government, to generate funding (cf. Giroux, 2011). Thus, we see the 
privatization of outdoor types of alternative physical activity just about 
everywhere, and we see schools entering into the marketplace, competing 
for ‘customers’ and skewing the fundamental democratic impulse that for 
so long deﬁ ned public education. 
 Those within these ﬁ elds can note some of the aggressive forms of commod-
iﬁ cation that have beset outdoor activities. Privatization, it seems, only serves 
to exacerbate the commodiﬁ cation of outdoor education (cf. Humberstone 
and Stan, 2012; Sandell, 2012). There is some resistance, however, which 
mostly comes from a reﬂ exive type of delivery of such outdoor-oriented 
programs (cf. Martin and Leberman, 2004; Šebek, 2004; Wattchow and 
Brown, 2011). 
 TIME, TEMPORALITY AND COMMODIFICATION 
 The caveat that cuts across the commodiﬁ cation of lifestyle, extreme, alter-
native and outdoor challenge activities is time. If life has become, in a sense, 
a series of ﬂ attened affects for some, time and temporality—action speeded 
up—help to shape and even drive a creeping ennui towards their own sacred 
activity. Jean Baudrillard, writing from the vast empty stretches of Western 
deserts (both literal and ﬁ gurative) in  America , creates a classic temporal 
dimension for the apprehension of this collective ﬂ attened affect. He cau-
tions the reader that, to really get at the feel and sense and heft of travel, 
 We’d have to replay it all from end to end at home in a darkened room, 
rediscover the magic of the freeways and the distance and the ice-cold 
alcohol in the desert and the speed and live it all again on the video 
at home in real time, not simply for the pleasure of remembering but 
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because the fascination of senseless repetition is already present in the 
abstraction of the journey. The unfolding of the desert is inﬁ nitely close 
to the timelessness of ﬁ lm . . . (1989: 1). 
 The initial, primary experience is unassailable, but of course it can be 
‘replayed’ in so many ways. 
 A signiﬁ cant dimension of an appreciation for pleasure—at least as it has 
been ‘taught’ to the postmodern subject through how we are meant to clas-
sify acculturation, everyday experience, even sensory apprehension—relies 
upon anticipation or reﬂ ection. Despite the viral insistence on a contempo-
rary cultural shift towards existentialism—in the products we are steered 
towards buying, the media we devoutly consume and so forth—there 
remains, in everyday lived life, a hope for the future, a desire for the past. 
 The dream of living existentially—this viral insistence—leads to a ﬂ at-
tened affect. The only exception is within idealized art formations, within 
already ﬂ attened discourses, in novels and short stories and ﬁ lm and poetry 
and plastic art and sculpture, where Walter Pater’s ‘hard, gemlike ﬂ ame . . . 
[that] maintain[s] this ecstasy’ (1966: 267) may actually exist, unaffected 
by the patina of time. But these dreams of desire, ironically, lead to a post-
modern subject position that is, like capitalism itself, never satisﬁ ed. And it 
is not coincidental that this lack of satisfaction occurs in a moment of late 
capitalism (cf. Andrews, 2004). 
 Pater suggests that we should live from existential moment to existential 
moment, ‘burning always . . . [which will result in] success in life’ (1966: 
267). Pater’s exhortation does not go so far as to assess a sense of existen-
tialism, realism or idealism in his passionate subject, but a postmodern sub-
ject would: how do we, for example, assess the degree of ‘burning’ except by 
comparison with other experiences, past and future? The inbuilt competi-
tion of late capitalism ﬂ avors everything it touches. 
 Simone De Beauvoir, in an interview in 1965, reﬂ ected on thinking about 
lived life—as an existentialist: 
 When one has an existentialist view of the world, like mine, the para-
dox of human life is precisely that one tries to  be and, in the long run, 
merely exists. It’s because of this discrepancy that when you’ve laid your 
stake on being—and, in a way you always do when you make plans, 
even if you actually know that you can’t succeed in being—when you 
turn around and look back on your life, you see that you’ve simply 
existed. In other words, life isn’t behind you like a solid thing, like the 
life of a god (as it is conceived, that is, as something impossible). Your 
life is simply a human life. (in Gobeil, 1965) 
 In Jay Gatsby’s world, created by F. Scott Fitzgerald, the reader is lead to 
believe that Gatsby is living a life of total satisfaction, his every need met, 
as admirers ﬂ ock to his house nearly every weekend: we see him living from 
heightened moment to heightened moment. But Jay Gatsby is a ﬁ ctional 
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character. His universe is a created universe. We do not see Gatsby cleaning 
his teeth, sitting waiting for someone overdue to share a cup of coffee, being 
annoyed with trivia, enjoying the antics of an unselfconscious child at play 
or being uncertain as to others’ meanings. We do not know Gatsby’s reac-
tion to these everyday moments because F. Scott Fitzgerald has  selected —
really, created—moments of Gatsby’s life that tell us a certain story, a story 
of fallen triumph, a modernist tale that builds a dramatic irony within the 
reader, that portrays Gatsby as a singularly alone man. Any pleasures he 
might have are deliberately ﬂ attened—but is this a reﬂ ection of reality lived, 
or a produced effect? 
 The irony of Gatsby the man (within the novel) is that his  apparent genu-
ineness masks his actual biography. We ﬁ nd that Gatsby, as he invents him-
self, has a ‘heart [that] was in a constant, turbulent riot’, and that he comes 
to believe that ‘the rock of the world was founded securely on a fairy’s 
wing’ (1953: 89).  The Great Gatsby is a story= of appearance versus real-
ity. Gatsby the man is a ﬁ ction.  Gatsby the book is instructional for lived 
lives. No one—except in ﬁ ctions, which may portray the world more truly 
than the kaleidoscope of life—lives from heightened moment to heightened 
moment in real time. 
 And extreme sport, or outdoor challenge, action, lifestyle, whiz or alter-
native sport athletes and participants do not either. Fitzgerald intimates that 
Gatsby had difﬁ culties adjusting to mundane everyday life—except with 
Daisy. I suggest that these sport participants—to one extent by virtue of 
expectations of pleasure in part created by media, to another by the insis-
tence upon commodiﬁ cation of themselves, their lifestyles and their sport—
cannot really experience pleasure either, except by rejecting the available 
contemporary sport and capitalist models. 
 The very process of contemporary commodiﬁ cation relies on this sense 
of consumers living for the  now , within a foreshortened world that, not 
coincidentally, demands they sanctify the present moment while they simul-
taneously look back nostalgically at former consumptive practices and 
anticipate future consumption patterns. A world framed this way becomes 
a ﬂ attened world, where ever-increasing possessions lead to ever-increasing 
desire. This emotional landscape, brought to consumers at least partially by 
purveyors of commodiﬁ cations, results, at least emotionally, in a seemingly 
passionate, yet realistically bereft, life experience. 
 As Fitzgerald writes, 
 . . . the expression of bewilderment had come back into Gatsby’s face, 
as though a faint doubt had occurred to him as to the quality of his 
present happiness. . . . No amount of ﬁ re or freshness can challenge 
what a man will store up in his ghostly heart. (1953: 86–87) 
 Gatsby, a perceptive man, could only sense, but not know, how the pro-
cess of object-acquisition had imprisoned him. Many contemporary alterna-
tive sport athletes follow a similar pattern. 
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 While ﬁ lm (and for that matter, mediated extreme sport)  can be ‘time-
less’ (Baudrillard, 1989: 1), a constant barrage of ‘peak experiences’ also 
reduces any actual lived moments that are mundane, boring, repetitive into 
the receding background. Mundane, day-to-day experiences have their own 
value, if only to provide relief to the peak moments (Caudwell, 2014). The 
result privileges major occurrences and major events but, in doing so, may 
ﬂ atten the pleasure and enjoyment of everyday experiences. 
 A CONCLUSION 
 One of the keys to the apparent paradox of participating in extraordinary 
events of physical skill and yet having a gnawing feeling of malaise is the pres-
ence or absence of a temporal element. With time to reﬂ ect, the experience 
itself may take on new pleasurable meaning. But where participants experi-
ence and privilege sudden rush over reﬂ exive thinking about the experience; 
where one moment tumbles atop another, without pause for reﬂ ection; where 
there is a clamor for (a felt need to have) the latest experience to surmount 
others, without time passing to appreciate, enjoy, intensify and reﬂ ect on the 
experience is where anhedonism takes over in the postmodern subject’s life. 
 It is up to those who commoditize to deliberately compress time, to 
reduce consumers’ sense of historical perspective: in this way, of course, the 
strategy mirrors capitalism itself. Corporations need to demonstrate more 
and more proﬁ t, more and newer product,  ad inﬁ nitum . Just as casinos 
in Las Vegas lack clocks in order to inﬂ uence patrons’ conception of time, 
so too do lifestyle entrepreneurs skew a sense of time to their advantage 
(cf. Cope and Kalantzis, 1999). This is decidedly an anti-sustainability 
strategy, meant for the momentary ﬁ x, but it does not come from nowhere 
(cf. Schumacher, 1975). 
 If we were to compare this current sense of compressed time (cf. Kroker, 
Kroker and Cook, 1989) for relationships to a WWII or pre-WWII gen-
eration, we would generally discover in the earlier generations a more 
linear, focused sense of relationships between people. There was a closer 
ﬁ t between the ‘realism’ of the novel and the ‘realism’ of lived life—but 
there has  never been an exact ﬁ t. Episodic relationships still occurred, but 
there was more connection between individuals, families and communities 
(cf. Brokaw, 1998). Even with the sudden epiphanic moment (for a whole 
generation) of a profound traumatic invasion in global war—using tactics 
of storm troopers, the blitzkrieg and the atomic bomb (tactics which later 
devolved into the US military’s use of ‘shock and awe’ (Ullman and Wade, 
1996) and its justiﬁ cation)—there was time  after to reassess, to mull over, 
to reﬂ ect. 
 Sometimes relationships happened quickly, but again there was a sense 
of potential lastingness as opposed to planned obsolescence. Relationships 
may have been based more on pragmatic, instrumental goals: courtly love 
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was still a fantasy, not a goal; snap, instantaneous, immediate falling in love 
and Hollywood fantasies were only beginning to inﬂ uence societal attitudes 
towards real, face-to-face relationships (cf. Denzin, 1991; Lyman, 1987); 
people dreamed that they could ‘have it all’, but didn’t truly rely on that as 
a life trajectory. Hope was a reality, if only sometimes for survival (Wiesel, 
1960). The paradox is that the more postmodern humans clamored for 
hedonistic pleasure, the more its actual realization receded, like Baudrillard’s 
objects in the side-view mirror. 
 Yet the concept of anhedonia is not simply about time compression. As 
Stanford Lyman puts it in his study of ﬁ fty years of American ﬁ lm: 
 ‘Anhedonia’ speaks to a deep and unresolved dilemma in the American 
 Lebenswelt . In its penultimate form it expresses itself as a frenzied 
desire to escape coupled with a recognition that there is no place to go. 
Nothing is left but sudden, sharp, uncathartic aggressive displays, and 
then—ultimately—a grudging acquiescence to a life alternating between 
boredom and frustration. (1987: 264) 
 This vague sense of an inability to experience pleasure, and the concomi-
tant panicked rush to experience it as quickly, episodically and deeply as 
possible, is what constitutes a major facet of the paradoxical nature of con-
temporarily lived life. It also parallels the strategies of modern and postmod-
ern marketing and advertising campaigns to create uncertainty, need, want, 
desire in consumers. As this commodiﬁ cation process works its way through 
not just tangible product but also lifestyle, worldview and a gnawing sense 
of self as passive, there is an individual and collective backlash. But like the 
ﬂ y caught in the web, the more we struggle, the more we become enmeshed. 
 NOTES 
 1 .  A revised version of Chapter 11 ( Anhedonia and Alternative Sports ) by Robert 
Rinehart is due to be published in the French journal  STAPS ( Revue interna-
tional des sciences du sport et de l’education physique ), for which Rinehart 
has attained permission from the journal. Appreciation to  STAPS  for rights to 
reproduce this piece. 
 2 .  Our ‘social science’ observations of such phenomena as human-object, human-
machine, human-nonhuman relationships have, to some extent kept pace with 
the actual interactions: see, e.g. Bruno Latour (2005), Nigel Thrift (2008) 
and John Law’s (2004) works on Action Network and Non-Representational 
Theories. 
 3 .  The gendered nature of alternative sports, in any form, is well documented 
(see, for example, Beal 1996; Rinehart 1999, 2005; Thorpe 2005; Wheaton 
and Tomlinson 1998). Though there are hopeful pockets of breakthrough, for 
the most part these action/extreme sports have reﬂ ected the dominant main-
stream sport models, which, in turn, have reﬂ ected the dominant patriarchal 
societal models extant in the 21st century world. 
 4 .  I am grateful to Jayne Caudwell for pointing out this piece. 
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 5 .  The term ‘commodiﬁ cation’ has, until fairly recently, also been used by those 
in business as meaning the process wherein similar niched products become 
relatively indistinguishable from one another: thus their value drops, and they 
have become mere commodities. To distinguish between ‘commodiﬁ cation’ in 
the two senses, the term ‘commoditization’ has taken on the latter meaning. 
 6 .  ‘Almost gone’: of course, there are the rare exceptions, as Rinehart and Grenfell 
(2002) point out in their ethnography exploring the creation of a neighbor-
hood BMX track. 
 7 .  I am grateful to Clive Pope for alerting me to this article. 
 8 .  Director of  Dogtown and Z Boys (ﬁ lm, 2001). 
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 12  Be Happy, Play Sport? 
 Governing Happiness via 
the Promotion of Sport 
 Richard Pringle 
 . . . hedonic well-being refers to happiness, pleasure, and positive 
affect. In the sports domain, hedonic well-being can be viewed as an 
immediate consequence, and one that is easily reported and identi-
ﬁ ed by athletes. 
 (Blanchard et al., 2009: 546). 
 The above quote from Céline Blanchard and colleagues (2009) reﬂ ects a rel-
atively common assumption that participation in sport leads to the experi-
encing of happiness, pleasure and positive affect. Limited research evidence 
from a variety of sources has also supported such contentions. For example, 
Paul Dalziel (2011), an economist within Aotearoa New Zealand, contends 
that the broader social value of sport to New Zealanders, calculated in rela-
tion to the opportunity cost of time spent in sport and recreational activities, 
is approximately $6.9 billion per year. In other words, Dalziel intimates by 
using monetary estimations that sport is ‘good’ for New Zealanders. Similar 
assumptions/ﬁ ndings about the alleged positive beneﬁ ts of sport have subse-
quently shaped government policies worldwide. These policies are remark-
ably alike, as they typically desire to encourage more people to participate 
in  and enjoy sport. 
 The national agency for sport in Scotland, for example, is driven by 
its primary aim to help more Scottish people  enjoy the beneﬁ ts of sport, 
whereas Sport New Zealand reports that it is ‘dedicated to getting New 
Zealanders enjoying and excelling through sport and recreation’ (Sport New 
Zealand, 2013a: ¶ 1). Sport England reports that it is committed to help-
ing ‘as many people as possible to ﬁ nd a sport that they enjoy and want to 
continue being involved in’ (Sport England, 2013a: ¶ 1). In a similar man-
ner, Australian ex-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd reported that his government 
would continue to fund the Active After-schools Communities program, as: 
‘It is extremely rewarding to see so many children participating in healthy 
activities but most importantly it is great to see children having so much fun 
participating in sport and physical activity’ (Australian Sport Commission, 
2013: ¶ 1). Governments are seemingly using sport as a technology to enhance 
a population’s level of wellbeing and happiness. As a consequence, a new 
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social imperative appears to have emerged: all citizens should play sport 
and enjoy it. 
 Sara Ahmed (2010b: 14), in drawing from Nietzsche, argued that: ‘what 
is apt to cause pleasure is already judged to be good’. In other words, she sug-
gested that the various things that humans ‘know’ to cause pleasure—such 
as friendship and love—are already judged to be good. If this is the case, then 
the seemingly widespread belief that sport causes pleasure can be assumed to 
be underpinned by the equally widespread but  unquestioned belief that sport 
is good for people. Indeed, the efforts of various governments to encourage 
their populations to enjoy participation in sports appear to be buttressed by 
such a belief.  Sport scotland (2003), for example, alleges that: 
 . . . participating in sport can improve the quality of life of individu-
als and communities, promote social inclusion, improve health, counter 
anti-social behaviour, raise individual self-esteem and conﬁ dence, and 
widen horizons. ( sport scotland, 2003: 7) 
 Fred Coalter (2007) reported, however, that evidence to support these 
seemingly functionalist views of sport is limited and/or based on dubious 
research. Despite such a recognition, Barrie Houlihan (1997: 113) observed 
that ‘[a]lmost without exception, industrialised and many developing states 
have, over the last thirty years, increased their funding for sport at a pace 
greater than that for most other services’. This unprecedented increase in 
funding has not abated even in times of global recession. Within Aotearoa 
New Zealand, Australia and England, for example, funding for sport over 
the last ﬁ ve years has increased at a faster rate than spending on health and 
education services. Government funding of sport in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
for instance, has more than doubled between 2007 ($NZ32 million) and 
2012 ($NZ70 million). 
 In commenting on this increased funding of sport, Houlihan (1997) 
surmised that sport was not necessarily valued by governments because 
of its intrinsic qualities but due to its supposed ability to ‘ameliorate or 
camouﬂ age problems ranging from poor cardiovascular health and juve-
nile delinquency to low tourist volume’ (Houlihan, 1997: 113). Houlihan, 
accordingly, believed that governments were not primarily interested in 
attempting to enhance a population’s levels of happiness but in the political 
value of the alleged positive ‘side-effects’ of increased sport participation. 
Indeed, Sport New Zealand (2013b) states that they ‘want young New Zea-
landers (aged 0–18) to develop a  love of sport and recreation that leads to 
lifelong participation’ (¶ 1; italics added for emphasis), suggesting that their 
prime concern is maximizing participation in sport. 
 The global encouragement of mass participation in sport has become 
an important public policy issue, with claims that sport participation can 
enhance public health, reduce anxiety and depression and enhance a sense 
of wellbeing. Yet, as governments have recognized, the key for gaining mass 
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participation rests primarily upon individuals enjoying and gaining mean-
ingful pleasures through sport. But do most people enjoy playing sport? And 
is sport a panacea for social and health problems? 
 In this chapter I critically review what is known about sport and its con-
nections to pleasure/happiness, health and wellbeing and examine the issues 
surrounding the use of sport as a form of ‘biopower’. Biopower, a term 
coined by Michel Foucault (1990), refers to the various techniques used by 
governments in attempts to foster the health and life of their populations. 
Biopower is a technology of power or a government mechanism of control-
ling or managing bodies (i.e. people). With the development of nation-states 
from the 18th century onward, Foucault argued that governments became 
concerned with fostering and controlling the biological features of a popu-
lation. These features are tied to the body and related to issues of sexual-
ity (e.g. population growth, pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, 
control of ‘deviant’ sexual practices), family relations and, more broadly, 
attempts to regulate various social practices, customs and the health and 
wellbeing of a population. Foucault (2007) suggested that biopower was a 
term that: 
 . . . somewhat vaguely (refers) . . . to a number of phenomena that seem 
to me to be quite signiﬁ cant, namely, the set of mechanisms through 
which the basic biological features of the human species became the 
object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other 
words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies 
took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a 
species. (Foucault, 2007: 1) 
 In this chapter I argue that governments are using sport as a form of 
biopower to foster the health, happiness and wellbeing of populations, but 
that this is a ﬂ awed strategy that produces a number of unintended and 
problematic consequences. To support this argument, I begin by examin-
ing the concept of subjective wellbeing (SWB), as this concept has become 
a prime focus of analysis within diverse disciplines (e.g. psychology, eco-
nomics, politics, education, philosophy, sociology), including sport studies. 
I then review the limited literature associated with the intersections between 
sport and SWB, with the intention to understand whether it is prudent for 
governments to promote sport as a technique for enhancing a population’s 
sense of wellbeing. 
 THE BIOPOLITICAL ‘MEASUREMENT’ OF 
HAPPINESS/SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING 
 A growing body of researchers suggest that happiness is not just the product 
of positive outcomes but is also a state of being that is connected to ‘better 
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health, better work performance, better social relationships and to more 
ethical behavior’ (Kesebir and Diener, 2009: 66). In this respect, government 
policies that aim to promote happiness are often (uncritically) regarded as 
beneﬁ cial for individuals and societies and, correspondingly, an interest 
in  governing happiness has grown in recent years. The United Kingdom’s 
national wellbeing survey was undertaken in 2011 (Ofﬁ ce for National Sta-
tistics, 2012), and the United Nations recently adopted a resolution for all 
member nations to give greater attention to happiness in their economic and 
social development policies (O’Brian, 2012). 
 Researchers (particularly psychologists) have tended to operationalize 
‘happiness’ in relation to human ﬂ ourishing and, more speciﬁ cally, to the 
term  subjective wellbeing  (SWB): which refers to ‘people’s evaluations of 
their lives and encompasses both cognitive judgments of satisfaction and 
affective appraisals of moods and emotions’ (Kesebir and Diener, 2009: 61). 
The concept of SWB does not offer a prescriptive deﬁ nition of happiness 
but allows for subjective evaluations in relation to four prime components: 
 . . . life satisfaction (global judgments of one’s life), satisfaction with 
important life domains (satisfactions with one’s work, health, marriage 
etc.), positive affect (prevalence of positive emotions and moods), and 
low levels of negative affect (prevalence of unpleasant emotions and 
moods). (Kesebir and Diener, 2009: 62) 
 Although the relationship between pleasure and SWB is not distinctively 
outlined, it is not difﬁ cult to imagine how experiencing of pleasure in sport 
could be linked to a prevalence of positive affects and emotions and per-
haps, for some, to a broader sense of life satisfaction. At the same time, 
sporting displeasures could potentially work to decrease judgments of SWB. 
 Despite the recognition that SWB is a subjective judgment, researchers who 
have examined SWB have tended to adopt quantitative methods in an attempt 
to ‘objectively’ measure and correlate SWB with various socio-cultural factors. 
The Ofﬁ ce for National Statistics (2012) in the UK, for example, surveyed 
4000 respondents aged over 16 and found that the majority of people (75%) 
were satisﬁ ed with life, believed that there life was worthwhile (79.5%) and 
reported that they felt happy yesterday (71.3%). 1 These results are broadly 
similar to other surveys of happiness, which typically reveal that happiness 
trumps unhappiness by a three-to-one ratio. Additional ﬁ ndings suggested 
that older (aged 65–80) and younger people (aged 16–19) tended to be hap-
pier and less anxious than the middle aged; that those who were married or 
in civil unions and/or lived in a house with children considered their lives 
more worthwhile than those who did not; that females and males (despite 
differing socio-cultural expectations of how they should perform gender) 
were similarly satisﬁ ed with life; and that people living in Northern Ireland 
(which has suffered from ethno-nationalist and sectarian conﬂ ict for decades) 
reported greater levels of life satisfaction than those who lived in London. 
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 These results could be interpreted as broadly comforting, given that they 
suggest that most people appear happy. 2 Yet the survey method, in conjunc-
tion with correlational analysis, has a number of well-known limitations 
dependent on one’s paradigmatic position. Questions, for example, have 
been raised by researchers within the positivist paradigm about the valid-
ity of the constructs. Some individuals, for example, may be unhappy but, 
given the ambiguity of the term ‘happiness’, may rate themselves as happy. 
Postmodern scholars, on the other hand, simply reject that ‘happiness’ and 
‘life-satisfaction’ can be measured and represented numerically, as they are 
complex and subjective social phenomena. Concern has also been raised 
about the limited depth of analysis afforded by the survey technique, as it 
does not take into account the nuances or context of how different people 
self-assess themselves. Darrin McMahon (2006), more broadly, concluded 
that the survey results of happiness/wellbeing have provided relatively 
few new insights with respect to the prime existential questions (e.g. how 
to obtain happiness and what constitutes the good life). More pointedly, 
McMahon claimed that these insights could have been readily obtained 
from reading the works of classical philosophers. 
 Despite these important limitations, SWB population surveys have 
become important tools of biopower and the results of such surveys are 
now being drawn upon to shape social policy, including policy related to 
sport participation. In the following section, I examine what is known about 
sport participation, health and SWB and how this knowledge is shaping 
social policy. 
 SPORT, SUBJECTIVE WELLBEING AND 
GOVERNMENTALITY 
 The biomedical health beneﬁ ts of physical activities are well known. These 
beneﬁ ts tend to be stated in terms of risk reduction; for example, regular 
bouts of moderate-intensity aerobic activity have been linked with reduced 
risk of sustaining cardiovascular disease, type-2 diabetes, and some cancers 
(Warburton, Nicol and Bredin, 2006). Numerous studies have also revealed 
a positive association between physical activity and positive affects. In a 
major review article, Kenneth Fox (1999) concluded that sufﬁ cient evidence 
supports the idea that exercise can be effective in managing depression, 
reducing levels of anxiety and, in some cases, improving physical self-
perceptions and mood states. Recent research supports these contentions, 
but in a more cautious manner (e.g. Biddle and Mutrie, 2008; Galloway 
et al., 2006). 3 The links between health and SWB are, however, surprisingly 
tenuous. Ed Diener (2009), for example, found that physical health has little 
impact on an individual’s SWB unless they are very ill, in which case SWB 
ratings are decreased, and that the ‘healthy’ typically take their health for 
granted rather than rejoice in their wellbeing. 
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 The links between sport participation and SWB are also questionable. 
From an extensive review of literature, Susan Galloway, David Bell, Chris-
tine Hamilton and Adrienne Scullion (2006: 92) summarized that ‘there is 
a lack of research on the contribution of sport to QOL (quality of life) and 
well-being’ and ‘most of the existing research relates to exercise, and even 
in this area there are signiﬁ cant gaps, and many of the studies undertaken 
have speciﬁ c limitations’. They cautioned, however, against drawing from 
the physical activity literature and assuming that the ﬁ ndings would relate 
to sport. 
 The physical activities linked with health beneﬁ ts are typically those that 
involve ‘rhythmic, noncompetitive exercises in which individuals control 
and regulate their own body movements’ (Coakley et al., 2009: 108). These 
types of physical activity are clearly different from that which occurs in 
many popular sports, within which high-speed movements associated with 
sudden changes in direction and acceleration, and the complex movements 
of other players, increase possibilities for injury. As such, the biomedical 
health beneﬁ ts of sport have been judged as markedly less in comparison to 
rhythmic non-competitive forms of physical activity. In fact, given the high 
cost of sporting injuries, some epidemiologists now regard sporting injuries 
as a public health problem and are subsequently encouraging governments 
to adopt sport injury prevention policies within the broader health sector 
(e.g. see Finch, 2012). These policies, however, fall short of discouraging 
participation in particular sports. The generalized notion that participation 
in competitive sport is good for one’s health is, nevertheless, being ques-
tioned. Ivan Waddington (2007), for example, stated: 
 The health-related arguments in favour of regular and moderate physi-
cal activity are clear, but they are considerably less persuasive in relation 
to competitive, and especially contact, sport and very much less in rela-
tion to elite or professional sport. (Waddington, 2007: 2094) 
 Despite these cautionary observations, Galloway et al. (2006: 80) noted 
that key agencies for sport in the UK (e.g.  sport scotland and Sport 
England), in the absence of sport-speciﬁ c literature on wellbeing and health, 
‘have drawn on the wider exercise literature to underpin policy making’. 
Thus, governance policies to promote widespread sport participation as a 
strategy to promote health and pubic wellbeing are not typically based on 
studies that have examined the  actual outcomes of sport participation. This, 
of course, is highly remiss. 
 Susan Galloway and colleagues (2006) tentatively suggested that if it is 
accepted that exercise is a part of sport, and that psychological wellbeing is 
an aspect associated with a quality of life, ‘then it can be argued that sport 
has a role to play in the promotion of QOL’ (Galloway et al., 2006: 87). 
Yet they further suggested that this was not a convincing argument, as 
psychological wellbeing is only one aspect of the complex array of factors 
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associated with a quality of life or SWB (e.g. SWB is associated with factors 
such as social capital, social connections, sense of purpose to life, employ-
ment/income equality, positive affects and housing). In this manner, they did 
not believe that the exercise literature was particularly helpful for under-
standing how sport participation might impact SWB. 
 In the limited research that has examined sport and SWB, ﬁ ndings reveal 
a complex but limited relationship. William McTeer and James Curtis 
(1993) analyzed the connections between sport, physical activity and SWB 
and found that as levels of physical or sporting activity increased, so did 
feelings of wellbeing. The strength of this relationship was, however, mark-
edly diminished when health status and involvement in social networks 
were included as controls. As such, they concluded that the sport, physical 
activity and wellbeing relationship was relatively weak and that other fac-
tors likely accounted for the increased feelings of wellbeing. They stated 
that the most important predictor of SWB was the degree of social interac-
tion; that is, the greater the social interaction, regardless of sport or activity 
involvement, the higher the levels of SWB. They tentatively suggested: 
 The ﬁ nding that there is only a modest relationship between physical 
activity and psychological well being is better understood when we con-
sider how little time each day is devoted to physical activity in com-
parison to other aspects of social life that seem to affect well being. The 
effects upon well being from circumstances concerning work (e.g., stress, 
alienation, unemployment) and the family (e.g., the burdens of domes-
tic and paid work, parent/child conﬂ ict, or parental discord over child-
rearing and household duties), as well as economic circumstances . . . 
probably all have far more persistent effects upon one’s psychological 
state than does a relatively brief bout with sport or exercise . . . (McTeer 
and Curtis, 1993: 409). 
 Susan Galloway and colleagues (2006: 92) similarly concluded that the 
beneﬁ ts of sport are primarily associated with  other social factors such as 
‘the social support, friendship and collective identity gained through partici-
pation’. Likewise, Richard Bailey and fellow researchers (2009) concluded, 
from an examination of physical education and school sport literature, that 
the prime social beneﬁ ts gained (e.g. a sense of community, trust, empathy, 
responsibility and cooperation) were not necessarily related to the sporting 
or PE activities  per se  but to the social and educational processes inherent 
in movement participation. Accordingly, they stressed that the role of the 
teachers and coaches is paramount if one expects social beneﬁ ts to accrue 
through sporting involvement. Indeed, they emphasized that social beneﬁ ts 
are only likely to occur if there is credible leadership, a pedagogical empha-
sis on social interactions and learning processes and the youth are involved 
in decision-making processes. In other words, similar social beneﬁ ts could 
be gained from participation in alternative activities, if the social context 
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was organized in a similar manner (such as related to drama, dance, art, 
music or outdoor recreation). 
 In partial response to the lack of robust evidence connecting sport with 
enhanced levels of SWB or other social beneﬁ ts, Paul Downward and 
Samona Rasciute (2011) analyzed cross-sectional survey data to understand 
how the frequency and duration of participation in 67 different sporting 
activities inﬂ uenced SWB. One of their (indirect) ﬁ ndings was that sport 
participation levels were found to be  very low  within the UK. For example, 
of the 28,117 respondents, less than 1% of them had participated in any 
one of the following sports in the four weeks prior to the survey: moun-
tain biking, outdoor bowls, judo, karate, gymnastics, rugby league, rugby 
union, baseball/softball, hockey, netball, track and ﬁ eld, yachting, canoe-
ing, windsurﬁ ng, climbing, volleyball, orienteering, triathlon, boxing, fenc-
ing, Frisbee, trampolining, shooting or pilates. The most popular activities 
were cycling (11%), health/ﬁ tness/gym (16%), keepﬁ t classes (8%) and 
snooker/pool/billiards (8.6%). Yet most people do not necessarily concep-
tualize these exercise or recreational activities as sports. The most popular 
‘sports’, in contrast, were outdoor football (including ﬁ ve-a-side and six-
a-side) (6.8%), cricket (1.8%), tennis (3.3%), squash (1.6%) and basket-
ball (1.3%). Yet these statistics, once again, indicate that the overwhelming 
majority of the general population had not actively participated in these 
sports over the four-week period of the survey. 
 Despite the general lack of participation in sport, Downward and Ras-
ciute (2011: 345) concluded that their research ‘demonstrates that sports 
participation has a positive association with the subjective wellbeing of the 
population, as measured by happiness . . .’. Yet this conclusion is dubious, 
as the overwhelming majority of the population did not actively participate 
in sport. A better conclusion, I surmise, would be: ‘in relation to the small 
percentage of the population who participate in sport, there appears to be 
a positive association between participation and SWB’. But this does not 
mean that participation enhances SWB, as this correlational study does not 
conﬁ rm causality. 
 Similarly to McTeer and Curtis (1993), Downward and Rasciute found 
that the positive association with SWB was greater in sports that encouraged 
social interaction. They were nevertheless reticent to endorse the promotion 
of sport participation as an effective means for enhancing a population’s 
SWB. McTeer and Curtis (1993: 346) concluded that further research needs 
to examine ‘to whom the beneﬁ ts accrue, how they link to any external ben-
eﬁ ts and costs, and the consequent levels of funding that might legitimately 
be committed to support sport as a policy objective’. I concur and suggest 
it is particularly important to ﬁ nd out to whom the beneﬁ ts accrue, as if it 
is found that government promotion of sport typically works to support a 
small minority of people and if this minority is an already privileged section 
of the population, then the promotion of sport as a governing strategy to 
enhance levels of SWB needs to be questioned. Sport England (2013b), for 
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example, reports that young men are much more likely than women to par-
ticipate in sport, and participation is greatest amongst managerial/profes-
sional workers and lowest amongst manual workers and the unemployed. 
 More pointedly, I argue that if participation in sport has a positive associ-
ation with SWB, then it seems reasonable to expect that a higher percentage 
of the population would regularly participate in sport. Yet survey evidence 
suggests that over half of the English population does not participate in 
any sports and that participation rates decrease with age (e.g. 69% of those 
aged over 26 do not participate) (Sport England, 2013b). The Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (2013) similarly reveals that the overwhelming major-
ity of Australians are not active participants in team sports. 4 This evidence 
indirectly suggests that sport participation, for the majority of adults, does 
not enhance SWB or produce pleasure, as otherwise it would be expected 
that more people would participate. 
 Despite the lack of robust evidence that sport has any signiﬁ cant impact 
on a total population’s wellbeing, a functionalist view of sport continues to 
underpin government investment in sport. Accordingly, governments con-
tinue to legitimate investment of large sums of public money in relation 
to quixotic beliefs that sport engenders national pride, integrates differ-
ent socio-cultural groups, reduces crime, promotes public health, enhances 
wellbeing and produces a  feel good factor or  pleasure among the popu-
lation (Hallmann, Breuer and Kühnreich, 2013). With respect to this last 
point, undoubtedly feelings of national pride and pleasure can be triggered 
by select sport performances or the hosting of international sporting tourna-
ments (e.g. the London Olympics), yet these feelings have also been found 
to be somewhat transient and relatively small in overall consideration of an 
individual’s rating of his/her SWB (see van Hilvoorde, Elling and Stokvis, 
2010; Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010). 
 In relation to the short term ‘feel good effect’, Kirstin Hallmann, Chris-
toph Breuer and Benedikt Kühnreich (2013) conducted a survey within Ger-
many to examine which groups of people gain the most from the sporting 
success of national teams/athletes. Perhaps surprisingly, given the assumed 
connections between sport and masculinities, they found that women, 
migrants and individuals with low levels of education and income gained the 
greatest feelings of happiness and national pride. Hallman and colleagues 
interpreted this ﬁ nding by suggesting that those who are more privileged in 
a society (e.g. males with higher income and higher education) possibly have 
a greater range of activities or abilities that they can draw on to increase 
happiness and, correspondingly, are less affected by the transitory impact 
of national sporting success or failure. Hallman et al. (2013) did not spe-
ciﬁ cally problematize the governmental promotion of sport but indirectly 
raised issues with sport enjoyment and existing social inequities between 
various groups. 
 In my view, these social inequities should be of fundamental concern if a 
government is interested in shifting a population’s sense of wellbeing. Indeed, 
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the literature concerned with SWB suggests that various social inequalities/
injustices (e.g. as associated with income, sexualities, disability, illness, 
social capital) are factors that can potentially limit a populations and/or an 
individual’s SWB (see Diener, 2009). Accordingly, various researchers have 
suggested that public policy that directs resources to select disadvantaged 
groups or to speciﬁ c geographic regions is likely the most effective initiative 
to enhance a population’s SWB (Cummins et al., 2009; Wilkinson and Pick-
ett, 2010). There is  no evidence, however, to suggest that attempts to use 
sport as a form of biopower has any positive impact on reducing inequities 
or inequalities between different social groups. 
 I am concerned, however, that the biopolitical promotion of sport could 
work to entrench existing inequities and sets of power relations and, cor-
respondingly, impact negatively on SWB levels. To explain these concerns 
I draw from Valerie Harwood (2009), who encouraged critical exploration of 
how truths about the body and life are circulated via techniques of biopower. 
I argue, more speciﬁ cally, that the promotion of national sporting teams and 
elite athletes and sport participation more broadly, via governance strategies, 
indirectly reinforces select body discourses (e.g. as associated with ability, gen-
der, shape, size, sexualities, competition, worthiness, nationality and race). 
These various sets of discourses in turn mark and regulate particular bodies 
and athletic performances as normal or abnormal, which indirectly allows 
certain groups/individuals to gain social privileges over others. Thus, the bio-
political promotion of sport may be a factor in itself, which leads to some 
individuals/groups having less ability to exercise power and/or feel positive 
about their bodies/selves. This may seem a convoluted argument, yet if we 
draw on the now substantial body of sociological and pedagogical research 
concerned with sport/exercise, these concerns have very real substance. 
 Numerous studies have examined and found that the workings of dis-
courses/power surrounding sport create divisions and inequities amongst 
groups and individuals. Sport indirectly works, as pertinent examples, to 
divide females from males (e.g. Hargreaves, 2000), able-bodied from dis-
abled/injured (e.g. Howe, 2008; Smith and Sparkes, 2002), coordinated 
from the uncoordinated (e.g. Evans and Penny, 2008), dominant from mar-
ginalized forms of masculinities (e.g. Adams, 2011; Messner, 1992; Pringle 
and Markula, 2005;), straight from gay/queer (e.g. Caudwell, 2003; Cox and 
Thompson, 2000; Krane, 1996) and bodies of differing sizes (e.g. Gard and 
Wright, 2005; Sykes and McPhail, 2008). And although sport can work to 
challenge problematic sets of relations of power (e.g. in relation to the 
growth of female sport) it has, however, been more typically critiqued for 
its conservative political tendencies (see Fiske, 2005). At the least, therefore, 
I suggest that if we are interested in attempting to enhance a population’s 
level of SWB, it is prudent to understand how the biopolitical promotion of 
sport in turn promotes select discourses and associated sets of power rela-
tions (e.g. amongst males/females, citizens/migrants, skilled/unskilled) and 
its potential impact on the wellbeing of select groups and individuals. 
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 CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNING SWB VIA SPORT 
 With respect to questioning why sport is prioritized as a wellbeing/happi-
ness strategy, I suggest there are lessons to be learned from Michael Gard 
and Jan Wright’s (2005) meticulous analysis of the alleged obesity ‘epi-
demic’, in which they discussed the links between science, morality and ide-
ology. They concluded that there were prime ﬂ aws in the epidemiological 
evidence that underpinned the concerns about obesity. They even illustrated 
how some epidemiologists would fail to show a link between obesity and 
poor health within their research but still conclude that more effort was 
needed to confront the ‘obesity epidemic’. Thus, these researchers did not 
appear to believe their own evidence but, as Gard and Wright speculated, 
were driven by an existing ideology that positioned excess adipose tissue or 
fat as a social problem. 
 In a similar manner, I suggest that it is not empirical evidence that is 
driving the biopolitical promotion of sport, but discursive understandings 
of sport that promote an uncritical and unquestioning acceptance of the 
moral, social and health value of sport. Although the recent widespread 
governmental promotions of sport have likely been undertaken with good 
intentions, the  unquestioning acceptance that sport is a force for social good 
needs to be challenged. For example, the promotion of sport as an activity 
that allegedly leads to good health, sound character and positive wellbeing 
acts to position sport participation as a moral imperative: correspondingly, 
individuals who do not enjoy participating in sport—perhaps those who are 
unskilled, unﬁ t, uncompetitive or simply ﬁ nd sport painful or boring—are 
possibly at risk of understanding themselves as ‘moral or health failures’. 
The non-sporting body in certain contexts is, accordingly, at risk of being 
marked as deviant or as unworthy. 
 Within schools, non-sporting boys risk social exclusion, harassment and 
bullying and correspondingly can feel dejected and unvalued (see Parker, 
1996). This unfortunate link between non-sport participation and social 
exclusion has long existed, particularly amongst youthful males. Todd Cros-
set (1990), for example, contended that within the Victorian context, males 
who did not participate in sport indirectly risked becoming known as effemi-
nate and unhealthy. Relatedly, weaker and non-sporting boys were dispar-
aged as ‘wankers’ or ‘saps’. The hierarchy of valued bodies is not just linked 
to gender but is also stratiﬁ ed via the intersections between race, class, age, 
size and sporting ability. Joanne Hill and Laura Azzarito (2012), relatedly, 
reported within their examination of valued bodies in physical education that: 
 (I)n today’s public health context, certain cohorts of young people are 
more likely than others to be identiﬁ ed as having ‘bodies-at-risk’, a dis-
course that ﬁ xes and homogenises minority young people identities as 
‘different’, unhealthy and physically inactive. Evidence from national 
reports in the UK indicates that ‘Other’ girls, such as those from South 
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Asian backgrounds, with low socio-economic status or with disabilities, 
have been identiﬁ ed as the least physically active and having the worst 
health status. . . . Rather than valued bodies—bodies that are healthy, 
sporting, physically active—‘different’ bodies are presented as ‘deviant’ 
from ‘normal’ white bodies and Western ways of knowing . . . (Hill and 
Azzarito, 2012: 264) 
 Akin to healthism (see Robert Crawford, 1980), I suggest that ‘sportism’ 
can be understood as an attempt by a government to use propaganda and 
ideological state institutions (e.g. schools, national sporting agencies, media) 
to encourage individuals to believe that their lives would be better if they 
played sport. The ideal or responsible citizen, correspondingly, is one who is 
thin, able-bodied, athletic and  enjoys participating in sport. The non-sport 
participants, on the other hand, are at risk of being wellbeing failures. Thus, 
the promotion of sport as a biopolitical technique to enhance SWB can have 
unintended and negative consequences. Indeed, as Sara Ahmed (2010a: 41) 
argued, the governing of happiness can be fraught, as the ‘promise of happi-
ness . . . directs life in some ways rather than others’, and this is not always 
in an individual’s best interest. 5 
 With a tinge of irony I also suggest that the discourse that informs that 
sport is ‘good’ for individuals simultaneously renders the biopolitical pro-
motion of sport somewhat futile, as this discourse already works in speciﬁ c 
contexts to actively encourage sport participation. Most parents/guardians, 
for example, encourage their young children to participate in sport. Like-
wise, the discursive contexts within schools also encourage and, at times, 
demand youthful sport participation. Hence, this invitatory sporting dis-
course (i.e. ‘play sport, it is good for you’) already circulates widely, so why 
does it need additional government promotion and funding? 
 FINAL WORDS 
 In this chapter, I have illustrated that governments are increasingly encour-
aging their populations to  enjoy sport participation with the underpinning 
belief that this enjoyment will translate to physically active lifestyles and 
subsequent health and wellbeing beneﬁ ts. Although the outcomes of these 
attempts to govern a population’s wellbeing are currently under-researched, 
available evidence suggests that it is not a prudent strategy, as sporting par-
ticipation does not come with any health or wellbeing guarantees. More-
over, if participants understand sport as a zero-sum game, as it is in elite 
sport, then victory can only be savored when the defeated know that they 
are defeated. Or, as 18th-century English poet William Cowper bemoaned: 
‘Detested sport, that owes its pleasures to another’s pain’. 
 Many participants decide to stop playing, often in their youth, as they 
are frustrated with losing, physical pain, non-selection and inability to 
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demonstrate skill (Butcher, Koenraad and Johns, 2002). For these indi-
viduals, withdrawal from sport is undertaken with a desire to help avoid 
displeasure. The consequence of promoting sport participation as a moral 
good,  without modiﬁ cation to how sport is played , will not likely encour-
age these individuals back into sport and can have unintended and negative 
consequences, such as the castigation of non-sporting bodies in particular 
contexts (e.g. see Hill and Azzarito, 2012). 
 There are vast differences between the various sporting codes and respec-
tive cultures. Many competitive sports revolve around a participant’s ability 
to tolerate pain (e.g. marathon running, rugby, American football, swim-
ming, weightlifting, boxing, diving) with rewards being a sense of achieve-
ment, camaraderie or sensations of pleasure, but the ‘costs’ can be high. 
Michael Messner (1992) revealed that the average life expectancy of a pro-
fessional American footballer was only 56 years. He suggested that it was 
not just the brutality of this high-speed collision sport, but the masculine 
culture of ‘no pain no gain’ that inﬁ ltrated the lives of the sportsmen and 
resulted in increased chances of early death (e.g. via car crashes, heart dis-
ease, violence, addiction, poor health care). 
 Biopolitical strategies to promote physical activity via sport simultane-
ously work to promote various sporting cultures, some of which have been 
linked to problematic sets of values (e.g. tolerance of pain, normalization 
of injuries, binge drinking, sexism, homophobia, hyper-masculinity). If gov-
ernments desire to promote sport, they should, at the least, carefully con-
sider which sports and associated cultures and values they wish to promote. 
 Although I readily acknowledge that sport participation, for a minor-
ity of individuals, can induce various pleasures and enhance the quality of 
their lives, for the majority this does not appear to be the case. Competitive 
sport fundamentally works as a dividing practice to mark bodies as differ-
ent from each other (e.g. winners or losers, able or disabled, ﬁ t or unﬁ t, 
male or female). If governments desire to enhance population happiness and 
SWB, it is more prudent to consider other political strategies, such as reduc-
ing income inequality, increasing the quality and availability of education, 
promoting democracy and peace, challenging prejudice and discrimination 
or targeting select groups via housing improvements or employment oppor-
tunities. The blanket call to encourage a population to participate in sport 
with a desire to encourage citizen wellbeing is a ﬂ awed biopolitical strategy. 
 NOTES 
 1 .  These broad results were obtained by asking respondents to answer the follow-
ing four (seemingly simplistic) questions in relation to a (0–10) Likert scale: 
 Overall, how satisﬁ ed are you with your life nowadays? Overall, to what 
extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile? Over-
all, how happy did you feel yesterday? Overall, how anxious did you feel 
yesterday? 
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 2 .  In a similarly uncritical manner, the results could be interpreted to mean that 
dominant social practices (e.g. as associated with expectations to have chil-
dren or be in an ofﬁ cially recognized and stable relationship) are worthy of 
pursuit, as they appear to be linked to enhanced levels of SWB. Yet such a 
conclusion is problematic, in part, as the direction of causality is impossible to 
determine. In other words, being married or having children might result from 
happiness as well as cause it. But perhaps more importantly, the simple act of 
performing accepted social practices might enhance SWB scores, as one simply 
feels ‘good’ through being accepted as normal. 
 3 .  Findings from intervention studies with older adults, however, appear more 
robust. Steriana Elavsky and colleagues (2005) concluded, for example, from 
their randomized controlled exercise study with older adults (M = 66.7 years) 
who increased their levels of physical activity, that they subsequently, over a 
ﬁ ve-year period, gained enhanced self-esteem, positive affect and life satisfaction. 
 4 .  There are many different ways that participation levels are calculated amongst 
populations, and survey results can appear to illustrate that a population is 
relatively active when the majority of citizens may not be overly active. For 
example, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013) survey of participation in 
sport and physical recreation reported that 63.6% of Australians were active 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013). Yet what this statistic meant was that 
63.6% of those surveyed had participated in sport or physical recreation (e.g. 
walking for exercise, cycling, swimming)  at least once in the 12 months prior 
to the survey. Thus, over a third of the population had not participated in any 
sport or physical recreation at all over a 12-month period. The survey further 
revealed, with respect to participation in the most popular team sports, that 
only 3.7% of males had participated in soccer (at least once over the last year), 
2.8% in cricket and 2.6% in Australian Rules Football, and only 4.6% of 
females had participated in netball. Thus, only a small percentage of the Aus-
tralian population is active participants in team sports (which are the sports 
most promoted within Schools). 
 5 .  To illustrate the complexity of promoting happiness, Sara Ahmed (2010) pro-
vided the example of a father who wanted his daughter, who identiﬁ ed as 
queer, to be ‘happy’. The father believed that his daughter would not be happy 
in a queer relationship. Ahmed summarized: 
 The father is unhappy as he thinks the daughter will be unhappy if she is 
queer. The daughter is unhappy as the father is unhappy with her being 
queer. The father witnesses the daughter’s unhappiness as a sign of the 
truth of his position: that she will be unhappy because she is queer. The 
happy queer becomes unhappy at this point. In other words, the unhappy 
queer is made unhappy by the world that reads queers as unhappy. (Ahmed, 
2010: 43) 
 Ahmed’s vignette astutely illustrated that discourses of happiness (in this case 
the discourse or ‘lay belief’ that a queer relationship produces unhappiness), 
in and of themselves, have socially productive and political consequences. 
Ahmed correspondingly encouraged the need to critically interrogate the pur-
suit and monitoring of happiness. 
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